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A B S T R A C T
This thesis deals with the alienations of minors* 
properties by their guardians in South Asia and the law 
of limitation as it involves the setting aside improper 
alienations* In dealing with these two aspects of guardian­
ship relating to property of minors a little effort is 
made to comment on the security of a minor's life if the 
guardianship of his person and of property are united in 
the same individual in the Subcontinent, and on the conser­
vative attitude to deny custody of minor children to a 
guilty parent in Sri Lanka. For a convenient discussion 
of the subject the work is divided into six chapters 
devoting the first five to the relevant law of guardian­
ship as it obtains in the Subcontinent and the last one to 
that of Sri Lanka.
The first chapter deals, in brief, with the major 
legal systems from which the modern law of guardianship 
in the Subcontinent has developed. In the course of treat­
ment it is attempted to show, along with the general 
discussion of the powers of guardians to deal with minors' 
properties, how the early British Regulations and Acts 
maintained the sastric and Common law principle of separat­
ing the guardianship of person and of property.
Chapter 2 portrays the transformation of the powers 
of Hindu natural guardians from the sastric via Anglo-Hindu
to the modern law. It has been shown in this connection 
how some of the sastric principles of Hindu law, e.g., 
for the payment of ancestral debts, have yielded to the 
influence of English equity rules.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the exposition of de facto 
guardianship in Hindu law, the development of the powers 
of a de facto guardian equal to those of a natural guardian, 
and how it served the society well for over a century. 
Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,
1956, has been specially examined for its alleged abolition 
of de facto guardianship, and its amendment is suggested 
in this chapter. The principles of Mir Sarwarjan's case 
regarding the specific enforcement of a guardian's contract 
have been investigated and the powers of Hindu testamentary 
guardians are discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 4 deals with the powers of a Muslim natural 
guardian in respect of minors' property; and suggestions 
are made in this chapter to place Muslim mothers in the 
position of natural guardians with full powers to deal with 
their minor children's properties, and to introduce the 
institution of de facto guardianship in Muslim law.
Chapter 5 deals with the law of limitation especially 
with regard to setting aside an improper alienation of a 
Hindu de facto guardian. It has been shown how the judges 
were misled by the principles of Muslim cases to develop 
a different set of limitation rules applicable in cases of
Vimproper alienations by de facto guardians, while their 
general powers and the effects of their proper alienations 
are similar in all respects with those of natural guardians. 
Uniformity of law in this regard is suggested.
In the last chapter is discussed the law of guardian­
ship in Sri Lanka. In the earlier part of the chapter the 
personal laws of different communities and the Roman-Dutch 
law are discussed in so far as they are concerned with the 
law of guardianship of person, and the growing influence 
of South African law has been shown. The little case-law 
that has developed in regard to property guardianship has 
been dealt with in the light of statutory law in the latter 
part of the chapter. The law of prescription which is appli­
cable to an improper alienation of a minor's property is 
discussed in this chapter.
In the conclusion I have submitted my suggestions.
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P R E F A C E
The purpose of this study is to bring to light some 
of the problems that are cropping up in family laws of 
South Asian countries either due to unhappy wording of 
some statutes in connection with the alienation of a minor's 
property by his guardian, for example, section 11 of the 
HMGA of India, or unjust application of the principles of 
one personal law into another, as in the case of application 
of limitation law in connection with the improper alienations 
by Hindu de facto guardians, or the denial of any power 
to guardians without courts' permission to deal with minors' 
properties as in Sri Lanka.
The law relating to minors, being an independent 
system developed by the laws of Parliaments and case-law, 
finds little treatment in the text-books of personal lawsi 
while it needs fresh treatment to clear up the hazy atmos­
phere created around it by the massive case-law. In the 
Subcontinent excepting the recent HMGA of India the Acts of 
Parliament relating to the guardianship of minors state 
in general terms the powers and duties of guardians who do 
not take a certificate from the court to deal with minors' 
properties, and still none where the guardian is a guardian 
in case of need or de facto guardian. The personal law 
text-book writers deal with guardianship for the limited 
purpose of marriage and a little of custody of minors'
xiii
person, and leave the law regarding minors' property to 
be treated by writers dealing with the general principles 
of law relating to minors. But unfortunately very few 
writers have spent their labour in this respect. Excepting 
Sir E.J. Trevelyan's book 'Law Relating to Minors as 
administered in the provinces subject to the High Courts 
of British India' no other major work may be found in this 
field; but that too has become outdated, the last edition 
being published in 1929. Besides Trevelyan's book, all 
other few books are mere annotations of the GWA of 1890 
and the HMGA of 1956. Among them B.B. Mitra's and M.W. 
Pradhan's books are worth mentioning, but the writers have 
hardly discussed any problem that might arise in the practi­
cal application of the provisions of guardianship Acts. 
Recently Narmada Khodie even does not consider the law of 
guardianship as a subject of Civil law; in her Readings in 
uniform Civil Code she did not feel to include any writing 
on guardianship. In Sri Lanka it is even more difficult to 
find any consistent treatment on this subject. Dr. H.W. 
Tambiah who is the most prolific writer on almost all 
aspects of the laws of Sri Lanka has devoted a few pages 
in discussing the guardianship of person of minors, but he 
has not done anything particularly in respect of the 
guardianship of minors' properties.
Rapid change of the society, growing new needs of 
the people and their constant grappling with an inflationary
xiv
finance have increased the value of property. Therefore, 
the care and protection which a minor's property needs 
may also have changed, but the law has not been changed.
The judges look to guardianship cases from the point of 
view of the welfare of the minors, but hardly do they 
consider the interest of a bona fide purchaser for value; 
while as a matter of fact protection of purchasers is 
essential for the ultimate benefit of the minors! Sometimes 
Parliaments of the Subcontinent being inspired by the 
Western systems and assuming an idea of protecting the 
interests of minors pass legislation either to abolish some 
age-old institution of guardianship or restrict the powers 
of some guardians hitherto unknown without foreseeing the 
inconveniences of such abolition or restriction. In this 
work an attempt is made to highlight the problems that are 
caused due to this partial attitude of the judiciary or 
immature legislation. A keen observer of Indian life, 
Derrett, has raised some of the problems in his Critique; 
he has also hinted at the solutions of some of them but 
not in detail. A detailed analysis of the problems and 
their solutions in the present social and economic perspec­
tive have been attempted in this thesis.
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1C H A P T E R  I
LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP IN GENERAL
1• Meaning of guardianship
In this work we will deal only with the guardianship 
of minors. Although lunatics and idiots may need guardians, 
like minors, to look after their property and sometimes 
their persons, the provisions applicable to the protection 
of their persons and management of their property do not 
form part of the general law of guardianship. The word
•guardianship* implies the relation that exists between a
1 . . .  . 2  . . guardian and a ward , it signifies an office or a position
that a guardian holds. Whether this office is a remunerative 
one or not depends on the nature of relationship in which 
a guardian stands to the minor ward and also on the mode
1 Webster*s Third New International Dictionary (Massachu­
setts, U.S.A.i 1961), 1007.
2 The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford! 1961), 482. Lord 
Macclesfield did not like to call guardianship an office, 
because in it he found the guardian having an interest in 
a minor*s estate, namely, the guardian could bring an 
action in his ownrname, could make leases of the minor's 
property, etc. See Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury (1722)
2 P. Wms. 103, 122} 24 ER 659, 665. But actually they 
cannot be called interests, they are appurtenant to the 
office itself. Guardianship is virtually an office, and 
from it guardians derive their authority, in it the acti­
vities of guardians are in the interests of minors, and 
it terminates when the minor is 'mature enough to look 
after his own affairs'. See S.J. Stoljar, 'Children, 
Parents and Guardians', in (1973) 4/7 International Ency­
clopedia of Comparative Law, 27, sec. 61. In Continental 
law it has become a public office. See W.W. Buckland, 
Eguity in Roman Law (London* 1911), 109.
2of appointment1. Guardianship is a right, a duty and above 
2all a trust • It is a natural right of parents to be appoin­
ted as guardian of their minor children, unless they are 
otherwise disqualified? it is a claim of the minor's near 
relations to be preferred to strangers to be appointed 
as guardians of their minor relations, if they do not 
suffer from any disqualification in consideration of the 
minor's welfare. But it is more a duty than a right; it
demands a constant duty which is to be exercised only for
3the benefit of the minor until he attains majority, and 
even for a certain period after majority as in the case
4
of accounts. The parents have got a natural duty towards
their minor children to rear them with parental care and
5 . . . .affection • Guardianship is, indeed, a trust for the care
6 7of the persons as well as of the property of minors. It
1 Generally where the guardians are parents they do not take 
any remuneration, so also the near relations. In the case 
of testamentary guardians, unless it is provided in the 
testament, they cannot take remuneration. When guardians 
are appointed from among persons other than natural 
guardians, the court may provide for their remuneration. 
See section 22(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act (Act 8) 
of 1890.
2 Sir E.J. Trevelyan, The Law Relating to Minors (London*
6th ed., 1926), 48.
3 J.D.M.-Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (Oxford* 
University Press, Bombay, 1963), 47, para 46.
4 Queen v. Gunqo Singh (1873) 5 N.-W.P. HC Rep 44; Queen 
Empress v. Mir Chia (1896) 18 All 364. See also sections 
32 and 317 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45) of 1860.
5 Empress v. Bauni (1879) 2 All 349.
6 Wellesley v. Wellesley (1824-34) All ER 189.
7 Duke of Beaufort v. Berty (1721) 1 P. Wms 703; 24 ER 579.
3is a trust to look after the physical and mental well-being
of minors, it is a trust to maintain the status quo of
1 2 minors* property • Romilly, M.R. observed i
"The relation of guardian and ward is strictly 
that of a trustee and cestui que trust. I look 
on it as a peculiar relation of trusteeship 
... A guardian is not only trustee of the pro­
perty, as in an ordinary case of trustee, but 
he is also the guardian of the person of the 
infant with many duties to perform such as to 
see to his education and maintenance ... Of all 
the property which he gets into his possession 
in the character of guardian, he is trustee for 
the benefit of the infant ward".
Persons who are entitled by law to the custody or
who assume themselves the custody of the person or property
or both of minors are called guardians. The word 'guardian'
generally means 'the person who holds the status of a
guardian' and whenever it stands alone, it implies the
3guardian of the person of a minor , even if appointed by 
4the court unless there is any express direction. As long
5as the father is living no one else can be guardian . 
Parents are regarded as natural guardians . In common 
parlance, of course, the concepts of parent and guardian 
are quite distinct, "for the rights and duties of the former
1 W.S. Holdsworth. A History of English Law Vol. 3 (London* 
1923), 513} the same Vol. 6 (London* 1924), 649; W.P.
Eversley, The Law of Domestic Relations (London* 3rd ed., 
1906), 606.
2 Mathew v. Brise (1851) 14 Beav 341, 345; 51 ER 317.
3 Riminqton v. Hartley (1800) 14 Ch D 630, 632 per Jessel, M. R.
4 Re Willoughby (1885) 30 Ch D 324, 330 (CA).
5 Re Marquis of Salisbury and the Ecclesiastical Commissioner 
(1876) 2 Ch D 29, 35-36 (CA).
6 Under Muslum law among the parents father alone is the 
natural guardian. See N.B.E. Baillie, A Digest of Moohu- 
mmudan Law Vol. 1 (London* 2nd ed., 1875), 689.
4arise automatically on the birth of a child, whilst the 
latter voluntarily places himself in loco parentis to the 
ward and his rights and duties flow immediately from 
this act'*1.
2• Necessity for guardians
The minors are by reason of their tender age incap­
able of taking care of themselves and their properties.
They are inexperienced and unable to form any accurate 
decision or to come to any just and farsighted conclusion 
on matters which intimately concern their personal welfare 
and specially the administration of their property. Advant­
age of their physical weakness or defective judgment may 
be taken by others. So they need other adult persons who 
would be charged with the duty of taking care of their 
persons, administration of their property, and of generally 
looking after their interests. Such persons are termed 
guardians. The immature intellect and imperfect discretion 
of the minors have made them incapable of exercising any
civil rights or performing any civil duties. Law does not
2recognise any contractual capacity in them . So in ordinary 
life and commerce they are in a disadvantageous position. 
Even if they are in extreme necessity or their goods demand 
immediate disposition, nobody would like to transact with
1 P.M. Bromley. Family Law (Londont 4th ed., 1971), 319.
2 Indian Contract Act (Act 9) of 1872, section 11. See also 
Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (1903) 30 IA 114 (PC).
5them, since nobody wants to purchase litigation thereby.
Indeed the disabilities of the minors and their legal
incapacity to manage their own affairs render it necessary
that they should have guardians of their persons and
property1. So long as the parents are living they afford
or are expected to afford the necessary care for their
minor children, to protect their property, if any, and
to effect transactions wherever required, with others.
But when they are dead or unfit to fulfil their duties,
some other persons are required to provide the parental
love and affection and to fulfil parental duties. The king
or state as parens patriae assumes these responsibilities
in respect of all minors, male or female, and delegates
2them to the courts which m  their turn repose them on 
their chosen representatives. The law of guardianship may 
be said to be based not only on the need of minors* physi­
cal care and protection from adverse circumstances in the 
society, but also on the requirement of protection of 
their properties and of supplementing their contractual 
inabilities.
3• Types of guardianship and their guiding principles
As seen above guardianship may be broadly divided 
into guardianship of person and of property, and the
1 Halsbury*s Laws of England Vol. 21 (Londoni 3rd ed., 1957), 
203.
2 Ram Bunsee Koonwaree v. Soobh Koonwaree (1867) 7 WR 321,
325 (CR); Abdul Ghani v. Sardar Begum AIR 1945 Lah 183.
6guardians under each of them may be either (a) natural,
(b) testamentary or (c) court-appointed. When the custody 
of the person of a minor is assigned to a guardian he 
becomes the guardian of the minor's person and the rela­
tion between him and the minor is like that of a parent 
and child; he stands in loco parentis to the minor. He 
is expected to supplement the parental love and affection 
to the minor and all his efforts should be towards the 
attainment of the minor's physical and mental welfare. 
Generally as long as the parents are alive, nobody else 
is appointed to this guardianship. But when a guardian
is appointed to the property of a minor he is called the
minor's property guardian and he bears a resemblance to 
a trustee. In his dealings with the minor's property he 
is expected to exercise the same care and skill as a man 
of ordinary prudence would do with his own property.
4. Union of guardianship of person and of property
Sometimes the same person is entrusted with the 
guardianship of both the person and the property of a 
minor*. It is doubtful unless the guardian is a parent 
or an executor, how far such union fulfils the actual 
purpose of guardianship. The fundamental principle of 
guardianship being protection of the person as well as 
the property of a minor, such a union may not be always
1 Mathew v. Brise (1851)14 Beav 341,345; 51 ER 317;
Duke of Beaufort v. Berty (1721) 1 P. Wms 703; 24 ER 579.
7desirable. What is required for the welfare of the person 
of a minor is parental care and affection from a guardian, 
while what is required for the welfare of the minor's 
property is the skill and circumspection which a man of 
ordinary prudence exercises for the preservation of his 
own property. One who is willing to protect the person of 
a minor with almost parental love and affection may not 
protect the minor's property. Parental affection and 
selfless protection of property may hardly live together 
in the same individual excepting parents. Guardianship of 
person and that of property demand contrary consideration 
for their respective purposes. For the care and protection 
of a minor's person a certain class of people may be 
desirable because of their love towards the minor, but 
that class of people may have detrimental interest in 
the minor's property. Instead of protecting the property 
they may convert or divert it to their own use and enjoy­
ment •
The paramount consideration for the appointment of 
the guardian of a minor's person is the minor's welfare 
and this can be achieved through the love and affection 
of the person to be appointed. Davar, J., observed^*
"In making orders appointing guardians for the 
persons of minors the most paramount consideration
for the judge ought to be --  which order under
the circumstances of the case would be best for 
securing the welfare and happiness of the minors? 
With whom will they be happy? Who is most likely 
to contribute to their well-being and look after 
their health and comfort? Who is likely to bring 
up and educate the minors in the manner in which
1 In re Gulbai (1908) 32 All 50, 54.
8they would have been brought up by the parents 
if they had been alive? In fact the main question 
for the court to consider in the case of the 
unfortunate minors who have lost their natural
guardian is --  who amongst the relations or
for the matter of that, friends of the minors 
can you select who will supply as nearly as 
possible the place of their lost parents”.
Usually such parental love and care is expected to
flow from closer blood relations of the minors1. Under
Hindu law in the determination of nearness of blood, the
2
paternal kinsmen are preferred to the maternal ones , 
because they are presumed to feel natural love and affection 
for the minors? while under Muslim law it is presumed to 
flow not from any male, including the father, but from 
female relations and for this reason the 'hizanut * or 
custody of minor children is given to mother and failing 
her to other female relations under the general supervi­
sion of the father who is expected to finance the mainte­
nance of the minors.
The filial love and affection which is required of 
a guardian for the personal welfare of a minor is not 
needed by the property of a minor. What it needs, as is 
often supposed, is only the protection in the sense of 
maintaining status quo. How much this protection may be 
provided by near relations is a matter to be considered.
The care and affection of the minor's relations hardly
1 Bindo v. Sham Lai (1907) 29 All 210.
2 Sir T. Strange, Hindu Law Vol. 1 (London* 1830), 71; the 
same, Vol. 2, 72-74; J.D. Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage 
(Madrasi 11th ed., 1950), 300 section 231.
3 Rashida Begum v. Shahab Din PLD 1960 Lah 1142, 1178.
9survives when it comes into clash with their personal 
interests which they may have in the minor's property, 
i.e., when they have an expectation of inheritance in 
the property of the minor. As said earlier, in the case 
of guardianship of the person of a minor the principle 
of nearer blood relations may ensure parental care and 
affection, but the same principle might act detrimentally 
to the minor's interest in property. The welfare consider­
ation which is there in the case of guardianship of a 
minor's person is also there in the case of guardianship 
of a minor's property, but in the sense that the minor's 
property will be conserved by the guardian for the future 
use by the minor. The guardian is expected to protect the 
property for the benefit of the minor, but if the guardian 
himself becomes interested in the property itself, he
may not hesitate to remove "the incumbrance of his pupil's
1 2life from that estate" • Kautilya looked with suspicion 
upon the assignment of guardianship of the property of a 
minor to his agnatic relations who may inherit the property 
on the minor's death. He recommended keeping the minor's 
property either with maternal relations or in their absence 
with village elders. Almost in the same words Blackstone
1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England Vol. 1 
(Oxfordi 1775), 461.
2 Kaut. III. 5; P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra Vol. 3 
573.
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observed1!
’•Where the estate descended from his (infant’s) 
father, in this case his uncle by the mother’s 
side cannot possibly inherit this estate, and 
therefore shall be the guardian”.
For the protection of a minor’s individual property 
its guardianship should be given to persons who may have 
no interest in that property; and for the security of the 
minor’s life it would be wise to separate the guardianship 
of person from that of property. When a minor is kept under 
the custody of his ’next of kin to whom the land may descend’, 
his property should be kept by the court with a guardian 
appointed from among persons indicated by Kautilya. Although 
Kautilya and Blackstone did not say expressly that a union 
of guardianship of person and that of property in an 
expectant heir of a minor may result in the murder of the 
minor. Lord Macclesfield expressed the doubt in the follow­
ing words^i
”It is very shocking to think that any brother 
or uncle would commit murder upon his own brother 
or nephew to get his estate”.
Lord Macclesfield did not approve of Blackstone’s
views of law on this point and vehemently criticised it
3m  the following words s
’’Surely the maxim, that the next of kin to whom 
the land cannot descend is to be guardian in 
socage, is not grounded upon reason, but prevailed 
in barbarous times before the nation was civilised”.
1 Blackstone, Commentaries Vol. 1, 461; Coke, The laws of 
England [ed. by J.H. Thomas ] Vol. 1 (London! 1818), 337-38; 
Coke upon Littleton [ed. by Thomas Coventry] (London! 1830), 
68b.
2 Justice Dormer’s case (1724) 2 P. Wms 262, 265; 24 ER 723, 
724.
3 Ibid.
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But he did not rule out the principle altogether.
He based his decision on the long standing tenderness of 
the guardian in that case. Moreover, that was a case of 
a lunatic who was maintained for long thirty-two years 
by his uncle, Justice Dormer, to whom the custody of the 
lunatic's property was given. What Lord Macclesfield could 
not believe in the early 18th century came true before 
the Madras High Court in the late 50s of this century. 
Sometimes a guardian's transaction of a minor's property 
may not be upto the satisfaction of the latter and it is 
most likely in the Indian society that the minor commits 
suicide for the loss of his property; or sometimes it 
happens that in order to grab the minor's property the 
relation with whom the minor lives and who acts as his 
guardian does not give the minor sufficient food and 
medical care, and this exposes him to diseases which 
cause him to commit suicide or die prematurely. In Palani 
Goundan v. Van iiakkal1 a minor who was living with one of 
his relations committed suicide when the latter acting 
as the minor's guardian sold the minor's property.
Of the two considerations, viz., physical well-being 
and security of life, undoubtedly the latter demands more 
attention of the court. Where guardianship is simply that 
of the person of a minor, nearest blood relations are by 
far the best guardians; but where it involves property
1 AIR 1956 Mad 476.
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due considerations should be given to all factors. If 
guardianship could result in the loss of the minor's life, 
it becomes a negation of the whole conception of the 
institution of guardianship and a dastardly disregard by 
the court of a sacred duty delegated to it by the state. 
Once a person is lawfully appointed a guardian, he is 
entrusted with the minor's person or property or both. 
Indeed when a court unites the guardianship of both in 
the same person, it must not exercise its discretion to 
be turned into a murderer. So far as a minor's property 
is concerned a guardian is expected to exercise as much 
care as a man of ordinary prudence would do if it were 
his own property. In the exercise of this duty can he 
deal with the minor's property? If he can, under what 
circumstances and to what extent he is allowed to do it? 
Let us see how was the law in the following systems from 
which the present law of the area under our study has 
evolved.
5. Guardianship in different systems
5.1. Roman law
In Roman law as long as the parents were alive, the 
natural relationship of parent and child protected the 
minor children from the dangers to which their immaturity 
and inexperience exposed them. In the absence of parents 
their place was taken by guardians. In Roman law the 
question of guardianship did not arise so long as the
13
paterfamilias was alive. On his death his place was taken 
by a guardian appointed by his will, or in the absence 
of a testamentary guardian, by one appointed by the minor’s 
agnatic near relations, or in the absence of both, by one 
appointed by the court. Among the parents father was the 
natural guardian of his legitimate children until they 
attained the age of puberty. From that age until the age 
of twenty-five another type of guardian was appointed to 
them1. When the father was living he was alone entitled 
to the custody of his children and was responsible for 
their support and education. When he died without appoint­
ing any guardian by will, the mother could become the
guardian of her minor children, if she gave a declaration
2
that she would not marry again . But she could not herself
3appoint a guardian for her minor children , nor was her 
guardianship extended to the property of the children4.
In the absence of a testamentary guardian and the mother’s 
declaration of ’no marriage* the minor children were placed 
under the guardianship of a person selected from among 
the agnatic kins, i.e., the male members of the family.
The appointment used to go to the nearest male agnates, 
e.g., brother, uncle or cousin, that is, someone who upon
5
the minor's death might become his heir . The guardians
1 Curator was appointed for a person between puberty and 
twenty-five years of age.
2 W.W. Buckland, Equity in Roman Law, 150-151.
3 Buckland and McNair, Roman law and Common law (Cambridgei 
2nd ed., 1952), 52.
4 Mackenzie, Roman law (London* 7th ed., 1898), 157.
5 J. Muirhead, Historical Introduction to the Private law
of Rome (London* 2nd ed., 1899), 117, sec. 28; T.C. Sandars, 
Institutes of Justinian (London* 7th ed. 13th impression, 
1910), 54.
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were not responsible for the custody or education of 
minors beyond the provision of funds from the minor's 
estates^.
Unlike Common law in early Roman law guardianship
was less in the interest of the minor than in that of 
2
the guardian , and its primary purpose was the protection
of the property for successors, although this did not
exclude protection of the interests of the minor . And
perhaps for this the Romans entrusted guardianship of
both the person and property of a minor to the same 
4individual .
As regards the property of a minor the Roman 
guardians used to perform two functions, viz., administra- 
tio (negotiorum qestio)^  and auctoritatis interpositio. 
Under the former they were allowed to carry out business 
transactions on behalf of minors, and under the latter 
they used to supplement the legal incapacity of the minors
with their auctoritas by giving authorisation to transac-
6tions carried out by the minors themselves . This is
1 Buckland and McNair. Roman law, 52.
2 W.W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private law (Cambridge! 
1925), 88, sec. 33.
3 W.W. Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman Private law 
(Cambridge! 1931), 79, sec. 27.
4 Blackstone criticised the Romans for such a union of 
guardianship of a minor's person and property in the same 
individual. See Blackstone, Commentaries Vol. 1, 462.
5 Buckland, Manual. 95, sec. 35.
6 Ibid.
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completely absent in the Common law where no amount of 
approval by guardians could enlarge a minor's contractual 
capacity. Neqotiorum gestio was a quasi-contractual rela­
tion. To constitute it1 it was necessary that the business 
in which the qestor interfered should be someone else's 
and not his own (he would be an uninvited stranger) , and 
that his interference should not be grounded on any office 
or express mandate. Transactiona entered into by guardians 
including neqotiorum gestores with regard to minors* immo­
vable property without the sanction of courts were binding
on the minors, if they were advantageous to and ratified
. . . . 3by them on attaining majority •
Under Roman law guardians had large powers of alie-
4
nation and acquisition on their minors' behalf with the 
leave of the court. But law strictly controlled the powers 
of a guardian as regards the administration of a minor's 
property. Since as an agnatic relation the guardian was 
the minor's potential heir, and since he had also the right 
to act in place of the minor and in his own name, Roman 
law tried from the very beginning to set rules to control 
•the selfish temptations to which the guardians were open*. 
It put the guardians under a constant duty to act according 
to the dictates of fides  "an honest and conscientious
1 W.W. Buckland. Elementary Principles of Roman Law, 
(Cambridgei 1912), 304.
2 Moyle, Imperatoris Justiniani Institutiones (Oxford!
5th ed., 1912), 456.
3 M. Donaldson, Minors in Roman-Dutch law (Durban! 1955) 
43-44.
4 Buckland and McNair, Roman law. 52i Buckland, Equity, 108.
5 Muirhead, Historical Introduction. 120.
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regard for the interests of the ward”, a fraudulent breach1 
of which was noticed by the Civil law. Other remedies 
were also available to punish a guardian for his malprac­
tices, and an action ex delicto for double value could be 
instituted against him for conversion of his ward's property. 
Whenever a guardian's administration was suspected anyone 
could bring an action to force his removal. Again, an 
action of account could be brought against him at the end 
of his guardianship in which he could be charged either 
with his deliberate mismanagement or failure to exercise
as much care as he would take of his own affairs. Thus a
2guardian in Roman law became i
MA complete fiduciary whose principal duty it is 
not only to act for the ward's benefit, but to 
preserve as much as possible of his property? 
a duty, indeed, which was to become famous 
since it also entailed two typical obligations, 
namely, that a guardian can make no gifts out 
of his ward's property and that wasting assets 
must be sold and invested in permanent (typically 
immovable) capital".
5.2. English law
At Common law guardianship developed first along
the feudal and then commercial lines to be turned into
3a valuable commodity, a profitable right which used to
4
be controlled by the Tudor Court of Wards , and enjoyed
1 Buckland, Institutions. 79L sec. 27.
2 Stoljar, 'Children, parents arid guardians', in (1973)
4/7 IECL. 28, sec. 64.
3 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English law Vol. 2 
(Cambridge* 1923), 442.
4 J. Hurstfield, The Queen's Wards (London* 1958), 16-17.
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only by the feudal lords and not by any family members 
or relations of the minor, agnatic or cognatic. In early 
law guardianship usually depended on the ownership of 
property. Unless an orphan minor had any property, no 
guardian could be appointed for him1. Where he owned 
land either his military lord, if the land inherited 
was held by knight service, or his lay lord, if the 
feudal tenure was in socage, would be the guardian of 
his body and estate. Where the orphan minor had only 
money or goods obtained on bequest, and no land, the 
ecclesiastical courts protected the minor by obliging
2the executor to retain the estate for the minor's benefit . 
But neither the ecclesiastical nor the Common law took 
any interest in a minor if he was left with nothing, land 
or chattels. The king's prerogative protection as parens 
patriae was not effectively extended to him until the 
Court of Wards was dissolved and the Court of Chancery 
began to intervene in matters of guardianship.
. . 3As long as the father was living at Common law
4
he was the sole guardian of the persons of his minor
1 T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common law 
(Londons 5th ed., 1956), 545•
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English law Vol. 2, 442.
3 Blackstone, Commentaries Vol. 1, 461; Ratcliff's case 
(1592) 3 Co. Rep 37a, 38b; 76 ER 713, 721; R. v. Thorp 
(1697) Carth 384; 90 ER 824; Re Marquis of Salisbury and 
Ecclesiastical Commissioners (1876) 2 Ch D 29, 34-36 (CA).
4 Cotton, L.J., observed in Re Aqar-Ellis. Aqar-Ellis v. 
Lascelles (1883) 24 Ch D 317, 334 (CA)s "... by birth, 
a child is subject to a father, it is for the general 
interest of families, and for the general interest of 
children, and really for the interest of the particular
(contd)
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children and after his death the mother1 was entitled to
their custody if the father did not supersede her right
2by appointing a testamentary guardian . The mother was 
not allowed any testamentary power. Where a minor had 
no parent or testamentary guardian the court on applica­
tion appointed guardians. In the selection of persons to 
be appointed the court "according to its ordinary practice, 
gives preference to the nearest blood relations, and
does not appoint strangers when fit persons are to be
3found among relations” .
Although Common law allowed the father to be the
paramount guardian of the persons of his minor children,
it did not extend this guardianship to the property of 
4the children . He had no rights over their real estates
which vested in the persons entitled to the legal estates
5 6 7in the minors* hands • If he or the mother of the minors
(contd) infant, that the court should not, except in very
extreme cases, interfere with the discretion of the 
father, but leave to him the responsibility of exer­
cising that power which nature has given him by the 
birth of the child".
1 Blackstone, Commentaries Vol* 1, 46lj Mellish v. De Costa 
(1737) 2 Atk 14; 26 ER 405; Mendes v. Mendes (1747) 3 Atk 
620; 26 ER 1157; Queen v. Clarke (1857) 7 E & B 186, 200; 
119 ER 1217.
2 Tenures Abolition Act (12 C. II, c. 24), 1660, sec. 8.
3 Re Nevin (1891) 2 Ch 299, 303.
4 If the circumstances required the father could be appointed 
the guardian of his minor child's property. See R. v. Thorp 
(1697) Carth 384; 90 ER 824.
5 R. v. Sherrington (1832) 3 B & Ad 714; 110 ER 261.
6 Morgan v. Morgan (1737) 1 Atk 489; 26 ER 310; Thomas v. 
Thomas (1855) 2 K & J 79, 84-86; 69 ER 701, 703-704.
7 Well v. Stanwick (1887) 34 Ch D 763.
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entered the children’s property he or she was treated as 
trustee and was liable to accounts for rents and profits 
received therefrom.
Unlike Roman law Common law did not favour the union
of guardianship of person and of property in the same
individual1. It split them up into two offices and reposed
them in different individuals. A guardian of the person
of a minor had no authority over the minor's property ,
and a guardian of his estate had no authority over his 
3
person • At Common law the custody of the property of a
minor had to be given to the minor’s friends or next
of kin 'to whom the inheritance cannot possibly descend'^.
The guardian had to keep the property safely until the
minor attained the age of majority. He had to act so far
as possible according to the idea of leaving matters in
5status quo till the minor came of age , and to preserve 
the property more or less intact. At a period when inflation 
was imperceptible this could hardly be objected to. He 
was allowed to do what was needed for the administration 
of the minor's property, such as letting farms, keeping 
down encumbrances, investing money in the purchase of lands .
1 H. Seton, Forms of Judgments and Orders in the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal (Londoni 7th ed., 1912). 951.
2 Re Marquis of Salisbury and Ecclesiastical Commissioners 
(1876) 2 Ch D 29, 36 (CA).
3 Re Pavitt (1907) 1 IR 234.
4 Blackstone, Commentaries Vol. 1, 461.
5 Holdsworth, History of English law Vol. 3, 513} Vol. 6, 649.
6 Earl of Winchelsea v. Norcliffe (1686) 1 Vern 403; SC 435;
23 ER 545, 569.
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But he was not allowed to make any waste, sale or destruc­
tion of the said property. Where he wished to act on behalf 
of the minor he should get the sanction of the court for
the payment of money for the minor's maintenance1 or for
2
any other acts for the latter*s benefit ; otherwise he
would be removed from guardianship for the abuse of the
3
minor's property • He could not apply any portion of the 
minor's property for the payment of the minor's ancestor's 
debts, as a minor could not be forced by his ancestor's
creditors for the payment of debts as long as he was under
4 . .age • Unless specifically empowered he could not grant a
5
lease for any longer term than the infant's minority • At
the end of guardianship a guardian had to submit an account
of the property, but he was allowed to get reasonable
costs for the maintenance of the property^. Guardianship
7was virtually turned into an office of trust .
1 Enqlefield v. Enqlefield (1691) 2 Vern 236; 23 ER 753.
2 Cecil v. Satisbury (1691) 2 Vern 225; 23 ER 745. A long 
term lease was granted in this case and the court allowed 
the lease since it was considered to be for the benefit 
of the minor.
3 Holdsworth, History of English law Vol. 6, 650; Stoljar, 
'Children, parents and guardians', in (1973) 4/7 IECL, 33, 
sec. 76; see also Bedell v. Constable (1668) Vaugh 177;
124 ER 1026.
4 Pollock and Maitland, History of English law Vol. 2, 441.
5 J.D. Chambers, A practical treatise on the jurisdiction
of the High Court of Chancery over the persons and property 
of infants (London* 1842). 309-310; W. Macpherson, A treatise 
on the law relating to infants (London* 1842), 501.
6 Coke, Laws of England Vol. 1, 160; Coke upon Littleton 88b.
7 Holdsworth, History of English law Vol. 3, 512-13; A.W.B. 
Simpson, An Introduction to the History of land law (OUP* 
1961), 17-19* see also Wellesley v. Wellesley (1824-34)
All ER 189.
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After the dissolution of the Court of Wards, the 
Court of Chancery began to exercise its control over 
minors* guardians. This was a delegation by the Crown 
of its prerogative rights as parens patriae of looking
after their interests1. As regards the custody of the
2person of a minor equity concurred with Common law and
supported the father's paramount right to it. This right
could be refused by the courts on a number of factors
which guided the welfare of a minor; and equity began
to refuse it much more readily than Common law, if there
3was any threat of physical or moral harm to the minor •
. . 4In such refusals the courts were to act judicially •
IT Falkland v. Bestie (l696) 2 Vern 333. 342; 23 ER 814. 818. 
It was observed in this caset ”In this court (Court of 
Chancery) there were several things that belonged to the 
king as pater patriae, and fell under the care and discre­
tion of the court, as charities, infants, idiots, lunatics, 
etc., afterwards such of them as were of profit and advan­
tage to the king were removed to the Court of Wards by 
the statute; but upon the dissolution of that Court, came 
back again to the Chancery”•
2 P.H. Pettit, 'Parental control and guardianship', in
R.H. Graveson and F.R. Crane, ed., A Century of Family Law 
(Londoni 1957), 56-86.
3 Fitzgibbon, L.J., observed in Re O'Hara (1900) 2 IR 232, 
240-2411
”The court, acting as a wise parent, is not bound to 
sacrifice the child's welfare to the fetish of parental 
authority, by forcing it from a happy and comfortable 
home to share the fortunes of a parent, however innocent, 
who cannot keep a roof over its head, or provide it with 
the necessaries of life”.
4 In R. v. Gyncrall (1893) 2 QB 232, 241-242 (CA) Lord Esher, 
M.R. observed*
”The court is placed in a position by reason of the pre­
rogative of the Crown to act as supreme parent of the 
child, and must exercise that jurisdiction in the manner 
in which a wise, affectionate, and careful parent would 
act for the welfare of the child, ... The court must 
exercise this jurisdiction (interference with parental 
right) with great care, and can only act when it is shown 
that either the conduct of the parent, or the description
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Equity, however, extended the mother's power of guardian­
ship by allowing her, first a limited1 and then an equal 
2right with the father to appoint testamentary guardians.
Like Common law, equity did not approve of the vesting
of guardianship of person and property in the same indi-
3vidual, although testamentary guardians and a surviving
4 . . .parent could have both guardianships united m  them# In
those cases they controlled the minor's property not as
guardians but as trustees. The Law of Property Act (15 &
16 Geo. 5. c. 20) of 1925 virtually rendered guardianship
of property obsolete in England, for in almost every case
property in which a minor had an interest was vested in
trustees. As under Common law, parents* guardianship was
not extended to minor's property? so far as the property
of a minor was concerned the court of Chancery put guardians
under strict discipline. Recent legislation has given the
mother a position equal to that of a father in respect of
the guardianship of a minor's person and property. The
(contd) of person he is, or the position in which he is
placed, is such as to render it not merely better but --
I will not say 'essential', but --  clearly right for the
welfare of the child in some very serious and important 
respect that the parents' rights should be suspended or 
superseded; but ... where it is so shown, the court will 
exercise its jurisdiction accordingly".
1 Guardianship of Infants Act (49 & 50 Viet. c. 27) 1886, 
sec. 3.
2 Guardianship of Infants Act (15 & 16 Geo. 5. c. 45) 1925, 
secs. 4 and 5.
3 Tenures Abolition Act (12 C. II, c, 24), 1660, sec. 9;
see also Duke of Beaufort v. Berty (1721) 1 P. Wms 703, 704; 
24 ER 579; Mathew v. Brise (1851) 14 Beav 341; 51 ER 317, 
319.
4 Guardianship of Infants Act 1886, sec. 4; Guardianship 
of Infants Act 1925, sec. 4(1) and (2).
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Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 gave the mother an equal 
right to apply to the court in respect of any matter affect­
ing the minor as were possessed by the father1. This right 
has been further extended recently by the Guardianship Act 
1973 under which the mother has been given rights equal
to those of the father in respect of custody, upbringing
2
and property of the minor •
5,3. Sastric Hindu law
Like Common law sastric Hindu law recognised the
3 4king as the ultimate guardian of the person and property
of all minors, male and female. Parents were regarded as
natural guardians and among them the father occupied the
5 6dominant position in the family. The respect which he
7
commanded from, the power which he exercised over, and
p
the duty which he owed to his children entitled him to 
the supreme custody of the person of his minor legitimate 
childreni and after his death the guardianship went to the 
mother. In Hindu law guardianship of their minor children
1 Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, sec. 2.
2 Guardianship Act 1973, secs. 1 and 2.
3 Narada XII. 22.
4 Manu VIII. 27; Gautama X. 48; Vasistha XVI. 8-9; Vishnu
III. 65.
5 Nar. I. 37.
6 Manu II. 145. 225. 227; IV. 162. 180. 183; Gaut. < H • U> 1 Ul
XXI. 15; Vish. XXXI. 1-3; Yainavalkva I. 35. 157, 158;
Vas. XIII. 48.
7 Vas. XV. 2; Baudhavana Parisista VII. 3-4.
8 Manu V. 151: IX. 4. 89. 90. 93: Nar. XII. 20-21; Vas. XVII.
69-70; Baudhavana IV. 1, 14; Gaut. XVIII. 20-22; Yajn. I. 64.
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specially the male ones was more for the interests of the
parents than the minors themselves as the sons were begotten
to release the father from indebtedness1, Sastric Hindu
2
law, however, places women m  perpetual dependence on men
like their Roman counterparts under tutela perpetua impube- 
3
rum , but that did not affect the mother’s right to the 
custody of both the person and property of her minor child­
ren. No other female relations, e.g., step-mothers, were 
regarded as guardians. Where guardianship involved the 
performance of initiatory rites or the giving of daughters
in marriage which the mother could not perform, her pre-
4ferential right to guardianship was not lost thereby •
Those rites and ceremonies were performed by the paternal
5male kinsmen of the minor • The parents could exercise 
their right of guardianship over the person of their minor 
children even when they were members of a joint Hindu family, 
but such a right over their unmarried daughters terminated
1 Nar. I. 5; Katvavana 551.
2 Manu V. 148; IX. 3; Gaut. XVIII. lj Nar. XIII. 30-31}
Vas. V. 1-2; Baud. II. 2, 3, 44, 45 (Sacred Book of the 
East Vol. 14, 231); Vish. XXV. 12, 13; Yajn. I. 85.
3 Buckland, Manual, 101, sec. 37; Jolowicz, Roman Foundation 
of Modern law (Oxford» 1957), 113-114.
4 Gour’s view that the absolute dependence of women in ancient 
Hindu household left no room for assigning them any duties 
for the protection of her own children and that her right 
was of later growth and a product of jus naturale practised 
in courts cannot be accepted.[See H.S. Gour, Hindu Code 
(Nagpuri 4th ed., 1938), 280]. The view of Cowell that
the mother’s right to guardianship of her minor children 
was a product of custom cannot also be accepted [See H. 
Cowell, Hindu law (Calcutta; 1870), 152].
5 Yajn. I. 63.
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as soon as they were married. In the absence of a natural 
guardian the guardianship of the minor's person devolved 
on the nearest male kinsmen who would be appointed by the 
king, the paternal relations having preference over the 
maternal.
Under the sastric Hindu law the guardianship of a 
minor's property depended on the character of the property, 
i.e., whether it was separate or joint, and also on the 
school of law to which the minor belonged. A minor could 
have an interest in a joint family property or he could 
have his own separate property obtained by inheritance, 
partition, gift or by earning. Where he had an undivided 
interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property no guardian 
was required to be appointed unless all the male members 
of the family were minors. Until partition the whole copar­
cenary property including the minor's interest therein 
was managed by the manager or head of the family. And since 
the shares of coparceners including minor coparceners were 
not ascertained and since none of the coparceners could 
claim an individual property in it, no separate guardian 
was required to be appointed for the administration of the 
minor's interests therein. Even the natural parents could 
not be the guardian of their minor children's interests in 
the coparcenary property. Where the minor had a separate 
property, a guardian was necessary for the management, 
protection and in proper cases for the alienation of his 
property. Under the Dayabhaga law a son could not acquire
26
ownership by birth in ancestral property; there was hardly 
any distinction between ancestral and separate property 
as far as the father's power of alienation was concerned1.
Minors, as the sastric law provides, had no contract-
2 . . ual capacity , nor had they the ability to manage and
3administer their property • Smrti texts are available 
regarding the management, partition and alienation in 
fit cases of joint family property including the interests 
of minors, and also regarding the guardianship of minors' 
separate and individual property. The texts supply the 
basic principles of the law of guardianship in Hindu law 
and in some cases of Anglo-Indian law.
5.3.1. Joint Hindu family property and the alienation of 
minors* interests therein
Vijnanesvara in discussing the sources of a joint
4Hindu family property observes i
"Therefore it is a settled point, that property 
in the paternal or ancestral estate is by birth, 
(although) the father have independent power in 
the disposal of effects other than immovables, 
for indisputable acts of duty and for purposes 
prescribed by texts of law, as gifts through 
affection, support of the family, relief from 
distress, and so forthi but he is subject to 
the control of his sons and the rest, in regard 
to the immovable estate, whether acquired by 
himself or inherited from his father or other
1 Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 576.
2 Manu VIII. 163; Nar. I. 39; IV. 10; Katya. 271; Strange, 
Hindu law Vol. 1, 271; Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 412.
3 K.R.R. Sastry, Hindu Jurisprudence (Calcutta; 1961), 136.
4 Mitakshara []Tr. by H.T. Colebrooke (Calcutta; 1810), 256-57] 
1.1.27.
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predecessor; since it is ordained, ’Though 
immovables or bipeds have been acquired by a man 
himself, a gift or sale of them should not be 
made without convening all the sons. They who 
are born and they who are yet unbegotten, and
they who are still in the womb, require the means
of support, no gift therefore, be made”.
The immovable property of a joint Hindu family is
held in collective ownership by all the coparceners includ­
ing the minor coparceners, and is for the support of those 
who are in existence, those who are still in the womb and 
those who are yet unbegotten. Since none of the coparceners 
has any defined interest or ascertained share in this 
joint property, it cannot be disposed of by the father 
without the consent of all the sons. But where the family 
is in urgent need to raise money which cannot be done 
without disposing of the family property, and the family 
consists of some minor coparceners who cannot give consent, 
the coparcenary property may be transferred by a single 
coparcener without such collective consent. To meet such 
situations Vijnanesvara quotes from Brihaspati (subsequently 
cited in the Vivada-ratnakara) the following exception1!
’’Even a single individual may contract a donation, 
mortgage, or sale, of immovable property, during 
a season of distress, for the sake of the family, 
and especially for pious purposes’*.
Vijnanesvara gives his own explanation of the above
2verse in the following words *
’’While the sons and grandsons are minors and 
incapable of giving their consent to a gift and
1 Mitakshara 1.1.28; Ganganatha Jha, Hindu law in its 
sources Vol. 2 (Allahabad* 1939), 122•
2 Mitakshara 1.1.29.
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the like? or while brothers are so and continue 
unseparated} even one person, who is capable, 
may conclude a gift, hypothecation, or sale, of 
immovable property, if a calamity affecting the 
whole family require it, or the support of the 
family render it necessary, or indisputable duties, 
such as the obsequies of the father or the like, 
make it unavoidable*'.
This legal situation was applied quite literally 
towards the end of the 19th century in Mitakshara cases 
in Bengal and remained in vogue in Mysore state until 
1950s1, In a joint family if due to minority some members 
are incapable of giving their consent to alienation of 
family property, even a single coparcener who is qualified 
to do it, can give away, or mortgage or sell an immovable 
property in a season of distress, for the sake of the 
family and/or for pious purposes. The 'season of distress' 
implies that the whole family is affected by a calamity 
which cannot be averted without the transfer; 'for the sake 
of the family' means that the support of the family renders 
it necessary; and 'pious purposes' includes indispensable 
duties, such as the obsequies of the father, marriage of 
an unmarried sister, or the like which cannot be avoided.
It is to be observed that the person effecting the transfer 
is, in all cases, a co-owner with the minor or minors in 
the joint family property and not a person having no 
interest in the property. A minor's interest in a joint 
family property can be disposed of in the above three 
exceptional cases only by a person having an interest in
1 Derrett, Introduction, 273 para 442. See also Shkharam 
Sheku v. Shiva Deorao (1973) 76 Bom LR 267, 269.
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the said family property and also having a contractual 
capability to supplement the minor’s legal incapacity; 
in this latter respect he is actually representing the 
minor* A separate guardian for the minor’s interest in 
such property is not required to be appointed, since he 
will not be allowed to deal with it. The father-manager 
of a joint family combines in himself the dual functions1 
of a manager of the whole family and a guardian of the 
minor’s interest in it. The minor would be bound by his 
dealings with respect to the joint family property if any 
of the three conditions is complied with.
Under sastric Hindu law the mother had no power with 
regard to her minor children’s interest in the joint family 
property, even where the manager was somebody else than 
the father of the minor children. Her guardianship was 
limited in such a case only to the custody of the persons 
of the minors.
Where minors held estates in co-tenancy with other
co-tenants, neither any co-tenant, although he is a major,
nor the minor’s guardian could sell the minor's share in
the said tenancy, since the property of a minor must be
2preserved until he attained majority • This is the basic 
. . 3sastric position •
1 W.H. Macnacrhten. Principles and Precedents of Hindoo 
law Vol. 1 (Madrasi 1829), 103.
2 Nar. VII. 1, 3; Katya. 612.
3 Manu VIII. 27.
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5*3.2. Minor's separate property and its guardianship
The parents were entitled to the custody of their 
minor children's separate property. As long as they were 
living, no one else could become the guardian of that 
property. Among the parents the father was the acknowledged 
guardian of his minor children's property and after him 
the guardianship of the property devolved on the mother. 
Unlike Roman and English law, sastric law recognised the 
mother's natural right to the guardianship of her minor 
children's property1. Sastric law, however, does not give 
any direct information about the amount of prudence which 
a parent as guardian would exercise in the administration 
of the minor's property, but it is assumed that he or 
she should exercise the same care as he or she would do 
if it were his own. On the death of the parents the 
guardianship of the minor's property devolved on the king.
The sastric texts prescribe the king to protect the
individual property of a minor until he attains the age
2of majority or return from pupillage. Manu says i
"The king must protect the estate belonging to 
a minor heir until such time as he is either 
returned from pupillage or has reached the end 
of immaturity"•
3Estate here implies the whole assets which descend
4
on the minor by inheritance and it goes under the protec-
1 Manu IX. 190.
2 Manu VIII. 27. See also Bharuci's Commentary on the Manur 
smrti [Tr. by Derrett (Wisebadeni 1975)J Vol. 2] 99-100j 
Manusmrtii The laws of Manu with the Bhasva of Medhatithi 
[Tr. by Ganganatha Jha (Calcutta! 1924)J Vol. 4 part 1, 38•
3 Bharuci's Commentary, 100.
4 Jagannatha Tercapanchanana, A Digest of Hindu Law [Tr. by 
H.T. Colebrooke (Calcutta* 1801)] Vol. 3, 542 (v. 449).
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tion of the king only when the minor is without any natural 
guardian, ’having neither father nor mother*. ’Pupillage* 
refers to studentship in the teacher’s house. This applied 
in historical times chiefly to Brahmins. The king delegates 
his responsibility to courts which in their turn appoint 
guardians from among the relations of the minor or others 
whom the courts would deem fit. The guardians would virtually 
carry out the king's responsibility. But whom would the 
courts appoint to represent the king? In explaining the 
above verse of Manu, Jagannatha expressed the apprehension 
that the other heirs might defraud the minor by taking the 
whole inheritance. But the learned commentator believed 
that if there were any co-heir whose trustworthiness was 
beyond doubt, the minor’s share would be given to him in 
trust; otherwise, a guardian should be appointed from 
among others. Jagannatha observes1!
"Consequently the meaning is, let him act in such 
a manner that other heirs may not take the whole, 
defrauding the infant, who is incapable from 
non-age of conducting his own affairs, or the 
sense may be, let him commit the share of the 
minor in trust to any one co-heir or other 
guardian"•
Medhatithi in his comment on Manu’s verse observes 
that because the minor's uncles and other relatives may 
quarrel among themselves as to which of them is the guardian 
of the minor’s property, it is the exclusive duty of the 
king to take care of the minor's property. A rule similar
1 Jagannatha, Digest Vol. 3, 542 (v. 449).
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1 2 to Manu is also laid down by Vishnu , and Sankha-Likhita .
O  A
Baudhayana and Vasistha extended the king’s duty even 
to the protection of accumulations on the minor’s estate 
which implies a procedure of calling for an account.
Katyayana mentioned the 'relatives and friends’ of 
the minor with whom the other co-heirs of the minor should 
keep the property on partition . But who are these 'rela­
tives and friends’? Jagannatha in explaining the relevant 
texts of Katyayana assumes them to be minor's relations 
in the male line, or on failure of them, a sister's or 
daughter’s son, or other near kinsmen of the father. In 
any case these persons could be heirs of the minor at 
Dayabhaga law. But the selection of a guardian from among 
them would not remove the apprehension of Jagannatha
as seen earlier. Jagannatha in his comments on Katyayana’s 
verses with his interpolations therein mentions specifically 
the ’maternal uncles or the like* as persons who can act 
as the guardian of a minor, and who can "take a loan from 
money-lender for the benefit of the minor, executing a
1 Vis. III. 65; SBE Vol. 7, 20; Digest Vol.~3. 542 (v. 450).
2 Digest Vol. 3, 542-43 (v. 451).
3 Baud. II. 2, 3, 36} SBE Vol. 14, 229-30; Jha, Hindu law 
Vol. 2, 523} Digest Vol. 3, 543 (v. 452).
4 Vas. XVI. 8, 9.
5 Katya. 845, 845A; Kane, Katvavanasmrti (Poonai n.d.), 297.
6 On partition during the minority of a coparcener see 
Derrett, 'The minor's partition* a lapse in the Supreme 
Court*, in AIR 1960 (Jour) 78; comments by B. Dayal on 
this article in AIR 1960 (Jour) 97, and its reply by 
Derrett in AIR 1961 (Jour) 10.
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deed in the ward’s name and in their name and it is legal 
if the money-lender advances after ascertaining that the 
guardian does not act fraudulently”1. In pointing out 
the reason behind the arrangement of Katyayana Derrett 
says^i
”The motive is perfectly plain, if the property 
remained with agnates, especially the separating 
brothers or cousins, it would be extremely 
difficult for the infant heir to assert his 
separate rights and prevent deliberate or acci­
dental embezzlements”.
It is notorious in India that the maternal uncle is
3
the child’s best friend after his parents. Kautilya has 
directly said that on a partition of ancestral property 
the separating coparceners ”shall deposit with the mother’s 
kinsmen or with village elders, the share of those who 
have not attained majority, clearing it of debts, till 
they come of age”. What Kautilya wants to say is this that 
the guardianship of a minor’s property should not be given 
to a person to whom the ’inheritance can possibly descend'. 
He favoured a complete separation of guardianship of person 
from that of property where the person to be appointed is 
an heir of the minor. Whenever a person having the expect­
ation of some interest or claim in a property is given in 
trust the management of that property, there is every 
likelihood that he may misuse the trust. A guardian’s
1 Jagannatha, Digest Vol. 1, 16-18 (w. 8, 9).
2 Derrett, ’The origins of the laws of the Kandyans', in 
(1956) 14/3 & 4 University of Ceylon Review, 105, 124.
3 Kaut. III. 5; R.P. Kangle, The Kautilya Arthasastra 
(University of Bombay* 1963) Vol. 2, 210; R. Shamasastry, 
Kautilya's Arthasastra (Bangalore* 1915), 204-205;
Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 573.
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temptation to acquire property may be a source of danger
1 2 to the minor*s life • Blackstone observes i
"How much it is the guardian's interest to remove 
the incumbrance of his pupil's life from that 
estate for which he is supposed to have so great 
a regard".
Kautilya seems to be more logical in selecting guardians 
from among the maternal relatives or in their absence from 
the village elders and his views have great similarity
3
with Common law .
As mentioned earlier the sastric texts do not provide
any direct provision about the duty and responsibility of
. 4a guardian towards the ward's property. Bnhaspati and 
Narada5 observe that where a 'person offers himself for 
protection' or where a man 'takes charge of a boy with his 
wealth', the rules of bailment will be applicable with 
respect to that man's dealings with the minor's property.
In other words the guardian would bear the same duties 
to his ward's property as a bailee to the bailor's. The 
guardian will be responsible for the loss of the minor's 
property in cases where a bailee would be responsible 
for the same to the bailor. The care which a guardian
1 See supra.
2 Commentaries Vol. 1, 461.
3 Ibid. Blackstone observesi "By Common law the guardian­
ship (guardians in socage which takes place only when 
the minor has some estate in lands) devolves upon next
of kin, to whom the inheritance cannot possibly descend".
See also Coke, Laws of England Vol. 1, 160.
4 Bri. XII. 15; Vivada-ratnakara, 85, 96.
5 Nar. II. 15 (L. Sternbach, Juridical Studies Part I, 47);
Nar. V. 15 (Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 460); Vivada-
ratnakara. 96.
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should take of a minor’s property must be that of a bailee.
Commenting on Narada*s verse Jagannatha observes1*
"Halayudha reads, if a man receive a poqanda .^ 
or adolescent? consequently, according to him, 
the law respecting an infant received with 
valuable effects, is the same with that respect­
ing deposits* it will be mentioned? and the whole 
of the law, declared under the head of deposits, 
must be understood. A deposit may occur in regard 
to an infant. Thus a child, whose father and 
mother are deceased, is bailed by the king or 
his officer, or by the child’s maternal uncle? 
in this and in other cases a deposit arises”.
In explaining the same verse of Narada Sternbach 
observes^ *
”... the child, whose father and mother were 
deceased, was ’deposited* by the king or on his 
behalf with a man who had to take care of the 
orphan. As the orphan-minor could not dispose 
the estate left by his father, the guardian 
had to take care of him similarly as an object 
committed to his care”.
But the writer hesitates to agree with Narada in 
classifying guardianship as a deposit, since he understands 
it as a tutela dativa. It makes, however, no difference, 
as a tutor dativus had ’similar pecuniary obligations 
towards the minor as a depositary towards the depositor*.
A
5.3.3. Bailment under sastric Hindu law
Under sastric Hindu law the depositary was not the 
possessor of the things deposited? they were in his detention
1 Pi ere st Vol. 1, 408 (v. 11).
2 It means a minor.
3 Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law Part ,1 (Delhi* 1965). _
4 The leading secondary authorities on this subject are
Kane and after him Sternbach. See Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 
454- 461? L. Sternbach, Juridical Studies Part 1, 29-108.
Niranjan Roy, ’Ancient Hindu law of pledges and bail­
ments’, in University of Calcutta, (1939) 32 Journal 
of the Department of Letters. 1-120, 50-87"!
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only. As Sternbach puts it1*
"He had not animus possendi. he had not animus 
res sibi habendi. but had animus rem aIteri 
habendi. The depositary according to ancient 
Indian law possessed the thing deposited in 
subordination to the depositor! therefore, the 
thing deposited was in his detention only. The 
depositary could not alienate the thing deposited”.
The depositary could not give a valid title in the
goods deposited to the transferee by sale, mortgage, gift
2or lease, as he himself had no title in them • Sastric law
3provides that if a bailee does not return or if he destroys
the deposit owing to his own fault or negligence4 or uses
5the deposit for his own purposes without authority, he
shall be punished like thieves and fined with an amount
7 8equal to the value of the deposit with interest at the
g
rate of five per cent per month when he uses the deposit 
himself. The amount of care which a bailee is expected to 
exercise is that of a man of ordinary prudence. If the 
deposit is destroyed by the king, i.e., taken by the king1  ^
on requisition or destroyed by an act of God or fate, or 
stolen by thieves11, or destroyed along with the goods of
1 Juridical Studies Part 1, 52.
2 Bri. XII. 2; Nar. VII. 1.
3 Manu VIII. 191; Yain. II. 66; Nar. II. 13.
4 Bri. XII. 10, 11; Katya. 596, 597; Nar. II. 7.
5 Yain. II. 67; Nar. II. 8; Bri. XII. 12.
6 Nar. II. 13; Manu VIII. 191.
7 Nar. II. 13; Yain. II. 66; Manu VIII. 192.
8 Bri. XII. 11.
9 Katya. 506; Kane, Katyayanasmrti, 216.
10 Yain. II. 66; Bri. XII. 10.
11 Yajn. II. 66; Nar. II. 12. See also Derrett, 'Nandakumar's 
forgery', in (1960) English Historical Review, 223-238.
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the bailee^, the bailee will not be made to restore the
deposit or fined for negligence. Again, if the bailee
restores voluntarily the deposit to the next kinsmen of
2the deceased depositor , or if the depositor, knowing
3himself the probable loss, deposits it and it is lost 
the bailee should not be punished or fined. It may, there­
fore, be presumed that even if the deposit alone is lost 
but without any fault of the bailee, the depositary will 
not have to compensate? but if it is lost by a fraudulent 
act on the part of the depositary, it must be compensated. 
The loss of bailee’s goods along with the bailor’s is
assumed as the standard of care that is expected of the
4bailee. Jagannatha m  illustrating the verses : of-Narada 
and Katyayana observes that the bailee will be liable 
”if fraudulently he place the thing deposited near an old
wall or the like, while he places his own property else-
5where” . In other words, the bailee must take as much care 
of the depositor’s property as he would take if it were 
his own property.
Sastric law, therefore, requires the guardian of a 
minor's property to take the same care as he would take
1 Nar. II. 9; Katya. 598.
2 Manu VIII. 186.
3 Katya. 599; Kane, Katyayanasmrti, 241.
4 Digest Vol. 1, 421; Nar. II. 9; Katya. 598.
5 Digest Vol. 1, 421; Derrett, ’Nandakumar’s forgery’, in 
(I960) EHR, 223-238.
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if it were his own property, and would be liable "in the
same circumstances as a depositee would be for loss of
the minor’s property"1. Under sastric law the guardians
were required to submit accounts of the profits and accu- 
2
mulations on the minor's property; but they were allowed
3incidental expenses for the maintenance of the property.
5.3.4. Sastric rules and the payment of a minor's ancestral 
debts
Under sastric law a' guardian was not empowered to 
pay off a minor's father's debts. Debts were no doubt
4
considered binding on the minor sons, but the sastric
law did not prescribe any rule that they should be paid
immediately after the death of the father or during the
5minority of the sons. Narada says that debts incurred 
by a father or a coparcener need not be paid by the son 
or other coparcener before the lapse of twenty years, but 
he has not mentioned any time when the father who incurred 
the debt is dead. Katyayana^ mentiones that they should 
be paid after the lapse of twenty years, even when the
7father is living but diseased or staying abroad. Vishnu
1 Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 460-61.
2 Baud. II. 2, 3, 36; SBE Vol. 14, 229-30.
3 Katya. 845; Kane, Katyayanasmrti, 297; Jha, Hindu law 
Vol. 2, 616 (v. 26).
4 Bri. XI. 48-49; Ya in. II. 50; Nar. I. 2; Vish. VI. 27. 
Katya. 548, 559.
5 Nar. I. 14.
6 Katya. 548, Kane, Katyayanasmrti, 227.
7 Vish. VI. 27.
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however, indicates the date from which the period of twenty
years should be computed. According to him the date should
be counted from the date of the father’s death or his
becoming a sannvasin or leaving home for abroad. In any
case sastric law allowed the sons a period of twenty years
for the payment of their father's debts. The creditors
could follow the assets inherited from the deceased, but
they could not proceed against them for the liquidation
of debts, until the minority of the sons terminates1. This
rule is similar to the Common law rule which states that
an 'heir need not answer the demands of his ancestor's
2
creditors so long as he is under age* • Jagannatha inter-
3 4 5polating the verses of Yajnavalkya , Katyayana and Narada
attempted to make a distinction between minority and infancy,
and inferred that it was only during the latter state that
a son was exempted from liability for his father's debts.
But if the verses are read shorn of the interpolations it
would appear that no such distinction was intended in the
original texts6. Where a guardian took charge of a minor's
deceased father's assets he could not lawfully apply any
portion of the said assets for the payment of the deceased's
debts.
1 Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 1, 105.
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English law Vol. 2, 441 
f.n. 4.
3 Digest Vol. 1, 270 (v. 171).
4 Ibid. 291 (v. 187).
5 Ibid, 291-292 (v. 188).
6 Ya in. II. 51; Katya. 552; Nar. I. 5, 14, 23.
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5. 4. Pre-British Muslim lav
5.4.1. Guardianship of person
Muslim law also recognises the ruler or sultan as 
the parens patriae or ultimate guardian of all minors* 
person and property. The ruler's power in this respect 
is delegated to the courts which appoint guardians in 
the absence of any legal guardian. Unlike Hindu law Muslim 
law does not recognise the mother as the legal guardian 
of her minor children. It maintains a distinction between 
the custody of the person of a minor and the guardianship 
of his property. It keeps the minors under certain age 
under the care and affection of certain females and compels 
the father or legal guardians to bear the cost of mainten­
ance of the minor. Like other laws Muslim law gives dominant 
consideration to the welfare of a minor in appointing his 
guardian; but it considers the females as possessing the 
love and affection which is necessary for the welfare of 
a minor's person. The requirement of this care and affection 
is determined according to the age and sex of the minor.
Muslim law makes a distinction between infancy and 
minority. As long as a boy has not attained the age of 
seven years and a girl# puberty it considers them incap­
able of taking care of themselves1 and puts them in the 
custody of female relations. This custody is known as
1 Under shia law the hizanut continues in the case of a 
boy until he attains the age of two years and a girl 
until she attains the age of seven years.
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hizanut and it terminates when the boy completes seven
years of age and the girl attains puberty1. When the
mother is living she is entitled to this custody, and
her right is not lost after her divorce by the minor’s
2father, but it may not subsist on her remarriage , Failing
the mother the hizanut or custody belongs to the following
3females in the order mentioned below i
(1) mother’s mother, how high soever;
(2) father’s mother, how high soever;
(3) full sister;
(4) uterine sister;
(5) full sister’s daughter;
(6) uterine sister’s daughter;
(7) maternal aunt; and
(8) paternal aunt.
In default of the mother and other female relations 
or when a boy has completed seven years or an unmarried 
girl has attained puberty the custody belongs to the
4
following agnatic relations in the order given below i
(1) father;
(2) nearest paternal grandfather;
(3) full brother;
(4) consanguine brother;
1 C. Hamilton. The Hedava 1 ed. by S.G. Grady (Londoni 2nd.
1870)], 139; N.B.E. Baillie, A Digest of Moohummudan law
Vol. 1 (London* 2 n d 1 8 7 5 ) ,  437-38.
2 Hedava, 138.
3 Hedaya, 138; Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 435-36.
4 Hedaya, 139; Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 437-38.
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(5) full brother's son;
(6) consanguine brother's son;
(7) full brother of the father?
(8) consanguine brother of the father;
(9) son of the father's full brother; and
(10) son of the father's consanguine brother.
But for her welfare the custody of a minor female 
child should not be entrusted to a male who is not within 
the prohibited degrees, and therefore a paternal uncle's 
son should not be given the custody of a female child, 
since 'there may be apprehension of treachery
2The father is bound to provide maintenance to his
children when they are under the custody of their mother
or other female relations and in the case of female children
until they are married. As long as the minors have property
of their own the maintenance would be provided out of that 
3property ; but when they have no property of any descrip­
tion, it becomes the duty of the father to provide it from 
his own property; and he cannot avoid it unless he is
indigent or in strained circumstances and physically unable 
4to work . Poverty alone is not a ground to refuse mainten­
ance because if he is physically able to work he will be 
compelled to work for his children's maintenance and on
1 Hedava. 138-39; Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 437.
2 Hedava. 146; Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 460.
3 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 462.
4 Hedava. 147.
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refusal he may be imprisoned1. The amount of maintenance
is to be decided by the court according to the condition
of the father and is to be delivered to the mother or
other female relation who has the custody of the minor .
Where the father is poor and the mother is rich, the
mother may maintain the child with the leave of the court
with a right of recourse against the father. The court
may also order other agnatic kins of the minor to provide
maintenance with a right of recourse against the father.
The father may entrust the custody of his minor children
3to the executor by his will , but it seems that he cannot 
thereby deprive the female relations of their right of 
hizanut.
5.4.2. Guardianship of property
In Muslim law, as in Roman and Common law, the minors
are not incompetent to do such acts as are manifestly
. 4for their benefit , but they are not competent to do any 
civil acts, such as purchase, sale, and the like. If they 
are done without any authority from their guardians, they 
will be unlawful; but if they are assented to by their 
guardians, they will be valid. In this respect Muslim law 
bears a similarity with Roman law. The guardians are required
1 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 460-61.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, 676.
4 Ibid, 518-19.
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to supplement their minors' legal incapacity with their 
assent to the transactions which are being carried out 
by the minors themselves# What is needed in such cases 
is the minor's attainment of an age at which he could 
understand the difference between purchase and sale1.
Guardians are required to give validity to minors* acts 
where they have attained the age of discretion, or to act 
of their own when they have not and to manage and preserve 
their property. They must perform their duty with utmost 
good faith.
The guardian under Muslim law occupies the position 
of a wasi or trustee. Unlike the trustee of English law 
the property does not vest in him but he is entrusted with 
the management and preservation of it for the welfare and 
benefit of the minor. As long as the father is alive guardian­
ship of his minor children's property resides in him. For 
the support and education of the children he can, if necessary,
sell the whole of their property, movable and immovable.
2He may sell the property even to himself . He may enter 
into any contract beneficial to the minor children and is 
not fraudulently intended. He can deposit their property 
in trust. Muslim law gives due consideration to his tender 
affection to his children. Thus he is allowed to pledge 
their goods into his own hands or into the hands of persons 
over whom he has authority. He may pledge their goods in
1 Hedava, 524.
2 Ibid, 639.
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security for his own debts, but he will be responsible 
if the pledge is destroyed in the pawnee’s hands* If the 
son on attaining majority redeems the goods by discharging 
the debt, he will have a claim on the father for the sum1.
The father may also pledge the goods of his son for a debt 
jointly due by both, but if the pledge is destroyed the 
father must compensate the son by a sum equivalent to his 
share of the debt. The father may incur necessary debts 
for the support and education of his minor son and the 
debts will become due on the minor's attaining majority; 
he may, however, pay them out of the minor’s estate. Unlike 
a Hindu mother, under Muslim law a mother is not entitled
2to the guardianship of the property of her minor children .
Under Muslim law after the father’s death the charge
and control of the property of a minor is ordinarily
assumed by the father's executor and unless a guardian is
appointed, the executor should be considered the guardian
3of the property of the testator's minor children • The 
validity of a guardian's transaction with a minor's movable 
goods depends on how much it is for the manifest advantage 
of the minor, how much it is immune from any fraud. A 
guardian may, therefore, enter into a contract which is 
advantageous and not injurious to the minors and is not 
entered into with fraudulent intention. He may sell, purchase, 
or pledge the whole of the minor's movable goods for the
1 Hedava. 638-39.
2 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 129-30.
I 3 Ibid. 689.
I -----------
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support and education of the minor either for an equivalent
or at a moderate lower price but not at a great and apparent
loss1. He may carry on trade on behalf of the minor and
2for this he can give and receive pawns . The guardian may 
pledge the minor’s goods in security for his own debts, 
but unlike the father he cannot lawfully pledge the minor’s 
goods into his own hands or into the hands of persons whom 
he can influence. Also, he is not permitted to sell or 
pledge anything belonging to him into the hands of the 
minor where he owes a debt to the minor. But where he 
purchases ’necessaries', e.g., food and raiment for the 
use of the minor and he has paid the price from his own 
money, he may pledge the minor's goods as security for 
the price paid. Like the father he may pledge the goods 
of the minor for a debt jointly due by both. But if the 
pledge is lost he must compensate the minor by an amount 
equivalent to his share of the debt.
With regard to a minor’s immovable property the 
justification of a guardian's transactions depends on 
two principles, viz., first, how far the rule of status 
quo is observed, and secondly, how far the interests of 
creditors are safeguarded. Generally, a guardian is not 
allowed to sell the akar, i.e., immovable property of a
1 Hedava, 702.
2 Ibid, 639.
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minor as long as it is in a state of conservation; but for 
the benefit of the estate, such as where there is possibi­
lity of its being perished or destroyed, it may be sold1. 
Where it is absolutely necessary for the minor's mainte­
nance, the guardian may sell the minor's immovable property 
according to the quantum of necessity; but he must not 
sell immovable property so long as there are movable goods 
to meet the exigency. If any immovable property is sold
while there are movable properties, the sale will not,
2however, be unlawful •
Law differs if the minor's property is an ancestral
one and the deceased ancestor has left no debts or legacies.
3
The guardian may sell, according to the 'ancients' the 
whole of the minor's movable and immovable property for
4
the minor's support and education, but the 'moderns' 
maintain that akar or immovable property of a minor can 
only be sold in the absence of any debts or legacies of 
the father if, first, the minor has necessity for the 
price; secondly, the purchaser is willing to pay double 
its market value; and thirdly, the sale is purely advan­
tageous to the minor, e.g., the property is maintained at 
a loss, such as tax of the land is greater than its income, 
or the property is in the danger of being decayed-or 
destroyed. The guardian may also sell the minor's immovable
1 Hedava, 702.
2 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 688.
3 Ibid, 687.
4 Ibid.
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property where the necessity arises for the payment of 
land revenue (khurai). and the sale proceeds of the minor’s 
goods and chattels are not sufficient to meet the demand 
of the revenue. Such sale may be either at the actual 
price of the property or at a little lower, but in no 
case at such a depreciated price as a man would not accept 
had it been his own property. Where, however, the deceased 
father has left debts, unlike Hindu law, the guardian is 
empowered to sell the whole estate if the debts demand 
it or as much of it as is necessary for their payment 
before the minor attains majority. Where the deceased has 
left legacies, the guardian should not sell more than one- 
third of the whole property left after the payment of debts; 
and of the debts and legacies, the former should be paid 
first, and then the latter. Where the minor has his own 
property and the guardian contracted debts on his behalf, 
the debts are to be paid out of the minor’s property by 
the guardian or by the minor himself on attaining majority1. 
The guardian must pay the debts of the minor in the presence 
of witnesses or with the permission of the court; otherwise 
he will have to account for the payment. He must keep 
strict accounts of the income and expenditure of the minor’s 
property. The court will not hesitate to remove him for 
malversation.
Where the minor is in co-tenancy with others, the 
guardian may sell the share of the minor. He may purchase
1 Hedaya, 639.
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anything for the minor at a reasonable price, but not at 
a very high price"*'. He cannot mortgage the minor's property 
without the leave of the court, nor lawfully give a long 
lease of the minor's ancestral property for the payment 
of the minor's debts even. Neither he, nor the minor's 
father, nor even the court can lend the minor's property2. 
For an obvious benefit of the minor, he may sell the minor's 
property to himself, or his own to the minor •
Under Muslim law sometimes an outsider could sell 
the property belonging to others. He is called fuzuli4 . i.e.,
a person who is busy in things not belonging to him, or
5
who acts without authority . A sale by such fuzuli is a 
dependent one or voidable. It remains with the proprietor 
either to confirm or dissolve it} but two things are always 
essential for a fuzuli sale, viz., it must be advantageous 
to the proprietor and the consent to it must be given when 
the buyer and seller are both extent. The fuzulis may also 
act for the minors just as the negotiorum qestores under 
Roman law; and the minors may be bound by such acts if they 
are effected with regard to their property and they rati­
fied them after attaining majority.
1 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 687.
2 Ibid, 691.
3 Ibid. 692.
4 Hedava. 296.
5 N.B.E. Baillie, Moohummudan law of Sale (London* 1850),
219 f.n.
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6• British Regulations and personal lavs on guardianship
The early British Regulations of India, viz., the 
Bengal Regulation 10 of 1793 and the Madras Regulation 5 
of 1804 contained a body of rules regarding guardianship 
of the person and property of minors. But the Regulations 
did not cover the guardiandhip of all the minors. Their 
application was limited only to those minors who had 
inherited estates paying revenue immediately to Government1. 
Even if those minors had landed estates, whether subject 
to or exempt from payment of revenue, ’which they acquired 
by purchase, gift, or by virtue of any other rights, except­
ing that of inheritance', or where they held jointly with
others estates paying revenue to Government, the Regulations
2did not apply to the guardianship of these properties •
The Court of Wards which was constituted by the Board of 
Revenue on August 20, 1790, assumed guardianship on the 
death of persons from whom the minors inherited estates.
The Regulations with all their limitations attempted for 
the first time to evolve a common system of law on guardian­
ship acceptable to different communities, specially the 
Hindus and the Muslims.
The Regulations regarded the guardianship of person
3and property of a minor as two distinct trusts , and used
1 Bengal Regulation 10, 1793, sec. 2; Madras Regulation 5, 
1804, sec. 2.
2 R. Clarke, Digest of the Regulations and Acts of the 
Bengal Government from 1793-1854 (Londoni 1855), section V, 
Land Revenue, Court of Wards, 204, 205.
3 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, sec. 6; see also the preamble of 
the Madras Reg. 5, 1804.
51
different terminology to denote the holders of these offices. 
When a person was entrusted with the care of the person, 
maintenance and education of a minor he was called a 
guardian, but when one was entrusted with the charge of 
the minor's property he was called a manager1. So far as 
the guardianship of the person of a minor is concerned the 
Regulations adopted a line closer to Muslim law. Thus 
unlike Hindu law, the Regulations allowed female relations
to have the custody of male minors until they completed
2 3the age of five years m  Bengal and seven years in Madras ,
and of female minors until they were married or attained
4majority whichever was earlier • Section 28 of the Bengal
Regulation 10 of 1793 fixed the period of minority to be
continued with respect to both the Hindus and Muslims until
5the completion of the fifteenth year of age in Bengal 
and eighteenth year in Madras^. Both the Regulations 
required the guardians to educate their wards in a manner
7
'suitable to their rank and condition in life'
Although sastric Hindu law under the constant
o
pressure of customs and 'effect of the (pre-British) royal
1 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, secs. 7, 10, 11; Madras Reg, 5, 1804, 
secs. 21, 22.
2 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, sec. 27.
3 Madras Reg. 5, 1804, sec. 21(9).
4 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, secs. 21, 29; Madras Reg. 5, 1804,
sec. 19(4).
5 This was the age under Muslim law when children of both 
sexes were considered adults. See Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 4. 
Under Hindu law there was difference of opinion on this 
point. See Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 573.
6 Madras Reg. 5, 1804, secs. 4, 21(5).
7 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, sec. 29; Madras Reg. 5, 1804, sec.
21(9) and (10).
8 Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature (Wisebaden* 
1973), 12.
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proclamation*1 was yielding ground for its own abolition, 
its rules did not fail to influence subsequent statutory 
enactments* As regards the union of the guardianship of 
person and that of property of a minor the Regulations 
supported Kautilya's views. Section 21 of the Bengal 
Regulation 10 of 1793 absolutely excluded the legal heirs 
or other persons interested in ‘outliving the ward* from 
guardianship of the person of a minor, and section 19 of 
the Madras Regulation 5 of 1804 even excluded from guardian­
ship persons who appeared to have a direct or indirect
advantage in the death of the minor. These sections remind
2us of the following sentence of Blackstone i
"The law judges it improper to trust the person 
of an infant in his hands who may by possibility 
become heir to him”.
Although section 8 of the Bengal Regulation 10 of
1793 admitted the claim of the minor's legal heirs and
other relations in the management of his property when
they were considered fit by the Governor-General in Council,
this qualified preference was abolished by section 26 of
the Bengal Regulation 7 of 1799. Section 30 of the Bengal
Regulation 10 of 1793 uniquely supports Kautilya's views
3when it provides t
"The trusts of guardian and manager may be united 
in persons to whom the inheritance cannot possibly 
descend, if circumstances should render the same 
eligible”.
1 Derrett, 'Bharuci on royal regulative power in India', 
in (1964) 84 Journal of the American Oriental Society, 
392-95? Kane,~Dharmasastra Vol. 1 (Poona? 1968), 569.
2 Commentaries Vol. 1, 461.
3 Sec. 9 of the Madras Reg. 5 of 1804 also gives a similar 
idea.
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The care which a guardian is expected to exercise
in the management and preservation of a minor’s property
is, both under Hindu and Muslim law, that of a bailee.
The Regulations demanded a similar amount of care and
sometimes even more^. Under them the managers and the
guardians had to deposit security for their office and
in case of any breach of trust they would be guilty of 
2
embezzlement and fined with treble amount of what had
been misappropriated. The managers had to manage and
improve the minors* estates diligently and faithfully and
in every respect they should act to the best of their
judgment for the benefit of the minors in 'like manner
as if the estate were his own'. They were not allowed
to grant any lease extending beyond the life of the minor
or to dispose of any part of the permanent property under
3their custody without the sanction of the court . But the
managers and the guardians had to maintain strict accounts
of the receipts and expenditures in respect of the minors*
4estates . Managers were permitted to invest the surplus
profits of the estates in purchasing lands or government
. . . 5securities or keeping mortgages •
1 In Hindu law (see Manu VIII. 192; Nar  ^ II. 13; Ya ini TT~, 66) 
and in Muslim law (see Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 690) if a 
guardian misappropriates the minor's property, he is account 
able for an amount equal to that so misappropriated. But 
under the Regulations it is treble amount.
2 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, secs. 9, 24; Madras Reg. 5, 1804, 
secs. 10, 21(1).
3 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, sec. 16; Madras Reg. 5, 1804, sec. 15.
4 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, secs. 17, 26; Madras Reg. 5, 1804, 
secs. 12(3), 21(8).
5 Bengal Reg. 10, 1793, sec. 18; Madras Reg. 5, 1804, 
sec. 16(1) and (2).
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As seen above the Courts of Wards did not assume 
the guardianship of all the minors. Certain civil courts 
used to have powers to declare and appoint guardians of 
the person and property of minors who were not under the 
superintendence of the Courts of Wards and thereby super­
seded the rights of natural and testamentary guardians.
The Bengal Regulation 5 of 1799 restricted the interference 
of the zilla courts in such cases and allowed the testa­
mentary guardians or nearest of kin of minors to take charge 
of the minors* estates without the leave of the courts.
But the Bengal Regulation 1 of 1800 soon withdrew the 
preference given to the next of kin and authorised the 
zilla judges, where there were no testamentary guardians, 
to appoint some other persons in lieu of next of kin as 
guardians. It was held in Oorahee v. Rajbansee Kowur1 that 
although the civil courts were vested by the Regulation 1 
of 1800 with authority to appoint guardians when considered 
advisable, they should not in any instance entrust the 
guardianship of property to the legal heirs of the ward 
or other person interested in outliving him.
In matters of guardianship of the person and property
of Hindu and Muslim minors the civil courts were to follow
2 .the respective personal law of the minors m  contradis-
1 (1847) SDA 557, 559 (Beng).
2 Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India (London* 
1968), 234} H.P. Dubey, The Judicial Systems of India 
(Bombay* 1968), 208; Judicial Establishments Act (Act 142) 
of 1797, secs. 12, 13.
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tinction with the Regulations which were applied by the 
Courts of Wards, Section 17 of the East India Company 
Act (Act 65) of 1780 provided that where the parties to 
a suit were Muslims the courts had to apply the laws of 
the Koran, and where they were Hindus, the laws of the 
sastra^. As the European officials who were appointed as 
judges of the Company’s courts had little legal training 
or knowledge in the Koran and the sastra. they were assisted
• . . . . .  9m  the administration of justice by moulvis and pundits •
3Sir R.K. Wilson observed s
”Immediate relief to perplexed European judges 
was afforded by attaching learned Moulvis and 
Pandits to every court, civil and criminal, whose 
opinions were in general to be accepted on all 
points relating to their respective laws*',
Thus in the case of Hindu law the pundits who were 
learned in sastra were consulted by the Anglo-Indian judges 
and their opinions, known as vvavasthas, were often sought
4
m  Hindu cases • And m  the case of Muslim law the moulvis 
who were learned in the Koran and the hadith were consulted. 
Like the vvavasthas of the pundits in Hindu law, the 
moulvis used to give fatwas on questions referred to them,
7. British Acts on guardianship
The Bengal Regulation 1 of 1800 which authorised 
the zilla judges, where there were no testamentary guardians,
1 Dubev. Judicial Systems, 94-95; M,P, Jain, Outlines of 
Indian Legal History (Delhi* 1952), 115.
2 Derrett, Religion, 233? Jain, Outlines, 132.
3 Anglo-Muhammadan Law (London* 1930), 41.
4 Derrett, Religion, 230, 234.
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to appoint guardians to minors not subject to the authority 
of the Courts of Wards, was repealed by the Bengal Minors 
Act (Act 40) of 1858, The new Act provided a machinery 
for the appointment of managers of the estates and guardians 
of the persons of minors (not being European British 
subjects) residing in Bengal outside the limits of the 
original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Similar 
provisions were made in Madras by the Madras Regulations 5 
of 18041 and 10 of 1831^, and in Bombay by the Bombay Minors 
Act (Act 20) of 1864 which was in its contents similar 
to the Bengal Minors Act of 1858. Under the Bengal as well 
as the Bombay Minors Act the courts used to grant certifi­
cate of administration to the testamentary guardians of 
minors' estates and in their absence to the minors' willing 
near relations. The courts could also appoint a certificated 
guardian to be the guardian of the person of a minor. But
such a union of guardianship was purely at the discretion 
3of the court and was only permitted m  the case of a
4minor's movable and homestead and structural property ,
5
and not in the case of landed estates • Section 10 of the 
Bombay Minors Act even restricted this discretionary power 
of the court to unite guardianship of person and property
1 Sec. 20.
2 Sec. 3.
3 Bengal Minors Act, 1858, sec. 7} Bombay Minors Act, 1864, 
sec. 6.
4 Bengal Minors Act, 1858, sec. 10; Bombay Minors Act, 1864, 
sec. 11.
5 Bengal Minors Act, 1858, sec. 12.
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in a certificated near relative guardian in the case of 
a Bombay minor's movable and homestead property* The 
section stated in clear words that a certificated guardian 
could be entrusted with the guardianship of the person 
of the minor if and when he was not the "legal heir of 
the minor, or next in succession to the property". Section 
12 of the Bengal Minors Act followed the earlier Regulations 
of Bengal when it dealt with the guardianship of a minor's 
landed estates* It provided for the appointment of a 
manager of the minor's property and a separate guardian 
for the minor's person 'in the same manner and subject to 
the same rules in respect of their appointments as if the 
property and person of the minor were under the supervi­
sion of the Court of Wards'. The certificated guardians 
were expected to exercise the same powers in the manage­
ment of the minor's estate as a proprietor could have 
exercised if he were not minor* He could collect and pay 
all just claims, debts and liabilities due to or by the 
estate of the minor; but without the leave of the court 
he could not sell or mortgage any immovable property, or 
grant lease thereof for a period exceeding five years^.
He had to submit accounts of the property annually. The 
expenses for the education of minors should be paid out 
of the profits of the minors' estates with the leave of
1 Bengal Minors Act, 1858, sec* 18; Bombay Minors Act, 1864, 
sec. 18.
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courts. Both the Acts provided that no guardian should be 
appointed of the person of a minor whose father was 
living and no person other than a female should be the 
guardian of the person of a female^.
The Minors Acts of Bengal and Bombay did not intend 
to alter or affect the provisions of Hindu and Muslim 
law as to guardians who did not avail themselves of the 
Acts. As seen above they were framed to remove the legis­
lative prohibitions on the jurisdiction of civil courts 
over the minor’s inheritance and to define the position 
of those who availed themselves of or.were:brought under the
Acts leaving unaffected persons to whom any existing rules
2of law were applied . In fact the object of the Bengal 
Minors Act of 1858 and the Bombay Minors Act of 1864 was 
not to supersede the rights of natural or testamentary 
guardians of minors' person and property, but to place
the testamentary and other certificated guardians under
. . . . 3the control and supervision of civil courts .
8* Guardianship of minors other than Hindu and Muslim
The rights of guardianship of minors other than Hindu 
and Muslim in British India were determined by dual systems.*
1 Bengal Minors Act, 1858, sec. 27; Bombay Minors Act, 1864, 
sec. 31.
2 Ram Chunder Chuckerbuttv v. Broionath Mazumder (1879) 4 
Cal 929 (FB) ; Kanti Chunder v. Bisheswar (1898) 25 Cal 
585, 590 (FB); Sham Das v. UmerDin AIR 1930 Lah 497, 501 
(FB).
3 Soonder Narain v. Bennud Ram (1879) 4 Cal 76; Roshan Singh 
v. Har Kishan (1881) 3 All 535; Bai Kesar v. Bai Ganqa 
(1871) 8 Bom HC Rep 31.
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Minors who were living within the Presidency towns of 
Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were governed by English 
Common law*, while those in the mofussil areas were, if 
they had no customary law of their own, governed by the 
rules of 'justice, equity and good conscience' , In the 
appointment of guardians of such minors, as under Common 
law, the legal powers belonged to the father and only 
after his death the mother acquired any rights . Under 
the English law the father had no right to control the 
property of his minor children, but the courts of India 
treated him to be the person 'most likely to guard the 
interests of his children and would maintain his custody
4
of their property' . He was not permitted to sell or charge
1 Jain, Outlines, 115; Dubey, Judicial Systems, 208-09.
2 P.K. Irani, 'The personal law of the Parsis of India', in 
J.N.D. Anderson ed., Family law in Asia and Africa (London* 
1968), 273-300; Mrs. Meher Rohinton Master Moos, 'The 
personal law of the Parsees with reference to a proposed 
Family law Code', in Narmada Khodie ed., Readings in Uni­
form Civil Code (Bombay* 1975), 116-169, 122; Derrett, 
Religion, 39-40; Madras Reg. 11 of 1802, sec. 17; Bombay 
Reg. 4 of 1827, sec. 26; Bengal Reg. 7 of 1832, sec. 9; 
Stephen v. Hume (1835) Fulton Rep 224, 227; 1 ID 778,
779; Musleah v. Musleah (1844) Fulton Rep 420, 423; 1 ID 
894, 896 (OS); Queen v. Bezonii (1843) Perry's Oriental 
cases, 97; Webbe v. Lester (1865) 2 Bom HC Rep 52, 56; 
Secretary of State v. Administrator of Bengal (1868) 1
BLR 87; Skinner v. Orde (1871) 14 MIA 309, 323; Mollow v. 
Court of Wards (1871T) 10 BLR 312; In the matter of Saithri 
(1891) 16 Bom 307, 323; Mithibai v. Limii Nowroii (1881)
5 Bom 506, 523; Philomena Mendoza v. Para Mistry AIR 1943 
Bom 338, 339. On the application of the doctrine of justice, 
equity and good conscience see Derrett, 'Justice, equity 
and good conscience', in J.N.D. Anderson ed., Changing 
law in Developing countries (London* 1963), 114-153.
3 In the matter of Holmes (1862) 1 Hyde 99.
4 Trevelyan, Minors, 60.
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his minor children's property without the sanction of the
court1. If it was felt necessary in the interests of the
minors to sell or mortgage their property one must apply
first to be appointed as guardian and then obtain the court's
sanction to the transaction. Trustees for sale of a minor's
property could exercise their power to sell independently
of the court. An alienation by a guardian which did not
bind the minor was not void but voidable at the instance
of the minor. Subject to the repayment of the money whose
benefit he had obtained, the minor was entitled, before or
after attaining his majority, to recover such of his property
as went into the hands of other persons by the wrongful or
2unauthorised act of his guardian . Unlike English law,
mother's custody of her minor children's property on the
death of their father and in the absence of any testamentary
3guardian was not considered unlawful . In the absence of 
parents or any testamentary guardian no person however 
nearly related was entitled to the guardianship of the
4
minor's person or property without the leave of the court . 
But the courts never interfered of its own with a possess­
ion not improperly obtained or not prejudicial to the
5welfare and interests of a minor .
1 Trevelyan, Minors, 167.
2 See Specific Relief Act (Act l) of 1877, sec. 41? Planche 
v. Colburn (1831) 8 Bing 14, 16; 131 ER 305, 306? Simpson 
v. Lamb (1856) 17 C B 603; 139 ER 1213; Prickett v. Badger 
(1856) 1 C B 296 (NS); 140 ER 123; Taleb Hossain v. Ameer 
Bux (1874) 22 WR 529 (CR).
3 Trevelyan, Minors, 60.
4 Ibid, 60.
5 Ex parte Intiazzoon Nissa Begum (1814) 2 Strange's Notes 
on casesT 109; 5 ID 289 (OS); In re Joshy Assam (1895)
23 Cal 290.
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In 1874 the European British Minors Act (Act 13) 
was passed for appointing guardians of European British 
minors in those parts of India to which the jurisdiction 
of the chartered High Courts did not extend. The Act 
declared the power of a father to appoint by will or other 
instrument a guardian of his legitimate children, and that 
of the mother in the absence of the father or any testa­
mentary guardian appointed by him. The courts could on 
application appoint a guardian of the person or property
or both of a minor where a testamentary guardian was found
1 2 insufficient . It was for the first time that any legis­
lation regarding the minors contained a provision that in 
appointing a guardian the courts should be guided by what 
appeared to be for the ’’best interest of the minor in 
respect to his temporal and his mental and moral welfare**, 
and should also consider the bearing of the following 
circumstances upon the guardianship of person or of pro­
perty* (l) nearness of relationship; (2) wishes of the 
deceased parent; and (3) any existing or previous connect­
ion of the proposed guardian with the minor’s person or
3 . .property . Although the terminological difference between
the guardianship of the person and of property of a minor
1 European British Minors Act, 1874, sec, 4.
2 Virtually, the earlier Regulations and Acts were more 
for the preservation of minors' properties for revenue 
purposes than for their physical or mental welfare.
3 European British Minors Act, 1874, sec. 10.
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which was being maintained in the earlier Regulations and
Acts was not expressly stated in the provisions of the
Act, the apprehension of the ill effects of their union
in one individual could be presumed from the wording of
section 10. The Act recognised the natural guardianship
of parents. As long as the father was alive he had the
custody of the person and property of his minor children.
On his death the mother could assume the guardianship
of their person and property. Either parent could, however,
appoint a testamentary guardian. Similar to the guardians
appointed by the chartered High Courts, under this Act
the guardians of person were charged with the custody of
the minors and they were to look to the minors* support,
health and education1. For the maintenance, education or
advancement the courts could order the principal of the
2wards * property or any part thereof to be disposed of .
The guardians of property were to keep safely the minors* 
property, and in the case of immovable property they should 
not suffer any waste, and should maintain the building 
and their appurtenances out of the rents and profits of 
the property. They could make leases for any term not 
exceeding a year of immovable property or any part thereof, 
but with the sanction of the court they could grant leases 
for such period of time and on such rents and conditions
3
as were approved by the court . In the maintenance and
1 European British Minors Act, 1874, sec. 11.
2 Ibid. sec. 17.
3 Ibid. sec. 16.
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administration of minors' property the responsibility of 
a guardian was that of a bailee, he was responsible for 
any loss occasioned to the property by his wilful default 
or gross negligence1. They had to give security for their 
office and submit accounts.
9. Consolidation of statutory guardianship law in British 
India
In 1890 the Guardians and Wards Act (Act 8) was 
passed to consolidate and amend the law relating to guardians 
and wards. This Act aims at providing a law on the subject 
applicable as far as possible to all classes of people in 
British Indiai all the earlier enactments regarding minors' 
guardianship were repealed. But it does not thereby alter 
the application of Hindu and Muslim law to the selection 
of a guardian and the administration of the property of a 
minor belonging to any of the Hindu and Muslim communities ,
nor does it affect the jurisdiction and authority of Courts 
3of Wards . In respect of the application of personal laws 
of the minors, the law remains the same as it existed in 
the Bengal Minors Act of 1858 and the Bombay Minors Act 
of 1864. As seen earlier in those Acts there was no indication 
of any intention to alter any provisions of Hindu or Muslim 
law as to guardians who did not avail themselves of those
1 European British Minors Act, 1874, sec. 18(c).
2 See Report of the Select Committee on the Guardians and 
Wards Bill, 1890, in the Gazette of India, 1890, part V 
77; see also secs. 6 and 7, Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
3 GWA, 1890, sec. 3.
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Acts. Therefore a lawful or natural guardian is not compelled 
by this Act to obtain the court's permission before dealing 
with the property of a minor. A guardian may, if permitted 
under the personal law of the minor, deal with the minor's 
property without obtaining a certificate of guardianship.
The father is recognised as the paramount guardian
of the person of his minor children, and the court is not
permitted to make an order declaring a guardian of the
person of a minor during the lifetime of his father unless
in the opinion of the court the father is unfit to be his
guardian1. Unlike the European British Minors Act of 1874
this Act does not expressly mention the mother to be the
guardian of her minor children if the father dies without
2appointing any testamentary guardian . But the courts cannot 
ignore her rights as it must be guided in appointing or 
declaring the guardian of a minor 'by what appears to be 
for the welfare of the minor according to the personal
3
law of the minor' . Thus under Hindu law the mother assumes 
guardianship of the person and property of her minor 
children when the father is dead, and under Muslim law 
although she is not allowed the guardianship of her minor 
children's property, she is entitled to the custody of a 
male child upto the end of his seventh year and a female 
child till she arrives at puberty.
1 GWA, 1890, sec. 19(b).
2 European British Minors Act, 1874, sec. 3.
3 GWA, 1890, sec. 17(1).
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Similarly to the European British Minors Act of 1874,
this Act uses the term *guardian* to refer to both person
and property guardian. Unlike the provisions of the Bombay
Minors Act of 1864 this Act does not clearly prohibit the
union of guardianship of person and property in any legal
heir of the minor or any person 'next in succession to the
minor’s property'1. For the omission of this prohibition
it is stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
2
the Guardians and Wards Bill that it was the opinion of 
the Legislative Council when the Guardians and Wards Bill 
was being considered by them that it should be dropped.
It is to be noticed that although they preferred not to 
put any restriction on the appointment of legal heirs or 
any person next in succession to the property of a minor 
as guardian of a minor's person, they did not thereby 
encourage a view contrary to that of Kautilya or Blackstone. 
To show the reason why they recommended removal of the 
prohibition, the Chairman who moved the motion and with 
whom other members of the Council agreed, cited the follow­
ing example of a widowed mother whom a deceased Hindu
3father left with a minor son i
"If the son died during his minority, of course 
the property inherited by him from his father 
would pass to his mother? but that was no reason 
why the mother should be deprived of the guardian­
ship of her child while he lived".
1 Bombay Minors Act, 1864, sec, 10.
2 The Gazette of India, 1886, part IV, 77. See para 13 of 
the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill.
3 Proceedings of the Legislative Council of India, 1858 
Vol. 4, 576-77.
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Neither Kautilya nor Blackstone would oppose a 
union of guardianship of person and property in a parent 
who is capable of managing the minor’s property, but as 
soon as it is united in an heir or a person other than 
a parent their objection applies . Perhaps what prompted 
the members of the Legislative Council to hold such a view 
was section 10 of the Bombay Minors Act of 1864 which 
contained the following provisoi
HProvided that in the case of minors who have 
inherited property by adoption, the natural father 
may be appointed guardian”.
They might have the conviction that had the prohibi­
tion been contained in the Act it would have excluded even 
the parents which was actually not true1.
Under this Act the courts may not distrust an heir 
(merely because he is an heir) as guardian of a minor’s 
property, but they rightly apprehend danger to put the 
custody of the minor under him at the same time. Reid, J., 
observed^ t
’’There is no obvious danger to property when it 
is managed by the heir, whatever danger there 
may be to a child in the guardianship of the 
person who would profit by his death” .
Courts must not neglect to consider the effects of 
a union of guardianship in a legal heir or a person having 
a chance of succession of the minor's property specially 
when such heir or person is someone else other than a parent.
1 Bengal Minors Act, 1858, sec. 27; Bombay Minors Act, 1864, 
secs. 6, 31.
2 Amin Chand v. Phagu Mai (1898) 33 PR 181, 182.
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If the sections 8(b), 17(2) and 39(g) of the GWA are read 
together it would show that for the welfare of a minor 
having landed property it is always advisable not to put 
the custody of his person and property in any of his 
relations having an 'adverse interest' in that property. 
Under the provisions of its section 17(1) the Act provides*
"In appointing or declaring the guardian of a 
minor, the court shall, subject to the provisions 
of this section, be guided by what, consistently 
with the law to which the minor is subject, 
appears in the circumstances to be for the 
welfare of the minor".
The welfare of the minor is the prime consideration 
in the appointment of a guardian, and a stranger may be
appointed a guardian of the person of a minor in preference
to a relation if the court considers that the welfare of 
the minor demands it1. It is the minor's welfare and not 
the rights of his prospective guardian which should be 
weighed in the appointment of a guardian; and in ensuring 
this welfare the courts are expected to make the appointment 
as much in consistence with the personal law of the minor 
as the circumstances of the case allow* The consideration
of the personal law must be subordinate to the minor's
welfare and its importance would be in proportion to its 
bearing upon the minor's welfare.
The earlier Acts on guardianship did not specify the 
nature of the relationship between a guardian and a ward;
1 Batcha Chetty v. Ponnusawmy Chetty (1912) 22 MLJ 68, 72; 
Narasayya v. Venkatappa AIR 1923 Mad 359.
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it was often assumed to be that of a trustee and a cestui
crue trust. Section 20 of this Act states clearly that 'a
guardian stands in a fiduciary relation to his ward* --
a relation uberrimae fidei1 which lasts even after the
function of guardianship itself has ceased to exist. The
liability of a guardian is that of a trustee and for the
abuse of or for negligence or incapacity to perform the
duties of this trust he may, as under section 22(a)to (e)
of the European British Minors Act of 1874, be removed3.
The guardian of the person of a minor has a right to the
custody of the person of his ward, and he must look to
the minor's support, health and education, and such other
matters as are agreeable to the personal law of the minor^.
The Bengal Minors Act of 1858 and the Bombay Minors Act
of 1864 provided in sections 27 and 31 respectively that
nothing in those Acts should authorise the appointment
of any person other than a female as the guardian of the
5person of a female • This Act has adopted a liberal atti­
tude in this regards there is nothing in it to prevent a 
male from being appointed as the guardian of the person 
of a female.
The Act has hot said in so many words that the dealings 
with a minor's property by his guardian should be controlled
1 The Gazette of India, 1886, part IV, 77, See para 13 of 
the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill,
2 GWA, 1890, sec. 37
3 Ibid, sec, 39,
4 Ibid, sec, 24.
5 Fuseehun v. Kajo (1884) 10 Cal 15.
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by the personal law of the minor. Section 27 of the Act 
provides!
"A guardian of the property of a ward is bound 
to deal therewith as carefully as a man of 
ordinary prudence would deal with it if it 
were his own, and, subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, he may do all acts which are 
reasonable and proper for the realisation, 
protection or benefit of the property”.
It appears from the literal wording of the section 
that it applies to all property guardians whether recog­
nised by personal laws or certificated by courts1. This 
is not necessarily the correct conclusion at which to
arrive, but the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (Act 32)
o
of 1956, as we shall see , took up the wording of section 
27 and no one has commented (as they well might) that any 
novelty was enacted thereby* all guardians, natural, testa­
mentary, or certificated are expected in the exercise of 
their powers to deal with minors* property as carefully 
as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with it if it 
were his own property, and they are also allowed to do
all acts which are reasonable and proper for the realisa-
3tion, protection or benefit of the minor's estate .
Without the prior permission of the court persons 
who are appointed or declared to be guardians of the 
property of minors are not permitted (a) to mortgage or 
charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise,
1 Dawsons Bank, Ltd. v. Ma May AIR 1934 Rang 335, 336.
2 See infra. 244-45.
3 Derrett, Introduction. 72 para 88.
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any part of the minor’s immovable property, or (b) to
lease any part of that property for a term exceeding
five years or for any term exceeding more than one year
beyond the date on which the ward ceases to be a minor^.
The court may grant the above permission only 'in case
of necessity or for an evident advantage to the ward'^.
If an alienation is made without the court's permission
or in excess of the powers given under a will or other
instrument that will not be void, but only voidable at
the instance of the affected person . As under the previous
Acts, the court may require a guardian to furnish securi-
4ties, submit accounts , and to apply for the maintenance
and education of the minor and his dependants, and also
for the celebration of ceremonies to which the minor or
5his dependants may be a party •
10. Modern law of guardianship
10.1. India
Section 18(3) of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 
provided that the law of British India as existing before 
the 15th of August, 1947, "shall, with necessary adoptations,
1 GWA, 1890, sec. 29. This section combines in itself the 
contents of section 16 of the Bengal Minors Act of 1858, 
section 20 of the Bombay Minors Act of 1864 and section 
13 of European British Minors Act of 1874.
2 GWA, 1890, sec. 31.
3 GWA, 1890, sec. 30.
4 Shamrao v. Shashikant AIR 1948 Bom 15, 19.
5 GWA, 1890, sec. 34.
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continue as the law of the new Dominion ... until other
provision is made by Legislature*'. After the Independence
the law relating to the guardianship of a minor's person
and property in India continued to be as before. The GWA,
1890, was adopted1 and cases were and are decided according
to its provisions even after August 25, 1956, when the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act was passed to amend
and codify the law relating to minority and guardianship
among the Hindus in matters of a minor's person or property
other than his undivided interest in joint family property
which is specifically excluded from the scope and purview 
2
of the Act . The provisions of the new Act are complementary
3
to those of the GWA of 1890 , but in case of any repugnancy
, . . . 4the provisions of the new Act will prevail . This Act has
fixed the age of majority at the completion of eighteen
5years of age instead of twenty-one years . Under this Act 
a person cannot claim to be the legal guardian of a Hindu 
minor unless he or she is (i) a natural guardian, (ii) a 
guardian appointed by the will of the minor's father or 
mother, (iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, 
or (iv) a person empowered to act as such by or under any 
enactment relating to any Court of Wards**.
1 Adaptation of Existing Laws Order, 1947, sec. 3 (with 
effect from 15 August, 1947). See also Art 372 of the 
Constitution of India, 1950.
2 HMGA, 1956, sec. 12. See also In re Krishnakant AIR 1961 
Guj 68, 71-72.
3 HMGA, 1956, sec. 2.
4 Ibid, sec. 5.
5 Ibid, sec. 4(a).
6 Ibid, sec. 4(b). See also Ramchandra Iyer v. Annapurni 
(1963) 1 Ker 656; (1963) KLT 348.
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The HMGA has expressly recognised the father and
after him the mother as the natural guardian1 of the person
and separate property of a minor, and it does not seem
that section 13(2) has, in any way, affected their rights.
So far as the power of disposition of a minor's property
is concerned the natural guardians are placed at par with
certificated guardians. Section 8(1) defines the general
powers of a natural guardian in terms similar to those
which could be found in section 27 of the GWA, but section
8(2) has made it obligatory upon him to obtain the previous
permission of the court for an alienation of a minor's
immovable property as it is required for a guardian appointed
by the court under section 29 of the GWA. The remaining
sub-sections of section 8 contain provisions similar to
those of section 30 and 31 of the GWA. Sub-section (l) of
section 8 also contains in it the ratio of the Privy Council
2decision m  Waghela Raisanii v. Masludin . But the most 
spectacular of all is section 11 of the HMGA which is said 
to have taken away the powers of a de facto guardian to 
dispose of or deal with the property of a Hindu minor.
Under Hindu law the powers of a de facto guardian
to bind a minor's estate by alienations of the latter*s
immovable property in the case of necessity or for the
benefit of the estate of the minor have been recognised
since the Privy Council decision in Hunoomanpersaud Panday
3 .v. Mussumat Babooee in 1856. But, as we shall see in chapter 3,
1 HMGA, 1956, secs. 6 and 9.
2 (1887) 14 IA 89 (PC).
3 (1856) 6 MIA 393 (PC).
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if the section is carefully read it will appear that the 
whole section seems to indicate that a person cannot validly 
dispose of a minor’s property merely for his being a de 
facto guardian, i.e., unless the alienation is supported 
by some other considerations which the Parliament may 
appear to think to have been contained in the Privy Council 
decisions in Hunoomanpersaud*s and Waghela Raisanii's case.
In India the guardians and minors of other communities are 
still governed by the GWA as before, so far as its provisions 
are consistent with the personal laws, if any, of the minors 
of those communities.
10.2. Pakistan
After Independence Pakistan adopted the GWA in 19491
2and extended it to the whole of Pakistan m  1955 . Before
such extension it was applied to the Phulera in the Excluded
Area of Upper Tanawal to the extent the Act was applicable
3m  the North-West Frontier Province and was also extended
1 Adaptation Order, 1949, Arts. 3(2) and 4 (see the Gazette 
of Pakistan, 29 April, 1949); and the Federal Laws (Review 
and Declaration) Act (Act 26) of 1951, sec. 8 (see the 
Gazette of Pakistan, 12 May, 1951).
2 Central Laws (Statute Reform) Ordinance, 1960 (21 of 1960) 
sec. 3 and Second Schedule (with effect from 14 October, 
1955), (see the Gazette of Pakistan, 9 June, 1960); see 
also Art 224 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan, 1956; Art 225 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Pakistan, 1962; and Art 268 of the Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
3 North-West Frontier Province (Upper Tanawal Excluded Area) 
Laws Regulation, 1950.
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to the Leased Areas of Baluchistan1, to the Baluchistan
2 3States Union , and to the Khairpur state , In 1958 it was
4
enforced in Gwadur . As stated earlier the GWA does not 
interfere with the personal laws of the Hindus and Muslims. 
The persons who are entitled to act as natural guardian 
under Hindu and Muslim law continue to be recognised as 
such guardians. It confers expressly a certain jurisdiction 
and defines the position of those who avail themselves of 
it, leaving persons to whom any other rules of personal 
law apply unaffected. Unlike the HMGA of India no attempt 
was made in Pakistan to codify the customary laws of the 
Hindus relating to minority and guardianship. The position 
of de facto guardians is not therefore shaken in any way 
in Pakistan and no limitation is imposed on their powers 
to bind the minors* estates by alienation of immovable 
property for the necessity or benefit of the minors.
Pakistan courts are following the GWA supplemented by the 
personal laws of minors as long as its provisions are 
consistent with their welfare.
1 Leased Areas (Laws) Order, 1950 (Governor-Genera1 *s Order 
3 of 1950), see the Gazette of Pakistan, 5 October, 1950.
2 Baluchistan States Union (Federal Laws) (Extension) Order, 
1953 (Governor-General *s Order 4 of 1953), see the Gazette 
of Pakistan, 15 April, 1953.
3 Khairpur (Federal Laws) (Extension) Order, 1953? see the 
Gazette of Pakistan, 15 April, 1953.
4 Gwadur (Application of Central Laws) Ordinance (37 of 1960), 
1960, sec. 2 (with effect from 8 September, 1958), see
the Gazette.of Pakistan, Extraordinary, 31 August, 1960.
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10.3. Bangladesh
The GWA has been adopted in Bangaldesh1, and, as in 
Pakistan, no other enactment is made to amend or supplement 
its provisions. The GWA does not interfere with the rules 
of personal laws. Thus persons who are entitled to act 
as natural guardians under Hindu and Muslim law continue 
to be so recognised. Although the provisions of the GWA 
do not contain anything against the union of the guardian­
ship of person and of property in the same individual, a 
presumptive heir to the property of a minor is not considered 
a suitable person to be appointed guardian of his person,
2because such a person stands to g a m  by the minor's death •
In India under the HMGA the Hindu natural guardians are
to seek prior permission of the court if they want to
dispose of their minor children's property, but in Bangladesh
they are allowed to do it to the extent permitted by the
customary Hindu law. The courts in Bangladesh recognise
the father's absolute right to appoint a testamentary but
it is not so recognised in the case of a motheri while in
India the HMGA has placed both the parents in an equal
3position m  this respect .
1 Art. 149 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of 
Bangladesh, 1972; Act 8 of 1973.
2 Sami Row v. Elivatha Row (1906) 16 MLJ 357; Krishnaswami 
Chetty v. Collah Mangammah (1911) 1 MWN 365; Sharfan v. 
Bholi AIR 1922 Lah 395, 396.
3 HMGA, 1956, sec. 9.
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C H A P T E R  II 
ALIENATION BY NATURAL GUARDIANS UNDER HINDU LAW
1. Alienation
In the previous chapter we have seen that in all the 
systems minors are incapable of entering into transactions 
in respect of their own property? and their guardians may 
alienate their property under certain circumstances on 
their behalf. Generally, in guardianship alienations are 
made for the purpose of either raising funds to meet 
necessity, or to pay some ancestral or other validly 
incurred debts, or to pay government revenue, or to improve 
the estate of the minor, or to purchase more profitable or 
income-bearing properties, or to start some business in 
expectation of attractive returns, or to convert immovable 
properties into cash for lending out at a high rate of 
interest, or for other transactions of a similar nature? 
and they are effected by sale, mortgage, lease, gift, 
exchange or other similar actions.
1.1. Who are natural guardians under Hindu law?
Under every system of law the father is the natural 
guardian of his minor children? but as regards others the 
position varies according to the personal law of the minor. 
Under Hindu law the parents are the natural guardians1 of
1 Derrett, Introduction, 50 para 51.
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their minor children, and among them the father has the 
preferential right1 over the mother to the guardianship 
of both the person and property of the minors# But as 
regards the claim of other relations to guardianship 
sometime it was said on the basis of the following authori­
ties of Strange and Macnaghten that paternal and maternal
2relations were also natural guardians. Strange observed i
"The natural guardians of a minor are, first his 
father, then his mother, elder brother, paternal 
relatives and maternal relatives".
. 3Macnaghten said i
"A father is recognosed as the legal guardian of 
his children, when he exists? and when the father 
is dead the mother may assume the guardianship.
In default of her, an elder brother of a minor 
is competent to assume the guardianship of him.
In default of such brother, the paternal relations 
generally are entitled to hold the office of 
guardian and failing such relatives, the office 
devolves on the maternal kinsmen, according to 
their degree of proximity? but the appointment 
of guardians universally rests with the ruling 
power".
Referring to the above passage from Macnaghten, Garth,
4C.J., observed in Knsto Kissor Neoghy v. Kadermoye Dossee i
"We do not think that this passage means that all 
persons therein mentioned have in turn an absolute 
right to take upon themselves the guardianship of 
a minor, without any permission or authority from 
the ruling power. If it did mean this, the authori­
ties cited would not appear to support it".
1 In the matter of Himnauth Bose (1862)1 Hyde 111? Mokoond 
Lai v. Nabodip Chunder (1898) 25 Cal 881, 884.
2 Hindu Law Vol. 1 (Madrasi 4th ed., 1864), 72a.
3 Hindu law Vol. 1, 103-04.
4 (1978) 2 CLR 583.
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The learned Chief Justice observed that no one else
in a minor’s family other than his parents was entitled
as of right to act as the minor's natural guardian; the
right to act after the parents depended upon the decision
of the king. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in
Chennappa v. Onkarappa1 did not approve of the above two
passages of Strange and Macnaghten. In his leading judgment
2
of the Full Bench Leach, C.J., observed i
"It is common ground that the ancient texts of 
Hindu law do not provide for the management of 
a minor's property beyond stating that the 
guardianship shall rest with the king. The 
position of the king is now taken by the court. 
Custom has, however, recognized that the father 
of a Hindu minor, and on his death the minor's 
mother, is entitled to the guardianship of the 
minor's estate. This has been accepted from 
time immemorial so universally that the right 
of the father or of the mother as the case may 
be cannot now be disputed, but it appears to 
be equally clear that custom has not extended 
that rule beyond mother".
Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., another member of the Full
3Bench rightly thought that the enumeration of other rela­
tions besides the parents in the list of natural guardians 
by Strange and Macnaghten was not intended to declare the 
persons to be recognised as lawful guardians under Hindu 
law without reference to an appointment by the court; on 
the contrary, it was an indication of the order of prefer­
ence which the court should bear in mind in the making of 
choice of a guardian from among the available relations,
1 (1940) Mad 358 (FB).
2 Ibid, 363-64.
3 Ibid, 371.
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the dominant consideration being always the welfare of the 
minor. Under Hindu law the father and after his death the 
mother are the natural guardians of their minor children1; 
on the adoption of a minor child the natural parents lose 
their right of natural guardianship over the child, and 
their place is taken by the child's adoptive parents; and 
on the marriage of a minor daughter her husband becomes 
her natural guardian.
The personal law of guardianship of the Hindus in
India has now been codified by the HMGA of 1956. Sections
6 and 7 of that Act denote the persons entitled to act
2as natural guardians of a Hindu minor . According to them 
the father and after him the mother are the natural 
guardians of a legitimate boy or unmarried girl; and in 
the case of an illegitimate boy or unmarried girl the 
mother and after her the father are the natural guardians.
In the case of a married minor girl her husband will be 
her natural guardian. Section 13(2) of the Act provides 
that no person shall be entitled to be appointed as guardian 
by the court by virtue of the provisions of this Act or any 
law relating to guardianship in marriage among the Hindus, 
if the court is of opinion that his guardianship will not 
be for the welfare of the minor. As it stands, although the
1 Anna purnamma v. Ramanianeyaratnam AIR 1959 AP 40, 46;
Jamuna Prasad v. Mst. Panna AIR 1960 All 285, 287;*
Sheokumar v. Shiv Rani Bai AIR 1966 HP 189; In re 
Dakshinamurthi Mudaliar (1969) 1 MLJ 345.
2 For a fuller discussion of these sections see Derrett, 
Introduction, 52 para 54; S.V. Gupte, Hindu law of Adoption, 
Maintenance, Minority and Guardianship (Bombay»1970), 401- 
406.
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father and mother are the natural guardians under the Act, 
the court can ignore their claims if it is of opinion that 
his or her guardianship will not be for the minor’s welfare.
1*2. Alienation by natural guardians and Hunoomanpersaud*s 
case
The circumstances under which a guardian or manager1 
of the estate of a Hindu minor can alienate his ward's 
property were clearly defined by Knight Bruce, L.J., in 
Hunoomanpersaud's case. The principles of that case apply 
equally to all guardians of Hindu minors, excepting those 
who are appointed by courts or whose powers are defined 
by testamentary instruments appointing them. The facts 
of the case show that a mother mortgaged the estate of 
her minor son as manager of the estate for the payment of 
government revenue and also some ancestral debts of the 
minor. Several propositions were laid down by that decision. 
The first one was that "under the Hindoo law, the right 
of a bona fide incumbrancer who has taken from a de facto 
Manager a charge on lands created honestly, for the purpose 
of saving the estate, or for the benefit of the estate,
1 It is to be observed that under the earlier British 
Regulations and Acts, specially the Bengal Regulation 
10 of 1793, the Madras Regulation 5 of 1804, the Bengal 
Minors Act of 1858, and the Bombay Minors Act of 1864, 
and also in the cases decided under those Regulations 
and Acts the person who was entrusted with the custody 
of a minor's person was called his guardian, while one 
who was entrusted with the custody of the minor's property 
was called his manager. This terminological difference 
was first removed by the European British Minors Act of 
1874 and then by the GWA of 1890.
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is not (provided the circumstances would support the charge
had it emanated from a de facto and de jure manager)
affected by the want of union of the de facto with the
de jure title”1. The second one was that the power of a
manager to charge his minor ward's estate "is, under the
Hindoo law, a limited and qualified power. It can only
be exercised rightly in a case of need, or for the benefit 
2
of the estate” . The last one was that "the lender is bound
to inquire into the necessities for the loan, and to
satisfy himself as well as he can, with reference to the
parties with whom he is dealing, that the Manager is acting
3in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate" . 
It was also observed that if a purchaser so inquired and 
acted honestly 'the real existence of an alleged sufficient 
and reasonably credited necessity is not a condition prece­
dent to the validity of his charge', and 'under such cir­
cumstances' he is not bound 'to see to the application of 
the money'.
Although the language in which the propositions are 
put by their Lordships of the Privy Council leads us to 
believe that they were there in the Hindu law from before,
4
but, in fact, they are completely alien to that system •
1 Hunoomanpersaud's case (1856) 6 MIA 393, 412-13 (PC).
2 Ibid, 423.
3 Ibid, 424.
4 Derrett has very logically traced out the genesis of these 
principles under the title 'The Misty Origins of Anglo- 
Hindu law', in Appendix II of his Critique to Modern Hindu 
Law, 425-432.
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Of the three propositions, the third is the corollary of
the first one; and they are taken out of the 'English law
of trusts as it was before 1 9 2 5 Such rules were not
2
there in the 'Hindu scriptures or commentaries' . So far
as the second proposition is concerned the power given
under it to the manager of a minor's estate is an import
from the Roman law which found its way through the Chancery
3and the Privy Council into Hindu law • Although this power 
is limited and qualified one, it was derived neither from 
Hindu law nor from English law so far as the payment of 
ancestral debts is concerned. We have seen earlier that 
under the sastric Hindu law minors were not liable for 
ancestral debts until they reached majority, and the 
guardians had no power to alienate the minors' property 
for their payment without the court's permission. Similarly 
under English law the creditors could not force the minors
4
to pay ancestral debts as long as they were under age ; 
and the guardians were not allowed to create charges over
5
their minor wards' landed property .
1 Derrett, Introduction. 427 para 542. See also Derrett, 
'Justice, equity and good conscience', in J.N.D. Anderson 
ed., Changing law in the Developing Countries (London; 
1963), 114-153.
2 Derrett, Critigue, 427.
3 Ibid, 429-431. See also Derrett, 'The role of Roman law 
and Continental laws in India', in (1959) 24 Zeitschrift 
fuer anslaendisches und internationales privatrecht, 
657-685.
4 Pollock and Maitland, History of English law Vol. 2,
441, f.n. 4.
5 Derrett, Critigue. 428; J. Story, Eguity Jurisprudence 
(London; 14th ed., 1918), sec. 1357.
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In Hunoomanpersaud*s case their Lordships of the 
Privy Council observed1!
"Though an estate be ancestral, it may be charged 
for some purposes against the heir, for the 
father’s debt, by the father, ... Unless the debt 
was of such a nature that it was not the duty 
of the son to pay it, the discharge of it, even 
though it affected ancestral estate, would still 
be an act of pious duty in the son. By the Hindoo 
law, the freedom of the son from the obligation 
to discharge the father’s debt, has respect to 
the nature of the debt, and not to the nature 
of the estate, whether ancestral or acquired by 
the creator of the debt"•
The first portion of the above observation is well
according to Hindu law, if the debt is paid by the father
during his lifetime out of the joint family property. A
minor would be bound by the payment of an ancestral debt
or a debt contracted by his father and not_affected by
illegality or immorality when it is paid by the father
before partition either from the ancestral or the father’s
2
self acquired property . It is on this account that this
Privy Council decision was followed by their Lordships in
3Girdharee Lai v. Muddun Thakoor . But the second portion 
of the observation is not in accordance with sastric Hindu 
law. If a partition is effected and the property is vested 
in a minor, or if the father is dead, the sastric texts 
provide that the minor is not required to pay his ancestral
1 (1856) 6 MIA 393, 421.
2 Mussomut Junuk Kishoree v. Raqhoonundan Sing (1861) SDA
213, 222 (Benq)t Sadabart Prasad v. Foolbash Koer (1869)
3 BLR 31 (FB).
3 (1874) 14 BLR 187 (PC).
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debts until he attains majority, or where the father or 
manager who incurred the debts is living abroad, until 
the expiration of twenty years from the date of their 
leaving the country. Consequently, under sastric law there 
is no legal necessity for the payment of a minor's 
ancestral debts during his minority. Therefore, a guardian 
cannot alienate the minor's property for such debts. In 
Hunoomanpersaud's case when their Lordships held the mortgage 
bond executed by the mother-guardian during the minority 
of her son for the payment of the latter's ancestral debts 
as binding on the minor's estate, the decision does not 
seem to be according to the sastric texts of Hindu law.
Their Lordships, per Lord Atkinson, did not notice this 
point in Palaniappa Chetty v. Devasikamony1 where in explain­
ing the meaning of the terms 'necessity' and 'benefit of 
estate' Hunoomanpersaud's case was thoroughly discussed.
This escape is probably due to their Lordships' assumption 
that the liability for the payment of a Hindu minor's 
ancestral debts is an unqualified one.
The decision in Hunoomanpersaud * s case which is the 
acknowledged basis of the powers of a guardian or manager 
of a minor's estate, is said to have been based on the 
texts of the Mitakshara. Their Lordships of the Privy 
Council, per Sir Dinshah Mu11a, observed in the Benares
1 AIR 1917 PC 33, 36.
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Bank Ltd* v. Hari Narain^:
"The power of a manager of a joint family governed 
by the Mitakshara law to alienate immovable 
property belonging to the family is defined in 
verses 27 to 29, ch. 1 of the Mitakshara. The 
judgment of this court in Hunoomanpersaud Pandey 
v. Mt. Babooee Koonweree. ... was founded appa­
rently on those verses".
We have seen earlier that these verses of the Mitakshara 
provide that in a Mitakshara joint family property the 
right of ownership originates by birth and all the copar­
ceners have equal interests in the joint family property, 
and further that none of the coparceners can effect any
alienation of the joint family property without the consent
2of other coparceners • An exception to this general rule 
of incapacity has been introduced by relying upon the 
text of Brihaspati in cases where the coparceners cannot 
give their consent because of their being minors. In his 
gloss on this text Vijnanesvara says that the transfer 
would be justified if a calamity affecting the whole family* 
i.e. in apatkale, requires it, or the support of the family, 
i.e., for kutumbarthe* renders it, or indispensable duties, 
such as the obsequies of the father or the like, i.e.,
3
dharmarthe, make it unavoidable •
It appears from the context in which Vijnanesvara 
used the text of Brihaspati and the gloss thereon that the 
text of Brihaspati relates to the disposition of such
1 AIR 1932 PC 182, 185.
2 Mitakshara 1.1.27.
3 Ibid, 1.1.29. See also Strange, Hindu law Vol. 1, 19-20? 
Paras Diwan, Modern Hindu Law (Allahabadi 2nd ed., 1974),
274.
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undivided immovable property as awaits partition at the 
hands of those who are entitled to it and as, before such 
partition, is in the management of an adult member of the 
family who has a distinct share in it jointly with the 
minor members of the family1. If the Privy Council decision 
is considered in this light it would appear that their 
Lordships strangely relied upon the Mitakshara verses in 
Hunoomanpersaud's case in which the mother-alienor had 
absolutely no interest whatsoever in the property transferred 
except her supervisory capacity over it as guardian of her 
minor son in whom all the interest in the property vested.
In so far as it is concerned with the transfer of a minor's 
property by his guardian, the Privy Council ruling is not 
based on the Mitakshara texts. Although lawyers, judges 
and text-book writers^ unwisely trace the origin of the 
alienating power of a guardian to the above mentioned 
verses of the Mitakshara» their Lordships of the Privy 
Council imported Roman law principle in this respect 
because of their training in that law'*. The Privy Council 
in fact introduced the Roman negotiorum qestio into Hindu 
law, under which the negotiorum gestor. i.e., a stranger 
could validly transfer the property of others without their 
concurrence but for their benefit or advantage. It is to 
be mentioned here that even under Hindu law a stranger or
1 Budhkaran Chaukhani v. Thakur Prosad AIR 1942 Cal 311. 317. 
per Pal, J.
2 Excepting J.D.M. Derrett who for the first time pointed 
out the non-Hindu basis of the Privy Council ruling.
(See his Critigue. 425-431).
3 Derrett, Critigue. 429-431.
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a person attached to the family may alienate the property 
of others or of that family under certain emergent cir­
cumstances, but, as we shall see in chapter 3, the Privy 
Council did not consider in Hunoomanpersaud*s case those 
circumstances and the texts and authorities providing 
that power.
In spite of its non-Hindu origin the Privy Council 
ruling worked very well for over a century and a quarter1.
Ever since this Privy Council decision both the Bench 
and the Bar regard its ruling as applicable to all circums­
tances of alienation. Paradoxically enough, after this
. . . 2 Privy Council decision some of the learned judges seek
to find justification for the alienation of a joint undi­
vided family property by the manager of that family consist­
ing of minor members as well, in the above Privy Council 
ruling while that authority of the manager is there in full 
force in the verses of the Mitakshara. Unless the manager 
is a stranger which is unlikely such reference seems to 
disown the manager's own interest in the joint family 
property.
3Nobody excepting a 20th century orientalist ever 
bothered about the quiet replacing of a sastric rule by a
1 Derrett. Critique. 425-432. See also Tulsidas v. Raisingji 
AIR 1933 Bom 15, 20 (FB) per Patkar, J.
2 Judges of the Full Bench in Jaaat Narain v. Mathura Das 
AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).
3 J.D.M. Derrett, Professor of Oriental laws in the University 
of London. In early 50s of this century he was Tagore 
Professor of Law in the University of Calcutta. His
(contd.)
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foreign non-Hindu principle1. However, the principles of 
the Privy Council decision have become the accepted basis 
of the powers of a guardian, natural or de facto. As seen 
earlier the Privy Council decision shows that the manager 
or guardian of a minor's estate can exercise his power to 
charge or alienate the minor's estate either on the ground 
of necessity or for the benefit of the estate. The two 
words 'necessity' and 'benefit' indicate, if they are 
looked at in the perspective in which they are pronounced 
by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud's
case, two distinct concepts   one relating to the personal
affairs of the minor, and the other relating to his property. 
Now the question arises what necessity of a minor or what 
benefit of his estate will, under Hindu law, justify an 
alienation of a minor's property?
1.2.1. Meaning of necessity
It is very difficult to give a precise definition 
of the term 'necessity' or to enumerate the necessities 
which may bind a minor's estate. There may be a necessity 
for the necessaries of a minor, or for the payment of debts 
validly incurred by a guardian for the minor, or for making 
a gift to any member of the minor's family or for any
(contd) assessment of sastric literature [^ See Derrett, 
Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature (Wisebadeni 1973 
and his recent translation of Bharuci's Commentary on 
the Manusmrti (Wisebadeni 1975) speak of his knowledge 
of the language in which all the Hindu Dharmasastras 
are written.
1 It is amazing that the origin of the principle, so adroitly 
phrased, escaped the notice of the Bench and the Bar for 
over a century.
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religious purpose. But necessity does not mean actual
compulsion? it implies a kind of pressure which the law
recognises as serious and sufficient^-• The actual occasion
for necessity must arise. A mere anticipated want does
not constitute a justifying necessity; and to justify
an alienation of a minor's property it must be shown that
the expenses could not have been met from the income of
the property in the hands of the guardian, and that they
were not unreasonable. Indeed necessity is to be understood
strictly with reference to the minor's own contemporary 
2objective need ; mere requirement of an ordinary kind, 
or mere fulfilment of a wish felt by the guardian in relation 
to a minor's estate will not constitute a necessity^. 
Necessity is the touchstone of a guardian's authority to 
alienate his minor ward's property. Broadly speaking 
necessity will include all those things which are deemed 
necessary for the minor and his dependants. Again, all 
necessities may not always be necessaries, but the minors
4are liable for necessaries, and not merely for necessities .
1.2,1.1. Necessity for necessaries
Certain things are necessaries, such as food, clothing, 
medicine, etc., but at times because of their quality,
1 Mayne, Hindu law (10th ed., 1938), 785 sec. 650? see also 
Ramsumaran Prasad v. Shyam Kumari AIR 1922 PC 356; Gulab 
Devi v. Banwari Lai AIR 1940 All 403, 404; Rani v. Santa 
Bala AIR 1971 SC 1028.
2 Derrett, Hindu law past and present (Calcutta; 1957), 125 
para 193; see also Pursid Narain Singh v. Honooman Sahay 
(1880) 5 Cal 845; Doulut Ram v. Meher Chand (1887) 14 IA 
187, 196.
3 Kanhiya Lai v. Deep Chand AIR 1947 Lah 199, 208.
4 W.R. Anson, Law of Contract (London; 24th ed., 1975), 206.
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quantity and the time when they are supplied they may lose 
their character of being necessaries. Minors are obliged 
to pay for the necessaries supplied to them1. Law considers 
it to be for the benefit of a minor that he should be 
capable of binding himself to pay for the necessaries of 
life supplied to him and other members of his family^.
But what are necessaries? Necessaries is a relative term. 
Primarily it implies only suitable food, drink, clothing 
and education for the minor in accordance with his position 
in life and his fortune. Articles purely of ornament and 
luxury are not to be included in it. Sometimes, however, 
ornamental or luxurious articles may become necessaries 
suitable to the state, degree and station in life of the 
minor. In each case it must be determined with reference
to the fortune and circumstances of the particular minor .
4
In Peters v. Fleming Parke, B., classically observed*
'•It is perfectly clear, that from the earliest 
time down to the present, the word necessaries 
was not confined, in its strict sense, to such 
articles as were necessary to the support of 
life, but extended to articles fit to maintain 
the particular person in the state, situation, 
and degree in life in which he is; and therefore 
we must not take the word 'necessaries' in its 
unqualified sense, but with the qualifications 
above pointed out".
To be precise, the word 'necessaries' does not mean
5articles of comfort or convenience , it implies goods
1 Coke upon Littleton. 172a.
2 Halsburv's laws of England Vol. 21, 142 sec. 320.
3 Jaqan Ram Marwari v. Mahadeo Prosad Sahu (1909) 36 Cal 768.
4 (1840) 6 M & W 42; 151 ER 314.
5 J. Chitty, Contracts Vol. 1 (London* 23rd ed., 1968),
387 sec. 389.
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suitable to the 'condition in life'1 of a minor and to
his actual requirement at the time of the sale and delivery2.
Whether an article supplied to a minor is necessary or not
depends upon its general character and upon its suitability
to the particular minor's means, age and station in life3.
Sometimes a minor's need for a particular article also
depends upon the particular circumstances under which it
is purchased and the use to which it is put. Thus Cockburn,
C.J., observed in Jenner v. Walker4 that wedding presents
purchased by a minor could be deemed necessaries, but in
ordinary circumstances such purchases might not be so
considered. Though this ruling of 1868 could well be
obsolete in England, it by no means follows that it will
5be so in India amongst the Hindus • Necessaries must be 
things which a minor actually needs . It is not unlikely 
that an article which may belong to a class of things that 
are unquestionably necessary and which may correspond in 
quality and price with the minor's means, when supplied
1 Sales of Goods Act (56 & 57 Viet. c. 71), 1893, sec. 2; 
Indian Contract Act (Act 9), 1872, sec. 68.
2 Maddox v. Miller (1813) 1 M & S 738} 105 ER 275; Harrison 
v * Fane (1840) 1 M & G 550} 133 ER 450} Brooker v. Scott
(1843) 11 M & W 67} 152 ER 718} Barnese v. Toye (1884)
13 QBD 410} Johnstone v. Marks (1887) 19 QBD 509} Sadasheo 
Balaii v. Firm Hiralal AIR 1938 Nag 65, 67.
3 Nash v. Inman (1908) 2 KB 1.
4 (1868) 19 LT 398 (NS).
5 Juqqessur v. Nilambur (1865) 3 WR 217} Makundi v. Sarab- 
sukh (1884) 6 All 417.
6 Pollock and Mulla, Indian Contract and Specific Relief 
Acts (Bombayi 9th ed., 1972), 116, 486} A.C. Dutt, Indian 
Contract Act (Calcutta* 4th ed., 1969), 571-74} K. Venkoba 
Rao, Indian Contract Act (Delhi* 1955), 541.
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turns out to be in excessive supply to the minor; that is,
the minor was already plentifully supplied with that
article1. In such a case the thing supplied does not fall
within the description of necessaries. Lord Esher, M.R.,
2observed m  Johnstone v. Marks that the true question 
is not a mere abstract one whether the articles supplied 
were in their nature necessaries, but a practical question 
whether they were necessary for the minor, and they could 
not be if the minor already had plenty of them. In an action 
against him the minor may show that he was already fully 
supplied with similar goods, and it is immaterial whether 
the plaintiff knew it or not . A certain amount of urgency 
about the minor’s need has been regarded as an essential 
element in a transaction with a minor; the expenditure 
must be for some purpose the accomplishment of which cannot 
well be postponed without irremediable detriment to the
minor himself or to some person whom he was legally bound
4 .to support . Necessaries for the wife and children of a
. 5minor are also necessaries for him •
Generally the question of alienation of a Hindu 
minor’s separate individual property for his maintenance
1 Nash v. Inman (1908) 2 KB 1.
2 (1887) 19 QBD 509.
3 Ford v. Fotherqill (1794) 1 Peake 301; 170 ER 164; Barnes 
v. Tove (1884) 13 QBD 410,
4 Cunningham and Shepherd, Indian Contract Act (Calcuttai 
3rd ed., 1878), 200-01; Chappie v. Cooper (1844) 13 M & W 
252, 153 ER 105; Walter v. Everard (1891) 2 QB 369; Sham 
Charan v. Chowdhurv (1894) 21 Cal 872; Nandan Prasad v.
A iudhia (1910) 32 All 325 (FB).
5 W. Macpherson, A Treatise on the law Relating to Infants 
(London: 1842), 502.
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and support does not arise so long as he lives in a joint 
Hindu family. His necessities for necessaries are met out 
of the joint family property managed by the father or 
other elderly members of the family as manager. Under the 
Hindu law it is the legal obligation of the father to 
maintain his minor sons and unmarried daughters^" whether
2he possesses any property or not, separate or self-acquired . 
The obligation of a non-father manager to maintain them 
arises from the fact that the manager is in possession 
of the family property both under the Mitakshara and the 
Dayabhaga schools. As seen earlier, a minor gets only an 
interest in the joint family property if the family is 
governed by the Mitakshara law, and not even that if it is 
governed by the Dayabhaga law, since under the latter a 
minor's interest in the family property does not accrue 
until the father dies. The interest which a minor has in 
a Mitakshara joint family property can be alienated by 
the father or manager along with that of others for the 
necessity of the family as a whole, and in the disposition 
of this interest the father's or manager's power is greater 
than that of the guardian of a minor's property. In the 
absence of any joint family property and for the necessity 
of the minor and his dependants, the father or other near 
relations may alienate the minor's individual property
1 Manu VIII. 389; Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act
(Act 78) 1956, sec. 20.
2 Mulla, Hindu law (Bombay* 13th ed., 1966), 540 sec. 545;
Mayne, Hindu law (11th ed., 1950), 817 sec. 685.
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only as guardian; and the minor would be bound by such 
alienations even if_they. are made without the sanction 
of the court provided they are effected for the necessity 
or benefit of the minor.
Under Muslim law, by contrast, the expenses for the 
maintenance of a minor are first charge on the minor*s 
own property. Although a father is bound like a Hindu 
father to maintain his minor children and nobody shares 
his obligation, the expenses for the maintenance of his 
minor children are not a liability to be met out of his 
property as long as the children have their own property, 
movable or immovable. At Common law, however, a father
was under a moral obligation to maintain his minor children**
2whatever their circumstances would be • Cockburn, C.J., 
observed** t
MExcept under the operation of the poor law, there 
is no legal obligation on the part of the father 
to maintain his child, unless, indeed, the neglect 
to do so should bring the case within the criminal 
law. Civilly there is no such obligation”.
In India, Pakistan and Bangladesh like a Hindu or a
Muslim father a Christian father is bound to maintain his
4 .minor children but unlike them he cannot alienate his
1 Blackstone, Commentaries Vol, 1, 449; A.H. Simpson,
A Treatise on the Law and Practice relating to Infants 
(London> 4th ed.. 1926). 129; Halsburv*s laws of England 
Vol. 21, 189; Stephen*s Commentaries on the laws of 
England (London! 21st ed., 1950) Vol. 2~, 509; Bromley, 
Family law, 402, 469.
2 Macpherson, Infants. 219.
3 Bazeley v, Forder (1868) 3 QB 559.
4 Trevelyan, Minors, 206.
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children*s property for their necessaries. In case of 
a minor's need a Hindu father can dispose of the minor's 
property without the court's permission, but if a Muslim 
father does it without the court's permission he will not 
have a recourse against the minor's property if the 
expenditure for necessaries exceeds the minor's money in 
his hands, while a Christian father cannot in any way 
give a valid title to an alienee of the minor's property.
Of the three minors, Hindu, Muslim and Christian, the 
Muslim minor's property is spent first for his maintenance, 
while the property of their parents, in the case of a 
Hindu and a Christian minor, is spent for their maintenance. 
But a Christian minor being governed by English law his 
parents or guardians cannot be forced by the civil courts 
to provide him maintenance.
Trevelyan observes1!
"Although that law [English law] recognizes the 
duty of the father to maintain and educate his 
children, the Civil Courts have no direct means 
of enforcing this obligation, so as to compel 
him to maintain them out of property in which 
they have no interest"•
1 Minors. 209. After the Second World War new statutes were 
passed in England to compel the parents either to maintain 
or to contribute towards the maintenance of their children. 
Thus the National Assistance Act (11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 29) 
1948, secs. 42(1) and 64(1) imposed upon each spouse the 
liability to maintain his or her children under the age 
of sixteen years, and was required to repay any assistance 
given to such children under the Act. The husband's Common 
law liability was not relieved by the wife's statutory 
liability. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 the court 
of competent jurisdiction can on a wife's application 
order a husband who wilfully neglects to maintain his 
minor children to make such periodical payments as may 
be just. Under social legislation financial assistance
(contd.)
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However, under Hindu law when a guardian alienates 
his minor ward's property for his necessaries, primarily 
the validity of the alienation would be determined not by 
the alienability of the property, but according to the 
goods* becoming necessaries. The guardians would be 
justified in selling, leasing or charging the minors* 
property for the necessaries of them and their dependants. 
East, C,J«, observed in Doe dem Bissonaut v, Doorqapersaud 
Day1 that it was not necessary to authorise the sale of 
a minor's property that the family should be in absolute 
and urgent want of the necessaries of life at the very
(contd) is given by means of family allowances out of public 
funds towards the maintenance of minors [see Family Allow­
ances Act (8 & 9 Geo, 6, c. 41) 1945? Family Allowances 
and National Insurance Act (15 & 16 Geo, 6 & 1 Eliz, 2, c. 
29) 1952; and Family Allowances and National Insurance 
Act (4 & 5 Eliz, 2, c. 50) 1956*], A similar relief is 
provided under the Ministry of Social Security Act 1966 
to relieve the poor parents and help them perform their 
social and legal duty of maintaining their children by 
providing money payments by the state in respect of the 
children of the family who are not yet earning their 
living. Previously mother had the 'agency of necessity' 
at Common law under which she could purchase necessaries 
both for herself and for her minor children by pledging 
the father's credit; it is now abolished finally by the 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, It is to 
be remembered that no two orders for financial provision 
for a child may be in force at a time. It was not a correct 
statement of law when a Full Bench of the Kerala High 
Court in Commissioner of I.T, v, Pailv Pillai [(1972)
KLT 24 (FB)] says that English law gives a child no right 
to be maintained by his parent [see Derrett, 'Crumbs 
from the tablet the Christian child's plight', in (1972)
KLT (Jour) 39-41], The basic jurisdictional inadequacy of 
civil courts under Common law is still obtaining in the 
whole Subcontinent, and for this reason the civil courts 
can, in matters of a minor's custody, exercise their juris­
diction but when the question of maintenance arises they 
cannot [see Walter v, Walter AIR 1928 Cal 600; Chakko v, 
Daniel AIR 1953 Tra-Co 60,
1 (1815) 2 Morley's Digest, 49,
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moment, or sufficient to take away the power, that they 
were subsisting at the time upon the charitable donations 
of their friends and relations, who could at any moment 
withdraw their help from them. The learned Chief Justice 
continued in observing that land should not be sold at 
a moment's warning. If a family does not have any certain 
resource for the future, and any actual means of providing 
for its members the decent necessaries of life according 
to their condition, and if its members live on casual 
charity and not on any regular competent allowance, it 
constitutes a reasonable necessity to warrant the sale 
of the family property. If a minor has any other means of 
subsistence, his property cannot be sold for his maintenance. 
Thus where a mother sells the property of her minor son 
for the support of herself and the son while the son's 
father is living and capable of supporting the son, the
sale is liable to be set aside1, even though under Hindu
2law such an alienation by the mother may be allowed .
The word .'necessaries' is not confined merely to
3goods, it includes also expenses for instruction and for 
certain other services as well. The necessary expenses
4
for defending a suit brought against the minor , money
5advanced to procure the minor's discharge from an arrest
1 Kishen Lochan Bose v. Tarini Dasi (1830) 5 Sel. Rep 66 (NE).
2 Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 2, 293 case 2.
3 Coke upon Littleton, 172a; Walter v. Everard (1891) 2 QB
269, 274.
4 Gunga Pershad v. Phool Singh (1868) 10 WR 106 (CR).
5 Clarke v. Leslie (1803) 5 Esp 28; 170 ER 726.
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and money spent in defending the minor in a criminal
prosecution1 are moneys advanced or spent for necessaries.
It also includes reasonable marriage expenses of the minor’s 
2
dependants . Once the expenses of the minor’s own marriage
or of other minor members of his family were considered 
3as necessaries , since child marriage was m  practice in 
the society and the sastric texts enjoined such marriage^. 
After the Child Marriage Restraint Act (Act 19) of 1929
and the Hindu Marriage Act (Act 25) of 1955 the marriages
5of minors have become a punishable offence , and the 
expenses for such marriage do not constitute a legal 
necessity justifying alienation of a minor’s property.
The expenses for the performance of an indispensable
1 Sham Charan v. Chowdhurv (1894) 21 Cal 872.
2 Prea i Nurain v. Aiodhyapurshad (1848) 7 Sel. Rep 602 (NE);
Sundrabai v. Shivnarayana (1908) 32 Bom 81. In this case 
Chandavarkar, J., in delivering the judgment of a Division 
Bench dissented from Govinarazulu v. Devarabhotla (1903)
27 Mad 206 in which the marriage of sons was not considered 
to be a moral or religious obligation on either the father 
or other coparceners in the event of the father's death.
See also Shriniwasrao v. Baba Ram AIR 1933 Nag 285; Bachu 
Singh v. Baldeo Prasad AIR 1933 Oudh 132, 134; Krishnama- 
charl v. Ramabadran AIR 1952 Mad 706.
3 Juqgessur v. Nilambur (1865) 3 WR 217 (CR); Makundi v. 
Sarabsukh (1884) 6 All 417, 421.
4 Manu IX. 94; Gaut. XVIII. 21; Yain. I. 64; Vas. XVII. 71; 
Kaut. 3.3.1. See also S.C. Banerjee, Hindu law of Marriage 
and Stridhan (Calcutta* 5th ed., 1923), 48; Sarkar Sastri, 
Hindu law (Calcutta* 7th ed., 1936), 127.
5 Derrett, Introduction. 157 para 238; N.R. Raghavachariar, 
Hindu law (Madras* 6th ed., 1970), 1068; Pan Mai v. Gad 
Mai (1936) 63 Cal 1153; Hansra1 v. Askaran AIR 1941 Cal 
244; Baiamoni v. Paramoni Debi (1950) Cut 362, 372; Tattya 
v. Rabha AIR 1953 Bom 273; Rambhu v. Ra iaram AIR 1956
Bom 250.
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religious duty, such as initiatory ceremony of the minor \
2
the funeral ceremonies or the sraddh of the minor's
3 4father , or of his father's widow , are necessaries.
5Fulton, J., observed t
"Doubtless, we have to determine what are necessa­
ries according to Hindu ideas, and a pilgrimage 
may be looked upon as beneficial. But we think 
we should be extending the meaning that has hither­
to been assigned to the word if we were to sanction 
as a binding charge on the defendant a debt con­
tracted for a pilgrimage not undertaken in dis­
charge of any urgent spiritual duty, which it 
was obligatory on him to perform"•
The necessity for expenses or services which are
recognised in law is called legal necessity. In describing
the legal necessity of a joint Hindu family K.K. Bhattacha-
ryya observes^i
"Legal necessity is of various forms. All the 
indispensable religious ceremonies, the sacra­
ments, such as marriage and the investiture with 
the sacred thread, the obsequies, the cremation, 
the periodical oblations to the manes, the cere­
monies customary in the family, the subsistence 
of the family, the education of the younger 
members, the payment of the ancestral debts, 
the giving of presents at particular seasons
and on special occasions to the relatives, --
these and a thousand other causes of expenditure 
are constantly cropping up in a fairly prosperous 
Hindu joint family. All these are in the strict 
sense of the word, lawful necessities".
1 MacnacrhtenHindu law Vol. 2, 296-97 case 6.
2 Nathuram v. Shoma Chhagan (1890) 14 Bom 562.
3 Privabala Dasi v. Hanuman Prasad AIR 1939 Cal 202, 203.
4 Sadashiv v. Dhakubai (1880) 5 Bom 450, 460.
5 Ranmal Singji v. Vadilal Vakhatchand (1896) 20 Bom 61,73.
6 The law relating to the Joint Hindu Family (Calcuttat 1885), 
488.
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Long after the above observation D.K. Mahajan, J., 
in Sam Singh v. Ran jit Singh* pointed out that legal 
necessity changes with the change of time, and one must 
examine the prevailing state of society while judging 
whether what was a necessity item of expenditure twenty 
years ago still remains the necessary item of expenditure
in the changed state of society. In Parasiva Murthy v.
2
Rachaiah Das Gupta, C.J., held that a natural guardian 
could alienate the minor’s property only for legal 
necessity and for no other purpose. Therefore, unless a 
religious ceremony comes within the definition of legal 
necessity an alienation of a minor's property for it could 
not be justified. The best test in each case would be 
perhaps to see whether the alienation would have been 
reasonably and prudently made by the minor himself had he 
been of full age.
1.2.1.2 Necessity for payment of debts
(a) Ancestral debts
Debts of a minor may be either ancestral or personal; 
the former are the debts incurred by his ancestor or 
ancestors through whom he has acquired his property, while 
the latter are contracted either by the minor himself or 
by others acting on his behalf. Under Hindu law it is the
1 (1968) 70 PLR 1134.
2 AIR 1958 Mys 125.
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pious obligation1 of the sons to pay the debts of their
ancestors, if they are not tainted with illegality or
2 . 3immorality . Sastnc texts provided that the debts of
the father and grandfather had to be paid by the sons
and grandsons. There are differences among the sastric
. . 4texts regarding the liability of the great grandson .
Kane has deduced the following propositions from the 
different texts. First, the debts of a man must be paid 
by his three descendants if they have ancestral estate in 
their hands. Secondly, when no ancestral estate is taken 
by the descendants, the son is liable to pay his father's 
debts with interest, the grandson to his grandfather's 
debts only and not the interest, and the great grandson
1 For a detailed discussion of the pious obligation see 
Mayne, Hindu law (10th ed.), 423; Derrett, Introduction, 
310-312 paras 503-506; the same, Critique. 93 para 127; 
also the same, 'Hindu lawi Mitakshara* the Pious Obligation 
and the Doctrine of "Antecedency”i the end to a prolonged 
controversy?', in (1955) 18 SCJ 139 ff; the same, 'Misdeeds 
of a Manager and the Pious Obligation', in AIR 1960 (Jour) 
2-5; the same, 'The pious obligation of the Hindu som 
apropos of a judicial attack on the institution', in (1970) 
KLT 59 ff. See also Bankey Lai v. Durqa Prasad (1931) 53 
All 868 (FB); Pannalal v. Naraini AIR 1952 SC 170.
2 Manu VIII. 159-160; Gaut. XII. 38; Yain. II. 47, 54; Vas. 
XVI. 31; Katya. 564-565; Kaut. III. 16; Kane, Pharmasastra 
Vol. 3, 446-447, For details of tainted debts see Derrett, 
Introduction, 312-316 paras 507-511; the same, Critique, 
94-108 paras 128-139.
3 Bri. XI. 49; Yain. II. 50; Nar. I. 2; Katya. 559.
4 Brihaspati says that a great grandson is not liable to 
pay his great grandfather's debts (Bri. XI. 49). Visnu 
holds that descendants beyond the grandson need not pay 
if they are unwilling to pay (Vis. VI. 27-28). Narada 
(Nar. I. 4) and Katyayana (Katya. 560) say that the 
obligation to discharge a debt 'does not include the fourth 
in descent', but this seems to be in conflict with other 
sastric texts, such as Manu IX. 137; Baud* n *
Vas. XVII. 5; Vis. XV. 46.
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is not liable to pay even the principal if he is unwilling
to pay. Thirdly, a son is not liable to pay the illegal
or immoral, i.e., avvavaharika1 debts of his father.
Fourthly, where the father is not dead, but suffering from
deadly disease or living abroad the son would be liable
for his father's debts after the lapse of twenty years.
After a dispassionate discussion of the relevant sastric
texts Kane further observes that the liability of the sons
during the father's lifetime or his absence is not absolute 
. . 2but limited . If the son who is liable to pay the debts
of his father or other ancestor is a minor, is he required
3 .to pay the debts during his minority? As seen earlier if 
a son is minor he need not pay his father's debts during
his minority, his pious obligation remains suspended during
4 . 5his minority . When the proper time to pay comes he must
pay the debts, otherwise his forefathers may remain in hell.
According to the sastric texts the payment of ancestral
debts during the minority of a son is not a legal necessity.
Since a minor son cannot exercise any power over his ances-
g
tral property until he comes of age , his guardian cannot
1 For avyavaharika debts see Derrett, Introduction, 312-316 
paras 507-511, the same, Critique. 101-108 paras 134-139; 
Mayne, Hindu law (10th ed.), 408; Paras Diwan, Hindu law, 
270.
2 Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 446.
3 See supra, 38-39.
4 See the comments of Jagannatha on Nar. I. 3 in the Digest 
Vol. 1, 284 (v. 181) where in commenting or) the three verses 
of Narada, viz., Nar. I._2| I. 3 and I. 14, he observes 
that excepting debts under Nar. I. 14 none need to be paid 
immediately.
5 After the lapse of 20 years when the father is suffering 
from deadly disease or travelling abroad, or after attaining 
majority when he is dead.
6 Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 2, 277 case 10, 305 case 14.
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alienate the minor's property for his ancestral debts until 
he attains majority, and if he does, it would be null and 
void according to sastric law1.
The Anglo-Indian courts did not follow the sastric
mode of payment of a minor's ancestral debts and allowed 
2discretion to guardians in their payment. The sastric 
view that the creditors had no right to demand the debts 
during the minority of a son, and that they must wait 
until the minor attained majority was given up, and the 
discharge of ancestral debts began to be regarded as a 
necessity. Indeed after Hunoomanpersaud's case the sastric
mode of payment of ancestral debts fell into oblivion.
. . 3In Vembu Iyer v. Srinivasa Iyengar Sundara Aiyar, J.,
observed*
"Prior to the enunciation of the law by the Privy 
Council, there appears sometimes to have been an 
idea in India that the creditors of a minor had 
no right to demand their debts during his minority
1 Macnaghten strongly observes that "there is nothing 
whatever, in any text that I have been able to discover, 
relative to the payment of debts by a guardian"• See his 
Hindu Law Vol. 1, 110 and Vol. 2, 294 case 4. It is to
be noted that in the wavastha of this case, Zillah Nuddea 
June 9, 1817 the two authorities cited thereto are ascribed 
to Narada and Katyayana (Katya. 612) respectively, but 
with due respect, probably in place of Narada it would 
be Manu, since I could not locate this verse against Narada 
in the SBE, and moreover the translation of Manu VIII. 199 
coincides with it and the language of the quoted verse 
agrees with that of the Digest Vol. 1, 475 (v. 27) which 
is verse Manu VIII. 199.
2 Babaii Mahadaii v. Krishnaii Devii (1877) 2 Bom 666; 
Naaammal v. Varada Kandar AIR 1950 Mad 606, 607; Palanippa 
v. A.F. Harvey AIR 1953 Tra-Co 481, 488; Gopalakrishna
v. Krishna Iyer AIR 1961 Mad 348, 352.
3 (1912) 23 MLJ 638, 641-42.
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and that they must wait till the minor attained 
age. This would of course, affect the guardian's 
power to deal with the estate for the discharge 
of the minor's father's debts. This view was, 
however, subsequently given up and ... it was 
held that the discharge of debts would be regarded 
as a necessity”•
The duty of discharging the ancestral debts was 
entrusted to the guardians, and how this duty was to be 
performed rested on the guardians themselves. An unethical 
analogy between the duty of payment of a minor's ancestral 
debts and that of payment by a trustee of a testator's
debts led to remove the difference between the payment of
ancestral and personal debts of a Hindu minor. By the appli­
cation of such an analogy in Gopalnarain Hozoomdar v. Muddo- 
mutty Guptee1 Couch, C.J., found it to be a principle of
Hindu law that the debts of a deceased were a charge upon
his estate in the hands of the person to whom the estate 
came upon his death, and that the latter had the authority 
to pay off debts due by the deceased. The learned Chief 
Justice compared the payment by the guardian of a Hindu 
minor's ancestral debt to the case of a trust or charge 
created by will in English law upon personal estate for 
the payment of debts, the personal estate being vested in 
the executor or administrator as a fund for the payment
1 (1874) 14 BLR 21. 45. In Soonder Narain v. Bennud Ram 
(1878) 4 Cal 76 Jackson, J., did not even feel the 
necessity of ascribing any reason for making the minor's 
real estate liable for paying his ancestral debts except 
simply stating that the said estate of the minor would 
be liable when the guardian was acting bona fide and under 
pressure of necessity.
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of the debts1. It is to be remembered that unlike a trustee# 
the property left by a deceased to his minor children 
does not vest in the guardian of the minors.
If the payment of ancestral debts of a minor made by
others and not his father is influenced by the doctrine
2of pious obligation , and if the courts bring the notion 
of the said doctrine into play to compel the minors to 
pay their ancestral debts before their attaining majority, 
and if a guardian alienates his minor ward's property for 
their payment, it would be an extra-sastric action and 
undoubtedly an excess of a guardian's sastric capacity. 
Indeed pious obligation stops where guardianship starts.
In Sudhanva Kumar v. Haripada Banerjee, J., rightly points 
out that a guardian of a Hindu minor cannot, in the matter 
of transfer of a minor's property, seek justification in 
the rarefied atmosphere of pious obligation without feeling 
himself circumscribed by consideration of material benefits 
of the minor. It is the duty of a guardian to preserve 
the estate, augment its resources and manage it as best 
as he can promoting the interest of the minor just as
1 Scott v. Jones (1838) 4 Cl & F 382; 7 ER 147; Freake v. 
Cranefeldt (1838) 3 Myl & Cr 499; 40 ER 1019; Evans v. 
Tweedy (1838) 1 Beav 55; 48 ER 859. All these cases 
were relied on by the learned Chief Justice.
2 In Balakrishna v. Ganesa AIR 1954 Tra-Co 209, 216 (FB), 
Subramania Iyer, J., thought it pious obligation to meet 
the ancestral debts even if fresh debts were incurred 
for their payment by the minor's guardian.
3 AIR 1960 Cal 34, 36.
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much as a man of ordinary prudence would do if it were 
his property. The guardian has no right or duty to acquire 
or accumulate for the minor any store of spiritual welfare 
or benefit^.
It looks strange how the two individualistic doctrines,
viz,, the doctrine of pious obligation and the doctrine
of minor's welfare, were unjustly harmonised by the Anglo-
Indian judges through the action of a guardian who has no
interest whatsoever in his ward's property and whose guiding
principle of action is the well-being of the minor. There
2is no doubt that according to the sastric texts a debt 
is not merely an obligation but a sin too, and a debtor 
must be relieved of the sin and saved from its degenerating 
effects. A son performs a pious obligation by relieving 
his father from the evil consequences of the sin of debt 
in the life hereafter, and he may acquire spiritual benefit 
therefrom. But there is no material benefit involved in 
discharging such obligation. A guardian is more concerned 
with the material benefit of a minor than with his spiritual 
well-being. He is not given the authority to sacrifice the 
material resources of the minor to discharge a pious obliga­
tion 'resulting in some unknown and unknowable spiritual 
benefit of the minor'. As the payment of ancestral debts
is a pious obligation it would have been better to leave
1 Re Lalitha Bai AIR 1961 Mad 153, 157~.
2 Manu XI. 66? Gaut. XII. 40? Vas. XI. 47-48? Vis. XV. 45?
Mayne, Hindu law (10th ed.), 405 sec, 312. See also the 
judgment of B.K. Mukherjea, J., in Sriramulu v. Pundari- 
kakshawa AIR 1949 FC 218, 238.
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its payment to the discretion of the minor who could 
exercise it when he would attain majority than to entrust 
it to the discretion of the guardian.
(b) Personal debts
Debts other than ancestral are personal when they 
are incurred for a purpose of the person or property of the 
minor concerned. As seen earlier, minors may have necessity 
for necessaries including goods and services, and their 
guardians can alienate their property for such necessaries. 
Consequently, if a guardian incurs any debt for the purpose 
of necessaries for a minor or his dependants, or if he 
incurs any debt for meeting the expenditure with respect 
to the minor’s property1, i.e., expenditure for the realisa­
tion, protection or benefit of the minor’s estate, it
becomes the minor’s personal debt. Although a minor is
2incapable of entering into any contract and he cannot be
3made personally liable , his property may be made liable 
for necessaries supplied to him or for the debts incurred 
for such necessaries and expenditure for his property under 
section 68 of the Contract Act (Act 9) of 1872. The section
1 Bechu Singh v. Baldeo Prasad AIR 1933 Oudh 132. Debts 
incurred for the benefit of a minor's estate are also 
necessaries within the meaning of section 68 of the 
Contract Act of 1872.
2 Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (1903) 30 IA 114 (PC).
Also see sec. 11 of the Contract Act of 1872.
3 Waqhela Rajsanji v. Masludin (1887) 14 IA 89 (PC).
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states*
"If a person capable of entering into a contract, 
or any one whom he is legally bound to support, 
is supplied by another person with necessaries 
suited to his condition in life, the person who 
has furnished such supplies is entitled to be 
reimbursed from the property of such incapable 
person"•
But when a person incurs a debt there must be actual
necessity for it, mere existence of necessary purpose would
not be sufficient to justify a debt. Necessity cannot be
said to exist where a sale is obtained by a vendee by taking
advantage of the guardian’s poverty1. The needy circumstances
of a minor do not by themselves constitute a sufficient
2legal necessity for an alienation , and the mere recital
in a sale deed of the object of sale is in itself no evidence
3of the necessity of alienation . A guardian cannot borrow 
ostensibly to pay land revenue where he has large resources
4
and actual cash at hand from the minor's property . When
a guardian incurred debts for necessity Vivian Bose, J., in
. . 5Dharamraismqh v. Chandrasekhar Rao viewed that necessity
from two angles, viz., first, necessity for the object
for which the debt was" incurred, i.e., the extent and
intensity of the necessity for it towards the existence or
well-being of the family or the preservation of its estatej
secondly, necessity for the debt itself, i.e., the urgency
1 Makundi v. Sarabsukh (1884) 6 All 417.
2 Krishna Kumar v. Gopal Das AIR 1934 Oudh 475, 479.
3 Railakhi Debia v. Gokulchandra Chowdhury (1869) 3 BLR
57 (PC); Rani“v. Santa Bala AIR 1971 SC 1031; Keluni Dei 
v. Kanhei Sahu AIR 1972 Ori 28, 31.
4 Ganpat Rao v. Ishwar Singh AIR 1938 Nag 476, 479.
5 AIR 1949 Nag 66, 69.
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for the debt in consideration of the financial ability 
of the family and the possibility of alternative arrange­
ment for obtaining the object. The learned judge observed 
that before an alienation was made by a guardian he must 
consider whether both the aspects were present or not.
In the matter of incurring debts and making binding 
alienation of a minor’s property Mahajan, J., observed in 
Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya1 that it was the necessity 
for the loan and its consequent pressure on the estate 
which could be called the touchstone on which depended 
the validity and binding character of the alienation of 
a minor's property.
In the payment of personal debts the sastric law
provides that they should be immediately paid even if the
debtors are minors. Thus in the case in Zillah Burdwan,
4 December, 1817, where a widow borrowed some money to
defray the necessary expenses of her minor son, the vyavasthas
of the pundits show that the bond so executed by the mother
2for the maintenance of her minor son, is valid and binding .
As authorities in this case the pundits cited Nar. I. 3 and
3Bri. XI. 50. Commenting on this verse of Narada, Jagannatha 
observes that this category of debts, i.e., debts incurred 
by joint tenants, such as uncle, brother, mother and not 
by the father for the support of the family must be paid
1 AIR 1949 FC 218. 250. See also Lakhmi Singh v. Mahendra 
Singh AIR 1949 All 501; Jaqdeo Singh v. Sitla Prasad 
AIR 1954 All 71, 73 where similar views are taken.
2 Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 2, 289 case 13.
3 Digest Vol. 1, 284-85 (v. 181).
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immediately in contradistinction with other debts, namely, 
debts which were contracted by the father who is dead, 
and debts which are contracted by the father or other 
coparcener who is diseased or travelling abroad. Of the 
last two^kinds of debts the first one is required to be
paid by the minor on attaining majority1, and the last
2one to be paid after a waiting period of twenty years ;
but in both cases the payment will be in proportion to
his share in the ancestral property. And in explaining
3
the cited verse of Bnhaspati Jagannatha qouted the
following from the Vivada-ratnakarai
"It is here implied, that a debt contracted even 
by others for the support of the family, must 
be discharged by the housekeeper”.
Among the personal debts, the debts owed to the
4
government take precedence over other debts and being
debts for the minor's necessaries a guardian can validly
5alienate the minor's property for their payment • For the 
payment of arrear revenue even a de facto guardian may 
charge or alienate a minor's property. Thus where a woman 
borrowed money for the purpose of paying arrears of revenue 
which had accrued on the estate and the money so borrowed 
was applied bona fide to that purpose and subsequent to 
this transaction her son's minor widow became the owner 
of the property, the pundits were asked whether the minor's
1 Nar. I. 2.
2 Nar. I. 14.
3 Digest Vol. 1, 294.
4 Kaut. II. 24; Yajn. II. 41; Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 441.
5 Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 2, 293 case 2.
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widow was liable for the payment of the debt by reason of
her having come into the possession of the estate. The
pundits replied in the affirmative1. In Gooroopersaud v.
2
Muddunmohun Soor where the mother of a minor mortgaged 
her minor son's property, a Full Bench of the Calcutta Sadar 
Dewanny Adawlut held that a mother under Hindu law could 
enter into a bona fide sale or mortgage of her minor son's 
property for the benefit of the minor. Here benefit implies 
necessity since in that case the property was mortgaged for 
the maintenance of the minor and his mother, and for the 
liquidation of the government revenue. Moreover the learned 
judges observed that benefit created the necessity for the 
sale or mortgage and it was the test by which the legality 
of the transaction must be tried.
Under Muslim law a guardian can contract debts on
behalf of the minor for the latter*s necessaries, but such
. . . . 3debts are to be paid by the minor on attaining majority •
If the guardian wants to repay them he must do so in presence
of witnesses or with the permission of the court, otherwise
4
he will have to account for the payment .
As seen earlier, at Common law the guardians could 
apply the income of a minor's property and, if necessary,
1 Gopee Churn Burral v. Mt. Lukhee Ishwuree Dibia (I82l) 3 
Sel. Rep. 124 (NE). This case was approvingly cited by 
their Lordships in Hunoomanpersaud's case,
2 (1856) SDA 980 (Beng). This case was decided shortly after 
Hunoomanpersaud's case and probably before the Privy Council 
judgment reached Calcutta and that is why the Privy Council 
decision was not referred to therein.
3 Hedaya, 639.
4 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 692.
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the capital with the sanction of the court for the minor's
maintenance, A guardian could contract debt for the
minor's maintenance^ or for the benefit of the minor's 
2estate . If the guardian had money of the minor in his
hands, he must employ it in the payment of debts charged
on the estate of the minor, and must not pay them with 
3his own money • Where he compounded a debt charged upon
the minor's estate he was allowed the amount actually
4paid by him and not more • The guardian could pay the
interest due upon a mortgage of the minor's estate out
5of the profits of the estate •
It is common that in Hindu, Muslim and Common law 
a guardian can alienate his minor ward's property for the 
repayment of debts if it becomes a legal necessity; it is 
also common that in the payment of debts a guardian should 
employ the movable property of the minor and when such 
property is exhausted his immovable property may be applied. 
In Hindu law a court's sanction may not be essential for 
such alienation if there is legal necessity only; in 
Muslim and Common law even if there is legal necessity 
sanction of the court is necessary for the validity of the 
alienation.
1 J. Comyns, Digest of the laws of England Vol. 2 (London* 
5th ed., 1822), 662 (3 R 6).
2 Blue v. Marshall (1735) 3 P. Wms 381; 24 ER 1110.
3 Comyns, Digest Vol. 2, 645 (3 0 2). See also Chaplin v.
Chaplin (1735) 3 P. Wms 365; 24 ER 1103.
4 Comyns, Digest Vol. 2, 645 (3 0 l).
5 Jennings v. Looks (1725) 2 P. Wms 276, 279; 24 ER 729.
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As seen above in the matter of ancestral debts sastric
Hindu law presents a striking similarity with Common law.
In both the systems the repayment of ancestral debts is
not a legal necessity so long as the minor does not attain
majority. But the sastric law has fallen into disuse and become
a matter of academic interest only. So far as the personal
debts are concerned sastric Hindu law requires them to be
paid immediately, so also at Common law. Under Muslim law
there is some obvious contradiction on this point. In the
general statement of principles^* it is stated to be paid
by the minor on attaining majority? while the law is
stated in the particular perspective of necessity it is
implied that a guardian can alienate the minor's immovable
2property for the repayment of his ancestral debt • It is 
more reasonable and adaptable to social requirements that 
similar to Hindu and Common law, personal debts under 
Muslim law are to be paid promptly, otherwise it would 
create inconveniences to minors, and their guardians 
would find it difficult to get further loans if the necessity 
for further debts arises, since default discourages a 
lender to extend loans. But most of the cases regarding 
personal debts are now governed by the Contract Act of 1872.
Section 19 of the Bengal Regulation 10 of 1793 and 
section 17 of the Madras Regulation 5 of 1804 required
1 Hedava. 639; Macnaqhten, Moohummudan law. 73, prin. 6.
2 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 687? Macnaghten, Moohummudan law,
64, prin. 14.
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the managers of minors' estates to satisfy debts against 
the estates with the court's permission on demand by the 
creditors and consistently with the 'rights of Government'. 
Section 18 of both the Bengal Minors Act of 1858 and the 
Bombay Minors Act of 1864 provided that 'all just claims, 
debts, and liabilities due to or by the estate of the minor' 
were to be paid by the managers with the sanction of the 
court. But in the payment of debts and liabilities the 
managers had no power to sell, alienate, mortgage or other­
wise incumber any immovable property, or to grant a lease 
thereof for any period exceeding five years without the 
sanction of the court.
1.2.1.3. Necessity for making gift
Under sastric Hindu law the guardian of a minor cannot 
make a gift of his minor ward's property for any purpose.
The general principle being that the property of a minor 
must be preserved until he comes of age1, none can alienate 
his property even for valuable consideration. Usually 
nothing can be more religious than the release of the spirit 
of a deceased ancestor by the payment of his debts. If a 
guardian is inhibited from paying ancestral debts by the 
sastric texts, it speaks clearly of his incapacity to make 
any gift for any religious purpose. Unlike the necessaries 
or the payment of personal debts, promise of a gift does
1 Manu VIII. 27; Gaut. X. 48; Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 
165; Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 2, 294-95 case 4.
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not create any necessity so as to empower a guardian to 
alienate the minor's property. Thus where a mother consented 
to the alienation of her minor son's shares in a property 
for valuable consideration but for no necessity, the pundits
considered the alienation as null and void1 on the authorities
2 3of Manu and Katyayana . Indeed a guardian cannot give
4
away his ward's property m  charity . The authority of a
guardian to alienate a minor's property is admittedly
circumscribed, and he has no power to make a gift of the
minor's property. In Luchmeswar Singh v. Chairman of Darbhanga 
. . .  5Municipality it was held that the guardian had no authority 
to make a gift of the minor's property in charity. The facts 
of the case show that a piece of land belonging to a minor 
was acquired by the Municipality under the provisions of 
the Land Acquisition Act, 1870. The minor was under the care 
of the Court of Wards. The Court of Wards accepted on behalf 
of the minor one rupee offered as nominal compensation for 
the land and gave possession to the Municipality. The minor 
brought the suit to recover possession and for mesne profits. 
The Privy Council held that the Court of Wards being unable 
to give away the land of its ward could not by colourably 
accepting a nominal consideration confer a valid title.
Sir Richard Couch in submitting the Advice of the Judicial
1 Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 2, 294-95 case 4.
2 Manu VIII. 199.
3 Katya. 612.
4 Trevelyan, Minors. 176.
5 (1890) 17 IA 90 (PC).
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1
Committe observed i
"It is not true, as the High Court seems to have 
thought, that, as the Maharaja, if were of age, 
might waive the right to compensation, his guardian 
might do so. The Maharaja, if of age, might have 
made a present of the land to the town, ••. but 
it was known by all parties that the manager had 
no power to do this. The offer and acceptance 
of the rupee was a colourable attempt to obtain 
a title under the Land Acquisition Act without 
paying for land".
Sastric texts do not allow a minor to perform any 
. . . 2religious rites excepting the performance of funeral ones. 
And if he makes any transfer by gift that will be void on 
the ground of his own contractual incapacity in the sastric 
as well as in the statutory law. When such an alienation 
would be made by a guardian it would be invalid on the 
authority of the Privy Council decision. Kane observed that
3
if a minor himself made a gift that would be voidable only •
It is to be remembered that a father's or a manager's
power to make a gift of an undivided joint family property
including the interest of a minor member of the joint family
4 .for family necessity or for pious or religious purposes is 
much wider than and distinct from a guardian's power of 
alienating his minor ward's property for the latter's 
necessity. The interest of all members of a joint family 
being united and undivided, the father-manager or manager 
can alienate a reasonable portion of the joint family
1 (1890) 17 IA 90, 95-96 (PC).
2 Manu II. 172; XI. 37? Gaut. II. 4} Vas. II. 6.
3 Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 472.
4 Mitakshara 1.1.27-29.
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property for the performance of a pious duty obligatory 
on the family1. Again, the alienating father or manager 
has his own interest in the property alienated. A guardian
simpliciter has no such interest in a minor's property;
2a gift by him would therefore be voidable .
Under Muslim law a guardian cannot make a gift of his 
minor ward's property. Even a father cannot alienate his 
minor son's property for valuable consideration. This is 
a corollary of the principle that a guardian cannot alie­
nate the minor's property except under special circums- 
3
tances • As under Hindu law so also under Muslim law gift 
does not create such necessity as is reguired to justify 
an alienation of a minor's property by his guardian.
At Common law also a guardian could not make a gift 
of or alienate without consideration a minor's property. 
Since the enforcement of the Trustee Act (15 & 16 Geo. 5, 
c. 19) of 1925 a minor's beneficial interests in any 
property has been generally vested in a trustee by an 
order of the court, and therefore the scope of a guardian's 
dealing with his minor ward's property has been almost 
negatived. Unless authorised to do so, trustees and other
1 Guramma v. Mailappa AIR 1964 SC 510, 516.
2 Rangaswami v. Marappa AIR 1953 Mad 230.
3 Ameer Ali, Law relating to gifts, trusts, and testamen­
tary disposition among the Mahommedans (Calcutta; 1885), 
127.
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persons in a fiduciary position cannot make a gift or 
presents out of the property which they merely hold 
for others1.
1.2.2. Benefit of the estate
The second ground on which, as observed by their
Lordships of the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud1s case,
a guardian or manager of a Hindu minor can validly charge
or alienate his minor ward's property is the 'benefit of
the estate'. But what actually amounts to 'benefit of the
estate* does not admit of any precise definition and
whether a particular transaction impugned in a particular
case can satisfy this ground depends on the facts and
2circumstances of each particular case . Broadly speaking 
'benefit of the estate' means anything done in respect 
to the maintenance, protection or improvement of the estate. 
The expression 'benefit of the estate' appears to be a
3
'gradual substitution' of the phrase 'for the sake of the
.4family' as used m  the translation of the text of Bnhaspati • 
As seen earlier the text of Brihaspati is the alleged 
basis of Hunoomanpersaud's case. In giving their own views 
about the benefit of the estate their Lordships observed
1 Halsburv's laws of England Vol. 18, 370; and Vol. 38, 970. 
See also Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation (1954) 3 All ER 
698, 706.
2 Nirmal Singh v. Satnam AIR 1960 Raj 313, 317.
3 Derrett, 'Unauthorised alienations of joint family property* 
can they ever be void rather than voidable?', in (1955)
55 Bom LR (Jour), 105-111, 108.
4 See Colebrooke's translation of the Mitakshara 1.1.28.
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that it covered all acts which a prudent owner would do 
*in order to benefit the estate*, and that in the deter­
mination of this benefit one must consider the actual 
•pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the 
benefit to be conferred upon it•. In the course of their 
judgment their Lordships stated that the reduction of 
interest on the mortgage amount which was arrived at 
between the guardian and the mortgagee by a subsequent 
transaction in that case should be considered as a benefit 
to the estate1. From the Privy Council decision it appears 
that all circumstances of pressure which render the raising 
of money necessary for the protection or preservation of 
the minor's estate, or a subordinate transaction which 
adds financial relief to the minor's property as a whole 
would support an alienation of his property by his guardian. 
Thus where a woman, on her husband's death, sold his landed 
property for liquidating the arrear revenue due to the
government and for.the maintenance of herself and her
2
minor son and grandson , or where a property was sold
3
by a stepmother m  execution of a decree , the sale was 
considered good and valid, and done for the benefit of the 
estate. Indeed no greater benefit can be conferred upon an 
estate than to save it from extinction by sequestration.
1 Hunoomanpersaud's case (1856) 6 MIA 393, 421 (PC).
2 Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 2, 293 case 2.
3 La11a Bunseedhur v. Koonwar Bindeseree (1866) 10 MIA 
454 (PC).
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1 2 The payment of government revenues or other dues or debts ,
the non-payment of which would imperil the estate, confers
benefit on the estate. Sometimes even the substitution of
an unproductive land for a more productive and suitable
one by sale and purchase is considered to be for the benefit
of the estate. Thus the sale of a property which is situated
at a long distance from the residence of a family and which
cannot be conveniently managed, with the intention of
purchasing other landed property in a more accessible
3
situation , or the sale of a property in order to migrate 
to another place and purchase lands there which are more
4
productive , is considered to have been for the benefit 
of the estate. The sale of a minor's excess land in anti­
cipation of its being acquired by the government at a 
comparatively low price under a land reform legislation
is also considered to have been for the benefit of the 
5minor's estate • Again, where a guardian effected a sale 
of his minor ward's lands which were 'sandy, barren, useless 
and did not yield any income or profit', and invested 
the sale proceeds in arable, income yielding and cultivable
1 Ram Lochun Raee v. Ramunee Mohun Ghose (1846) SPA 371 
(Beng); Gooroopersaud v. Huddunmohun Soor (1856) SDA 980 
(Beng).
2 Chetty Colum Comara v. Ra iah Runqaswamy (1861) 8 MIA 319 
(PC); Succaram Morarii v. Kalidas Kalianii (1894) 18 Bom 
631; Murari v. Tavana (18951 20 Bom 286.
3 Jaqat Narain v. Mathura Das AIR 1928 All 454 (FB). See 
the contrary views in Ganesa Aivar v. Amirthasami Odayar 
(1918) MWN 892.
4 Prasad v. Subbaiah AIR 1973 AP 214, 217.
5 Sakthi v. Kuppathamma1 AIR 1960 Mad 394.
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lands1, or where he effected the sale of an unproductive
2land for repairing a dilapidated family house , the sale 
was held to have been for the benefit of the estate.
Under Muslim law a guardian can alienate his minor 
ward’s property for the benefit of the minor or his estate.
He can sell the minor's property if he obtains double value3, 
or for the payment of government revenue (khura1)^ . Again 
where the produce of a minor’s property is not sufficient 
to meet the expenses of keeping it, or where the property 
is in the danger of being destroyed, or where it has been 
usurped and there is no chance of its restitution, the
sguardian can validly alienate the minor’s immovable property .
At Common law a guardian could not exercise any such
power without the leave of the court. Trevelyan observes
that the law applicable to persons other than the Hindus
and Muslims does not permit guardians, other than those
appointed by the court, or having power given to them by
the instrument appointing them, to sell or charge the
6immovable property of their minor wards .
Early British Regulations allowed the managers of 
minors’ estates to spend the surplus profits for the' 
benefit of the estates. Section 12(2) of the Bengal 
Regulation 10 of 1793 and section 16(1) of the Madras
1 Rabi Naravan v. Kanak Prova Debi AIR 1965 Cal 444, 445.
2 Govinda Pillai v. Pathimunnissa (1958) 2 MLJ 28.
3 Macnaghten, Moohummudan law. 64 prin. 14.
4 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 687.
5 Macnaghten, Moohummudan law, 64 prin. 14.
6 Trevelyan, Minors, 167.
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Regulation 5 of 1804 empowered the managers of minors* 
estates to spend the surplus incomes of the estates for 
the improvement of lands or 'otherwise for the benefit of 
the estate under his charge *.
1.2.2.1. Another Privy Council decision on the meaning of 
*benefit of the estate*
The courts are not, however, unanimous with respect
to the meaning of the expression 'benefit of the estate*,
although the terms 'necessity* and 'benefit of the estate'
are being used side by side ever since the decision in
Hunoomanpersaud's case. Discussing the earlier Privy Council
decisions1 regarding the meaning of the said expression
their Lordships of the Privy Council in Palaniappa Chetty
2v. Devasikamony saidi
"No indication is to be found ... as to what is 
..• the precise nature of the things to be included 
under the description 'benefit to the estate'.
It is impossible ... to give a precise definition 
of it applicable to all cases, and they do not 
attempt to do so. The preservation, however, of 
the estate from extinction, the defence against 
hostile litigation affecting it, the protection 
of it or portions from injury or deterioration 
by inundation, these and such like things would 
obviously be benefits. The difficulty is to draw 
the line as to what are, in this connection, to 
be taken as benefits and what not".
1 Hunoomanpersaud's case (1856) 6 MIA 393 (PC); Prosunno 
Kumari Debva v. Golab Chand Baboo (1875) 2 IA 145 (PC); 
Konwar Dooraanath Roy v. Ram Chunder Sen (1876) 4 IA 
52 (PC).
2 AIR 1917 PC 33, 37
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1.2.2.2. Conflicting vievs of High Courts on the above 
meaning
Following the above observation of their Lordships
the High Courts of the Indian Subcontinent took two divergent
views on the meaning of 'benefit of the estate*. And
probably the Allahabad High Court played a most significant
role on this issue with its numerous cases supporting
at times either of the views. Expressing the rival views
Mulla says^i
"One view is that a transaction cannot be said 
to be for the benefit of the estate, unless it 
is of a defensive character calculated to protect 
the estate from some threatened danger or destruc­
tion. Another view is that for a transaction to
be for the benefit of the estate it is sufficient
if it is such as a prudent owner, or rather a 
trustee, would have carried out with the knowledge 
that was available to him at the time of the 
transaction**.
2After an examination of a large number of cases
supporting either view a Full Bench of the Allahabad High
■ ■ - 3
Court held in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das that there was
no real justification for the view that an alienation by
the manager to be binding on the estate must necessarily
be of a defensive character, and that if the transaction
1 Hindu law (13th ed., 1966), 276 sec. 243A.
2 In the following cases the words 'benefit of the estate' 
was used in a wider sensei Tula Ram v. Tulshi Ram (1920)
42 All 559? Tahal Singh v. Ariun Das (1920) 56 IC 879; 
Sadhusaran Prasad v. Brahmdeo Prasad AIR 1921 Pat 99; 
Kalika Nand Singh v. Shiva Nandan Singh AIR 1922 Pat 122; 
Mahabir Prasad v. Amla Prasad AIR 1924 All 379; Jado Singh 
v. Nathu Singh AIR 1926 All 511. But they were used in
a narrower sense in the following cases; Bhagwan Das v. 
Mahadeo Prasad AIR 1923 All 298; Shankar Sahai v. Baichu 
Ram AIR 1925 All 333; Inspector Singh v. Kharak Singh 
AIR 1928 All 403? Rattan Chand v. Thakur Ram AIR 1928 
All 447.
3 AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).
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was for the benefit of the estate and such as a prudent 
owner would have carried out with the knowledge that was 
available to him at that time, it could not be set aside.
It was further laid down that the degree of prudence required 
would be that which an ordinary man would exercise with 
the knowledge available to him and the transaction would 
have to be judged not by the results but by what might 
have been expected to be its results at the time it was 
entered into, and that the degree of prudence to be demanded 
might well be held to be analogous to that which would be 
demanded of a trustee in an ordinary case. This decision 
was approved as correct by two other Full Benches^- of the 
same High Court.
2
The Bombay High Court in Naqindas v. Mahomed Yusuf 
seems to have treated the terms 'legal necessity' and 
'benefit of the estate' as inter-changeable, and, therefore, 
they held that the benefit of the family could under certain 
circumstances mean a necessity for the alienation, but they
admitted that the terms must be understood with due regard
. . . 3to the conditions of modern life. In a subsequent case
the court adopted a narrow view. In Raqho v. Zaqa4 Patkar, J.,
reviewing the important cases on the issue observed that
1 Amrai Singh v. Shambhu Singh AIR 1932 All 632 iFB)
Mukerji, J., dissenting; Ram Nath v. Chiranii Lai AIR 
1935 All 221 (FB).
2 AIR 1922 Bom 122.
3 Venkatraman v . Janardhan AIR 1928 Bom 8.
4 AIR 1929 Bom 251.
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the benefit of the estate was to be of a protective character. 
Naaindas *s case was brought to his notice but the learned 
judge preferred the narrower line of decisions1 taken in 
the Allahabad High Court which was, as we have already seen,
not approved by the Full Bench of the same High Court in
Jaqat Narain's case. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court
2in Hemrai v. Nathu adopted an intermediate view. Beaumont, 
C.J., in delivering the unanimous judgment of the Bench 
observed that he could not accept the view taken in Jaqat 
Narain's case as that went too far, nor could he accept 
the view of Patkar, J., in Raqho*s case which was too pro­
tective to accommodate cases which might not be of such 
•compelling character* that any court would hold them to 
be for the benefit of the estate. The learned Chief Justice 
said whether a transaction was for the 'benefit of the 
estate* or not involved the consideration of something 
more than merely whether the purchase price paid was a
good pricej it involved the further question of what was
3
to be done with the purchase money . He mentioned the 
following transactions as examples of cases that fall 
within the definition of benefit of the estatei (l) the 
sale for adequate price of land which could not be conveniently 
cultivated with other property of the minor, and the invest­
ment of the proceeds in the purchase of land which could
1 See supra. 123 f.n. 2.
2 AIR 1935 Bom 295 (FB).
3 This view was not accepted in subsequent cases? on the 
contrary, the test proposed in Jaqat Narain's case has 
been approved by the Supreme Court in Balmukand v. Kamla
Wati AIR 1964 SC 1385. See also Derrett, Introduction,
76 f.n. 4.
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be so conveniently cultivated; (2) the sale of lands in 
order to raise money to secure irrigation or permanent 
improvement of the other lands of the minor; and (3) a 
beneficial exchange, or the sale of a house in a dila­
pidated condition.
More than a decade before Jagat Narain's case the 
Calcutta High Court held in Krishna Chandra Choudhury v. 
Ratan Ram Pal1 that mere increase in the immediate income 
of the minor's estate did not necessarily justify the 
inference that the particular transaction was for the
2benefit of the estate. In Kamal Singh v. Sekhar Chand 
Das Gupta, J., adopted the 'prudent man' test in arriving 
at the meaning of the word 'benefit'.
The meaning of the expression 'benefit of the estate' 
also came before the Lahore High Court for decision; and
3
in Havat Ali v. Nem Chand a Full Bench of that court after 
considering a large number of cases brought to its notice 
including the Full Bench cases of the Allahabad and Bombay 
High Courts expressed its views in favour of the decision 
in Jagat Narain's case when it said that the words 'for 
the benefit of the family' had a wider meaning than mere 
'compelling necessity' and that these could not be limited 
to or exhausted by transactions of purely defensive nature.
1 (1915) 20 CWN 645.
2 AIR 1952 Cal 447, 451.
3 AIR 1945 Lah 169 (FB).
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In its earlier decisions1 the Madras High Court used 
to hold a somewhat narrow view about the import of the 
terms 'benefit of the estate'• But after the Full Bench
decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jagat Narain's
2case they changed their views* In Sellappa v* Suppan 
Venkatasubba Rao, J., sitting with Cornish, J., considered 
the question of the benefit of estate and expressed their
agreement with the opinion held in Jagat Narain's case.
. . . . 3This decision was followed by Yahya All, J,, in Re Vasudevan •
4In Medikendun v. Venkatawa Chandra Reddy, J,, observed
that the validity of the sale of an ancestral land by a
father did not necessarily mean that the benefit should
be purely of a defensive or protective character, and that
to hold such a view would be to miss the significance of
the expression 'benefit of the estate'. The learned judge
went further to say that if the transaction was not a
speculative or risky one but beneficial or advantageous
from the financial point of view and was calculated to
confer a benefit on the estate, the sale must be held to
be valid one and binding on the members of the family
including the minors* Rajamannar, C.J., in his judgment
5of a Division Bench in Sengoda v. Muthuve1lappa explained
1 Re Krishnaswami Doss Reddi (1912) MWN 167; Subramania 
Nadan v* Ramasami Nadan (l913) 25 MLJ 563; Ganesa Ajyar 
v. Amirthasami Odayar (1918) MWN 892*
2 AIR 1937 Mad 496.
3 AIR 1949 Mad 260.
4 AIR 1953 Mad 210.
5 (1955) 2 MLJ 331.
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Sellappa*s and Re Vasudevan*s case and adopted a view 
similar to Beaumont, C.J., in Hemra i *s case. In Sengoda *s 
case an unproductive family property was sold at an advanta­
geous price because of a town planning scheme, but since 
the sale proceeds were not utilised in the purchase of 
other income-fetching property for the family the learned 
Chief Justice could not call the alienation to have been 
made for the benefit of the family or of its estate. In 
Govinda Pillai v. Pathimunnissa  ^Ramaswami, J., adopted 
a very progressive view towards the meaning of the expression 
'benefit of the estate' when he observedi
"The latter decisions have more readily recognised 
that if a guardian honestly and bona fide enters 
into transactions for the benefit of the estate 
and which are demonstrated to be such, those 
transactions would be upheld by courts.
One moment's reflection shows that in the 
modern stress of life if we are to follow ancient 
decisions, there will be a complete paralysis 
of all acts on the part of the guardians to 
augment the revenues of their wards and benefit 
them. If all guardians are at all times to 
remain summa seeking safety first in doing 
nothing the bettering of the prospects of the 
wards and even preserving properly their estate 
will be very poor and dim indeed".
In this case the learned judge upheld the sale of 
an unproductive land by the guardian of a minor limited 
owner. The sale was effected to repair a family house which 
had become dilapidated and stood in need of improvements
1 (1958) 2 MLJ 28, 30. Also see the view of Anantanarayanan, 
J. .mSakthi v. Kuppathamma1 AIR 1960 Mad 394 where the 
learned judge said that the courts should take a liberal 
attitude in considering which measures amount to the 
benefit of the estate.
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like plastering, putting up a terrace etc., and make it 
yield a steady and fixed rent. In Gopalakrishna v. Krishna 
Iyer* Ramachandra Iyer and Rajagopalan, JJ., observed 
that a power to sell for the benefit of the ward implied 
a discretion on the part of the guardian, discretion not 
merely to decide as to the form of alienation, but whether 
the alienation was at all to be made? the test should not 
be that there was no alternative but that whether the act 
was one for the benefit of the minor in the known circums­
tances.
A view very similar to that expressed by the Madras
High Court in recent cases was adopted by the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in its drive for the meaning of the words 'benefit
of the estate•. A Division Bench of that High Court observed
2
in Peddaya v. Venkayya that the rule of the benefit of 
estate was not restricted to acts of defensive character; 
on the contrary, it included such positive acts as a prudent 
man would carry out. The benefit must be actual and not 
speculative, the calculated purchase must not be one in the 
realm of imagination, the sale proceeds must have been 
invested therein. The court is always suspicious in the 
case of the sale of a minor's property by his guardian, 
and looks carefully to the application or the intention
1 AIR 1961 Mad 348. This case was relied on: by the Orissa 
High Court in Nidhi Padhan v. Bhainra Khadia AIR 1963 
Ori 133, 135.
2 (1963) AP 99, 113.
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for such application of the sale proceeds. Relying on the 
somewhat conservative decision of the Madras High Court 
in Sengoda*s case Chandra Reddy, C.J., and Chandrasekhara, 
J., held in Thota Appanna v. Nakkava Appanna1 that it 
was not competent for the legal guardian of a Hindu minor 
to alienate by sale the minor's immovable property for 
the reason that a good price was fetched by the sale and 
thereby the minor was financially benefitted. The learned 
judges observed that in the absence of proof that the 
guardian intended to purchase either income fetching 
property for the minor with the proceeds of the transaction 
or that he intended to invest the sale proceeds in any 
other manner which would be beneficial to the minor, the 
transaction could not be held to be for the benefit of the 
estate.
It is to be observed that of the two Full Bench 
cases, viz., Jagat Narain's and Hemrai's case, which 
directly dealt with the interpretation of the expression 
'benefit of the estate' only Hemrai's case is concerned 
with the alienation of a minor's property by his guardian. 
In that case the mother-guardian sold her minor son's 
property at a comparatively high price and invested the 
sale proceeds in a money-lending business which the minor's 
father used to carry on. In Jagat Narain's case the adult
1 AIR 1963 AP 418, 420
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male members of a joint Hindu family sold a joint family 
property situated at a distance of 19 miles from the 
family residence with the expressed purpose of purchasing 
another property nearer home. The purchase money was 
deposited in a bank which accidentally failed. But the 
following observation of Beaumont, C.J., in Hemrai's case 
has somewhat obscured his reasoning^" i
"The question whether a transaction is for the 
benefit of an estate or not involves the con­
sideration of something more than merely 
whether the purchase price paid is a good 
price; it involves the further question of 
what is to be done with the purchase-money".
In the above statement the learned Chief Justice
does not adhere closely to the Privy Council ruling in
2
Hunoomanpersaud's case , although he has quoted a passage 
from the judgment of that case. He applies his mind to 
the guardian's intention, and there, no doubt, the two 
lines of approach are nearer than, at first sight, they 
seem to be.
Commenting on the conflicting views about the meaning 
of the phrase 'benefit of the estate' K.N. Ananthasubramanya
1 AIR 1935 Bom 295, 298 (FB).
2 The observation of the learned Chief Justice seems to
have gone against the following statement of their Lord­
ships in Hunoomanpersaud's case* "The purposes for which 
a loan is wanted are often future, as respects the actual 
application, and a lender can rarely have, unless he
enters on the management, the means of controlling and
rightly directing the actual application". [See (1856)
6 MIA 393, 424 (PC)].
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Aiyer1, an advocate of the protective theory, said that 
there should be no justification for any such conflict 
of views in respect of alienations by guardians or other 
persons who stand in a purely representative capacity, 
because quite distinct from the interests of managers 
or limited interest holders they had no interests in the 
properties alienated; the protection of the minors and 
their properties was alone the sole concern of their 
guardians. He further observed that unless an augmentation 
was the natural result of the conservation of the incomes 
arising from the minors' properties in their possession, 
the guardians were incompetent to augment the income or 
add to the properties of the minors by charging the estate 
of the minors with some liability.
Such an inactive position as is indicated by the 
writer cannot be always conceived of in the case of a 
guardian entrusted with the person and property of a minor. 
His duty is not only to conserve or accumulate the income 
or profits of the minor's property, but also to manage 
the property; and such management may require him, at 
times, to deal with the property itself. If the guardian
acts honestly and bona fide, his acts should be upheld by
the courts.
1 'Doctrine of benefit in Hindu law; its applicability 
to alienations by guardians and trustees^, in (1938;
26 Travancore Law Journal. 22-80.
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Benefit of the estate to be a sufficient ground for 
alienation need not be of a defensive character any more. 
Derrett has beautifully summerised the law as follows1*
"The courts, after long holding that the guardian 
might not validly make an alienation unless it 
were purely defensive of the minor's property 
and interests, have more recently taken the view 
that acts which are done bona fide and likely 
to enhance the value of the estate may be binding 
on the minor even if an alienation of land is 
involved, more particularly if the minor has in 
fact profited from the exchange of sources of 
income. An unsuccessful project may be upheld 
if its results, though disappointing, might have 
been favourably predicted by a prudent manager 
of property of which he was not sole owner.
Similarly the earlier cases which denied that a 
guardian might exercise the wider and more 
comprehensive powers of the manager of a joint 
Hindu family, ... are beginning to give place 
to judgments which eguate the powers of the two 
functionaries, allowing the guardian to incur 
debts and alienate property if in the opinion 
of a prudent man it would be for the benefit of 
the minor”.
A guardian who carries out his functions faithfully 
can hardly confine himself to a supine reaction to crises 
as they arise; on the other hand, he can hardly be allowed 
to trade with the minor's assets even if he is a market- 
wizard.' It is a question of the correct balance. The society 
of the South Asian peoples being primarily based on agricul­
ture, and their judicial and higher administrative machineries 
being mainly located at distant towns, often independent 
and prompt actions are required to be taken by the guardians 
for the necessity or benefit of the minors. In such circums­
tances 'prudent man' test fits in with the need. But benefit 
of the estate alone cannot fulfil this test; it must be
1 Derrett, Introduction, 76 para 94.
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united with necessity, i.e., it must be a benefit causing 
or creating necessity. Moreover, such a union would help 
eliminate a speculative transaction.
It is to be remembered that the powers which may be 
allowed to the manager of a joint Hindu family consisting 
of minor coparceners in alienating the joint family property 
may not be allowed to the guardian of a minor's estate 
in the alienation of the minor's property. The courts do 
not consider them as uniform. They are usually cautious as 
to their own role of guardianship. Whenever the question of 
alienation of a minor's property by his guardian comes 
before them they look at it with the greatest suspicion 
and judge its validity by the strict application of the 
principles of Hunoomanpersaud's case, and even by observing
the actual application of the purchase money --  an action
seems to be in excess of the third principle of the Privy 
Council decision. While in the case of alienation of a 
minor's interests in a joint family property by its manager, 
the courts do not play any such role of guardianship. There­
fore, even if the doctrine of benefit of the estate may be 
a ground sufficient to justify an alienation of a minor's 
interest in a joint family property, it will not alone 
save a guardian's transaction which cannot be justified by 
the principle of legal necessity. Even if the cases relating 
to the alienation of a minor's interests in a joint family 
property are looked at closely it would be clear that the 
doctrine of benefit alone does not validate a transaction
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unless it is extended to include the application of the 
purchase money which means, in fact, necessity for the 
alienation. In Senqoda v. Muthuvellappa Rajaraannar, C.J., 
did not uphold the alienation of a family property by the 
father-manager because the sale proceeds were not utilised 
for the purchase of other income-fetching property for the 
family.
Although their Lordships in Hunoomanpersaud *s case 
stated that a bona fide lender was not bound to see to the 
application of the purchase money if he honestly inquired 
into the existence of necessity, the judges are keen to 
see to the application of the purchase money in order to 
be doubly sure about the bona fides of both the manager or 
guardian and the purchaser. Undoubtedly, this is harsh and 
unjust to the purchaser or alienee. But perhaps the socio­
economic conditions of the Asian people and the psychological 
distrust in guardians prompted the judges to adopt such a 
line of action for the safety of the minor's property.
Murphy, J., expressed his mind in this regard in the follow­
ing words2*
"It must be remembered that these people are 
peasants, whose ideas of a trust are not those 
of a lawyer, or such as would be commonly 
recognized in a city such as Bombay. There is 
no likelihood of any separate accounts being 
kept for the benefit of the trust property, 
and once it has become inextricably mingled 
with the father's property, the probability 
that it will ever be separated from it and 
handed back to the minor, to whom it belongs, 
short of a suit for partition, is very remote".
1 AIR 1955 Mad 531; (1955) 2 MLJ 331.
2 Racrho v. Zaga AIR 1929 Bom 251, 256.
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Some people1 think that ’benefit of the estate* is 
quite independent from 'necessity' and may save transactions 
which cannot be justified by the mere principle of legal
2necessity. Sundara Aiyar, J., m  Vembu Iyer v. Srinivasa 
maintained a difference between them in the following 
words *
"'Necessity' seems to connote the idea of warding 
off evil or the doing of something that cannot 
be avoided or of something which it is one’s 
legal duty to do. To avoid the sale of a minor's 
property for a debt would be warding off an evil; 
conducting necessary repairs would also be an 
act of the same class. The maintenance of the 
minor would be a necessity as something which 
cannot be avoided. Performing his father’s 
funerals would be a necessity as an act which 
it is his duty to perform. But over and above all 
these acts that are necessary there may be acts 
which are positively beneficial to the minor. 
and an alienation which would conduce positively 
to the benefit of the minor would be upheld apart 
from any necessity unless of course it is accom­
panied by other evil".! My emphasis I
It is to be observed that the learned judge adumbrated
the possibility of such acts arising as would be upheld
purely for their being beneficial to the minor, but he did
not give any example. In Jagat Narain’s case the learned
judges of the Full Bench were almost holding such a view
when by emphasising the word 'or' in the classic sentence
'The actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted,
or the benefit to be conferred upon it, in the particular
3instance, is the thing to be regarded' , they said that a
1 P.N. Chadha, see his book Hindu law (Lucknow* 4th ed., 
1974), 301; Mookerjee and Newbould, JJ., in Krishna Chandra 
Choudhury v. Ratan Ram Pal (1915) 20 CWN 645.
2 (1912) 23 MLJ 638, 642.
3 Hunoomanpersaud's case (1856) 6 MIA 393, 423.
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benefit of the estate such as a prudent owner would endeavour 
to effect was by itself a sufficient justification for the 
creation of the charge.
As seen earlier, necessity justifies an alienation 
of a minor's immovable property for his necessaries; that 
necessity (understood as a set of acts bound to prompt an 
honest guardian) is also present where an alienation of 
the minor's property is to be justified on the ground of 
'benefit of the estate'. Benefit alone cannot, in my view, 
be said to be a ground justifying alienation. My opinion 
is based on the traditional South Asian standpoint that a 
guardian's initiative is far too often employed for the 
advantage of others than the minor himself. Benefit minus 
necessity is hard to conceive of, and such a situation 
rarely occures, especially in relation to minor's property. 
Benefit presupposes necessity, without necessity it could 
not be realisedi for we are, in any case, bound to exclude 
speculation. A Full Bench of the Calcutta Sadar Dewanny 
Adawlut tersely observed3'!
"We hold that a mortgage entered into by the 
mother of a minor of a portion of the minor's 
property for the benefit of that minor, is 
valid under Hindu law, that benefit being the 
causing of, or creating a necessity which has 
arisen".
Further in the same judgment the learned judges saidi
"The benefit of the minor, as creating the necessity 
is the test by which the legality of the transaction 
must be tried". 1 Underlined portions are in italics 
in the judgment]
1 Gooroopersaud v. Muddunmohun Soor (1856) SDA 980, 984-85 
(Beng)•
138
In respect of a minor's property the two concepts,
viz., 'legal necessity* and 'benefit of the estate' are
intimately connected and sometimes they are overlapping1,
but that does not imply that they are identical as Shah, J.,
2erroneously said m  Naqindas v. Mahomed Yusuf . On the 
contrary, they are supplementary or one is the causing of 
the other. The facts of the case and the reasoning of the 
learned judge support it. In that case the adult coparceners 
of a Hindu joint family contracted to sell to the plaintiff 
a house belonging to the family. The house was in a dilapi­
dated condition and did not fetch any rent. It was not nece­
ssary to sell the house as the family was in good circumstan 
ces. When the plaintiff sued for specific performance of the 
contract, the minor coparceners objected on the ground that 
there was no necessity for the sale and that the contract 
could not affect their interests. The learned judge held 
that as the adult coparceners very properly decided to 
dispose of the house which was not in good condition and 
which the Municipality wanted to pull down the minor copar­
ceners were bound by the agreement. In fact, the benefit 
obtained from the sale causes the necessity for it.
According to Vijnanesvara all the three expressions, 
namely, apatkale, kutumbarthe and dharmarthe, convey the
1 Nirmal Singh v. Satnam AIR 1960 Raj 313, 317.
2 AIR 1922 Bom 122.
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sense of necessity. The 'benefit of the estate' or 'benefit 
of the family' is the literal construction of the expression 
kutumbarthe1; therefore necessity lies at the heart of 
'benefit'. Even if 'benefit of the estate' is considered 
to be a 'new content poured into the old norm'2 expressed 
by the Mitakshara verse, the norm does not change its 
character and necessity is its meaning,
3
Trevelyan observes *
"Apart from necessity, it is not easy to say what 
is for the benefit of the minor's estate. It is 
clearly not intended that this power should 
authorize the guardian to sell or charge the 
inheritance for the purpose only of increasing 
the immediate income of the minor or of his 
estate, or for developing the estate".
1,2,3. Extension of the rule in Hunoomanpersaud*s case to 
other transactions and institutions
1.2.3.1. Other transactions
Although the decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case was 
in relation to the mortgage of a minor's property, it was 
not confined to mortgage alone. It was extended to sale
1 Paras Diwan, Hindu law, 275. See also Derrett, 'May a 
Hindu woman be the manager of a joint family at Mitakshara 
law?', in (1966) 68 Bom LR (Jour), 1-11, 4. The writer 
has given the meaning of the expression 'kutumbartha' as 
used in Nar. II. 15, as 'benefit of the estate'.
2 Budhkaran Chaukhani v. Thakur Prosad AIR 1942 Cal 311,
320 per Pal, J. The learned judge construed the expression 
'kutumbarthe' as 'for the sake of the family', but he 
thought that the 'benefit of the estate' was a new addition 
made by their Lordships in Hunoomanpersaud's case to the 
verses of the Mitakshara.
3 Minors. 154.
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as well1, for mortgage was inconceivable without the power
2
of sale. Trevelyan observes *
"No distinction can be drawn between the power 
to charge and the power to sell. The need which 
would justify the exercise of the one power 
would justify the exercise of the other".
The rule -inr.Hunoomanpersaud * s case is also extendable
to all transactions effected by one on behalf of another.
3
Derrett says i
"There is no reason why the rule in Hunoomanpersaud 's 
case should be confined to sales and mortgages; 
indeed there is every reason why it should apply 
to any transactions with a person who acts for 
the sake of another"•
1.2.3.2. Other institutions
The decision in Hunoomanpersaud *s case established the 
law with regard to the alienation of a minor's property by 
the guardian or manager of his estate. Subsequently its rule 
was extended by later Privy Council and Indian High Courts 
to other institutions as well. Thus it was applied to adjudge 
the validity of an alienation of a joint family property
4
by the manager of that family , or of a woman's estate by
1 Ram Pershad v. Raiunder Sahov (1866) 6 WR 262, 264 (CR);
Gunga Pershad v. Phool Singh (1888) 10 WR 106 (CR);
Mohanund Mondul v. Nafur Mondul (1899) 26 Cal 820 per Maclean,
C.J.; Ram Charan v. Mihin Lai (1914) 36 All 158; Krishan Das 
v « Nathu Ram (1926) 54 IA 79, 84 (PC); Hitendra Naravan v. 
Sukhteb Prasad (1928) 115 IC 886; Commissioner of Agricul­
tural I.T. v. Jacadish Chandra Sahoo (196l) 1 Cal 379.
2 Minors, 153.
3 Critique, 192.
4 Luchmeedur Singh v. Ekbal Ali (1867) 8 WR 75, 77 (CR); Gharib- 
ul-lah v. Khalak Singh (1903) 30 IA 163; Ga iadhar Mahton v. 
Ambika Prasad (1925) 47 All 459, 461 (PC); Benares Bank Ltd. 
v. Harj Narain AIR 1932 PC 182, 185.
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a limited heir^, or of a temple or debutter property by the
2manager, shebait or dharmakarta of the temple . In Sriramulu
3
v, Pundankakshavva Mukherjea, J., saidi
"The principle enunciated in Hunoomanpersaud .
Pandev*s case has been followed since then in 
numerous cases by the Privy Council as well as 
by the High Courts in India and the principle 
has been applied to alienations by limited 
heirs like the Hindu widows, by managers of Hindu 
joint family and religious endowments and also 
by persons in charge of the estate of lunatics.
The case itself related to a transaction by way 
of mortgage, but it cannot be disputed that the 
same principle applies to a sale".
Although the rule was so extended and applied, the 
difference between the powers of a guardian or manager of 
a minor's estate and those of the other institution holders 
continued.
(a) Difference between the powers of the guardian or manager 
of a minor's estate and those of the manager of a joint 
Hindu family
We have seen earlier that usually under the sastric 
texts no individual coparcener including the manager had 
any power to dispose of the joint family property without 
the consent of all others, and to this general rule exceptions 
were provided by the text of Brihaspati which was commented 
upon by Vijnanesvara to imply that in apatkale. for kutumbarthe 
and for dharmarthe even a single member of the family could
1 Ram Gopal v. Ballodeb Bose (1864) WR 385, 386 (CR); Collector 
of Masulipatam v. Cavalv Vencata (1861) 8 MIA 529 (PC);
Venkaii v. Vishnu (1893) 18 Bom 534, 536; Viraraiu v, Venkata- 
ratnam AIR 1939 Mad 98, 100; Jaisri v. Ra idewan AIR 1962 SC 
83, 86-87.
2 Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (1875) 2 IA 145 
(PC): Palaniappa Chetty v, Devasikamony AIR 1917 PC 33, 36,
3 AIR 1949 FC 218, 232.
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dispose of the family property* The course of judicial 
decisions has gradually modified Vijnanesvara*s interpre­
tation and re-classified the exceptions as follows1*
(i) legal necessity implying apatkale and including
a part of kutumbarthe which relates to the benefit 
of the members of the family;
(ii) benefit of the estate implying kutumbarthe so 
far as it relates to the benefit of the family; 
and
(iii) acts of indispensable duty which include all 
that are implied by dharmarthe.
Although previously it was held that for an alienation
by the manager of a joint family property the consent of
the coparceners was necessary, a long series of judicial
decisions provided that when the manager exercised power
of alienation in exceptional cases, the consent of other
2
coparceners would be implied . If the manager is a father 
he has two additional powers, viz., (i) he may make gifts 
of affection to a reasonable extent of immovable property 
of the family , and (ii) he may, by incurring debts, so
1 Paras Diwan, Hindu law, 275.
2 Mayne said* "The whole current of authorities, however, 
supports the view that the manager of the family property 
has an implied authority to do whatever is best for all 
concerned, and that no individual can defeat this power 
merely by withholding his consent. For, where family 
necessity rests upon the coparceners as a whole and it is 
proper to imply a consent of all of them to that act of 
the one which such necessity has demanded". [See Mayne,
Hindu law (10th ed.), 468].
3 Guramma v. Mallappa AIR 1964 SC 510; Ammathavee v. Kumaresan 
AIR 1967 SC 569.
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long as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate 
open to be taken in execution proceedings upon a decree 
for the payment of that debt^.
Unlike the manager of a joint family, the guardian of 
a minor’s property is not the owner of the property; owner­
ship lies with the minor. Where the minor is a member of 
a joint family his ownership is not distinct, and is only 
of a fluctuating interest crystalizing into a definite 
share only after partition. The interest of a minor in the 
joint family being not definite, it is liable to meet the 
fair demand of the joint family, though he may not have 
derived any benefit out of it. Any debt contracted by the 
manager for family purposes is binding even on the minor's 
interest. Although a manager can bind the share of a minor
in a joint family property for joint family trade debts, he
. 2cannot do so when new trades are started by him . The manager 
of a joint family has certain powers which a guardian may not 
have. Thus while the power of a guardian is that of an 
ordinary prudent man in dealing with the minor's property, 
the manager has a greater freedom. The latter cannot be 
called upon to account for being imprudent provided his 
acts are not fraudulent; he cannot be called upon to account
1 Derrett, Introduction, 275 para 447; Bri i Narain v. Mangla 
Prasad AIR 1924 PC 50, 56.
2 Joykisto Cowar v. Nittvanund Nundy (1878) 3 Cal 738 (FB); 
Rampartab v. Foolbai (1896) 20 Bom LR 767; Nunna Setti v. 
Chidaraboyina (1902) 26 Mad 214; Bishambar Nath v. Fateh 
(1906) 29 All 176; Benares Bank Ltd. v. Hari Narain AIR 
1932 PC 182.
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for such sums as he might have saved had he acted like an
1 9ordinary prudent man . In Labhu Ram v. Bhaq Mai the 
guardian's liability was extended to what he would have 
received but for his gross and wilful default, but a manager 
in that way cannot be called upon to account for what he 
ought to or might have received if the property had been 
properly dealt with or properly invested . Only if the 
manager fraudulently misappropriates the family fund will
4
he be held responsible to make good the loss • Again, the
manager of a joint Hindu family is empowered to make a gift
of a portion of the family property for pious purposes
. . 5within reasonable limits , while a guardian cannot exercise 
any such power. In Palaniammal v, Kothandarama6 the mother 
of a minor sole coparcener was not allowed as guardian to 
exercise this power. Mayne said that a father and head of 
a family might have greater powers than a guardian, but
7
could not have less •
1 Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram (1866) 3 Mad HC Rep 177; Balakrishna 
Iyer v. Muthusami Iyer (1908) 32 Mad 271; Official Assignee 
v. Raiabadar Pillai (1924) 46 MLJ 145.
2 (1920) 54 IC 926.
3 Muhammad Askari v. Radhe Ram (1900) 22 All 307; Perrazu v. 
Subbarayadu AIR 1922 PC 71; Sirikant Lai v. Sidheshwari 
Prasad (1937) 16 Pat 441;
4 Ramnath v. Goturam (1919) 44 Bom 179; Benoy Krishna v. 
Amarendra Krishna (1940) 1 Cal 183.
5 Sithamahalakshmamma v. Kotayya (1936) 71 MLJ 259; Zamindar 
of Kallikote v. Beero Pillai (1936) Mad 825.
6 AIR 1944 Mad 91.
7 Hindu law (10th ed.), 470.
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(b) Difference between the powers of a limited heir and 
those of the guardian of a minor's estate
Although under Hindu law the powers of a widow or
other female heirs were limited, their right was of the nature
of a right of property, and their position was that of an
owner1. A widow used to hold an estate of inheritance to
herself and until the termination of.this estate it was
impossible to say who were the persons who would be entitled
2to succeed as heirs to her husband . The purposes which
authorised her to mortgage, sell or otherwise alienate,
in whole or in part, this estate were stated by the Judicial
3 ,Committee in Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalv Vencata in 
the following words*
"It is admitted, on all hands, that, if there be 
collateral heirs of the husband, the widow cannot 
of her own will alien the property except for 
special purposes. For religious or charitable 
purposes, or those which are supposed to conduce 
to the spiritual welfare of her husband, she has 
a larger power of disposition than that which 
she possesses for purely worldly purposes. To 
support an alienation for the last, she must show 
necessity. On the other hand, it may be taken as 
established that an alienation by her, which 
would not otherwise be legitimate, may become so 
if made with the consent of her husband*s kindred. 
But it surely is not the necessary or logical 
consequence of this latter proposition, that, in 
the absence of collateral heirs to the husband, 
or on their failure, the fetter on the widow's 
power of alienation altogether drops. The exception 
in favour of alienation with consent may be due 
to a :presumption of law that, where that consent 
is given, the purpose for which the alienation 
is made must be proper".
1 Janaki v. Naravansami (1916) 43 IA 207 (PC).
2 Moniram v. Kerry (1880) 7 IA 115, 154 (PC).
3 (1861) 8 MIA 529, 550 (PC).
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Again in Bhushana Rao v. Subbava1 their Lordships of 
the Privy Council observed*
"The power of a Hidu widow to alienate the estate 
inherited by her for purposes other than religious 
or charitable is analogous to that of a manager 
of an infant's estate, as described in 6 M.I.A.
393. She can alienate it, not only for legal 
necessity, but also for the benefit of the estate".
It is clear from the above Privy Council decisions 
that so far as her powers of alienations are concerned a 
widow or a female limited owner can also alienate for reli­
gious or charitable purposes in addition to her powers
which are obtained by a guardian under Hunoomanpersaud's
2case. In Parasiva Murthv v. Rachaiah Das Gupta, C.J., 
said that under Hindu law a widow could transfer the widow's 
estate not merely for legal necessity but for other reasons, 
one of such reasons being religious or charitable purposes; 
but the guardian of a minor could only alienate the property 
for legal necessity or benefit of the estate and for no other 
purpose. The duty of a guardian is to preserve the minor's 
estate, augment its resources and manage it as best as he 
can, but not to confer spiritual benefit or welfare or bliss 
upon the minor, still less any relative of the minor. Any 
analogy between the powers of a widow acting for the spiritual 
welfare of her husband and those of the guardian of a minor's
3
estate can only result in strange anomaly • The guardian has
1 AIR 1936 PC 283, 284.
2 AIR 1958 Mys 125.
3 Re Lalitha Bai AIR 1961 Mad 153, 157. A widow's cover to
burden the estate for voluntary acts conducive to the 
spiritual welfare of her husband is substantial [see 
Ram Dulare v. Batul Bibi AIR 1976 All 135].
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no duty to earn piety or spiritual benefit for his ward in 
exchange or commutation of a portion of the estate however 
small or negligible it might be. The distinction between 
the legal capacity of a Hindu widow inheriting her husband's 
estate and that of a guardian is well brought out by King,
J., in Palaniammal v. Kothandarama  ^in the following words*
"It is now argued that what can be done by the 
manager of a family and what can be done by a 
widow in possession of the family properties can 
be done also by a widow as guardian or her infant 
son who is the owner of the properties. No 
authority has been cited which bears directly on 
this point. The learned Advocate-General has 
relied strongly upon 22 Mad. 113 fRamaswami 
Iyer v. Vengiduswami Iyer1. A widow has full 
power to deal with the estate subject of course 
to the ordinary restrictions of a widow's right 
to alienate, but here the owner of the estate is 
not the widow at all but the plaintiff. We see 
no reason why we should hold in the interests of 
a donee that a marriage gift which can be made 
by the manager of a joint family can also be 
made by the guardian of the only person now 
constituting the family. Such a gift can be 
validated only if it is made for purposes binding 
upon the minor. It is not contended here that 
the minor, had he been a major, would have been 
compelled to make the gift. He could have pleased 
himself whether he made the gift or not".
Similarly in Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax
2v. Jagadish Chandra Sahoo where a mother effected as 
guardian of her minor sons a gift of the minors' immovable 
ancestral property on the basis of a deed of trust in order 
to fulfil the alleged cherished desire of the minors' father, 
Bachawat, J., treated the alienation as made unauthorised.
1 AIR 1944 Mad 91, 92.
2 AIR 1960 Cal 546? (1961) 1 Cal 379.
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In Sudhanva Kumar v. Haripada1 it was observed*
"A guardian is mainly concerned with the custody, 
maintenance, education and health of the minor 
and it is his duty to deal with the minor's 
estate as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence 
would deal with it, as if it was his own. He 
should avoid experimenting with things said to 
be spiritually beneficient to a minor and seeking 
justification for transfer of minor's estate in 
pious or spiritual considerations".
(c) Difference between the powers of the guardian of a minor's 
estate and those of the shebait. manager or dharmakarta 
of a temple
All the three terms, viz., manager, shebait and dharma­
karta are more or less synonymous, implying a person who 
is entrusted with the possession and management of a debutter
property. In Bengal the person is called shebait, in Tamilnadu
2and Andhra Pradesh dharmakarta and in English manager . The
position of a manager, shebait and dharmakarta of a temple
towards debutter property is not similar to that of a trustee
in English law; it is only that they are to perform certain
3duties which are analogous to those of trustees . The legal
estate in debutter property does not vest in them but in the
4
deity or the institution • In discussing the powers of a
1 AIR 1960 Cal 34, 36.
2 Derrett, Introduction, 498 para 790; Paras Diwan, Hindu 
law, 431. For difference among them see Mayne, Hindu law 
(10th ed.), 928 sec. 796.
3 Derrett, 'The reforms of Hindu religious endowments', in
D.E. Smith ed., South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton 
University Press, 1966), 311, 327ff. Also see J.C. Ghose, 
Hindu law of impartible property and endowments (TLL, 1904), 
350-353.
4 Mayne, Hindu law (10th ed.), 929 sec. 796.
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shebait their Lordships, per Sir Montague E. Smith, said1*
"But, notwithstanding that property devoted to 
religious purposes is, as a rule, inalienable, 
it is, in their Lordships* opinion, competent 
for the sebait of property dedicated to the 
worship of an idol, in the capacity as sebait 
and manager of the estate, to incur debts and 
borrow money for the proper expenses of keeping 
up the religious worship, repairing the temples 
or other possessions of the idol, defending 
hostile litigious attacks, and other like objects. 
The power, however, to incur such debts must be 
measured by the existing necessity for incurring 
them. The authority of the sebait of an idol's 
estate would appear to be in this respect analogous 
to that of the manager for an infant heir".
Although at the inception a shebait had little interest
in debutter property, his right began to develop during
2the later period. Derrett says i
"The shebait ••. had obtained through the develop­
ment of Anglo-Hindu law a definite right of 
property in his shebaiti, or right to be shebait. 
This is not surprising since the courts have 
somewhat naively admitted that the shebait has 
a right to utilize at his discretion (i.e., for 
his personal purposes) the surplus after the 
needs of the idol have been met, and it is entirely 
in his discretion what these needs amount to".
A shebait's power, as seen above, in dealing with the
property of the idol or temple exceeds that of a trustee
even. Though in the matter of alienation of property the
/affects to
Privy Council decision^show that there was no difference 
between the powers of a guardian and those of a shebait. 
the later development in the rights of a shebait undoubtedly
1 Prosunno Kumari Debva v. Golab Chand Baboo (1875) 2 IA 145, 
151 (PC).
2 'The reforms of Hindu religious endowments', in D.E. Smith 
ed., South Asian Politics and Religion. 311, 329.
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makes a wide difference between them. The guardian of a
minor's estate can hardly utilise the profits of his minor
ward's property for his own purpose. So far as the corpus
of property is concerned a shebait is 'confined to defensive
acts and may not sell the idol's property in the hope, for
example, of buying more remunerative property*1. In this
respect the courts have allowed a little more liberal power
2to the guardian of a minor's estate .
2. Alienation by natural guardians under the Guardians and 
Wards Act, 1890
Ever since the decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case
the law as settled by that case has been regarded as the
basis of the power of alienation of a Hindu minor's estate
by his guardians, natural as well as de facto. The GWA did
3not interfere with the existing rules of personal laws . 
Therefore, the principles of the above Privy Council case 
continued to govern the acts of natural guardians inter alia 
as before. The persons who were entitled to act as natural 
guardians under Hindu law continued to be recognised as 
such. Section 19 of the GWA prohibits the appointment of
1 Derrett, Introduction, 60 para 68; 502 para 795.
2 See infra. 155.
3 Trevelyan, Minors, 151; B.B. Mitra, The Guardians and Wards 
Act (Calcutta* 11th ed., 1969), 3; M.W. Pradhan, The Guardian­
ship Acts (Bombay* 1958), 105. See also Shooqhury Koer v. 
Boshisht Narain (1867) 8 WR 331 (CR); Heit Singh v. Thakoor 
Singh (1872) 4 N.-W.P HC Rep 57; Shivji Hasam v, Datu Mavji 
(1874) 12 Bom HC Rep 281; Amrit Bai v. Manik Bai (1875) 12 
Bom HC Rep 79; Ram Chunder cnucxerbutty Broionath Mozumdar 
(1878) 4 Cal 929: Roshan Singh v. Har Kishan Singh (1881)
3 All 535; Manishankar v. Bai Muli (1888) 12 Bom 686; Honapa 
v. Mahalpai (1890) 15 Bom 259.
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the guardian of the person of a minor whose father is living 
and is not unfit to act as such guardian, or of a minor married 
female whose husband is not unfit. The Act does not compel 
a natural guardian to take out a certificate of guardianship 
from the court before he can deal with the property of his 
ward. Section 6 saves the power of a father to appoint a 
testamentary guardian to his children subject, of course, 
to the appointed guardian's being removed by the court under 
section 39.
No section of the GWA specifically contains any law 
relating to the alienation of a minor's property by his 
natural or de facto guardian. This indicates that the 
Legislature assumed in framing the law that their authority 
would be decided according to the personal law of the minors1 
and judicial precedents thereon. Of the three sections, viz., 
sections 27-29, which are concerned with the powers and 
duties of guardians of property, section 27 contains general
1 From the following suggestion of Mr. Justice Field which 
the learned judge submitted for framing the Guardians and 
Wards Bill, it may be gathered that it was the intention 
of the Legislature to keep the personal laws with respect 
to natural guardian's power unstated in the Act* "All 
persons dealing with the property of minors without any 
certificate obtained from the civil court should be 
left to the general law applicable to persons of their 
class and to those transactions into which they may have 
entered. It would be extremely difficult and, to my mind, 
dangerous to attempt to reduce to propositions in the 
form of sections of an Act those principles applicable 
to Hindus, Muhammadans and other classes in India which 
regulate the power of dealing with property belonging 
to minors or in which minors have an interest, in the 
numerous.cases:in which questions as to the extent of 
that power may arise". [~The Gazette of India, March 20, 
1886 part V, 134-135].
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provisions which are applicable to all guardians, natural, 
testamentary, de facto or certificated, section 28 deals 
with the provisions regarding the powers of testamentary 
guardians, and section 29 speaks of the limitation of 
the powers of guardians appointed or certificated by courts. 
Therefore alienations by guardians other than those for 
whom special provisions are made in sections 28 and 29 
are to be governed by the provisions of section 27 of the 
GWA in so far as they are not inconsistent with the personal 
laws of the minors concerned. Section 27 provides that in 
the discharge of his duty a guardian must deal with the 
property as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would 
deal with it if it were his own, arid the section empowers 
him to do all acts which are 'reasonable and proper for 
the realisation, protection and benefit of the property'.
2.1. Test of prudence
This is not for the first time that the guardian of 
a minor's estate is expected to deal with the estate as 
carefully as a man of ordinary prudence. Section 16 of 
Regulation 10 of 17931 in a somewhat different wording 
demanded the manager of a minor's estate to manage it 
'diligently and faithfully, for the benefit of the proprie­
tor, and in every respect to act to the best of his judgment
1 In almost similar language the Bengal Court of Wards Act 
(Act 9) of 1879, section 40 describes the powers of the 
manager of a minor's estate.
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for the proprietor's interest, in like manner as if the 
estate were his own'. In Hunoomanpersaud's case their 
Lordships of the Privy Council observed that an act of a 
manager or guardian justifying an alienation of a minor's 
property must be one that a 'prudent owner'1 would make
for the benefit of the estate. The question of prudence
. . 2 of a guardian was raised in Vembu Iyer v, Srinivasa Iyanqar
and in his agreement with the contention of the appellant's
counsel that the prudence which a man would exercise in
the management of his own affairs would not necessarily
be sufficient in the administration of the property of a
minor, Sundara Aiyar, J., observed that it would not be
enough for the court to say that if an adult had acted in
the management of his own property in the way in which a
guardian dealt with his ward's property, the adult owner's
act would not be pronounced as imprudent. The learned judge
further observed that there were risks which an owner could
take and yet which might be consistent with the conduct
of a prudent man, but a trustee or a guardian had no right
to take the same risks in dealing with the property of
3
another. In Munawa v. Krishnawa Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., 
found the test of ordinary prudence as too broad, and 
suggested two limitations on it, viz., first, that no court
1 Hunoomanpersaudfs case (1856) 6 MIA 393, 423.
2 (1912) 23 MLJ 638, 643.
3 AIR 1925 Mad 215, 218.
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should uphold a transaction which it considered a man of 
ordinary prudence would not have done in respect of his 
own property; secondly, the prudence in a particular 
transaction must be judged in the light of the circums­
tances which obtained at the date of the action.
In the course of their judgment in Jaqat Narain v.
Mathura Das1 the learned judges of the Full Bench gave an
explanation of the words 'that a prudent owner would make*
used in the judgment of Hunoomanpersaud *s case. They observed
that their Lordships of the Privy Council did not mean to
suggest by these words that "the presence or absence of
prudence was to be determined by what the manager chose to
say he thought to be prudent, but by what the ordinary man
knowing all the facts that were or could properly be within
his knowledge at the time the charge was created would
2
consider to be prudent" • They further observed that the 
prudence of the transaction must not be judged by its 
result, but in the light of the circumstances which were 
within the knowledge of the manager, or knowledge of which 
he could reasonably be expected to have acquired. And 
further, the degree of prudence required of him in a case 
where he was not the sole owner of the property but others 
had interests in that property, would be greater, as in 
the case of a trustee, than if he were the sole proprietor.
1 AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).
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In Taieswar Putt v. Lakhan Prasad1 Dawson-Mi Her, C.J., 
observed that the guardian of the person and property of 
a minor was bound to deal with the minor's property as if 
it were his own and to do everything which was reasonable 
and proper for the protection and benefit of the property
2entrusted to him. In Sital Prasad Singh v. A labial Mander 
Harris, C.J., considered that prudence implied caution 
as well as foresight and excluded hasty, reckless and 
arbitrary conduct.
However, the courts should judge an act of a guardian 
as it would appear to a prudent man at the time when the 
act was done; and must not set aside the act long after 
it had been done because it appeared to the court that 
the guardian could have acted better. It would be just 
to consider whether in the circumstances that existed at 
the time of alienation the act would be regarded as a 
prudent one by men of ordinary prudence in dealing with 
the property of a minor. And once it is recognised, the 
court should not invalidate it. The safe and convenient 
rule is that if the guardian alienates a minor's property 
because he considers it, after weighing all the then cir­
cumstances, to be in the best interest of the minor to 
make that alienation. The minor would be bound by that
act of alienation. Such a view was approved in Gopalakrishna
3 . . .v. Krishna Iyer and followed in Dhobani Dei v. Linqarai
1 AIR 1923 Pat 231.
2 AIR 1939 Pat 370, 372.
3 AIR 1961 Mad 348, 352.
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Bhuvan1. Where the alienation is subject of an executory 
contract, the prudence for it should be decided according 
to the circumstances as they were obtaining at the time 
when the contract was entered into and not when it is 
executed; subsequent circumstances should not invalidate 
it.
2.1.1. Dual standard of test
As seen in Jaqat Narain*s case the amount of prudence 
required in a particular case depends on the interest of 
the person in the property he is dealing with. If he is 
the sole owner of the property, i.e., the only beneficiary
of a trust in respect of which he was trustee, the test of
prudence would be subjective one; but if he is not the
owner or if he is one of the owners the amount of prudence
required would be greater than in the case of the first 
one. He would be required to exercise as much care as a 
trustee, or in other words the test of prudence would be 
objective.
2
In Tulsiram Sitaram v. Narayan Waman and Nathu Bhiwaii 
.. 3v. Ganpat Bablan little scope was allowed for the exercise 
of any standard of prudence, since in both the cases the 
alienees from natural guardians had to show positively that 
the course which the guardians had adopted was the only one
1 AIR 1971 Ori 224.
2 AIR 1950 Nag 69.
3 AIR 1958 Bom 25.
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open to him in the circumstances. Such a view is not
correct1 because a guardian can sell the minor*s property
for necessity or benefit and such benefit need not be of
a defensive character. A power to sell for the benefit of
the minor implies a discretion, discretion not merely to
decide as to the form of alienation, such as mortgage,
sale or lease, but also whether the alienation is at all
to be made. The views of these cases were disapproved by
a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Gopalakrishna
2v. Krishna Iyer where the learned judges following Vembu 
Iyer *s case observed that the standard of prudence was 
not a subjective one, i.e., what the guardian would do if 
the property were his own, but an objective one, i.e., 
whether in the circumstances it was necessary for the minor 
or for the benefit of his estate that the property should 
be sold or otherwise alienated. The learned judges rightly 
said that the standard of care required would be more akin 
to that of a trustee than that of an owner. Now, what amount 
of prudence is a trustee expected to exercise?
In English law a 'trustee is bound to execute the 
trust with fidelity and reasonable diligence, and ought 
to conduct its affairs in the same manner as an ordinary 
prudent man of business would conduct his own affairs;
1 Derrett, Introduction, 75 para 93.
2 AIR 1961 Mad 348.
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but beyond this he is not bound to adopt further precautions'1.
2In Re Speight. Speight v. Gaunt Jessel, M.R., saidi
"On general principles a trustee ought to conduct 
the business of the trust in the same manner that 
an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct 
his own, and that beyond that there is no liability 
or obligation on the trustee. ... It never could 
be reasonable to make a trustee adopt further 
and better precautions than an ordinary prudent 
man of business in any other way".
Speaking about the standard of care which a trustee
would exercise Lindley, L.J., observed in Re Whiteley.
3Whiteley v. Learoyd t
"The duty of a trustee is not to take such care 
only as a prudent man would take if he had only 
himself to consider; the duty rather is to take 
such care as an ordinary prudent man would take 
if he were minded to make an investment for the 
benefit of other people for whom he felt morally 
bound to provide"•
The above standards apply not merely to the trustees*
power of selecting investments, they apply also to the
exercise of their discretionary powers generally. A similar
4view was expressed by Lord Watson m  Learoyd v. Whiteley 
when he saidi
"As a general rule the law requires of a trustee 
no higher degree of diligence in the execution
1 Halsbury's laws of England Vol. 38, 969 sec. 1679. See also 
T. Lewin, The Law of Trusts (London* 16th ed., 1964), 221? 
W.F. Fratcher, 'Trust*, in (1973) 4/11 IECL. 60 sec. 77; 
Charitable Corporation v. Sutton (1742) 2 Atk 400, 406?
26 ER 642, 645 per Lord Hardwicke, L.C.; Massey v. Banner 
(1820) 1 Jac & W 241, 247; 37 ER 367, 369; Clough v. Bond
(1838) 3 My & Cr 490, 497; 40 ER 1016, 1018.
2 (1882) 22 Ch D 727, 739-40. See also Speight v. Gaunt (1883) 
9 AC 1, 29 per Lord Fitzgerald. This case was followed in 
Re Cassumali (l906) 30 Bom 591, 592.
3 (1886) 33 Ch D 347, 355 (CA).
4 (1887) 12 AC 727, 733 (HL).
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of his office than a man of ordinary prudence 
would exercise in the management of his own 
private affairs. Yet he is not allowed the same 
discretion in investing the moneys of the trust 
as if he were a person sui juris dealing with 
his own estate. Business men of ordinary prudence 
may, and frequently do, select investments which 
are more or less of a speculative characters but 
it is the duty of a trustee to confine himself to 
the class of investments which are permitted by 
the trust, and likewise to avoid all investments 
of that class which are attended with hazard.
So, so long as he acts in the honest observance 
of these limitations, the general rule already 
stated will apply'*,
The same standard of diligence and prudence is not 
applicable to both cases, viz., in a case where the trustee 
conducts his own business, and another where he conducts 
the business of others who have moral as well as legal 
claims upon him. The degree of the standard is different 
for two different situations. The prudence required in 
the case of one is to be determined by applying subjective 
test, while in the case of another it is to be done by 
the application of the objective test.
In English law there is a controversy between the
degree of skill and care to be exercised by a. paid trustee
and that to be exercised by an unpaid trustee1. A trustee * s
?
duty of skill and care is extremely onerous • Would he be
1 Fratcher, 'Trust', in (1973) 4/11 IECL, 60 sec. 77 f.n. 455.
2 In Knight v. Earl of Plymouth (1747) 1 Dick 120, 126;
21 ER 214, 216 Lord Hardwicke, L.C., observed that when 
to the onerous nature of the duty of skill and care was 
added the fact that a trustee was also under a duty to 
act gratuitously, it appeared that the office of trustee 
was such that *'It is an act of great kindness if anyone 
to accept it".
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put under the same duty of skill and care when he is
acting gratuitously? In Jobson v. Palmer1 Romer, J., held
that the same standard should be demanded of a trustee
whether he acted gratuitously or received payment. The
learned judge observed that a paid trustee who had selected
a servant with the same degree of prudence as an ordinary
man of business would exercise in his own affairs, was
not liable when the servant stole trust property. The 
. . . 2traditional view was the same as decided in Jobson's case. 
The situation is different where the trustee is an insti­
tutional or professional one. An institutional or profes­
sional trustee is frequently a banker or actuary who 
advertises for business, works for pay and has no personal 
relationship with the settlor; while an unpaid trustee is 
frequently a personal friend of the settlor. The editors 
of the 11th and 12th editions of Underhill's Trusts and
3
Trustees observe *
"(1) ... unpaid trustees are only bound to use such 
due diligence and care in the management of the 
estate as men of ordinary prudence and vigilance 
would use in the management of their own affairs. 
The mere fact, however, that a trustee has acted 
under the advice of his counsel or solicitor 
will not necessarily excuse him, even from paying 
the costs of the action, where a breach of trust 
has been committed.
(2) A higher standard of diligence and knowledge 
is expected from paid trustees".
1 (1893) 1 Ch 71, 76.
2 See Underhill; Trusts and Trustees (10th ed., 1950), 308 
Art. 50. In this and earlier editions of this book it is 
stated* "Nor, on the other hand, does the fact that a 
trustee is remunerated add to this liability".
3 11th ed., 323-324; 12th ed., 369.
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In Re Waterman*s Will Trusts1 Harman, J., expressed
a similar view in the following wordst
"I do not forget that a paid trustee is expected 
to exercise a higher standard of diligence and 
knowledge than an unpaid trustee and that a bank 
which advertises itself largely in the public 
press as taking charge of administration is under 
a special duty**.
2Some may expect that the standard of skill and care
required of other persons who occupy fiduciary or quasi-
fiduciary positions in England is lower and more flexible
than that required of a trustee, but a guardian's liability
for his minor ward's property, if ever it comes to his hands,
does not become less for his being unpaid, for his assuming
or being forced to assume the onus. In the management of
his ward's property he must use the same care and caution
as a man of ordinary prudence would do if it were his own
property. If a person appointed as guardian possessed
himself of any of his ward's property he became a trustee,
although he was only a trustee by construction and not
3appointed by name . Every guardian is bound to keep safely 
the real and personal estate of his ward and to account 
for the personal estate and the issues and profits of the
1 (1952) 2 All ER 1054, 1055.
2 D.R. Paling, 'The trustee's duty of skill and care', in 
(1973) 37 (NS) The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, 48-59, 
59 f.n. 46.
3 Sleeman v. Wilson (1871) 13 Eq. Cas 36 per Sir James Bacon, 
V.-C.
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real estate. If he has been guilty of negligence in the 
keeping or disposition of the minor's money, whereby the 
estate has incurred loss, he will be obliged to sustain 
that loss1. The guestion remains whether an unpaid, and 
perhaps unwilling, guardian is liable for failure to show 
the highest degree of diligence.
2 . . . .Paling suggests that if the distinction between
paid and unpaid trustees would be maintained the law should 
be s
"(l) A trustee who acts without remuneration shall 
exercise that degree of skill and care in the 
management of the trust including the selection 
of investments which he is accustomed to exercise 
in the management of his own affairs?
(2) A trustee who receives remuneration shall 
exercise that degree of skill and care in the 
management of the trust including the selection 
of investments which an ordinary prudent man 
of business would exercise in the management of 
his own affairs if he were regardful of the 
pecuniary interests in the future of those having 
claim upon him".
Such a classification of paid and unpaid trustee 
is not envisaged by the Indian Trusts Act (Act 2) of 1882, 
which of course antedates professional trustees. Section 15 
of the Act states the care which is reguired from a trustee. 
The section runs as follows?
"A trustee is bound to deal with the trust-property 
as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would
1 Eversley, Domestic Relations (6th ed., 1951), 437.
2 D.R. Paling, 'The trustee's duty of skill and care', in 
(1973) 37 (NS) The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, 48-59, 
59.
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deal with such property if it were his own; and, 
in the absence of a contract to the contrary a 
trustee so dealing is not responsible for the 
loss, destruction or deterioration of the trust- 
proper tyM •
A guardian of a minor's estate must deal with that 
estate as 'carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would 
deal with such property if it were his own', and every 
plain neglect of duty by him would amount to a breach of
trust and he must compensate his ward for any loss occasioned
1 . . .  2thereby . He has all the responsibilities of a trustee .
It is not true to say that a minor must take his guardian 
as he finds him. So long as the guardian acts bona fide 
in the interests and welfare of the minor and the trans­
actions on behalf of the minor result in benefit to the 
minor, and so long as the transactions are free from any 
taint of fraud, malpractice or abuse of power, the yardstick 
of an ordinary man's conduct in respect of his own property
to test the validity of the guardian's transactions can
3 . 4well be applied • In Nidhi Padhan v. Bhainra Khadia
G.K. Misra, J., clearly pointed out that the standard of
prudence required was not a subjective one, but an objective
one --  'a standard more akin to that of a trustee than
that of an owner'. This decision was followed by R.N. Misra,
5Jf., m  Dhobani Dei v. Linqarai Bhuyan .
1 Trevelyan, Minors, 180 f.n. 2; Labhu Ram v. Bhaq Mai 
(1920) 54 IC 926; (1919) PR 419.
2 Mathew v. Brise (1851) 14 Beav 341; 51 ER 317.
3 Palani Pillai v. Senqamalathachi AIR 1960 Mad 160, 163.
4 AIR 1963 Ori 133, 135.
5 AIR 1971 Ori 224, 225.
164
2.2. Fiduciary relationship1
One who holds anything in trust for another is the
fiduciary; and he is said to act in a fiduciary capacity or
to receive money or contract a debt in a fiduciary capacity,
when the business which he transacts or the money or
property which he handles is not his own or for his own
benefit but for the benefit of another person as to whom
he stands in a relation implying and necessitating great
confidence and trust on the one part and a high degree of
good faith on the other. The fiduciary relation does not
depend upon any particular circumstances. It exists in
almost every shape. It exists 'notoriously* in the case of
2trustee and cestui que trust ; it exists m  the case of
3 . 4  5guardian and ward , parent and child , husband and wife ,
6 7doctor and patient , solicitor and client •
1 For the general nature of a fiduciary relation see Chitty, 
Contracts Vol.l (London* 23rd ed., 1968), 140 sec. 290;
Snell, Principles of Equity (London* 27th ed., 1973), 547 ff; 
Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern Equity (London* 10th ed., 1976), 
512-527; Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract (London* 9th ed., 
1976), 291 ff; Pollock, Law of Fraud (Calcutta* TLL, 1874),
63 ff. For an illuminating discussion of fiduciary princi­
ples in Hindu law see Derrett, 'Fiduciary principles, the 
African family, and Hindu law', in (1966) 15 ICLQ. 1205-1216.
2 Plowright v. Lambert (1885) 52 LT 646, 652 (NS) per Field, J.; 
Douqan v. Macpherson (1902) AC 197, 203.
3 Hylton v. Hylton(1754) 2 Ves 547; 28 ER 349; Hatch v. Hatch 
(1804) 9 Ves 292; 32 ER 615; Maitland v. Irving (1846) 15 
Sim 437; 60 ER 688.
4 Archer v. Hudson (1844) 7 Beav 551; 49 ER 1180; Lancashire 
Loans. Ltd. v. Black (1934) 1 KB 380.
5 Howes v. Bishop (1909) 2 KB 390. This relationship may now 
be in decay in advanced societies.
6 Dent v. Bennett (1839) 4 My & Cr 269; 41 ER 105.
7 Gibson v. Jeves (1801) 6 Ves 266; 31 ER 1044.
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A guardian stands in a fiduciary relation to his ward;
and except as provided by the will or other instrument, if
any, by which he was appointed, or by the GWA, he must not
make any profit out of his office1* Being a fiduciary the
guardian may not be liable for his failure to make a profit
2out of the minor's property , but if._he himself makes any 
profit by the purchase of a tenancy under the estate of the 
minor which is under his management, he may be required to 
restore the tenancy to the minor, since he would be considered
to have gained that advantage by the use of his position
3 4and knowledge as fiduciary • In Hunter v. Atkins Brougham,
L.C., said*
"There are certain relations known to the law, 
as attorney, guardian, trustee; if a person, 
standing in these relations to client, ward, or 
cestui que trust, takes a gift or makes a bargain, 
the proof lies upon him, that he has dealt with 
the other party, the client, ward, etc., exactly 
as a stranger would have done, taking no advantage 
of his influence or knowledge, putting the other 
party on his guard, bringing everything to his 
knowledge which he himself knew* In short, the 
rule rightly considered is, that the person 
standing in such relation, must, before he can 
take a gift, or even enter into a transaction, 
place himself in exactly the same position as a 
stranger would have been in, so that he may 
gain no advantage whatever from his relation to 
the other party, beyond what may be the natural 
and unavoidable consequence of kindness arising 
out of that relation".
1 Indian Trusts Act (Act 2) of 1882, sec. 20(1).
2 T. Lewin, The Law of Trusts (London* 16th ed., 1964), 355- 
356; Fratcher, 'Tust', in (1973) 4/11 IECL, 74 sec. 92.
3 Gokuldas v. Valibai (1913) 15 Bom LR 343.
4 (1834) 3 My & K 113, 135; 40 ER 43, 52.
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A person in a fiduciary position must not be allowed 
to take advantage of his position, and the court should 
not allow a person to be placed in a position in which 
his interest pulls him one way and his duty the other1. 
"Whenever two persons stand in such a relation that while 
it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, 
and the influence which naturally grows out of that confi­
dence is possessed by the other, and this confidence is 
abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage 
at the expense of the confiding party, the person so avail­
ing himself of his position will not be permitted to retain 
the advantage, although the transaction could not have
2been impeached if no such confidential relation had existed" . 
A person in a fiduciary relation is under a duty to act for 
the benefit of another as to matters within the scope of 
the relation. If the court can discover that some advantage 
has been taken, some information acquired by one party which 
the other party did not possess, though that advantage or 
that information was not to be precisely discovered, and 
though it was inadequate to go to the length of shocking 
the confidence of the people, it would go a long way to 
constitute a fraud. Where a gift bears no proportion to 
the circumstances of the giver, where no reason appears 
at all or the reason given is falsified and the giver is
1 Fox v. Mackreth (1791) 2 Cox 320; 30 ER 148.
2 Tate v. Williamson (1866) 2 CA 55, 61 per Lord Chelmsford, 
L.C. These remarks of Lprd Chelmsford, L.C., were.adopted 
bv Sir Evershed, M.R., in the Court of Appeal in Tufton v. 
Sperni (1952) 2 TLR 516, 521-22.
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a weak man liable to be imposed upon, the courts look upon 
such gift with jealous eye and strictly examine the conduct 
and behaviour of the persons to whom it is made. If the 
courts see that any undue means have been used by them 
to procure such gift, or if they see any sort of imposition 
or that the donor is placed in such a situation as naturally 
gives the donee an undue influence over him, or if there 
is the least scintilla of fraud, they will interpose1.
2 . . .Being in a fiduciary relation and his office being
3
a trust the validity of a guardian*s transactions with 
his minor ward*s property are to be determined by the 
rules embodied in the Indian Trusts Act (Act 2) of 1882. 
Section 88 of the said Act provides that where a trustee, 
executor, partner, agent, director of a company, legal 
adviser, or other person bound in a fiduciary character to 
protect the interests of another person, by availing himself 
of his character, gains for himself any pecuniary advantage, 
or where any person so bound enters into any dealings under 
circumstances in which his own interests are, or may be, 
adverse to those of such other person and thereby gains 
for himself a pecuniary advantage, he must hold for the 
benefit of such other person the advantage so gained.
Where, however, any advantage is gained in derogation of
1 Bridqeman v. Green (1757) Wilm 58,61;97 ER 22,24.
2 GWA, 1890, sec. 20(1).
3 Ibid, sec. 39(a)-(c).
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the interests of another, by the exercise of undue influence,
the person gaining such advantage without consideration,
or with notice that such influence has been exercised,
must hold the advantage for the benefit of the person
whose interests have been so prejudiced1. Thus where a
guardian, by availing himself of his character as such,
gains for himself any advantage, or where he enters into
dealings under circumstances in which his own interests
are, or may be, adverse to those of the ward, and thereby
gains for himself an advantage, he must hold the advantage
2so gained for the benefit of the ward . Again, where he 
gains an advantage in derogation of the minor ward's 
interests by the exercise of undue influence, he or any 
person who has the notice of the exercise of such influence 
must hold the advantage for the benefit of the ward so 
prejudiced. Section 53 of the Trusts Act of 1882 prohibits 
a trustee or any person who has recently ceased to be a 
trustee from buying, or becoming mortgagee or lessee of 
the trust property or any part thereof without the permission 
of the court. The court would not give such permission 
unless the proposed purchase, mortgage or lease is manifestly 
for the advantage of the beneficiary. Further, where a 
trustee's duty is to buy or obtain a mortgage or lease 
of particular property for the beneficiary such trustee
1 Indian Trusts Act, 1882, sec. 89.
2 Ibid. sec, 88, illustration (h).
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must not buy it, or any part thereof, or obtain a mortgage 
or lease of it, or any part thereof for himself. So also 
a guardian must not alienate to himself or obtain anything 
belonging to a minor without the permission of the court.
'Undue influence*'1' has been defined in section 16 of 
the Contract Act (Act 9) of 1872. The section runs as 
follows *
"(1) A contract is said to be induced by 'undue 
influence' where the relations subsisting between 
the parties are such that one of the parties is 
in a position to dominate the will of the other 
and uses that position to obtain an unfair advan­
tage over the other.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the 
generality of the foregoing principle, a person 
is deemed to be in a position to dominate the 
will of another --
(a) where he holds a real or apparent authority 
over the other, or where he stands in a 
fiduciary relation to the other; or
(b) where he makes a contract with a person 
whose mental capacity is temporarily 
affected by reason of age, illness, or 
mental or bodily distress.
(3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate 
the will of another enters into a contract with 
him, and the transaction appears, on the face of
it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscion­
able, the burden of proving that such contract 
was not induced by undue influence shall lie 
upon the person in a position to dominate the will 
of the other.
Nothing in this sub-section shall affect the 
provisions of section 111 of the Indian Evidence 
Act, 1872".
1 For a general discussion on undue influence see Halsburv's 
laws of England Vol. 17, 672 ff; Hanbury and Maudsley, 
Modern Equity (10th ed.), 627-630; Keeton and Sheridan,
The Law of Trusts (London* 10th ed., 1974), 120 ff.
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The main ingredients of undue influence are that one 
of the parties should be in a position to dominate the will 
of another and that he should use that position to obtain 
an unfair advantage over the other. A person is deemed to 
be in a position to dominate the will of another (i) where 
he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or 
where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or 
(ii) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental 
capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason 
of age, illness or mental or bodily distress. Commenting 
on the origin of the doctrine of undue influence Shah, J., 
observes'1' that under the Common law this doctrine was 
evolved by the courts in England for granting protection 
against transactions procured by the exercise of insidious 
forms of influence spiritual and temporal. 'The doctrine 
applies to acts of bounty as well as other transactions 
in which one party by exercising his position of dominance 
obtains an unfair advantage over another. The Indian 
enactment is founded substantially on the rules of English 
Common law'. The learned judge says that the first sub­
section of section 16 lays down the principle in general 
terms; sub-section (2) raises the presumption that a 
person shall be deemed to be in a position to dominate 
the will of another if the conditions set out therein 
are fulfilled; and sub-section (3) lays down the conditions
1 Ladli Parshad v. Karnal Distillery Co. AIR 1963 SC 1279,vim-.----
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for raising a rebuttable presumption that a transaction 
is procured by the exercise of undue influence.
The doctrine of undue influence was intended to ensure
that no person should be allowed to retain the benefit of
his own fraud or wrongful act. It applies to all cases
where influence is acguired and abused, where confidence
is reposed and betrayed1. Cotton, L.J., has classified such
2cases as follows i
"First, where the court has been satisfied that the 
gift was the result of influence expressly used 
by the donee for the purpose; second, where the 
relations between the donor and donee have at or 
shortly before the execution of the gift been such 
as to raise a presumption that the donee had 
influence over the donor. In such a case the court 
sets aside the voluntary gift, unless it is proved 
that in fact the gift was the spontaneous act of 
the donor acting under circumstances which enabled 
him to exercise an independent will and which 
justify the court in holding that the gift was 
the result of a free exercise of the donor's will. 
The first class of cases may be considered as 
depending on the principle that no one shall be 
allowed to retain any benefit arising from his 
own fraud or wrongful act. In the second class of 
cases the court interferes, not on the ground 
that any wrongful act has been committed by the 
donee, but on the ground of public policy, and 
to prevent the relations which existed between 
the parties and the influence arising therefrom 
being abused".
But it must be admitted that the principles of undue 
influence apply with great difficulty to a case where a 
guardian benefits from the use of his ward's assets up till
1 Smith v. Kay (1859) 7 HLC 750, 779; 11 ER 299; Subhas 
Chandra v. Ganga Prosad (1967) 1 SCR 331, 336 per Mitter, J.
2 Allcard v. Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145, 171.
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the settling of accounts upon the ward's majority* suits 
by ex-wards against their former guardians on the account 
are very rare and the reasons for this are obvious.
Although most of the cases in which undue influence 
has been successfully pleaded against acts by persons sui 
juris relate to gifts, the same principles apply to purchases 
at an undervalue or sales at an excessive price1. The differ­
ence between a gift and a manifestly disadvantageous contract
2is for this purpose only a matter of degree . We are concerned 
particularly with a guardian’s alienations and the subtelty 
of the situation is manifest.
Since a guardian is in a fiduciary position when his
interests conflict with those of his ward, he must see that
the ward is provided with proper and independent advice 
3and assistance . In dealing with transactions resulting
through fiduciary relationship the principles followed by
4courts of eguity and the rules embodied m  the Trusts Act
5of 1882 are to be applied however repugnant this may be 
to Asian habits of mind. Thus a transaction between a guardian 
and his ward would be looked upon by the courts with jealousy, 
and before upholding it they will require 'the clearest
1 Tufton v. Sperni (1952) 2 TLR 516, 526.
2 Pollock, Principles of Contract (London* 13th ed., 1950), 
482.
3 Rhodes v. Bate (1866) 1 CA 252, 257.
4 Poushong v. Moonia (1868) 10 WR 128, 129 (CR); Roopnarain 
Singh v. Gugadhur Pershad (1868) 9 WR 297 (OR).
5 Re Cassumali (1906) 30 Bom 591, 592; Labhu Ram v. Bhag Mai 
(1919) PR 419; Ramdin Hazari v. Manasaram Murlidhur (1929)
51 All 1027; Kishandas v. Godavaribai AIR 1937 Bom 334.
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proof of good faith and fairness, absence of influence, 
knowledge by the ward of the facts and of his rights, and 
benefit to the ward*'*'.
Section 20(2) of the GWA statess
"The fiduciary relation of a guardian to his ward 
extends to and affects purchases by the guardian 
of the property of the ward, and by the ward of 
the property of the guardian, immediately or 
soon after the ward has ceased to be a minor, 
and generally all transactions between them while 
the influence of the guardian still lasts or 
is recent”.
Where a man acts as guardian of a minor, the courts
are extremely watchful to prevent that person*s taking any
2advantage immediately upon his ward coming of age . If, as 
a result of direct pressure, a young man only six months 
after he had attained majority, executes a document it is 
not sufficient that he knew what the actual transaction was.
It must be shown that he was emancipated from control and 
had the advantage of a separate solicitor. In the absence
3
of any such proof the document must be set aside . On grounds 
of public policy even after a great lapse of time a conveyance 
by a ward to her guardian may be set aside unless the act 
is, on rational consideration, an *act of pure volition,
4
uninfluenced by anybody • If a guardian who is also the 
uncle of the ward procures the guarantee of his young niece
1 Toolseydas v. Premji Tricumdas (1888) 13 Bom 61, 66}
Thataiah v. Venkata Subbaiah AIR 1968 SC 1332, 1335.
2 Derrett, Introduction, 89-90 para 117; see also Hylton v. 
Hylton (1754) 2 Ves 547, 548; 28 ER 349, 350.
3 Sercombe v. Sanders (1865) 34 Beav 382, 386; 55 ER 682, 683.
4 Hatch v. Hatch (1804) 9 Ves 292; 32 ER 615.
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who is possessed of considerable property and who lives
with him, for the fulfilment of his contract with his
creditors, the guarantee is considered as procured by
undue influence1. A guardian is duty-bound to abstain from
entering into any arrangement beneficial to himself and
2detrimental to the minor's estate , but if he takes a
conveyance from the minor in consideration of an alleged
debt incurred for a grossly extravagant expenditure, the
3conveyance will be set aside .
Release of his share by a member of a joint Hindu 
family executed immediately after his attaining majority 
in favour of his guardian is also looked upon with suspicion. 
Thus where there was a dispute between the guardian and his 
ward about their respective rights to the estate of a 
deceased person and as to the genuineness and validity 
of a will alleged by the guardian to be the will of the 
deceased, and the guardian without giving an opportunity 
to the ward of testing the validity or the real meaning of 
the will by an independent advice, obtained a release from 
the minor soon after he attained majority and the ward in 
consideration of receipt of a certain sum of money agreed 
to give up all claim to any share in the estate of the 
deceased and undertook not to challenge the release at any 
time thereafter, it was held that the transaction was not 
of that absolute fairness and good faith as required by
1 Maitland v. Irving (1846) 15 Sim 437; 60 ER 688.
2 Prosunno Coomar v. Wooma Churn (1873) 20 WR 274 (CR).
3 Lachman Das v. Rup Chand (1831) 5 Sel. Rep (Beng) 136 (NE); 
Baboo Ram v. Kalee Pershad (1825) 4 Sel. Rep (Beng) 22 (NE).
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the relation of the parties and ought to be set aside
In such a case it is for the guardian to show that he
derived no benefit from the transaction, that he placed
the ward in full possession of all facts and accounts
relating to the estate, and explained to him the full
extent of his rights therein. Again, where an ignorant
young man who has just attained majority and whose mind
is clouded and affected by hemp smoking, has been deprived
of his property by his guru who has complete control over
him, the transaction being for an inadequate consideration,
2is set aside on the ground of undue influence .
3In Gillon v. Mitford where a minor executed a release
for a comparatively inadequate consideration to his guardian
soon after coming of age, Thomas Strange, C.J., said refer-
4ring to a number of English cases that the principles of 
equity which govern the case of a release "are those which 
render it the duty of the court, wherever a man appears 
to have been acting as guardian, or as trustee in the 
nature of guardian to a minor, to see, when he comes to 
give up his trust, that a fair account has been rendered, 
and that his release, if he have obtained one, has been 
fair. They operate in other relations beside that of 
guardian and ward; and, in their application, are always
1 Toolseydas v. Premii Tricumdas (1888) 13 Bom 61.
2 Mt. Manbhari v. Sri Ram AIR 1936 All 672.
3 (1808) 1 Strange 281, 287-88; 5 ID 149, 152 (OS).
4 Hylton v. Hylton (1754) 2 Ves 547; 28 ER 349; Hatch v. 
Hatch (1804) 9 Ves 292; 32 ER 615; Morse v. Royal (1806)
12 Ves 355; 33 ER 134; Osmond v. Fitzroy (1731) 3 P. Wms 
129; 24 ER 997.
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considered, not as ordinary principles, regulating rights, 
and as such, liable to be modified by a variety of personal 
circumstances, but as principles of policy to be enforced 
for the sake of the public, as affording by their efficacy 
a salutory and important protection, where protection is 
peculiarly needed, and, without the influence of which, 
great imposition might be practised, and incalculable 
injustice done. For this reason, their application does 
not depend upon detection of positive unfairness in the 
arrangement proposed to be impeached. If it confer an 
advantage upon the guardian, it may be one that he may 
have merited; but, upon the principles of the court, it 
may not be the less bound to set it aside. Neither does 
it depend upon its appearing whether the minor just come 
of age knew at the time in its full extent what it was 
that he was giving up, and was apprised of his option to 
withhold his consent. In ordinary cases, a man will be 
bound by his release, if there appear to have been a 
consideration for it, and that, knowing at the time the 
extent of his rights, he was aware of the nature of the 
instrument he was about to execute. But, I apprehend, it 
is different between a guardian and ward, at the critical 
moment of settling the account, upon the latter coming of 
age. At law, the relation may have ceased, the minor having 
become legally sui juris. But an influence for the most 
part on the side of the guardian still continuing, equity 
presumes its operation, and will not permit him at that 
moment, in the act of settling the account, to deprive an
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important advantage, for which he could not have stipulated; 
much less if it be more than doubtful, whether the ward 
was informed at the time of the extent to which he was 
entitled to call him to account, and whether he possessed 
advice to satisfy the court that he was not misled in 
releasing him'*.
The learned Chief Justice has put greater fidelity 
and burden of integrity on a guardian than any other con­
ceivable fiduciary. The guardian must give a fair account 
of the minor's property when his guardianship terminates 
or when he gives it up, and if he obtains any release from 
the minor that must be fair beyond doubt. As a matter of 
public policy the principles of equity do not depend for 
their application in cases of imposition or influence upon 
the detection of positive unfairness in any alleged trans­
action. If a transaction confers an advantage upon the 
guardian, the court must set it aside; the fact that the 
minor who has just come of age knew at the time of effecting 
the transaction its nature, character and extent, and his 
right to withhold his consent to it, would not be a defence 
to an action for setting it aside. In ordinary cases a 
man is bound by his release if he gets adequate consideration 
for it and if he knew at the time of the execution of the 
instrument the extent of his rights and the nature of the 
instrument. But the situation is different when it obtains 
between a guardian and ward upon the latter coming of age.
The court will presume the continuance of the guardian's
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influence and watch with jealousy any transaction between 
them. This notional extension of undue influence may not 
be so effective in the case of other fiduciary relations 
where minority or the recent termination of the minority 
of the weaker party is not involved. In Coles v. Trecothick1 
Lord Eldon says that a trustee may buy from the cestui que 
trust. if there is a distinct and clear contract, 'ascertained 
to be such after a jealous and scrupulous examination of 
all the circumstances, that the cestui que trust intended 
the trustee should buy; and there is no fraud, no conceal­
ment, no advantage taken, by the trustee of information 
acquired by him in the character of trustee'.
A transaction between a ward and his guardian or 
another person standing in loco parentis to her, two months 
after she came of age, could be set aside even against a 
third person, if he took a benefit knowing the nature of 
the circumstances; but where there was no ground for imput­
ing to him knowledge of undue influence it would be other- 
2wise . However the courts would not set aside transactions
3in the nature of a family arrangement between a guardian 
and his ward. Family arrangements which are advantageous 
for the ward's family generally are looked upon with favour
1 (1804) 9 Ves 234, 246; 32 ER 592, 597.
2 Archer v. Hudson (1844) 7 Beav 551; 49 ER 1180.
3 For the nature and utility of family arrangements see 
Derrett, Critique, 281-286 paras 360-366; the same, 'Family 
arrangements', in (1968) 70 Bom LR (Jour), 1-16; Derrett*s 
views are judicially accepted and applied in Kalhabai v. 
Kausalyabai (1969) Mah LJ 16 (NC No. 28); see also Paras
Diwan, Hindu law, 262-63; Sahu Madho Das v. Mukand Ram AIR
Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation AIR 1976 SC 807;
K .V. Narayanan v. K .V . Ranqanadhan AIR 1976 SC 1715; 
and cf. Ratnam Chettiar v. S.M. Kuppuswami AIR 1976 SC 
1.
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by the courts, and they will not, as in the case of ordinary 
releases executed by a ward to his guardian or other trans­
actions between them soon after the ward has attained 
majority, raise any presumption of undue influence^".
2.2.1. Burden of proving undue influence
If a transaction appears to be unconscionable, the
burden of proving that it was not influenced by undue influence
lies upon the person who was in a position to dominate the
2will of the other. Sir John Romilly observes *
"Whenever one person obtains, by voluntary donation, 
a large pecuniary benefit from another, the 
burthen of proving that the transaction is right­
eous, to use the expression of Lord Eldon, in 
Gibson v. Jeyes [(1801) 6 Ves 266; 31 ER 1044"], 
falls on the person taking the benefit. But this 
proof is given, if it be shown that the donor and 
donee were so situated towards each other, that 
undue influence might have been exercised by the 
donee over the donor, then a new consideration 
is added, and the question is not, to use the
words of Lord Eldon in Huguenin v. Baseley
[(1807) 14 Ves 273; 33 ER 526] 'whether the donor 
knew what he was doing, but how the intention 
was produced*; and though the donor was well 
aware of what he did, yet if his disposition to 
do it was produced by undue influence, the 
transaction would be set aside".
Approving the test of Huguenin *s case Lord Evershed,
3M.R., observed in Zamet v. Hyman that where a transaction
appeared on its face to be much more favourable to one
party than to the other, the court could, in the circums­
tances of the case, find that a fiduciary relationship
1 Trevelyan, Minors, 123.
2 Houghton v. Houghton (1852) 15 Beav 278; 51 ER 553.
3 (1961) 3 All ER 933, 938 (CA).
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existed such as to cast an onus on the party benefited
to prove, in order to stand the transaction, that it was
completed by the other party after full, free and informed
thought about it. In Espey v. Lake  ^it was found that if
there was a relation which gave rise to confidence between
the parties and if the person in fiduciary position
obtained an advantage, the court would give relief to the
party conferring the benefit, unless the other party could
show that he did not avail himself of the confidence which
subsisted between the parties. The burden was therefore
upon him and, if he did not discharge the burden , the
plaintiff would succeed. When there was a third party
involved, the position was not dissimilar. If it was shown
that he was aware of the existence of such confidential
or fiduciary relation, he was under the same disability
as the party who occupied the position of confidence. It
was enough that the third party was aware of the existence
of the confidential relation and the courts would not
insist on the proof that he was further aware of the
2actual exercise of undue influence •
Section 16(3) of the Contract Act of 1872 provides 
that the burden of proving the undue influence in a contract 
of unequal parties lies with the dominant party and that that 
section is not a bar to the application of section 111 of
1 (1852) 10 Hare 260; 68 ER 923.
2 Narayana Doss Balakrishna Doss v. Buchrai Chordi Sowcar 
(1927) 53 MLJ 842.
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the Indian Evidence Act (Act l) of 1872. Section 111 
runs as followsi
"Where there is a question as to the good faith 
of a transaction between parties, one of whom 
stands to the other in a position of active 
confidence, the burden of proving the good 
faith of the transaction is on the party who 
is in a position of active confidence".
The law contained in the above section has no 
application to those who are not in a fiduciary relation 
to the person who has recently attained majority1; and 
undue influence contained in section 16 of the Contract 
Act cannot be presumed unless the parties are or were in 
a fiduciary relation to each other, or in a mentally 
unequal situation. The two sections are equally applicable 
whether a parent or any other person is guardian.
2.3. Alienation for realization, protection or benefit of 
a minor's estate
In discussing the restrictions on the powers of a 
natural guardian to alienate his ward's property Trevelyan 
observes^i
"Although the appointment of a guardian by the 
court supersedes the powers of a natural and 
testamentary guardians, the powers of a natural 
guardian in the absence of such appointment 
are unaffected by the restrictions which the 
Guardians and Wards Act places upon the powers 
of guardians appointed by the court. The validity 
of his acts must be determined by the general 
principles which govern the relations of a minor 
to the manager of his estate, or, in the words
1 Raicoomer Roy v. Alfuzuddin Ahmed (I88l) 8 CLR 419.
2 Minors. 151. These observations were approvingly quoted 
in Lakhmichand Isardas v. Firm of Khushaldas Manqataram 
AIR 1925 Sind 330, 339-40.
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of the Guardians and Wards Act, he may do all 
acts which are reasonable and proper for the 
realization, protection, or benefit of the 
property”•
The natural guardian has all the powers which the 
manager of a minor's estate has in relation to the estate 
of the minor# His dealings with the minor's property 
would be justified provided they are according to the 
dual principles of Hunoomanpersaud's case# Derrett rightly 
observes* that the words realization, protection, or benefit 
of the minor's estate would cover all types of motive and 
that when they are read with the words 'necessary or 
reasonable and proper' they constitute a guardian's charter#
A guardian has all the responsibilities of a trustee^;
3
he must not do anything to the prejudice of his ward . All
his acts which are strictly within his powers, and done 
4
in good faith , and which are such as the minor might, if
of age, prudently do for himself, bind the minor and his 
5estate . In the exercise of his powers he must not practise 
any fraud ; if he does it will invalidate a sale or any 
other dealing affecting the minor's property which may be
fiotherwise unimpeachable • Section 17 of the Contract Act
1 Derrett, Introduction# 72 para 88.
2 Mathew v# Brise (1851) 14 Beav 341; 51 ER 317.
3 Dambar Singh v. Jawitri Kunwar (1907) 29 All 292.
4 Gireewur Singh v. Muddun Lall Doss (1871) 16 WR 252 (CR).
5 Temmakal v. Subbammal (1864) 2 Mad HC Rep 47.
6 Bunseedhur v. Bindeseree Dutt (1866) 10 MIA 454? Bro jo 
Kanto Das v. Tufaun Das (1899) 4 CWN 287.
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defines fraud as followsi
'"Fraud* means and includes any of the following 
acts committed by a party to a contract, or 
with his connivance, or by his agent, with 
intent to deceive another party thereto or his 
agent, or to induce him to enter into the 
contract * -
(1) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that 
which is not true by one who does not 
believe it to be true?
(2) the active concealment of a fact by one 
having knowledge or belief of the fact?
(3) a promise made without any intention of 
performing it*
(4) any other act fitted to deceive;
(5) any such act or omission as the law 
specially declares to be fraudulent.
Explanation*- Mere silence as to facts likely to 
affect the willingness of a person to enter 
into a contract is not fraud, unless the cir­
cumstances of the case are such that, regard 
being had to them, it is the duty of the person 
keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence 
is, in itself, equivalent to speech".
Again, section 25 of the Penal Code (Act 45) of 1850 
states that a person is said to do a thing fraudulently 
if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not other­
wise. The guardian will not be excused for a criminal
breach of trust even if the ward acquiesces to it^. Where 
2he dishonestly misappropriates or converts the property 
of his ward to his own use he will be liable to be punished 
for criminal breach of trust under sections 405 and 406 
of the Penal Code. Section 405 states*
"Whoever, being in the manner entrusted with pro­
perty, or with any dominion over property, dis-
1 Wilkinson v. Parry (1828) 4 Russ 272; 38 ER 808.
2 'Dishonestly* has been defined in section 24 of the Penal
Code as follows* "Whoever does anything with the inten­
tion of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful 
loss to another person is said to do that thing 'dis­
honestly'" .
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honestly misappropriates or converts to his 
own use that property, or dishonestly uses 
or disposes of that property in violation of 
any direction of law prescribing the mode in 
which such trust is to be discharged, or of 
any legal contract, express or implied, which 
he was made touching the discharge of trust, 
or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, 
commits ’criminal breach of trust*”.
And section 406 states*
”Whoever commits criminal breach^of trust shall 
be punished with imprisonment of either descrip­
tion for a term which may extend to three years, 
or with fine, or with both”.
2.3.1. Pressure necessary for alienation
All circumstances of. pressure which render the raising 
of money necessary for the protection or preservation of 
a minor's estate or for his personal well-being would 
support an alienation of the minor's property. In deter­
mining whether an alienation for the minor's or his family
necessity would be justifiable1, or whether a sale or mortgage
2
would be appropriate in a particular case , a reasonable 
latitude should be allowed for the exercise of the guardian's 
judgment. This does not, however, mean that the persons 
dealing with him are not required to take any precaution.
3
Markby observes *
"He who deals with the representative of another 
must know that it is the duty of the representa­
tive to act in all things to the best of his 
ability for the benefit of his principal, and 
if the circumstances be such that a reasonable
1 Babaii Mahadaii v. Krishnaii Devji (1878)2 Bom 666;
Nagammal v. Varada Kandan AIR 1950 Mad 606.
2 Krishnaraian v. Doraswamy AIR 1966 Her 305.
3 William Markby, Lectures on Indian Law (Calcutta* 1873), 81.
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man ought to suspect that the representative 
was not so acting, he is bound to abstain 
dealing further with the representative, until 
the suspicion is removed. No one is at liberty 
to deal with a representative whose conduct he 
doubts. The party dealing with the representative 
is not the judge of what is or is not for the 
benefit of the principal, but he must cease to 
act as soon as he has reason to believe that 
the representative is acting improperly. This 
is a general principle of the law of represen­
tation, and applies as much to the certificate- 
holder representing a minor as to any other 
representative”•
A guardian must have regard to the interest of the 
minor's inheritance, and not merely to its immediate 
income1. Where the minor's estate is encumbered or where 
there are debts for which his estate would be liable, the 
guardian should endeavour to pay off such debts by strict 
economy out of the income of the estate, and if it does 
not cover, by the sale of a part of the estate. Actual 
pressure in the sense of immediate demand by the mortgagee 
is not conclusive of the question of necessity. Where thete 
are other circumstances present which show that though 
there is no immediate pressure for repayment, there are 
no other means or way of paying off the antecedent debts 
including the mortgage debt of the deceased, even after the 
expiry of the specified period, it is not necessary for 
the sale to be binding on the sons that the purchaser 
should show that there was no alternative for the vendor 
but to sell the property. Thus where the father executed 
a usufructuary mortgage, redeemable after a specified
1 Sutton v. Jones (1809) 15 Ves 584, 588; 33 ER 875, 877•
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period of time, to secure a debt and, on his death, the
mother as guardian of the minor sons sells the charged
property for discharging that mortgage even before the
expiry of the stipulated period, the sons will be bound
by the sale'*'. The sale cannot be invalidated on the
ground that it was effected at a time when there was no
2necessity for such sale •
2,3,2, Sale by natural guardians
The natural guardian of a minor may alienate or
encumber the whole or any part of the minor's property
3for legal necessity , although he has no such power to
sell the undivided interest of a minor coparcener of a
joint family even for necessity or for benefit unless he
4is also manager of the family • He may sell the minor's 
property for the payment of the latter's ancestral debts, 
and such payment does not require any actual pressure at 
the time in the shape of a suit on the minor's property.
It would be sufficient if the courts find that such debts
5exist and the sale is a bona fide one to meet such debts .
It is not necessary that there should be a demand by the 
creditor .In some cases the payment of a minor's ancestral 
debts is not considered to be a necessity creating sufficient
1 Kesavalu Naidu v. Naqarathnam AIR 1964 Mad 374, 375,
2 Babaii Mahadaii v. Krishnaii Devii (1878) 2 Bom 666,
3 Naqalinqa v, Chinamma AIR 1950 Trav-Co 30, 31 (FB)j Hara- 
narain v, Moolchand AIR 1955 NUC (Raj) 4649? Chunilal 
Kanji v. Bhanji Kanji AIR 1955 NUC (Sau) 1452? Keluni Dei 
v. Kanhei Sahu AIR 1972 Ori 28, 30-31.
4 Venkatakrishna Reddy v. Amarababu (1971) 2 MLJ 461,
5 Kaihur Singh v, Roop Singh (1871) 3 N.-W.P. HC Rep 4.
6 Vembu Iyer v, Srinivasa Iyengar (1912) 23 MLJ 638, 645.
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pressure to justify an alienation of a minor's property, 
or even if it is considered to be a pious duty of the minor 
to pay such debts, proof of strict necessity is demanded 
from the transferees for their payment. In Dharmarai Singh 
v, Chandrasekhar Rao1 the majority view was that a non­
father manager of a joint Hindu family could alienate a 
minor's share to satisfy an antecedent debt of the minor's 
father binding on the minor if it was established by the 
transferee that in the circumstances in which the family 
was placed there was no other reasonable course open to 
the guardian. Similarly m  Tulsiram Sitaram v. Narayan Waman 
where the mother of a Hindu minor alienated the minor's 
property for paying the debts binding upon the minor, 
Mudholkar, J., held that the question whether the sale was 
justified or not depended upon whether the danger to be 
averted or the pressure of circumstances was such as to 
leave no other alternative but to effect a sale. The same 
learned judge held in Nathu Bhiwaii v. Ganpat Babla ii that 
where the mother of a minor alienated his share to satisfy 
an antecedent debt of the son's father the transferee had 
to show positively that the course which the natural 
guardian took was the only one open to her in the circims- 
tances of the family, and that if he failed to do so the 
transaction could not be upheld.
1 AIR 1942 Nag 66.
2 AIR 1950 Nag 69.
3 AIR 1958 Bom 25.
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Besides strict necessity, some courts consider the 
ethical aspect of the payment of ancestral debts. Thus in 
Sudhanva Kumar v. Haripada1 the Calcutta High Court held 
that a guardian should be concerned with the material 
benefit and not with the spiritual benefit of the minor, 
and that a guardian was not given the authority to sacrifice 
the material resources of the minor to acquire spiritual 
benefit to the minor. So also an alienation to fulfil the
cherished desire of a deceased ancestor was not considered 
by the same High Court to be a valid transaction by a
natural guardian in Commissioner of Agricultural I. T. v.
2 3Jaaadish Chandra Sahoo • In Re Lalitha Bal the Madras High
Court observed that a guardian administering the estate of
a minor should not alienate the minor’s estate on the
ground of conferring spiritual benefit or bliss upon the
minor. In his judgment of the said case Jagadisan, J.,
reminded the court of its duty and sounded a warning in
4
the following words t
’’The court should not be swayed by considerations 
of propriety or the meritorious nature of the 
object of the expenses, as the court in which 
the property is vested and which is acting through 
the medium of its manager, or delegate, the pro­
perty guardian, owes a duty to the minor wards 
to administer the estate in accordance with the 
law of the territory. ... the court has no power 
to sanction an ex gratia payment from out of 
the minors' estate even for the marriage of 
the minors’ sister”.
It is to be observed that in cases requiring the 
proof of strict necessity the courts showed an unexpressed
1 AIR 1960 Cal 34.
2 (1961) 1 Cal 379.
3 AIR 1961 Mad 153.
4 Ibid. 158.
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sympathy for the minors, since in all the cases the minors 
were favoured. The couts did not consider the interests 
of the alienees; on the contrary, they put unusual obli­
gation on them. As regards the duty of an alienee Derrett 
says1*
"To protect himself fully the alienee must show 
that he satisfied himself that the course proposed 
to be adopted by the guardian was necessary and 
proper and that no alternative which would involve 
less loss to the minor was open to the guardian.
•.• Where the alienee was protected in the manner 
described above he need not prove that the money 
he advanced was actually used for the purposes 
alleged by the guardian, since his protection 
rested upon the equitable claim of a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice of the defect 
in the guardian's power".
The reasoning of the learned judges in cases in which 
moral aspect of the payment of ancestral debts was considered 
sounds nice and it reminds us of the sastric law that a 
minor need not pay his ancestral debts until after the 
attainment of his majority. But it may have an adverse effect 
on the price of land in the case of sale or on the avail­
ability of a good lender to an old parent in the case of
2
mortgage. Commenting on such views Derrett observes i
"The view that the guardian might not sell unless 
there was no alternative open to him, a view 
which left prudent man's judgment very little 
room, was probably unsound. The method to be 
followed was the guardian to choose; and simple 
debts would bind the minor's estate ... as 
effectively as mortgages. But in each case the 
necessity must exist ..• both for the loan and 
for the rate of interest agreed upon. But 
imprudent and speculative transactions remained 
invalid upon any view of the matter".
1 Introduction, 75-76 para 93.
2 Ibid, 76-77 para 95.
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If a guardian has at his disposal large resources,
he cannot borrow to pay land revenue; and the minor's estate
will not be bound by any bond executed for any loan^. If
a guardian fails to mention himself in the sale deed as
the guardian of the minor, it would not affect the sale
if it_appears clearly from the deed that it is the minor's
2
property which forms the subject of sale , and for this 
purpose in each case the language of the deed and the
o
circumstances m  which it was executed have to be considered .
A
In Ranqaswami v. Marappa the question arose whether a minor
could be held to be a party to a deed of transfer which did
not contain the minor's name, and whether the transfer made
thereunder was on the minor's behalf. Venkatarama Aiyar, J.,
sitting alone, reviewed a wide range of cases on the point
and held that an alienation of a minor's property would
5not be binding on him unless he was a party thereto . If 
his name was disclosed in the body of the document he must 
be held to be a party thereto notwithstanding any error 
or defect in description^. If his name was not disclosed, 
it could not be said that the transfer was made on behalf 
of the minor. If, however, a guardian alienates the property 
of a minor under an assertion of a hostile title, the transfer 
cannot be regarded as one made by a guardian and it would
1 Ganpat Rao v. Ishwar Singh AIR 1938 Nag 476, 479.
2 Makundi v. Sarabsukh (1884) 6 All 417 following Judoonath 
Chuckerbutty v. James Tweedie (1869) 11 WR 20 (CR); Murari 
v. Tayana (1895) 20 Bom 286, the authority of the decision 
in this case was doubted in Margaret Lornie v. Abu Backer 
Sait (1939) 1 MLJ 664.
3 Seth Ghasiram v. Mt. Binia (1904) Nag LR 66; Chha ju Mai v. 
Multan Singh AIR 1936 hah 996•
4 AIR 1953 Mad 231, 233.
5 Ammani Ammal v. Ramaswami Naidu (1919) 37 MLJ 113.
6 Watson & Co. v. Sham Lai Mitter.(1887) 14 IA 178 (PC).
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be treated as void^ ". The guardian of a minor has no power 
to fritter away the minor*s property or to enforce the 
sale of the minor’s property. Therefore, if a guardian 
builds houses on his minor ward’s land with money taken 
partly out of the minor’s funds and partly by borrowing 
on the security of the land, and if the minor brings a 
suit for the settlement of accounts and for possession of 
the land after demolition of the houses, the court cannot 
ask the defendant to remain in possession of the houses 
on the minor's land and pay a certain ground rent to the 
minor^.
If a guardian sells the property of his minor ward
for a reasonable price and if there is legal necessity for
the purchase money the sale may be held valid. In Munayya 
3
v * Krishnayya Spencer and Srinivasa Aiyangar, JJ., did 
not consider it an improvident transaction when a minor’s 
guardian sold the minor's property for a reasonable price 
and there was legal necessity for half the purchase money 
in the shape of discharging a loan borrowed by the minor's 
father. The remaining half of the price was allowed to 
remain with the purchaser subject to the condition that 
the minor on attaining majority should get it with interest 
at 6 per cent per annum on a promissory note taken from the 
purchaser for this. Adequacy of consideration is a relevant
1 Ram Tuhul Singh v. BisseswarLai Sahoo (1875) 2 IA 131,
143 (PC)} Nathu v. Balwant Rao (1903T~27 Bom 390} Balwant 
Singh v. Clancy (1912) 34 All 296} Nandan Prasad v. Abdul 
Aziz (1923) 45 All 497} Ranqaswami v . Marappa ATR 1953 Mad 
230, 233.
2 Thakar Das v. Narainu AIR 1928 Lah 90, 91.
3 AIR 1925 Mad 215, 217.
192
factor in judging whether an alienation is prudent; and in 
appropriate cases the disposal of even the entire property 
may be justifiable and binding if the property was not 
sacrificed for an inadequate price and if the consideration 
was calculated to relieve the necessity for which the dis­
position was made1. If the sale price is not totally dis­
proportionate to the value of the property, i.e., if it 
does not amount to an improvident act on the part of the 
guardian, the sale would be binding on the minor if other­
wise supported by legal necessity and could not be set 
2aside • Where a sale was effected and with the sale price 
debts were paid, certain lands were redeemed from mortgage 
charge, and some property was acquired in the name of the 
minor, the sale could not be said to be a wasteful act; 
on the contrary, it should be regarded as an act of a 
prudent man3.
What amount of the purchase money may be said to
have legal necessity with respect to the sale of a minor’s
property by his guardian? Sitting with Ray, C.J., in Manqlu
4
Meher v. Sukru Meher Jagannadhadas, J., observed that m  
the case of an alienation of a minor’s property by his 
guardian by way of sale it was not necessary to prove that 
every portion of the consideration was required for legal
1 Krishnara ian v. Doraswamv AIR 1966 Ker 305.
2 Soshil Kumar v. Seth Madan Gopal AIR 1953 Punj 292, 293.
3 Sham Singh v. Ran jit Singh (1968) 70 PLR 1134, 1136 following 
Chiragh v. Fatta AIR 1934 Lah 542.
4 AIR 1950 Ori 217, 220.
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necessity, or that inquiry as to necessity had been made
out in respect of that portion not covered by legal
necessity. The learned judge considered that what needed
to be judged broadly was whether for raising the amount
for which legal necessity had been made out, the particular
transaction was in fact reasonably necessary and prudent,
or whether the alienees were reasonably and honestly
satisfied that it was so on a bona fide inquiry. It is,
no doubt, true that the necessity for the amount needed
f°r liquidating a claim cannot be decided by merely taking
into account the arithmatical proportion between that
portion of the amount which was for necessary purpose and
that which was not1. But if it implies that a guardian
of a minor's estate will have the same power as that of
the manager of a joint Hindu family consisting of minor
coparceners in respect of alienating property, it would
ignore an important difference which is maintained, despite
the equating decision of the Privy Council in Hunoomanper-
saud's case, between them in respect of rendering accounts,
and it would give a guardian power which as a trustee he
may not have. The manager of a joint family being one of
the co-owners has, in fact, greater power in alienating
the family property including the interests of the minor 
2members therein than the guardian of a minor's estate 
wherein he has no ownership. As said earlier, the positions 
of a manager and a guardian are not alike . By the very
1 Gopalakrishna v. Krishna Iver AIR 1961 Mad 348. 351.
2 In strict sense a manager is not a trustee. See Derrett, 
Introduction, 262 para 426. He is not bound to render 
accounts. See Mayne, Hindu law (10th ed.), 384-85. See also 
Abhavchandra v. Pvari Mohun (1870) 5 BLR 347; Ramanathan
v. Narayanu AIR 1955 Mad 629.
3 See also Mir Sarwarian v. Fakhruddin Mahomed (1911) 39 IA 1.
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nature of things, a manager of a joint Hindu family exercises 
very wide powers; and so long as he acts honestly, he can 
do anything, he can manage or mismanage the affairs of the 
family, he may give more to one member and less to another, 
he may spend more on himself and less on others'*'. The powers 
of a guardian are certainly not so wide. Although the 
validity of a manager's alienation of joint family property 
demands that he has acted, similar to the guardian of a 
minor's estate, for the legal necessity or benefit of the 
estate, his sui generis position in the family gives him 
the privilege not to give any account, amongst others, of 
the balance of purchase money that remains of a particular 
alienation at his hands after meeting the necessity for 
which the transaction was made. If a sale made by the 
manager of a joint family is for an adequate consideration, 
and the purchaser made inquiry as to the necessity of the 
sale, and a major portion of the purchase money is applied
to meet the necessity, the sale would not be set aside.
Would the same be allowed in the case of a minor's guardian?
Should he not give account of the balance money that remains
with him after meeting the necessity in a particular trans­
action? A guardian being the trustee of his minor ward's
2
property must render accounts of the surplus money and
3
invest it in approved securities . He must give account of the
1 Derrett, Introduction. 262 para 426; Paras Diwan, 'Powers 
of the guardian of the minor's property under Hindu law' 
in (1963) 15/2 Law Review, 142-201, 165.
2 Section 19, Trusts Act, 1882.
3 Section 20, Trusts Act, 1882.
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balance money; and if used unauthorisedly , he must make
good the loss of the minor; such is the equitable principle1.
Therefore, in the case of a guardian*s alienation of a
minor's property, in addition to the question whether the
sale itself was one which was justified by legal necessity,
the court should see whether the minor's money was justly
and securely invested for the benefit of the minor or his
estate. In a suit by a minor either during his minority
or after attainment of his majority for setting aside an
alienation made by his guardian if the courts look to the
legal necessity of the transaction as a whole only and
not to the application of the purchase money much scope
would be allowed to a guardian for the misuse of a minor's
money. The latitude which is said earlier to be allowed to
a guardian in relation to the alienation of a minor's property
does not mean that he should waste the minor's property.
The guardian must have bona fide intention to protect the
minor's property. In its investment he must take such care
as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to
make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom
he felt morally bound to provide. The bona fides of a
guardian could not be ascertained unless the application
2of the purchase money is seen. The cases on which the
1 Hanburv and Maudslev. Modern Equity (lOth ed.), 468.
2 Sri Kishun Das v. Nathu Ram AIR 1927 PC 37 [sale of 
ancestral property by the father for the payment of his 
debts"); Niamat Rai v. Din Daval AIR 1927 PC 121 [sale by 
the managing member for discharging family debtsJ; Sura j 
Bhan Singh v. Sah Chain Sukh AIR 1927 PC 244 [sale by a 
widow of her widow's estate |.
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learned judges in Manqlu Meher's case relied are either 
regarding the power of a manager in respect to the alie­
nation of the joint family property or that of a widow in 
respect to her widow's estate. In either case the alienor 
was the owner or one of the owners of the property. The 
decision in Manqlu Meher's case cannot be taken to have 
laid down an acceptable proportional legal necessity of 
the alienation of a minor's property. Proportional legal 
necessity was not unknown in India. Chakravartti, J., 
admitted in Kalipada Koer v. Purnabala Dassi* that at one 
time a doctrine grew up in India that the consideration 
for a sale ought to be subjected to an arithmatical analysis 
and if it was found that the whole of it was not justified 
by legal necessity, then the transaction ought to be upheld 
or set aside conditionally, according as the part justified 
by legal necessity was the greater or the lesser part. The 
condition would be to make a refund of the portion of con­
sideration money not applied, or applied to legal necessity, 
as the case might be. The learned judge further stated that
the growth of this doctrine was checked by the Judicial
. . . . . 2Committee by their decisions m  Sri Kishun Das V. Nathu Ram ,
3 . . 4Niamat Rai v. Din Daval and Gouri Sankar v. Jiwan Singh .
These were cases of sales by the manager of a joint family.
Therefore, in contradistiction to the validity of a manager's
alienation, the validity of a guardian's alienation should
1 AIR 1948 Cal 269, 271.
2 AIR 1927 PC 37.
3 AIR 1927 PC 121.
4 AIR 1927 PC 246.
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be generally in proportion to the legal necessity for the 
consideration.
Where the guardian of a minor sells the minor's 
property, it is the duty of the purchaser to see that the 
consideration is intended to be properly invested by the 
guardian. Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ., held in Kaliappa 
Goundan v. Devasigamani Pillai1 that if a guardian sold a 
minor's property and purchased land of less value, the 
sale not being prima facie beneficial to the minor, was 
not binding upon him. The learned judges stated that in 
such circumstances it was incumbent on the purchaser to 
make an enquiry as to the real value of the land, and he 
should have advanced money in good faith that it would be 
used for the purpose which would make the sale beneficial 
to the minor. If the purchaser could not prove this, the 
sale could be set aside. It was not enough that the pur­
chaser believed in the guardian's statement or recital in
the sale deed, since mere recitals are not sufficient to
2establish the facts recited . Although the purchaser is 
not bound to look to the application of the purchase 
money, or to enquire whether there are goods and chattels 
sufficient to discharge the minor's debts, yet if he fails 
to prove the necessity, or if he does not satisfy himself
3
as to the existence of necessity, the sale would be set aside .
1 (1913) MWN 795.
2 Krishna Rao v. Aivasami Padavachi (1914) 27 MLJ 138.
3 Gomain Sircar v. Prannath Goopto (1864) 1 WR 14 (CR).
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A sale of a minor's property becomes binding on the 
minor if the major portion of the purchase money has been 
applied for a binding purpose, and the balance is spent 
for the necessity or benefit of the minor. Thus where it 
is found that out of the consideration money of Rs. 600/- 
an amount of Rs. 400/- was paid off to discharge an ances­
tral debt incurred by the minor's father and the remaining 
Rs. 200/- was expended in purchasing a piece of land for 
the minor, the sale of the minor's property by his guardian 
was upheld1.
2
In Birad Rai v. Dhingarmal Wanchoo, C.J., and Dave, J., 
held that a natural guardian was not authorised to sell 
away the minor's property to any extent without having 
regard to the measure of the necessity. Where the only 
immediate necessity was for a small amount the sale of a 
very small portion of the property would be sufficient for 
that purpose. In other words the amount of property to be 
disposed of by a natural guardian must be proportionate 
to the needs of the minor. Indeed, if the courts take 
into consideration only the bona fides of alienees it 
protects the interests of the alienees and not of the minors. 
Minors may not be successful in impeaching the transaction 
of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any 
invalidity? but if the courts looked into the proportion 
between the amount of necessity and the amount of property 
disposed of much of the interests of minors would have 
been saved.
1 Thanhavelu v. Nachu Narayana AIR 1933 Mad 352.
2 AIR 1955 NUC (Raj) 4608 relying on Ratnam Pillai v.
Ganapathi AIR 1953 Mad 238.
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A natural guardian cannot convert the separate
property of a minor into the joint property of himself
and the minor\ nor can he sell it at an enhanced value
merely for the purpose of increasing the income of the
minor unless he applies the purchase price securely and
2for the benefit of the minor • Again, unless the purchase
price is applied for legal necessity, or unless it is
properly invested in a recognised, beneficial security,
a natural guardian cannot sell a minor's lands on the ground
that they are situated at a long distance from the village
where the minor resides, and that it is inconvenient to 
3
look after . Thus where a father effects a sale of his
minor son*s lands which do not yield any income or profit
and invests the sale proceeds in income yielding lands,
the sale is held as good and valid, and the minor is bound
by such sale not merely because it increases the minor's
4income, but also because it prevents loss to the estate .
2*3.3. Mortgage by natural guardians
With regard to the alienation of a minor's property 
by his guardian there is no difference of principles between
5
a sale and a mortgage . The grounds on which a guardian 
can validly sell his ward's property are the grounds on
1 Ragho v. Zaga AIR 1929 Bom 251. "
2 Hemrai v. Nathu AIR 1935 Bom 295 (FB).
3 Ramnath v. Deora1 AIR 1957 Pat 495, 496.
4 Rabi Narayan v. Kanak Prova Debi AIR 1965 Cal 444, 445.
5 Raman v. Tirugnansambandam AIR 1927 Mad 233, 237-38.
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which he can mortgage the minor's property. A natural
guardian of a minor can grant a mortgage of the minor's
property1, but the lender must ascertain whether the
guardian is acting for the benefit of the minor or for
himself. If it is for his own purposes the mortgage cannot
2
be treated as one for the benefit of the minor . The
mortgagee must ascertain whether the guardian was acting
for the benefit of the minor? he must enquire whether there
was necessity to borrow the money on behalf of the minor,
otherwise he could not claim to have a charge on the minor's 
3property . If he does so enquire and acts honestly, the 
real existence of an alleged sufficient and reasonably 
credited necessity is not a condition precedent to the 
validity of his charge, and under such circumstances he 
is not bound to see to the application of the purchase
4
money . Where a guardian borrows money on behalf of a 
minor, the proper test in a suit by the lender is whether 
the minor could reasonably and prudently have incurred the 
debt himself. It is not sufficient for the lender to show
only that the loan was announced by the guardian to be for
5 .a necessary purpose • When necessaries for the minor have
1 Manishankar Praniivan v. Bai Muli (1888) 12 Bom 686.
2 Gunduchi Sahu v. Balaram Balabantra AIR 1940 Pat 661, 662.
3 Maha Beer v. Dumreeram Opadhya (1864) WR 166 (CR)j Dalibai 
v. Gopibai (1902) 26 Bom 433? Kader Hoosein v. Mudeliar 
(1913) 18 IC 505? Shami Nath Sathi v. Lalii Chaube (1913) 
18 IC 251.
4 Hunoomanpersaud's case (1856) 6 MIA 393, 424.
5 Manohar Lai v. Ratan Singh AIR 1930 Lah 588, relying on 
JJulicnand v. Mt. sonai AIR 1926 Nag 75, 77.
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been purchased with loans advanced by a creditor on a bond 
he should take care that the bond is so drawn up as to make 
the minor's estate and not him personally liable for the 
debt1.
Where a guardian mortgages a minor's property to 
pay the minor's deceased father's debts, once the proper 
application of a substantial portion of the consideration 
has been proved, the court might, in the absence of cir­
cumstances creating suspicion, presume that the small
balance is also likely to have been required and applied
2
for proper purposes . But in such cases the courts must 
be very careful about the balance money and look to its 
proper investment by the guardian; and if any underhand 
transaction is proved between the guardian and the mortgagee 
or if the latter has exercised any undue influence over 
the former, the whole transaction would be set aside.
2.3.4. Lease by natural guardians
Rules which are applicable to a guardian's alienation 
in general are also applicable to leases by him. A lease 
does not cease to be an alienation because it is not permanent, 
or if it is permanent, it has a string elsewhere. Therefore, 
a guardian cannot lease out a land belonging to a minor unless
1 Armugam Chetti v. Duraisinga Tevar (1914) 37 Mad 38, 46 
relying on Bhawal Sahu v. Bai inath Pertab Narain (1908)
35 Cal 320.
2 Ambalavana Pillai v. Gowri Ammal AIR 1936 Mad 871, 873.
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there is legal necessity for it or it is for the benefit
of the minor's estate1. The duration of a lease may be
a relevant factor in determining its necessity or the
benefit from it, but it cannot alter the principles which
determine the validity of an alienation. Once a lease is
validly granted by the guardian, the lessee cannot be
2ejected except on a suit for arrears of rent .
Being in a fiduciary relationship with the minor
the guardian should not make a profit out of the minor's
property. If ever he does so through the intermediary of
others, he may be liable on a suit. Where a plot of land
belonging to a minor was given on lease by the guardian
to his own relation and it was found that the lessee was
merely a benamidar for the guardian Shadi Lai, C.J., held
that a claim against the guardian for the lease money could
be sustained only on the basis of a contract or a quasi-
contract and could not be enforced by a summery remedy
because the judge could not make a summary order calling
upon the guardian to deposit the lease money in the court;
. 3and the minor was therefore referred to a regular suit .
2.4. Contracts by natural guardians
2.4.1. Contracts for loan
A guardian who has to manage a minor's estate must 
have, in the case of necessity or benefit of the estate, the
1 Haribhau v. Hakim AIR 1^51 Nag 24§, 250; Bageshwari Prasad 
v. Deopati Kuer AIR 1961 Pat 416, 418; Bhusan Chandra v. 
Hiranmay AIR T§57 Tri 1.
2 Bhagwan Das v. Ghulam Mohammed AIR 1935 Lah 863.
3 Arur Singh v. Gur Bakhsh Singh AIR 1932 Lah 272.
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power to deal with the estate in the manner best suited 
to the occasion in the interest of the minor; and such a 
power may extend to charging or alienating the properties 
of the minor in cases where no other course is open. The 
minor would be bound by such charging or alienation. But 
it does not necessarily follow that the guardian can make 
contracts of loan on behalf of the minor so as to involve 
the minor and his estate in obligations or liabilities. In 
English law an executor or trustee cannot by borrowing 
money from a person make him creditor of the estate in his 
hands even though the money was applied for the purpose of 
the estate. In Farhall v. Farhall1 Mellish, L.J., took it 
to be a settled law that upon a contract of borrowing made 
by an executor after the death of the testator the executor 
was only liable personally and could not be sued as executor 
so as to get execution against the assets of the testator. 
The principle enunciated in this case has been applied to
the case of an executor or trustee in India in Shailendra-
2 . nath Palit v. Hade Kaza Mane . This general rule is subject
to the exception that in a proper case the executor or
trustee may be entitled to be indemnified out of the specific
3assets in his charge . Therefore in cases m  which a minor’s
1 (1871) 7 CA 123.
2 AIR 1932 Cal 356.
3 Re Johnson. Shearman v. Robinson (1880) 15 Ch D 548;
Dowse v. Gorton (1891) AC 190 (HL); Re Frith. Newton v. 
Rolfe (1902) 1 Ch 342.
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needs have to be met by incurring debts the guardian can 
also show that the estate ought to bear the burden which 
he has taken upon himself; and the creditor may invoke, 
under the equitable principle of subrogation, the guardian's 
right to reimbursement out of the minor's estate.
2.4.1.1. Privy Council decisions on guardians' contracts
Although the Privy Council decision in Hunoomanpersaud's 
case allowed the manager or guardian of a minor's estate 
to exercise a limited and qualified power 'in a case of need,
or for the benefi f the estate', it was not seen until
far he could use this power to bind the minor or his estate 
by a contract. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held 
in this case that it was beyond the power of a guardian to 
impose a personal liability on the minor. In that case a 
widow as guardian of her minor son transferred certain rent 
free villages, part of a talukdari estate in liquidation 
of certain debts due from the minor's father, and in the 
deed of transfer contracted on behalf of the minor to indem­
nify the transferee against any government claim for revenue. 
Subsequently, when the government enforced the payment of 
revenue upon the said villages the transferee filed a suit 
for the realisation of the amount paid as rent from the 
minor personally and also out of the rents and profits of
the decision in Waghela Raisanii v. Shekh Masludin  ^how
1 (1887) 14 IA 89 (PC).
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the minor’s other estates. In delivering the judgment of 
the Judicial Committee Lord Hobhouse observed1!
"Now it was most candidly stated ... that there 
is not in Indian law any rule which gives a 
guardian and manager greater power to bind the 
infant ward by a personal covenant than exists in 
English law. In point of fact, the matter must be 
decided by equity and good conscience, generally 
interpreted to mean the rules of English law if 
found applicable to Indian Society and circumstances. 
Their Lordships are not aware of any law in which 
the guardian has such a power, nor do they see 
why it should be so in India. They conceive that 
it would be a very improper thing to allow the 
guardian to make covenants in the name of his 
ward, so as to impose a personal liability upon 
the ward, and they hold that in this case the 
guardian exceeded her powers so far as she pur­
ported to bind her ward, ...H.
There is nothing contained in the above paragraph
which prohibits a guardian from entering into contracts
which are for the minor's necessity or for the benefit of
his estate as decided in Hunoomanpersaud's case. It lays
down only that a guardian cannot enter into a contract
imposing an onerous obligation upon the person and property 
2of a minor • In the course of his argument before the Privy
Council Mr. Mayne, Counsel for the respondent, put in a
circuitous way that if the minor's estate drew any benefit
under the contract, a charge could be made on the property.
Their Lordships appreciated the argument but they left the
3
question open when they remarked i
"The argument is one which is worthy of great 
consideration, but their Lordships do not wish
1 (1887) 14 IA 89, 96 (PC).
2 Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakharuddin Mahomed Chowdhury (1907) 34 Cal 
ifi?, 170(FB^ per Woodroffe, J.j Ramaloqaya v. Jaqannadham 
AIR 1919 Mad 641, 644 (FB) per Seshagiri Aiyar, J.
3 (1877) 14 IA 89, 97 (PC).
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to pronounce any opinion on it or to subject it 
to any minute examination, because assuming it 
in favour of the Respondent to be a sound argu­
ment, they are clearly of opinion that so far 
as regards the talukdari estate ... an answer 
to it is to be found in the terms of the Ahmeda- 
bad Talukdari Act, Act 6 of 1862** •
Five years later this question was raised before the 
Privy Council in Indur Chunder Singh v. Radha Kishore Ghose1 
where upon the death of an i iaradar his mother and widow 
remained in possession of the leased land as managers under 
his will which also authorised the widow to adopt a son. 
Subsequently a son was adopted to him and the adopted son 
succeeded to his estate. The lease having expired, a renewal 
for five years was taken by the managers, but was surrendered 
after the expiry of a period of two years when the son was 
still a minor. When the son attained full age the lessor 
brought a suit against him for the recovery of the three 
years rent of the renewed i iara. In these circumstances, 
their Lordships of the Judicial Committe held that the 
contract of the adoptive mother and guardian was not perso­
nally binding on the minor, and that if a guardian entered 
into a contract in her own name and did not purport so to 
act on the minor's behalf, no decree could be passed against
the estate of the minor on such a contract. After distinguish-
2
ing Hunoomanpersaud's case their Lordships observed i
"In the present case the mother and widow •.. were 
not dealing with, and did not purport to deal with 
or affect, his estate, but were incurring new 
obligations which it is now sought to transfer 
from them to the estate. It may be that, as between 
them and the infant, they might be able, in some
1 (1892) 19 IA 90 (PC).
2 Ibid, 94.
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circumstances,'to shew that the estate ought to 
bear the burden they had taken upon themselves, 
but that is not the question raised in this 
case, in which the plaintiffs seek to establish 
a direct relation between themselves and the
estate of the infant, and a liability on the
part of the infant now that he is of age, and 
of his estate, to fulfil the obligations entered 
into by the lessees in their own name” •
In Watson & Co. v. Sham Lai Mitter  ^a mother purchased 
for her minor son certain rights in land and also agreed 
to the enhancement of rent payable by the tenants. She 
contracted for enhancement of rent as guardian of her son. 
The Privy Council held that her agreement for the enhance­
ment of rent acting in lawful capacity was binding on the 
minor's estate. Thus a guardian has no power to bind a minor
personally by a contract which does not purport to charge
his estate.
2.4.1.2. Different High Courts on cruardians' contracts 
(a) Madras High Court
Only seven years after Waqhela Raisanii's case Muthu- 
sami Ayyar and Best, JJ., held in Sundarara ja v. Pattanathu-
9
sami that a guardian could enter into a contract on the 
minor's behalf, and it would be binding on the minor if 
there was necessity for the subject of the contract. White, 
C.J., and Benson, J., held in Subramania Ayyar v. Arumuqa 
Chettv3 that a minor's estate was bound by a promissory
1 (1887) 14 IA 178 (PC).
2 (1894) 17 Mad 306.
3 (1902) 26 Mad 330.
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note executed by his mother-guardian in respect of a debt 
for which the minor's share in the ancestral estate was 
liable at the time of execution of the note. In Duraisami 
Reddi v. Muthial Reddi1 a bond was executed by the guardian 
of a minor as such, and it contained a personal covenant 
by the guardian to pay a debt but it did not charge the 
minor's estate. It was held that the minor would be bound 
by it if it was executed for a pre-existing debt binding 
on the minor. Indeed, the Privy Council decision in Waghela 
Ra isan ii *s case forced the Anglo-Indian judges either to 
look to the English equitable principles or the personal 
law of the minor to protect the interests of creditors 
or lenders under a simple contract debt. Thus it would be 
found that although a guardian cannot bind a minor by a 
personal covenant, he can bind his estate by an indirect 
process through the principle of subrogation. Wallis and
Munro, JJ., sitting together in Sanka Krishnamurthi v,
2 . . .  v. Bank of Burma imported the English principle of sub­
rogation by allowing creditors to proceed directly against 
the minor's property when the guardian properly incurred
the liabilities. Following the decision in Joykisto Cower
3v. Nittyanund Nundv the learned judges found that Unlike
4a guardian m  English law a natural guardian of a Hindu 
minor could properly carry on a family business belonging
1 (1908) 31 Mad 458. — —
2 (1912) 35 Mad 692.
3 (1878) 3 Cal 738.
4 Land v. Land (1874) 43 Ch 311 per Jessel, M.R.
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to the minor, and to this they added the English rule that 
the guardian or legal representative, and not the minor or 
beneficiary on whose behalf the business was carried on, 
was the person personally liable on contracts entered into 
in the course of the business1. Creditors of a minor's 
business had therefore no right of direct recourse against 
the minor or his estate; but, as the guardian was entitled 
to indemnity out of the assets of the minor for liabilities 
properly incurred, creditors were entitled to proceed 
directly against such assets. If, however, the guardian had 
no right to indemnity against the assets in the business,
as where he had acted improperly, his creditors could have
2 . none . In its early cases the Madras High Court did not
apply the principles of Negotiable Instruments Act (Act 26)
of 1881 in considering the binding effect of bonds executed
by guardians on behalf of minors; the principles of Hindu
law were applied, and the minors' estates were usually
held liable if the debt evidenced by the promissory note
was borrowed for necessity or for the benefit of the minor.
The claim was considered as not made on the note but on the
debt evidenced by it.
3
In Padma Krishna Chettiar v. Naqamani Ammal , where 
the guardian of a minor executed a negotiable instrument 
for purposes binding on the minor, Seshagiri Ayyar, J.,
1 Henry Labouchere v. Emily Tupper (1857) 11 Moo PC 198;
14 ER 670 per Knight Bruce, L.J.
2 Ex parte Garland (1804) 10 Ves 110; 32 ER 786; Dowse v. 
Gorton (1891) AC 190 (HL).
3 (1916) 39 Mad 915.
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sitting with Napier, J., applied the principles of Hindu 
law and not sections 28 and 30 of the Negotiable Instruments 
Act which were brought to their notice. It was laid down in 
this case that a minor's estate could be made liable for 
a debt contracted by the guardian. In Venkitasami Naicker 
v. Muthusami Pillai1 the same judges affirmed their earlier 
decision in Padma Krishna's case, but the learned judges 
admitted this time the desirability of applying the principles 
of the Negotiable Instruments Act to cases of bonds and 
notes when they observed that a great deal could be said 
in favour of the proposition that the Hindu law liability
should not be extended to cases under the Negotiable Instru-
2 . ments Act • In this case the guardian of a minor executed
a bond in favour of a mortgagee to pay certain expenses
incurred by him which were considered reasonable. The learned
judges reviewed the early decisions of their own High Court
and considering the decision in Waghela Rajsanji's observed
that it went no further than this that no decree could be
passed against a minor personally, but a decree could be
made against his estate.
1
3
In Rama ioqava v. Jaqannadham a Full Bench of the 
Madras High Court considered the question how far a guardian's 
contract could bind the minor's estate. In this case the 
mother as guardian of her minor son borrowed money for the
1 (1918) 45 IC 949.
2 Ibid, 953.
3 AIR 1919 Mad 641 (FB).
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marriage of the minor's sister and executed a mortgage deed 
in favour of the plaintiff. The trial court held that the 
minor was bound to liquidate the debt, and that the plain­
tiff was entitled to a decree for the mortgage amount. On 
appeal it was argued before a Division Bench that no personal 
decree could be given against a minor on an obligation 
created by his guardian. The Bench referred the case to 
a Full Bench, and Napier, J., who wrote the order of refer­
ence, put the question whether any decree, and if so, what 
decree could be passed against a minor or his estate on a 
covenant entered into on his behalf by a guardian for his 
benefit, under which covenant no charge was made on the 
estate. The Full Bench was presided over by Wallis, C.J., 
Ayling and Seshagiri Aiyar, JJ. It considered inter alia 
the decision in Waghela Raisanii's case. The learned Chief 
Justice observed that according to that decision no guardian 
could impose a personal liability upon a minor, and that 
according to Ranmalsingji v. Vadilal Vakhatchand1 the Privy 
Council decision in Waghela Raisanii's case did not affect
the liability of the minor's estate under section 68 of
2 . . .  the Contract Act to persons who had supplied him during
his minority with necessaries suited to his condition in
life. It was further observed on the authority of Sanka
Krishnamurthi's case that where a guardian himself borrowed
money for the necessities of the minor in such circumstances
1 (1894) 20 Bom 61.
2 See supra, 107-108.
212
as to have a right to reimbursement from the minor's estate, 
his creditor could in a proper case be subrogated to his 
rights, and that a minor's estate could be made liable 
under one of the two heads independently of any contract 
by the guardian on his behalf, viz., liability for necess­
aries under section 68, and creditor's subrogation. In 
answer to the reference the learned Chief Justice said 
that no decree could be passed against a minor or his estate 
merely on a covenant entered into on his behalf by a guardian 
for his benefit. The other two learned judges disagreed 
with the Chief Justice. Seshagiri Aiyar, J., with whom 
Ayling, J., agreed, held that on a contract entered into 
on behalf of a minor by his guardian under which the guardian 
borrowed money but no charge was created on the minor's 
estate, no decree should be passed against the minor on his 
attaining majority except for an obligation incurred by 
the guardian under the personal law to which he was subject.
The decision in Waghela Raisanii's case is, therefore, 
subjected to two exceptions, viz., (i) where the contract 
is for necessaries supplied to a minor, and (ii) where the 
liability is one to which the minor is subject under his 
personal law, a supplier or creditor has a direct recourse 
to the minor's estate. In these two cases the guardian may 
directly bind the minor's estate. As seen earlier where 
necessaries are supplied to a minor his estate can be made 
liable for them under section 68 of the Contract Act of 
1872.
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Under the English law also when a sum of money is 
advanced to a minor to enable him to provide himself with 
necessaries, the lender stands in equity in the place 
of the supplier of necessaries and accordingly can maintain 
an action for the money^. But it must be mentioned here 
that completely different from Hindu and Muslim law, in 
English law the real estate of a minor cannot be bound by 
a contract, nor settled or alienated by his guardian or 
parent apart from statutory authority.
The decision in Rama ioaava * s case was subsequently
followed in the Madras High Court in a number of cases ,
and was affirmed by another Full Bench of the same High
3Court m  Satvanaravana v. Mallavva where the mother 
executed a promissory note in renewal of an earlier pro­
missory note executed by the father of her minor sons. 
Ramesam, J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench 
observed that any liability to which a minor would be subject 
under Hindu law was not the less a liability because it was 
incurred by his guardian on his behalf. Once the Hindu law 
liability of the minor is admitted, the judges could bring 
in the principles of Hunoomanpersaud's case to decide the 
liability of the minor's estate. But the principles must not
1 Walter v. Everard (1891) 2 QB 369 per Lord Esher, M.R.
2 Zamindar of Polavaram v. Maharaja of Pittapuram (1931) 54 
Mad 163) Meenakshi Sundaram v. Ranqa Ayyanqar AIR 1932 Mad 
696) Natesa Nattar v. Manicka Nattar AIR 1938 Mad 398; 
Seetharamayya v. Sathiah AIR 1938 Mad 716; Sudarsana Rao v. 
Dalayya AIR 1943 Mad 487; Pundarikakshayya v. Sreeramulu 
AIR 1946 Mad 1 (FB).
3 AIR 1935 Mad 447 (FB).
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be so extended as to include cases which are not actually 
in accordance with Hindu law. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., 
over-extended the principles of Hunoomanpersaud's case and 
came to find that even simple debts could be incurred by 
guardians and they would be binding on minors* eatates. 
Sitting with Pandrang Row, J., in Ramanathan Chettiar v. 
Palaniappa Chettiar1 the learned judge observed that a 
guardian could under Hindu law bind the minor's estate by 
a personal contract, such as one for incurring a simple 
debt, if it was entered into during the course of and for 
the purpose of carrying on the business of the ward. In 
incurring such a debt the learned judge did not consider 
that the guardian's power to bind the minor's estate was 
restricted to a pre-existing liability. If the guardian 
was found to have acted in circumstances regarded as suffi­
cient to bind the minor according to the general principles 
of Hindu law, the estate of the minor would be bound. A 
pre-existing liability was only one such circumstance; 
it was not the only factor that enabled a guardian to 
enter into a contract binding on the minor. The facts and 
circumstances of necessity or benefit which ordinarily 
justified an alienation under Hindu law would support a
contract for simple debt as well. Again in Annamalai Chetty
2v. Muthusawami Maniaqaran Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., 
sitting with Leach, C.J., held that the true test for
1 AIR 1939 Mad 531.
2 AIR 1939 Mad 538.
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determining the binding character of a Hindu minor's estate 
for a simple contract debt incurred by his guardian was 
that laid down by the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud*s 
case, that under the Hindu law the guardian had power to 
contract loans so as to bind the minor's estate for neces­
sary purposes, and that there was no difference in the test 
to be applied whether the money was obtained by pledge or 
sale of the property or by way of simple loan. In his 
attempt to empower a natural guardian under Hindu law to 
incur a simple contract debt and to bind the minor's estate 
for such debt the learned judge removed the requirement 
of a pre-existing liability which allowed a minor's estate 
to be bound by a guardian's contract for simple debt. The 
learned judge considered it a great anomaly if a guardian 
was denied the power to contract a simple debt while he was 
competent in similar circumstances to charge or even sell 
a portion of the minor's immovable property. He did not 
like to see any difference between a simple loan and a loan 
contracted on a security, and did not consider the risk of 
allowing a guardian to obtain money by way of a simple loan 
and the advantage of allowing him to obtain it by charging 
or selling the minor's property for an antecedent debt.
He did not notice that when a specific immovable property 
belonging to a minor was transferred by the guardian, the 
alienee could assert his right to that particular property 
on the strength of the transfer provided he could establish 
legal necessity or benefit of the estate; on the contrary,
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a lender who advanced money to the guardian without any 
charge could not claim to recover his money from the minor's 
property unless it was covered by section 68 of the Contract 
Act. The learned judge extended the meaning of the principles 
of Hunoomanpersaud's case to cases of simple borrowing 
without any charge on the minor's property and stated that 
what the Judicial Committee said with regard to a guardian's 
power in that case had been widened to integrate even the 
power of simple loan. He disregarded the fact that the whole 
object of conferring power upon the guardian to deal with 
the minor's property was to protect the interest of the 
minor, and for the protection of that interest the possibi­
lity of cheating and indiscriminate use of the minor's 
property should be stopped. So long as a loan was incurred 
to discharge an antecedent debt, the twin principles of 
Hunoomanpersaud's case could be applied. But it is inscru­
table how the learned judge justified their application 
in the case of a simple loan as such. It would be dangerous 
to lay down in the case of simple loans that the minor's 
estate is liable even though the money raised by loan 
was not applied to actual necessity. It is yet to be seen 
how far the learned judge fulfilled his own duty of safe­
guarding the minor's estate against indiscriminate borrow­
ing by the guardian. It is strange that the learned judge 
in giving such a power to a guardian did not mention the 
decision in Brii Narain v. Manqla Prasad1 and take notice
1 AIR 1924 PC 50.
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of the second and third propositions of its five classic 
propositions. The second proposition empowers only the 
father-manager to incur a debt, and so long as it is not 
for an immoral purpose he can lay open the estate to be 
taken in execution proceedings upon a decree for payment 
of that debt; and the third proposition empowers a manager 
to bind the estate by mortgage only when that mortgage is 
to discharge an antecedent debt. Certainly a guardian's 
power cannot be greater than that of a manager. How can 
a power, which the Privy Council did not dare to give in 
Brij Narain's case even to a coparcener manager of a joint 
Hindu family, be given to a guardian who may be a stranger? 
So it is difficult to agree with the learned judge when he 
disagreed with the following passage from Trevelyan's 
Law Relaing to Minors'1' i
"Although a guardian may under certain circums­
tances sell or charge his ward's property, he 
cannot bind his ward personally by a simple 
contract debt, by bill of exchange, by covenant, 
or by any promise to pay money or damages, unless 
such promise be made merely to pay or keep alive 
a debt for which the ward's property was liable".
Leach, C.J., sitting with Madhavan Nair, J., in Seeth- 
2aramavva v. Sathiah observed that m  proper cases it was 
within the competence of a Hindu guardian to bind a minor 
by executing a promissory note. By 'proper cases' presumably 
the learned Chief Justice meant cases within the purview of 
the decision in Hunoomanpersaud * s case. The liability of
1 (6th ed.), 169.
2 AIR 1938 Mad 716.
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the minor would, however, be limited to the assets of the 
estate in his hands. The facts of this case were almost 
identical with Satvanaravana1s case. The learned Chief 
Justice spelt out the law clearly in Rajarathna Chettiar 
v. Mahboob Sahib1. This time sitting with Patanjali Sastri,
J., very tersely he stated that although a minor could not 
be bound by a personal covenant in a contract entered into 
by his guardian, his personal law would affect the position. 
Under his personal law the natural guardian of a Hindu 
minor had power without the court's sanction to mortgage 
or sell any part of the minor's estate. Following the prin­
ciples of Hunoomanpersaud's case the learned Chief Justice 
said that in cases of necessity the guardian of a Hindu 
minor could borrow money upon a promissory note, and the 
minor's estate would be liable for repayment. Referring to 
Annamalai Chetty's case he observed that the minor was not 
bound on the note, but on the debt evidenced by the note, 
and that the liability was created by his personal law.
The decision in Ramajogava's case was uniformly followed
in binding the minor's estate by his guardian's properly
2
executed contract. In Sudarsana Rao v. Dalavva Wadsworth 
and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., held that a contract made by the 
guardian of a Hindu minor to pay maintenance to the minor's 
paternal grandmother was binding on the minor since under 
Hindu law the minor was liable to maintain her; and there­
fore a decree could be passed against the minor's estate
1 AIR 1940 Mad 106.
2 AIR 1943 Mad 487.
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in respect of such contract. In the course of his argument 
the counsel for the appellant suggested that the decision 
of the Full Bench in Rama ioqaya * s case was overruled by the 
Privy Council decision in Zamindar of Polavaram v. Mahara ja 
of Pittapur1 Patanjali Sastri, J,, who delivered the judg­
ment of the Bench, rejected the suggestion by referring to
2the following passage from Mayne's Hindu law and its sub- 
seguent following in Annamalai Chetty's and Ramanatha 
Chettiar1s case*
"In Zamindar of Polavaram v. Mahara jah of pittapur 
the Privy Council, reversing the decision of the 
Madras High Court, held that where a minor is not 
personally responsible for the payment of the 
debt, no decree against the 'general assets' 
could be given. It does not however appear that 
the Privy Council intended to overrule the 
decision in Ramaiocrava*s case which was cited 
before it. The observation probably proceeded 
on the special facts of the case".
(b) Bombay High Court
The Bombay High Court considered the guestion whether 
a guardian could bind the minor by his contract entered
into for the benefit of the latter in Ranmalsing ji v.
3Vadilal Vakhatchand , where the mother of a minor son 
borrowed money for the purpose of a pilgrimage to sacred 
places, and to defray the marriage expenses of the minor.
The lender got a decree against the minor's mother and his 
property in the trial court. On attaining majority the minor
1 (1936) 63 IA 304 (PC).
2 (10th ed.), 311.
3 (1894) 20 Bom 61.
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applied for setting aside the decree. Fulton, J., who 
delivered the judgment of the case held that the guardian 
of a minor according to Hindu law could impose a charge on 
the minor’s estate for obligatory purposes, but he could 
not bind him personally by contracts entered into by him 
which did not purport to charge the minor’s estate. Where, 
however, debts were incurred for necessaries, the minor 
would be bound to pay for them under the general principles 
contained in section 68 of the Contract Act, and this 
liability would not be affected because the loans were 
advanced at the instance of the guardian. In that case the 
expenses for the minor’s marriage being found illegal and 
the expenses for pilgrimage unnecessary, debts incurred 
for them were held not binding on the minor's estate. Thus 
a guardian can bind the minor's estate either under the 
personal law of the minor or under statutory law, but both 
are covered by the decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case. In 
Keshav v. Bala ii1 Rangnekar, J., observed that a minor could 
not be bound personally by a simple contract debt, nor could 
his estate be bound except by a document purporting to bind 
it. The learned judge further said that the principles to 
be applied in the case of a minor in regard to a personal 
contract or covenant must be the same whether the minor 
happened to be a ward of the court or was under the protec­
tion of a testamentary or natural guardian. In this case
1 AIR 1932 Bom 460. Similar view was also taken in Shankar 
v. Nathu AIR 1932 Bom 480.
221
the guardian borrowed money for constructing buildings 
and executed a promissory note in favour of the lender.
(c) Calcutta High Court
So far as the Calcutta High Court is concerned on this 
question a Full Bench decided in Joykisto Cower v. Nittyanund 
Nundy  ^that a minor would be liable for the debt contracted 
by his guardian for carrying on the minor*s ancestral busi­
ness? the liability would, however, be limited to the extent
of the minor's share in the business. In Surendra Nath Sarkar
2 . . .v. Atul Chandra Hoy Maclean, C.J., sitting with Holmwood,
J., held that a guardian could not bind the minor by a
.3personal covenant. In Bhawal Sahu v. Baimath Pertab Narain
Brett and Holmwood, JJ., expressed the opinion that the
rule that a natural guardian could not bind a minor by a
simple contract debt or by any promise to pay money or
damages, was subject to the modifications that the promise
would not bind the minor unless it was merely to keep alive
a debt for which the minor's property was liable, and that
where the promise was to pay money which had been expended
for necessaries the estate of the minor would be liable not
on the promise but on the fact that money had been supplied.
. 4
Ghose and Page, JJ., held in Raiaram Singh v. Pancha Deogi 
that although a minor could not be made personally liable
1 (1878) 3 Cal 738 (FB).
2 (1907) 34 Cal 892.
3 (1908) 35 Cal 320.
4 AIR 1927 Cal 862.
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for any debt incurred by his guardian on his own personal 
liability; if the debt was for the minor's necessity and 
was properly incurred by the guardian, the minor's estate 
would be bound by such debt by the application of the 
equitable principle of subrogation. Thus if a minor's 
guardian borrowed money for the purpose of carrying on 
a business of the minor which was continuing from before 
the date of the debt incurred, then, as the guardian was 
entitled to indemnity for liabilities properly incurred 
out of the assets of the minor in the business, creditors 
were entitled to proceed directly against such assets.
(d) Lahore, Patna and Nagpur High Courts
The Lahore Court did not mention the personal law
to be the determinant of a minor's liability; they stuck
at the 'prudent man' test'*'. More recently, they began to
follow other High Court decisions in this respect. In
2
Kanhiya Lai v. Deep Chand a minor's share m  his ancestral 
trade was held liable when his natural guardian incurred 
debts for the purpose of carrying on that business. The 
Patna High Court laid down that a creditor could not obtain
a decree against the minor's estate if he sued on a guardian's
3 . . .hand-note as such . A Division Bench of that court held m
4Suchit Chaudhan v. Harnandan Singh that the guardian of
1 Manohar Lai v. Ratan Singh AIR 1930 Lah 588.
2 AIR 1947 Lah 199.
3 Kashi Prasad Singh v. Akleshwari Prasad (1920) 58 IC 22.
4 (1933) 12 Pat 112, following Padma Krishna's case (1916)
39 Mad 915.
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a Hindu minor had power to contract loans on behalf of the
minor for the latter*s necessities and benefit and, although
the guardian could not impose any personal liability on
the minor, the estate of the minor was liable for such
debt. If, however, a guardian contracts a debt on behalf
of the minor with the sanction of the court, it would be
binding on the minor’s estate1. The Nagpur Court followed
the Privy Council decision in Waghela Rajsanji*s case and
did not allow a guardian’s contract which did not purport
2to bind the minor’s estate to bind the minor personally
and also did not allow a decree to be passed against the
3 4minor or his estate on a simple bond . In Lalchand v. Narhar
where the father of a minor owed money on bonds and on his
death his widow acting for herself and as guardian of her
minor son renewed and consolidated the earlier bonds by
executing a new one, Prideux, A.J.C., held that a decree
could be passed against the minor’s estate, since the estate
was under an obligation incurred by the father of the minor
which the minor was bound to discharge according to his
personal law. However, the law on this point has been more
clearly and forcefully laid down by Pollock, A.J.C., in
5 . . . .Shriniwasrao v Baba Ram . The learned Judicial Commissioner
said that the minor’s estate was not liable on a contract 
executed by his guardian, which did not purport to bind his
1 Rai Shvam Bahadur v. Rameswar Prasad AIR 1942 Pat 441.
2 Tukaram Manaii v. Ramchandra Hari (1906) 2 Nag LR 25.
3 Jhitibai v. Te jmal (1917) 13 Nag LR 109.
4 AIR 1926 Nag 31.
5 AIR 1933 Nag 285.
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estate, but that money expended on necessaries could be 
recovered from his estate under the provisions of section 
68 of the Contract Act, It was further stated that it was 
entirely immaterial whether the bond was executed by the 
minor or his guardian or whether no bond was executed at
all, for the liability of the minor's estate arose not 
ex contractu but because the money borrowed was spent on 
necessaries. In Sadasheo Balaii v, Shankar Govind  ^Bose 
and Puranik, JJ., brought in the Hindu law principles to 
make the law in this respect a complete whole in this court. 
The learned judges observed that the rule that a minor was 
not personally liable on a contract entered into on his 
behalf by his guardian was subject to two exceptions, viz.,
(i) where the contract was for necessaries supplied to 
the minor or where money was advanced for such supplies; 
and (ii) where the liability was such that the minor was 
subject to it under his personal law. In these two cases 
a decree could be passed against the estate of the minor.
(e) Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court viewed the question differently
. . 2from other High Courts. In Kandhia Lai v. Muna Bibi Blair 
and Aikman, JJ., emphasised the lender's duty of proper 
and reasonable enquiries as to the existence of necessity, and 
held that if after making such enquiries and entertaining
1 AIR 1938 Naa 68. This case was followed in Panduranq Dhake 
v. Panduranq Gorle AIR 1947 Nag 178.
2 (1897) 20 All 135.
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a bona fide belief in the existence of such necessity the 
lender advanced money to a guardian, then he could proceed 
against the minor's estate, even though the sum borrowed by 
the guardian was not actually used for the minor's necessi­
ties or benefit. Although the decision seems to be in accor­
dance with the principles of Hunoomanpersaud's case, it 
overreaches the principles. As seen from the decisions of 
different High Courts creditors' right against the minor's 
estate is based on the rule of subrogation which would not
allow the creditors to proceed against the minor's estate
*
unless the guardian who borrowed money on the minor's 
behalf himself has a right of indemnity against the minor's 
assets. Where money is not invested for the minor's neces­
sities or benefit, how will the court allow a charge to be 
created on the minor's estate? So also the suppliers of 
minor's necessaries would not be entitled to be paid merely 
because they have supplied goods to the minor for which the 
minor may not have any necessity. It is the necessity for 
the goods that determines whether or not the minor is bound 
to pay for them and not the reasonable belief of the supplier
that they were necessary'*'. As long back as in 1894 Farran, J., 
warned in Ranmalsingii's case that the ruling in Hunoomanper­
saud 's case that a bona fide creditor should not suffer when 
he acted with due caution could not be extended to a case 
in which it was sought to make the minor or his estate 
liable for a debt.
1 Barnes v. Toye (1884) 13 QBD 410} Johnstone v. Marks 
(1887) 19 Q3 509.
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Therefore it is obvious that unless a guardian’s 
contract creates a charge on the minor's estate or unless 
the guardian discharges by it an obligation deemed binding 
on the minor under his personal law, it would not bind the 
minor. Whether the contract binds the minor under his 
personal law or under statutory law, or whether it falls 
within the principles laid down in Hunoomanpersaud's case, 
the said principles should not be extended to a risky extent 
like Krishnaswami Ayyanger, J., of the Madras High Court, 
or understood partially like the Division Bench of the 
Allahabad High Court. From the decisions of different High 
courts it appears as settled law that a guardian can bind 
the minor's estate by a simple contract of loan only (i) if 
the loan is taken by the guardian in the circumstances 
falling under necessaries within the meaning of section 
68 of the Contract Act; and (ii) if the loan is taken by 
the guardian for legal necessity or benefit of the minor's 
estate within the meaning of the principles of Hunooman­
persaud 's case. In either case the dictrine of subrogation 
will be applicable and the creditor will be able to proceed 
against the minor's estate.
2.4.1.3. Indian Federal Court on guardians' contracts
The question of the binding effect of a guardian's 
contract for simple debt was finally considered by the 
Federal Court of India in Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya1.
1 AIR 1949 FC 218.
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Although the Federal Court case was mainly concerned with 
regard to the contractual capacity of a de facto guardian, 
the learned judges made their observations following the 
decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case and stated the principles 
in general terms applicable to both de jure and de facto 
guardians. Posing the question whether there was liability 
for money borrowed for necessity and, if so, in what manner 
it could be so borrowed, Kania, C.J., stated that ’'loans 
taken for the necessity of a Hindu minor have been ordered 
by the courts to be repaid out of the minor's estate’*^ .
The learned Chief Justice stated further that although in 
case of necessity a guardian could borrow money under section 
68 of the Contract Act and Hindu law as well, but that would 
be no justification for extending the application of the 
principle of necessity to transactions which did not strictly 
conform to that test, as that would open the gate to indis­
criminate borrowings by the guardian. In reply to the 
question whether the guardian of a minor could bind the 
minor's estate by a simple contract of loan entered into 
on his behalf in case of necessity, Fazl Ali, J., observed 
that a guardian could not bind the minor by contracts or 
obligations and then compel him to transfer his estate or 
enable the creditor to establish a direct relation between 
himself and the estate, but in cases of necessity or benefit 
to the minor he might be able to show that the estate ought 
to bear the burden which he had taken upon himself; and in
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 221-222.
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such cases the creditor could directly make the estate of 
minor liable under the principle of subrogation1. Mukherjea, 
J., posed the question how far a guardian in Hindu law 
whether de jure or de facto could bind his ward personally 
by a simple contract debt, or by a covenant or promise to 
pay money without creating a charge on his properties, and 
to what extent, if any, such liability could be enforced 
against the estate of the minor. The learned judge said 
that when the guardian himself was party to the contract 
in his capacity as guardian, a suit could be brought against 
him and a decree obtained; but simply because he was sued 
in his capacity as guardian, the estate of the minor could 
not be proceeded against in the execution of the decree 
obtained against him. In such a case as the guardian was 
personally liable under the contract, he would be entitled 
to reimbursement from the minor's estate under the rule of 
Hindu law if the borrowing was for necessity or benefit of 
the minor; and the creditor could invoke the equitable 
doctrine of subrogation in his favour and claim to be placed 
in the guardian's position for the enforcement of the 
latter's right of reimbursement against the minor's estate. 
The learned judge thought it as the only way in which the 
Hindu law rights of the guardian in the matter of contract­
ual debts for necessity or benefit of the minor could be
given effect to in perfect consonance with the well establi-
?
shed principles of the law of contract • Almost the same
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 226.
2 Ibid, 237.
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view was expressed by Mahajan, J. The learned judge stated 
that contracts of loan entered into by the guardian could 
not bind the minor's person, but they could bind the minor's 
estate by an indirect process, i.e., under the rule of 
subrogation. The guardian himself could become liable for
those debts personally and entitled to reimbursement and 
indemnity from the minor if the debts were incurred for the
needs of the minor; and when the guardian himself had the 
right of reimbursement and indemnity from the minor, the 
creditor on the rule of subrogation would be entitled to 
proceed against the property of the minor. The learned 
judge pointed out that the rule of subrogation in this 
regard had two exceptions in which a lender has direct 
recourse to the minor's estate, viz., (a) where the contract 
was for necessaries supplied to the minor, and (b) where 
the liability was one to which the minor was subject under 
Hindu law1.
From the remarks of the learned judges of the Federal 
Court it has now become the established law that a guardian
cannot enter into contracts of loan making the minor or his
2estate liable direct to the creditor . But where a guardian
personally makes himself liable under a contract or if it is
. 3true as Derrett has said that all acts by the guardian are 
done by him in his own name for the purposes of the minor, 
the creditor can indirectly proceed against the minor's 
estate under the rule of subrogation provided the guardian 
has acted properly. There cannot be a direct recourse by
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 254.
2 Suryaprakasam v. Gangara ju AIR 1956 AP 33, 45 (FB).
3 Introduction. 78 para 97.
230
the creditor against the minor's estate except in the case 
of necessaries supplied to the minor under section 68 
of the Contract Act and of personal law liability.
2.4.2. Contract for sale
In 1856 it was decided in Hunoomanpersaud's case 
that a guardian could mortgage his minor ward's property 
in a case of need or for the benefit of the latter's estate 
and subsequently this decision was extended to apply to 
sale, but in 1948 the question came before the Privy Council 
in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao1 how far a guardian could bind 
the minor's estate by a contract for the sale of such pro­
perty. The Privy Council approached this question from a 
new perspective. This time they did not give much importance 
to the position and power of the guardian, rather they 
ignored him. By the application of the law of transfer of 
property their Lordships considered the guardian a shadow 
of the minor and held that in a contract for the sale of 
a minor's property the minor was 'transferor' within the 
meaning of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act 
(Act 4) of 1882, and therefore a transferee from him who 
was in possession of property was protected under that 
section. The facts of the case show that the mother of a 
Hindu minor entered as guardian into a contract for the sale 
of the minor's property in order to discharge the debts 
incurred by the minor's deceased father. The purchasers
1 AIR 1948 PC 95.
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were let into possession of the lands contracted to be 
sold, but no sale deed was executed or registered. The 
minor being represented by his mother challenged the pro­
priety of the contract of sale and claimed possession of 
the property. Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act 
of 1882 provides*
"Where any person contracts to transfer for con­
sideration any immovable property by writing 
signed by him or on his behalf from which the 
terms necessary to constitute the transfer can 
be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and 
the transferee has, in part performance of the 
contract, taken possession of the property or 
any part thereof, or the transferee, being 
already in possession, continues in possession 
in part performance of the contract and has done 
some act in furtherance of the contract, and the 
transferee has performed or is willing to perform 
his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding 
the contract, though required to be registered, 
or, where there is an instrument of transfer, 
that the transfer has not been completed in 
the manner prescribed therefor by the law for 
the time being in force, the transferor or any 
person claiming under him shall be debarred from 
enforcing against the transferee and persons 
claiming under him any right in respect of the 
property of which the transferee has taken or 
continued in possession, other than a right 
expressly provided by the terms of the contract!
Provided that nothing in this section shall 
affect the rights of a transferee for consideration 
who has no notice of the contract or of the part 
performance thereof".
It will be seen from the section that the word 
'transferor' refers back to the person who "contracts to 
transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing 
signed by him or on his behalf". Obviously, unless the 
minor enters into a valid contract to transfer his immovable 
property the provision of the section cannot be invoked.
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Their Lordships, therefore, applied Hindu law to see 
whether it was within the powers of the mother to enter 
as guardian into a contract, and whether the contract so 
entered into was a valid one. Following the decision in 
Hunoomanpersaud * s case their Lordships observed that they 
entertained no doubt that it was within the powers of 
the mother as guardian to enter into the contract of 
sale on behalf of the minor for the purpose of discharging 
his father's debts, and that, if the sale had been comple­
ted by the execution and registration of a deed of sale,
the mother would have been bound under Hindu law. The 
contract of sale by the mother was therefore an act done 
on the minor's behalf. Again, referring to the law of 
contract their Lordships observed that although a minor's 
contract was void, contracts entered into on the minor's 
behalf by his guardian or manager were different. Their 
Lordships quoted the following passage from Pollock and 
Mulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts1*
"It is, however, different with regard to contracts 
entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian
or by a manager of his estate. In such a case
it has been held by the High Courts of India, in 
cases which arose subsequent to the governing 
decision of the Privy Council, that the contract 
can be specifically enforced by or against the 
minor, if the contract is one which it is within 
the competence of the guardian to enter into on 
his behalf so as to bind him by it, and, further, 
if it is for the benefit of the minor. But if 
either of these two conditions is wanting, the 
contract cannot be specifically enforced at all”.
1 (7th ed.), 70. The editor of the 9th edition has thoroughly 
recast the passage, but the contents of the passage are 
there.
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Either of the two conditions, viz., competence of the
guardian to bind the minor by his contract, and the benefit
of the minor, has to be present, otherwise a guardian’s
contract cannot be specifically enforced. These conditions
are the restatement of the law as contained in the decisions
in Rama iogava *s and Hunoomanpersaud *s case. But this decision
is confined to cases of contract of sale or purchase, and
it cannot be applied to cases of contracts for simple debts,
since the rule of subrogation has no place in it. Again, the
decision is confined to cases where the transferee is in
possession under a contract that the property would be
transferred to him 1, in other words, in the case of executed
2contract and not in the case of executory contract , and it
3 4can be used only as a shield and never as a sword .
Since the decision in Subrahmanyam* s case it has been
5
held by most of the Indian High Courts that a minor is 
bound by the contract entered into by his guardian for the 
sale of his property if the contract is according to this 
Privy Council decision, and in the case of personal contract 
the decision in Waghela Raisanii’s case continues to be 
followed^.
1 Thota Chima v. Malapalli Raju AIR 1950 FC 1.
2 Sitarama Rao v. Venkatarama Reddiar (1956) 1 MLJ 5, 16 (FB).
3 Dammrlal v. Mahomedbhai AIR 1955 Nag 306; Sardarilal v. 
Shakuntala Devi AIR 1961 Punj 378; Motilal v. Jaswant Singh 
AIR 1964 Raj 11.
4 Achavva v. Venkata Subba Rao AIR 1957 AP 854, 856; Akram 
Mea v. Secunderabad Municipal Corporation AIR 1957 AP 859.
5 In Sitarama Rao v. Venkatarama Reddiar (1956) 1 MLJ 5 (FB) 
the Madras High Court distinguished this Privy Council 
decision and did not apply it to the sale of a minor’s 
separate property.
6 I & G Investment Trust v. Raja of Kalikote AIR 1952 Cal
508, 520.
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2.4.3. Contract for purchase
It will be seen in the next chapter that on a wrong 
understanding of the Privy Council decision in Mir Sarwar jan 
v. Fakhruddin Mahomed  ^it has been held by the courts of 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh that a guardian is not com­
petent to create a liability on the minor or charge on the 
minor's estate by any executory contract for purchase of 
property. Although the contract in that case was relating
to purchase, the decision was uniformly followed in the
2
case of sales and mortgages as well . However, after the 
decision in Subrahmanyam' s case when it is found that a 
competent guardian can bind a minor by a contract for sale 
of the minor's property for the latter's benefit, the courts 
have extended this decision to cover cases of purchase also. 
Relying on this Privy Council decision a Full Be»nch of the 
Hyderabad High Court by a majority judgment in Amir Ahmmad
3
v. Meer Nizam All held that a contract for sale or purchase
of immovable property entered into by the de jure guardian
of a minor would bind the minor if it fulfilled the two
tests of competency of the guardian and benefit of the minor.
The same view was also held by Subba Rao, C.J., in Suryapra-
4kasam v. Gangara iu . But doubts are usually expressed whether 
necessity or benefit as may be found in the case of a sale 
could be found in the case of a purchase without involving
1 {1911) 39 IA 1 (PC).
2 Abdul Hag v. Yehia Khan AIR 1924 Pat 81} Swarath Ram v.
Ram Ballabh AIR 1925 All 595; Srinath v. Jatindra AIR 1926 
Cal 445; Ramakrishna Reddiar v. Chidambaran AIR 1928 Mad 407; 
Krishna Chandra v. Seth Rashabha AIR 1939 Nag 265.
3 AIR 1952 Hyd 120 (FB).
4 AIR 1956 AP 33 (FB).
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the minor in any onerous obligation. In Ramalinqam v.
Bavanambal Ammal  ^Viswanatha Sastri, J., observed that the
question which was vital to sales by a guardian, viz.,
necessity, could not arise in a contract for purchase;
Govinda Menon, J., agreed with this obvious observation
2 . •in Sitarama Rao v. Venkatarama Reddiar ; and a similar
3statement was made by Bhave, J., in Ramchandra v. Manikchand . 
If a purchase actually fulfils the tests laid down in 
Subrahmanyam*s case there is no point in invalidating the
4
purchase .
2.5. Promissory note and the liability of a minor*s estate
We have already seen that a guardian cannot enter 
into contracts of loan making the minor or his estate liable 
direct to the creditor; but where necessaries are supplied 
to the minor or where the liability of the minor is his 
personal law liability the creditor can proceed direct 
against the minor*s estate under the rule of subrogation.
Now the question arisesi can the guardian execute a promiss­
ory note so as to be enforceable against the minor’s estate?
5This question was discussed thread-bare in the Madras High 
Court in a series of cases, and very little in other High 
Courts, and was finally decided by the Indian Federal Court
"l AIR 1951 Mad 431. ~
2 (1956) 1 MLJ 5 (FB).
3 AIR 1968 MP 150.
4 Vi jaykumar v. Gokulchand (1964) 68 Bom LR 891; Popat 
ryamaeo v T Jagu Pandu (1*568) 70 Bom LR 456.
5 See Derrett * s discussion on a shebait *s promissory note 
in 'Promissory notes executed by shebaits' in (1966)
KLT (Jour). lOlff.
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in Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshavva1.
Nowhere for the first time the law regarding a guardian's
promissory note was better stated than in Swaminatha Odavar 
2v. Natesa Iyer where Reilly, J., sitting with Cornish, J., 
aptly put the question* 'how can any guardian impose a 
liability upon a minor by executing a promissory note on 
his behalf? If the promissory note is to effect anything, 
it must create an unconditional personal liability.' The 
learned judge held that the guardian of a minor could not 
impose a personal liability on the minor by executing a 
promissory note on his behalf even for necessary purposes, 
and drew a distinction between the liability arising from 
an ordinary debt and that arising from a debt secured by a 
negotiable instrument. It was observed that the special 
features of a promissory note distinguished it from a debt 
ordinarily incurred on behalf of a minor for necessary pur­
poses, that a negotiable instrument was intended to be one 
which could pass from hand to hand bearing its meaning on 
its face, as itself the basis and evidence of a money claim.
It was further observed that any qualification of the promise 
in a promissory note, such as that it would only be enforced 
against a minor if necessity binding on the minor could be 
shown, was wholly foreign to the idea of a negotiable instru­
ment. Cornish, J., observed that the plaintiff had chosen to 
sue upon the promissory note and not upon the consideration,
1 AIR 1949 FC 218.
2 AIR 1933 Mad 710.
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and the only liability under the promissory note was the 
personal liability of the minor defendant. The learned judge 
suggested that if the suit had been on the consideration, 
the case might have been different.
The correctness of this decision was considered by 
a Full Bench of the same High Court in Satyanarayana v. 
Mallayya1 where Ramesam, J., who delivered the judgment 
observed*
"The doubt seems to arise because of the fact that 
the payee of the note can succeed against the minor 
and his estate only if certain facts are estab­
lished. This is true. But I do not think this fact 
makes the liability under the promissory note 
one other than an unconditional personal liability. 
What is meant by that phrase is that the liability 
mentioned in the note should not be made contingent 
on some event, for if it is so made conditional 
or contingent upon the happening of some event 
it will not conform to the definition of promissory 
note. But so long as the form of the promissory 
note conforms to the definition of a promissory 
note under the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is 
not the less unconditional simply because when 
the matter goes to the court of law and the 
defendant raises some defence, the plaintiff has 
got to establish certain facts before he can 
succeed against the minor. The truth is that no 
transaction entered into by a guardian on behalf 
of a minor, can the opposite party succeed, if 
challenged, without establishing some facts such 
as that the transaction was for the benefit of 
the minor or some other fact. That such a fact 
has got to be established does not, in my opinion, 
make the liability under the promissory note a 
conditional liability. On the doubt entertained 
by Reilly, J., it follows that a promissory note 
on behalf of a minor is impossible. Such a view 
is opposed to the trend of all the decisions in 
the High Courts ... I am unable therefore to 
agree with the doubt suggested by Reilly, J."
1 AIR 1935 Mad 447 (FB).
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The learned judges of the Full Bench were not right 
in holding that the liability remains an unconditional one 
inspite of the fact that when the matter goes to a court of 
law and the defendant raises some defence the plaintiff has 
got to establish certain facts before he can succeed against 
the minor. The defence of necessity certainly affects the 
unconditional character of a promissory note, because 
the promise is that the amount will be payable on demand
and on the face of it. Section 4 of the Negotiable Instru­
ments Act (Act 26) of 1881 defines a promissory note as 
follows*
”A ’promissory note* is an instrument in writing
(not being a bank note or currency note) contain­
ing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the 
maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or 
to the order of, a certain person, or to the 
bearer of the instrument”.
When a promissory note is executed by a guardian on 
behalf of a minor it does not remain a document containing 
an unconditional undertaking to pay a certain sum of money, 
because the undertaking is subjected to two conditions, 
viz., first, that the note is to be enforced against the 
minor if necessity is proved, and secondly, that the amount 
is not payable except out of the estate of the minor, the 
creditor being unable to proceed personally against the 
minor. The negotiable quality of a promissory note will be 
greatly affected by reading these conditions into it, and 
if any enquiry is permitted into the sufficiency of consider­
ation, there will be really no undertaking to pay a certain 
sum. If the loan is considered on the promissory note alone,
it will neither be enforced against the minor since he cannot
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be bound personally by any contract, nor against the minor's
estate directly by the holder in due course of the note
since a creditor cannot proceed against the minor's estate
unless the guardian has a proper right of indemnity against
that estate1. Again, if the power of a guardian in this
respect is equated with that of a trustee it will be found
that unless special power is given to him, money borrowed
by the guardian on a promissory note even for the benefit
2
of the estate is not a charge on that estate , and a decree
3cannot be passed against the minor's estate . It is only 
by the application of the rule of subrogation that the 
minor's estate can be proceeded against, and when there 
is the rule of subrogation it cannot be said that the un­
conditional nature of a promissory note is maintained. 
Moreover, if the provisions of section 32 which provide 
that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the 
maker of the note is bound to pay the amount to the holder 
on demand, of section 117(e) which provide for compensation 
to be paid in case of dishonour of a note, and of section 
118 which presume the consideration of a promissory note, 
of the Negotiable Instruments Act are considered, it will 
be seen that when a promissory note binds a minor it puts 
him in an onerous obligation which according to the Privy 
Council decision in Waqhela Raisanii's case is void.
However, the question came before the Indian Federal 
Court in Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshavva^. The case being
1 Sanka Krishnamurthi v. Bank of Burma (1911) 36 6Q7.
2 Ramanath Paul v. Kanai Lai Dev (1903) 7 CWN 104.
3 Byramji Rustomii v. Heerabai (1909) 2 IC 161 as quoted in 
Ammalu Ammal v. Namaqiri Ammal AIR 1918 Mad 300, 305.
4 AIR 1949 FC 218.
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regarding the promissory note of a de facto guardian,
Kania, C.J., confined his observations to the case of a 
de facto manager. But the other judges of the court did 
not make any difference between the power of a de jure 
and a de facto guardian in this respect and stated the 
law as applicable to both types of guardian1. Fazl Ali, J., 
said that no guardian, much less a de facto guardian, 
could be allowed to involve the minor's estate in liabi­
lities which might follow by a strict application of the 
somewhat stringent provisions of the Negotiable Instruments 
Act. According to the learned judge to give an undertaking 
on behalf of a minor that a certain sum would be paid on 
demand and that, in default of such payment, compensation 
would be payable was a somewhat onerous transaction, and
a contract which exposed the minor and his estate to the
. 2risks involved in that transaction was void •
Mukherjea, J., observed that when money was borrowed 
on a promissory note the provisions of the Negotiable Instru­
ments Act would undoubtedly be attracted. A promissory note 
being payable unconditionally on demand and having some 
other special features, viz., the presumption that it was 
made for consideration and that the holder of it was a 
holder in due course, there could be no suit on such a 
promissory note against the minor's estate if the guardian
1 AIR 1949 FC 218. Fazl Ali, J., 227? Mukherjea, J., 234j 
Mahajan, J., 263.
2 Ibid, 227.
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excluded his personal liability under such promissory note. 
In other words, a guardian could not bind the minor's 
estate by executing a note on the minor's behalf. The 
learned judge said that if a promissory note was passed 
by the guardian who did not exclude his personal liability 
the holder of the note could have a decree against the 
guardian and if the guardian could succeed in proving that 
it was made for the minor's necessity, the creditor could 
avail himself of the guardian's right of reimbursement 
against the minor's estate. Thus it was pointed out by the 
learned judge that in a case of contractual debts borrowed 
either on simple bonds or promissory note the creditor 
could have a recourse to the minor's estate indirectly on 
the priciple of subrogation, when the guardian had the right 
of indemnity against the estate of the minor, and that he 
would have the right of direct reimbursement out of the 
minor's property only when the debt was for necessaries 
supplied to the minor. Through the rule of subrogation 
the learned judge attempted to bring about a harmony between 
Hindu law and the statutory law of contract when he said^i
"In this way can effect be given to the personal 
law of the Hindus in respect of the liability of 
a minor's estate for debts contracted by the 
guardian for legal necessity without infringing 
in any way the basic principles of the law of 
contract, and in this way alone, the different 
pronouncements of the Judicial Committee mention­
ed above can be consistently explained".
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 238.
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Mahajan, J., also observed that a promissory note 
was a peculiar kind of document and by its very nature it 
imposed an onerous liability on the minor. Therefore on the 
note itself a minor could not be sued or a claim decreed 
against his estate. The learned judge further observed1!
"If the guardian has given a promissory note, 
making himself personally liable, then, he can 
be sued on the note and he can then seek reim­
bursement from the minor's estate and that other­
wise the note can be used as evidence of the 
debt. There is no liability on the promissory 
notei the liability, if any, is aliunde of the 
note, i.e., on the loan itself, if.it is for 
the benefit of the estate or given for a pre­
existing liability that has been discharged by 
a fresh borrowing taken for the purpose and 
evidenced by the note. Unless there is a cause 
of action independently of the promissory note 
which can sustain the action, the minor cannot 
be made liable".
As seen from the observations of the learned judges
of the Federal Court a guardian cannot execute a promissory
2 . . . .note on behalf of a minor . The minor's liability under
Hindu law is a conditional one and, therefore, no uncon-
. . . . , 3ditional undertaking can be given by him . Even the promiss­
ory note cannot be used as evidence where the guardian has 
not been made a party to the suit and the equities between
the guardian and the minor cannot be worked out by applying
4the principle of subrogation. In Appalaraiu v. Yedukondalu 
Chandra Reddy, J., observed that where the debt had no 
independent existence apart from the promissory note, i.e.,
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 263.
2 See Derrett, Introduction, 79 para 98.
3 Suryaprakasam v. Gangara ju AIR 1956 AP 33, 45 (FB); Appala­
ra iu v. Yedukondalu AIR 1958 AP 713, 715.
4 AIR 1958 AP 713, 716.
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where there was no interval of time between the two, the 
benefit of the equitable rule of subrogation could not 
be obtained and a decree could not be passed against the 
minor on the promissory note unless the guardian was made 
a party to the suit.
3. Natural guardians* powers of alienation under the Hindu 
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
In 1956 the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (Act 32) 
was passed as a supplement1 to the Guardians and Wards Act 
of 1890 in order to amend and codify certain parts of the 
law relating to minority and guardianship among the Hindus 
only. We have seen earlier that the GWA was silent as to 
the powers of a natural guardian to deal with the minor's 
immovable property. The powers which were derived under 
the personal law were being exercised in accordance with 
the principles deduced from the sastric texts and their 
authoritative interpretation, it was firmly established
by a long catena of judicial decisions that the natural 
guardian of a Hindu minor had the power to alienate the 
property in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. 
Once the legal necessity was established it was not necessary 
for the natural guardian to apply under the GWA for the 
sanction of the court for an alienation of the minor's 
property; and the minor was bound by such alienation. As 
said earlier the provisions of section 27 of the GWA being 
of general application the powers of natural guardians
1 HMGA, section 2.
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were regulated by them in so far as they were not incon­
sistent with the personal laws of the minor. It is for 
the first time that the law relating to a natural guardian's 
powers with respect to a minor's estate has been specifi­
cally stated in any statute. Section 8 of the HMGA defines 
the powers of a natural guardian as followsi
"(l) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has 
power, subject to the provisions of this 
section, to do all acts which are necessary 
or reasonable and proper for the benefit of 
the minor or for the realization, protection 
or benefit of the minor's estate? but the 
guardian can in no case bind the minor by a 
personal covenant.
(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the 
previous permission of the court,--
(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, 
gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of 
the immovable property of the minor, or
(b) lease any part of such property for a term 
exceeding five years or for a term extend­
ing more than one year beyond the date on 
which the minor will attain majority.
(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural 
guardian, in contravention of subsection (1)
or subsection (2), is voidable at the instance 
of the minor or any person claiming under him.
(4) No court shall grant permission to the natural 
guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in 
subsection (2) except in case of necessity or 
for an evident advantage to the minor.
(5) ... ...
(6 ) ........"
Subsection (l) seems, from its language, to be a 
reproduction of section 27 of the GWA with an addition of 
the ratio of Waahela Raisanii's case to it. Subject to the 
other provisions of the section, under this subsection a 
natural guardian may do all acts which are necessary or 
reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor, or for
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the realisation, protection or benefit of the minor*s estate. 
This general power excludes fraudulent, collusive, colourable,
speculative, unnecessary or unreasonable transactions1. Wide
2as it may appear to some , this power has reduced the natural
guardian to the position of a certificated guardian under
section 29 of the GWA, with the little difference that in
the case of the former the legal necessity of a transaction
will still be decided by the minor's personal law. If the
power of a guardian under the Hindu law was previously a
3limited and qualified power , now under the HMGA it is 
doubly limited and doubly qualified one. Whenever the vali­
dity of a natural guardian's alienation of a minor's immo­
vable property will be challenged before a court, the court 
will have to see, first, under subsection (l) by applying 
the principles of Hindu law whether the alienation has been 
done for legal necessity or benefit of the minor, and 
secondly, under subsection (2) whether the natural guardian 
has obtained previous permission from the court for the 
alienation. Under the GWA it was only the first qualification 
that a court was required to see in determining the validity 
of a natural guardian's alienation.
The restrictions contained in subsection (2) are 
similar to those placed by section 29 of the GWA. Previously 
under the GWA if a natural guardian obtained a certificate
1 Derrett, Introduction. 72 para 88.
2 Paras Diwan, Hindu law. 222.
3 Hunoomanpersaud's case (1856) 6 MIA 393.
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of guardianship from the court he was not free from these 
limitations, and was required to obtain the permission of 
the court before being competent to transfer any property 
of the minor \  Subsection (3) contains the provisions 
regarding the legality of transactions made in contraven­
tion of subsection (l) or (2). Section 30 of the GWA 
contains similar provisions, but there is difference 
between this section and the subsection of the HMGA. Under 
the former a transaction in contravention of section 28 or 
29 is voidable at the instance of any other person affected 
thereby2, while under the latter any disposal of immovable 
property by a natural guardian in contravention of sub­
section (1) or (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor 
or any person claiming under him. Subsection (4) enjoins 
upon the court not to grant permission except in case of
necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. Section 
3l(l) of the GWA contains similar provisions. This subsection 
has taken away from a natural guardian the burden of judging 
whether a particular transaction is in the interest of the 
minor or not, and cast it on the court.
1 Surut Chunder v. Ashootosh (1875) 24 WR 46 (CR); Ram Chandar 
v * Chheda Lai (1905) 2 All LJ 460, 464j Das Ram v. Tirtha 
Nath (1924) 51 Cal 101, 106; Rameshwar v. Ridh Kuer AIR 
1925 Oudh 633; Jai Narain v. Bechoo Lai (1938) All 614.
2 Girra i Baksha v. Kazi Hamid Ali (1887) 9 All 340; Raj Lakhi 
v. Debendra (18971 24 Cal 668, 671; Dattaram v. Gangaram 
(1899) 23 Bom 287; Sinava v. Munisami (1899) 22 Mad 289; 
Shankerbhai v. Raisinqii (l9lTJ 19 Bom LR 855; Dwi iendra
v . Manorama (1922) 49 Cal 911; Chiranji Lai v. Syed Ilias 
(1924) 46 All 620; Labh Singh v. Shahban Mir (1926) 7 Lah 
129; Hussain Sahib v. Ayesha Bibi (l94l) Mad 775 (FB).
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3.1. Sale by natural guardians under„the HMGA
Bhave, J., observed in Ramchandra v. Manikchand1 that 
after the passing of the HMGA the authority of the natural 
guardian even to transfer the minor's property for legal 
necessity was taken away. Such transfers could now be 
effected only after obtaining the sanction of the court.
In Re Lalitha Bai Jagadisan , J., thinks that the guardian 
has no power to do anything to the prejudice of the minor; 
none of his acts can bind the minor and none of his acts can 
receive the approval of the court, if it does not result in 
some advantage to the minor, 'actual or prospective, but 
material and real'. Actually under the HMGA he has not the 
scope to do anything with respect to the minor's immovable 
property unless previously permitted by the court to do 
so. The court has taken upon itself the previous privilage 
of a guardian to deal with the minor's property "as carefully 
as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with it if it were
o
his own" . The words of the provisions of subsection (2)
being mandatory, any transaction of a natural guardian
without the previous permission of the court must suffer
from the mischief or conseguence of subsection (3), even if
4the transfer is found to be beneficial to the minor . The 
restrictions contained in section 8, however, do not apply
1 AIR 1968 MP 150, 155.
2 AIR 1961 Mad 153, 156.
3 GWA, section 27. Although the latter portion of this
section has been included in section 8(1), this portion 
is left out.
4 Prabhakaran Pillai v. Kumar Pillai (1971) KLT 32 (SN).
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in respect of the undivided interest of a minor in joint
1 ofamily property . Bhagwati, J., observed in Re Krishnakantz
that the entire scheme of the Act showed that the concept
of a guardian in respect of the undivided interest of a
minor in joint family property was excluded from the scope
and purview of the Act, and that the Act did not contemplate
and deal with any guardian in respect of the undivided
interest of a minor in joint family property. The manager
of a joint Hindu family can alienate the joint family
property including the interests of minor coparceners
therein without obtaining the previous permission of the
court even if the manager happens to be the natural
guardian of the separate property of any one or more of
the minor coparceners. But the alienation must be justified
under Hindu law. Thus when a mother and her minor son
. . . . 3constitute a joint Hindu family , each with a moiety of
the undivided interest in the house belonging to the 
family, the mother cannot alienate the minor's interest 
in the house in any case. It presents a peculir situation 
under which the mother can neither sell as manager, as she
4
cannot be a manager because of her being a non-coparcener , 
nor can she sell as natural guardian because the court, 
other than the Original side of certain High Courts, has 
no jurisdiction over the undivided interest of a minor
1 Sugqa Bai v. Smt. Hiralal AIR 1969 MP 32.
2 AIR 1961 Guj 68, 72.
3 Buddanna v. Commissioner of I.T., Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1523.
4 Commissioner of I.T. v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills AIR 1966 
SC 24.
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and consequently cannot give her permission for sale. This
situation occures only in cases where the mother and not
the father acts as natural guardian of minors. Faced with
such a problem R.N. Misra, J., in Sunamani Dei v. Baba 1i
Das1 without showing any regard to the Supreme Court decision
2in Commissioner of I.T. v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills
treated the mother as if she were a manager and determined
the validity of her transfer of the minor's interest in
joint family property by the principles of Hindu law. In
3
Venkataramanamurthy v. Subbayyamma Ekbote, J., missed the 
point for his conscious persistence to see the mother as 
natural guardian and not in any other character. The learned 
judge rightly pointed out that the provisions of the HMGA 
did not apply where the mother acting as the natural 
guardian of her minor sons sold the undivided interests 
of the minors in a joint family property; but he erred 
when he said that the mother as natural guardian could sell 
the undivided interests of her minor sons in the joint 
family property if she acted in the interest of the minors 
and for their benefit. How could she do it when the court 
cannot give her permission to sell, nor she can act as 
manager, and when, as the learned judge said, section 11 of 
the HMGA has no application?
For a fair solution of such a problem either the Indian 
Parliament should come forward with an amendment of section 6
1 AIR 1974 Ori 184.
2 AIR 1966 SC 24.
3 (1966) 1 An WR 368.
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or 8(2), or the Indian Supreme Court should overrule 
its own decision by treating such a woman as manager, an 
idea propounded by a writer of learning1.
3.2. Purchase by natural guardians under the HMGA
The word ’purchase* has not occured in section 8 of
the HMGA. Therefore, the courts think that the natural
guardians do not require the permission of the court when
they purchase any property for the minors. In Radheshyam v.
2Kiran. Bala it was held that for the purchase of a property 
for a minor no permission of the court was necessary? and 
where a guardian purchased property for the minor the minor 
would be bound by that purchase unless it bound the minor 
personally or imposed a personal liability on the minor.
The same view is also expressed by the courts in respect
of contracts for purchase, and the Anglo-Hindu law is
, . ,3 4applied . in Lingo Reddv v. Ramchandrappa Malimath, J.,
observed that since purchase did not come within section 
8(2), the natural guardian was not required to obtain
previous permission of the court to enter into a contract 
of purchase of immovable property provided the conditions 
specified in section 8(1) were satisfied. Bhave, J., in
5
Ramchandra *s case is not correct when he believes 
that no contracts of natural guardians, whether for sale
1 Derrett, *May a Hindu woman be the manager of joint family 
at Mitakshara law?* in (1966) 68 Bom LR (Jour). 1-11?
the same, Critique, 117-121 paras 149-153.
2 AIR 1971 Cal 341.
3 Derrett, *A Hindu law miscellancy, 1971* in (1971) 73 
Bom LR (Jour), 78-83, 79.
4 (1971) 1 Mys LJ 159.
5 AIR 1968 MP 150, 155.
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or purchase of property, can be enforced if no permission 
of the court is obtained. In Than Sincrh v. Barelal1 a 
contract for purchase of some agricultural lands and a 
house was entered into by the father of a minor. The trial 
court raised the question inter alia whether the father- 
guardian had obtained permission from the court for acquir­
ing the property for the benefit of the minor, and dismissed
the suit for the absence of any such permission. But on
appeal the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that there was 
no necessity for permission in the case of purchase where
the purchase was for the benefit of the minor. Oza, J.,
who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench, said 
that there was no such law where such permission was necessary 
when a father-guardian acquired property for his minor son's
benefit. In Golconda Industries Private Ltd. v. Registrar 
2of Companies the question arose whether a guardian could 
bind the minor by a contract for the purchase of shares.
The facts show that the appellant company allotted a number 
of shares to certain persons including some minors. The 
Registrar declined to register the return submitted by the 
company for the inclusion of minors as shareholders. The 
company claimed that the minors were given shares because 
the contracts were entered into by their guardians. The 
counsel for the appellant company argued on the authority 
of the Privy Council decision in Subrahmanyam*s case that
1 AIR 1974 MP 24.
2 AIR 1966 Delhi 170, 172 (FB).
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guardians could enter into contracts on behalf of their 
minors if the contracts so made were (l) within the competence 
of the guardians, and (2) for the benefit of the minors.
He also drew further support for his argument from section 
8(1) of the HMGA which empowers the guardians to do all 
acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the 
benefit of the minor or for realisation, protection or benefit 
of the minor's estate. The respondent's counsel argued that 
section 8(1) of the HMGA did not allow guardians to bind 
the minors in any case by a personal covenant; therefore 
allotment of shares to the minors through their guardians' 
contract was beyond the powers of guardians. Kapur, J., 
in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench abstained 
from expressing any opinion on the question. It may, however, 
be said that the respondent's counsel's argument is more 
convincing on the ground that guardians were not competent 
to bind the minors with any personal liability, even though 
the shares were for the benefit of the minors. The question 
would have been a little different if the purchase was of 
fully paid shares or stocks and if they were for the minors' 
benefit, as there would have been no personal liability 
on the minors. But that too was dependent on whether the 
guardians were competent to invest minors' money in such 
securities. In the case of trustees the court does not 
allow them to invest , in the absence of any special 
investment clause in the instrument of trust, in any 
securities other than those mentioned in section 20 of the
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Trusts Act of 1882. If the personal liability of the minors 
is considered in the light of the Federal decision in 
Sriramulu's case or the Privy Council decision in Waghela 
Ra isanji *s case it can be said that the guardians could not 
bind the minors by such contract for the purchase of shares.
254
C H A P T E R  III
ALIENATION BY DE FACTO AND TESTAMENTARY GUARDIANS UNDER 
HINDU LAW
1 De facto guardianship
1. 1 Who is a de facto guardian?
Derrett says that a de facto guardian is a "major
who takes a continuous interest in the welfare of the
minor and handles his property without any authority of
law --- in fact he or she is self-appointed”3'. Marten,
2C . J ., thought m  Hanla1 Ranchhod v • Gordhan Keshave 
that before a person could be described as a de facto 
guardian there must be some course of conduct in that 
capacity. In the same case Crump, J., considered him 
to be a person who being neither a legal guardian nor 
a guardian appointed by court assumed the management of 
the property of a minor as though he was a guardian, and 
agreed with Marten, C.J., by observing that the term 
'de facto* implied 'some continuity of conduct, some 
management of the property' beyond the isolated act of 
sale that came to be questioned in a particular suit.
3Wadsworth, J., observed in Hanumavamma v. Lakshmidevamma 
that the term 'de facto* literally meant 'from that 
which has been done' and that this 'basic conception
1 Derrett, Critique. 174 para 224.
2 AIR 1927 Bom 611.
3 AIR 1938 Mad 950.
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of past acts resulting in a present status * led to hold 
that a person became a de facto guardian as a result of 
a course of conduct. In China Alagum Perumal v. Vinava- 
qathammal1 Devadoss and Mackay, JJ., observedi
"A de facto guardian is one who looks after the 
property of the minor and generally acts in his 
interests for the time being. A fugitive or 
an isolated act of a person with regard to the 
minor's property would not make him a de facto 
guardian of the minor, nor would staying with 
a minor for a time make him a de facto guardian. 
There must be a continuous course of conduct 
as guardian of a minor in regard to his property 
in order to enable one to become a de facto 
guardian. The length of the period required to 
constitute one a de facto guardian would depend 
upon the circumstances of each case. The first 
act of intermeddling with the estate of a minor 
would not be the act of a de facto guardian, if 
he had not become one before the act, nor would
the subsequent management of the estate of the
minor by such person make the first act, which 
is one of alienation, the act of a de facto 
guardian".
The observation of the learned judges in China 
Alagum*s case shows that even though a person acts conti­
nuously as a guardian his first act would not be considered 
as that of a de facto guardian. If this situation is recog­
nised, if the position of a de facto guardian rests only 
on acts of intermeddling, and if it is a position which 
has only to be built up by a series of acts, the first
of those acts would, by itself, not be an act of a person
who was already in the position of a de facto guardian 
before that act was done. And a de facto guardian would 
be a person who is already a guardian owing to something
1 AIR 1929 Mad 110.
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which has happened previously; and to hold otherwise would 
be tantamount to admitting that a person buying property 
from a minor's estate or paying debts to the minor's 
estate can recognise anybody he likes with impunity as 
the guardian, provided that the person comes to be recog­
nised as the guardian de facto of the minor subsequently. 
But there are obvious difficulties in the way of the 
application of the above statement of a rule of law mainly 
because there may be circumstances in which the first 
formal act of the de facto guardian would be one which 
the court might rightly recognise as binding on the minor, 
for example, a case in which the position of the de facto 
guardian has been recognised in the family before any 
intermeddling act of a formal nature affecting the minor 
has been accomplished. The question should therefore be 
whether in the eye of the family of the minor and those 
interested in the welfare of the minor, the person who 
makes an alienation or receives a payment is, at the time 
of the transaction impeached, regarded by common consent 
as the person who is entitled to act on behalf of the 
minor. If there is such recognition, then once the person 
recognised has consented to act as guardian, it would 
not be necessary to wait for a series of transactions in 
the capacity of a guardian to clothe that person with 
authority to represent that estate1. If the intermeddler
1 Hanumavamma v. Lakshmidevamma AIR 1938 Mad 950, 952.
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is a self-constituted guardian who comes into being for 
the purpose of carrying out an isolated transaction, and 
if that transaction is of a very doubtful advantage to 
the minor's estate, then there could be no such general 
recognition of that guardian as would clothe him with 
authority and there could be no such course of conduct 
as would supplement the general recognition. Indeed, the 
question is essentially one of fact.
In Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya1 Kania, C.J., 
observed*
"In law there is nothing like a de facto guardian. 
There can only be a de facto manager, although 
the expression 'de facto guardian' has been 
used in text books and some judgments of courts".
In the same case Mahajan, J., observed that the
phrase 'de facto guardian' was a loose phraseology for
the expression 'de facto manager' used in Hunoomanpersaud's
case, and that this phrase was not known to any text of
Hindu law. The learned judge drew a distinction between
a de facto guardian and an intermeddler by bringing under
the former only the relations of a minor and under the
, 2latter, his friends when it is said *
"It (the phrase de facto guardian) aptly describes 
the relations and friends who are interested 
in the minor and who for love and affection to 
him assume superintendence over his estate. A 
father may not necessarily be the guardian of 
an illegitimate child, but his de facto guardian­
ship cannot be repudiated. Such is the case of 
the natural father of an adopted son, ... A 
person who is not attached to the minor by ties
1 AIR"1<T49 FC 218, 221.'
2 Ibid, 251.
258
of affection or other reasons of affinity and 
remains in charge of his estate is in truth 
a mere intermeddler with his estate".
The learned judge, however, prescribed that in order 
to come within the scope of the rule in Hunoomanpersaud * s 
case it was necessary that a de facto guardian must have 
a course of conduct in the capacity of a manager.
Mukherjea, J., in Sriramulu's case beautifully 
summarised the status and the legal competency of a de 
facto guardian when he observed*’!
"It is scarcely possible to define the circums­
tances under which a man could be regarded as 
a de facto guardian with regard to the proper­
ties of a minor. Existence of near relationship 
between such person and the infant cannot be 
insisted upon as a matter of law; nor can the 
courts scan minutely the motives which actuated 
him in assuming the responsibilities of manage­
ment except so far as such motives are manifested 
by outward acts. It cannot be said also for 
what period of time he must act as manager before 
a person can be recognised as a de facto manager 
or guardian of a minor's estate. Undoubtedly, 
law should never encourage an officious inter­
meddling with the estate of a minor and if Hindu 
law has given a legal recognition to the de facto 
guardian, it has given it only in the interests 
of the minor himself. As the law stands at present, 
if a person is not what is called an 'ad hoc* 
guardian and does not pose as a guardian for a 
particular transaction only but is found to be 
managing the property of an infant in the same 
way as a de jure guardian would, he could be 
described as a de facto guardian, although he 
is neither a natural guardian nor a guardian 
appointed by court".
Viswanatha Sastri, J., expressing the impossibility 
of setting any definite rule according to which a person
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 233.
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could be recognised as a de facto guardian observed in 
Palaniappa Goundan v. Nallappa Goundan i^
"It would be difficult to say as to whether a 
person who posed as a guardian in respect of 
a particular transaction affecting the minor's 
estate was a guardian ad hoc, or a guardian 
'de facto'* It is not possible to fix any 
period of time during which a person must 
have managed a minor's estate before he can 
be recognised as 'de facto' guardian or 
manager. Nor is it possible to formulate any 
precise course of conduct in reference to 
the management of the minor's estate as being 
necessary to create a 'de facto' guardianship. 
The leasing out of the properties of the minor, 
the collection of rents and profits, the pay­
ment of Government revenue, the maintenance 
of the minor, the discharge of debts binding 
on the estate and similar acts spread over a 
substantial period of time might constitute 
the manager of the minor's estate a 'de facto* 
guardian. ... But no definite rule can be laid 
down as to what acts constitute 'de facto' 
guardianship"•
2In Palani Goundan v. Vamiakkal Ramaswami, J., 
sitting with Govinda Menon, J., said that a de facto 
guardian was one who was not a legal guardian in the 
sense that he was either a natural or a testamentary 
or a certificated guardian, but who being interested 
in the minor, though a stranger, took charge of the 
management of the minor's property, and that in order 
to enable one to become a de facto guardian, there must 
be a continuous course of conduct as guardian of the 
minor in regard to the latter's property; the length 
of the period required to constitute one a de facto
1 AIR 1951 Mad 817, 819.
2 AIR 1956 Mad 476.
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guardian was dependent upon the circumstances of each 
case. It was considered by the learned judge that the 
first act of intermeddling with a minor's estate would 
not be the act of a de facto guardian, unless he had 
become such a guardian before that act, and that the 
subsequent management of the minor's estate by him 
would not make the first act which could be one of 
alienation of the minor's property, an act of a de 
facto guardian. This complete exclusion of a de facto 
guardian's first act from being considered as an act 
of a de facto guardian cannot be agreed with. As we 
have said earlier there may be circumstances in which 
the courts would be right to recognise the first act 
of a de facto guardian as binding on the minor. If 
before effecting his first intermeddling transaction 
a person is recognised as a de facto guardian by the 
common consent of the minor's family or of those 
interested in the minor's welfare, there is little 
reason why it would not be considered as the act of a 
de facto guardian. In delivering the judgment of a 
Division Bench in Baiamoni Debi v. Paramoni Debi1 
Das, J., rightly observed that once a person was found 
on the facts and in the circumstances to be a de facto 
guardian, he must be taken to have been a de facto 
guardian right from the commencement itself; the acts
1 (1956) Cut 362, 365-66.
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relating to the commencement period should not be 
isolated and treated as being without authority.
In the case of a family settlement and a partition 
arrangement, distinguished from an act of alienation 
or act of borrowing, Ramamurti, J., said in Govindaswamy 
v. Sakunthala  ^that it was not necessary that the de facto 
guardian of a minor should have managed the property of 
the minor for a continuous period of time; the validity 
or binding effect of his act in such cases would have 
to be judged with reference to the particular facts of 
the case and the setting and background in which they 
were entered into.
A de facto guardian is, therefore, a person who
2is not a legal guardian , or who does not come under
any of the categories given in section 4 of the HMGA,
but who takes charge of the properties or affairs of 
3a minor • Section 4 of the HMGA providesi
"In this Act,--
(a ) ..........
(b) 'guardian' means a person having the 
care of the person of a minor or of his 
property or of both his person and property, 
and includes --
(i) a natural guardian;
(ii) a guardian appointed by the will of 
of the minor's father or mother;
(iii) a guardian appointed or declared 
by a court; and
(iv) a person empowered to act as such 
by or under any enactment relating to 
any court of wards;
1 (1966) 2 Mad 414.
2 Ra ialashmi v. Ramachandran (1966) 2 MLJ 420, 423.
3 Narain Singh v. Sapurna Kuer AIR 1968 Pat 318.
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(c) 'natural guardian' means any of the 
guardians mentioned in section 6"•
Section 6 states*
"The natural guardians of a Hindu minor, in 
respect of the minor's person as well as in 
respect of the minor's property (excluding 
his or her undivided interest in joint-family 
property), are --
(a) in the case of a boy or unmarried girl
  the father, and after him, the mother*
provided that the custody of a minor who 
has not completed the age of five years 
shall ordinarily be with the mother?
(b) in the case of an illegitimate unmarried
girl --  the mother, and after her, the
father;
(c) in the case of a married girl --  the
husband *
Provided that no person shall be entitled to 
act as the natural guardian of a minor under 
the provisions of this section --
(a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or
(b) if he has completely and finally 
renounced the world by becoming a hermit 
(vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or 
sanyasi).
Explanation* In this section, the expressions 
'father' and 'mother' do not include a step­
father and a step-mother.
Previously under section 4(2) of the GWA the expression 
'guardian' was used to include within its meaning all 
classes of guardians. Thus as it was applied to include 
natural, testamentary and court appointed guardians1 so also
1 Dayabhai v. Bai Parvati (1915) 39 Bom 438* Dip Chand v. 
Munni Lai (1929) 52 All 110, 113? Damodar Das v. Mst.
Jatti (1927) 8 Lah 306? Noshirwan v. Sharoshbanu (1934)
58 Bom 724, 728? Deputy Commissioner v. Nawab (1935)
10 Luck 141, 148? Jeeban Krishna v. Sailendra Nath (1946) 
Mad351^ 357 Ba iara ]eswan v. Sankaranaravana (1948)
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to include de facto guardians1. And as seen from the 
above sections the HMGA does not say anything about a
de facto guardian. Obviously under section 2 of the HMGA
the previous connotation of the word ’guardian* as developed 
under the GWA could be imported, and a de facto guardian 
would be included under section 4(b) of the HMGA.
Regarding the appointment of a de facto guardian 
2
Derrett says i
"There is no positive obligation upon a de facto
guardian to seek appointment by the court and
most such guardians function in cases where the 
expenses of seeking appointment are not justified 
by the size of the minor's estate".
But he rightly suspected that "where a well-to-do 
minor's affairs are managed by a de facto guardian who 
does not seek appointment there are grounds for suspicion 
that his motives are not disinterested, as a guardian's 
must be".
Under Hindu law a stepmother, brother, uncle and
all relations other than father, mother or husband may
3act as de facto guardians , if they voluntarily place 
themselves in charge of the person or property of the 
minor. Sometimes a minor may have a de facto guardian 
for the disposition of his property, even when the natural,
1 Sitha Bai v. Radha Bai AIR 1919 Mad 189; Prem Kaur v.
Banarsi Das (1934) 15 Lah 630, 636; Great American Insurance 
Co. Ltd. v. Madanlal (1935) 59 Bom 656, 662; Abaii Ganesh
v. Damodar AIR 1938 Nag 399; Kailash Chandra v. Ra iani 
Kanta AIR 1945 Pat 298.
2 Introduction, 84 para 109.
3 Thayammal v. Kuppana Koundan (1914) 27 MLJ 285.
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testamentary or court appointed guardian exists but the
latter neglects the interest of the minor at the material 
1times .
In justifying the position of a de facto manager
Kania, C.J., said in Sriramulu*s case that a Hindu de facto
managership was a solution by the law out of two different
situations. First, when a Hindu minor had no legal guardian
there would be no one who could handle and manage his
estate lawfully, therefore, unless someone was deemed to
have such authority, the minor would not receive any income
or returns from his estates. Secondly, a person having no
title could not be permitted to intermeddle with the minor's
estate so as to cause a loss to the minor. The learned
Chief Justice stated further that this solution was of
. 2universal application when he said i
"Minors of all communities and everywhere have 
to face these difficulties. There appears to me 
no justification for treating the minors of 
different communities on different principles 
for the safety of the minor's estate, unless 
the personal law of the minor justified such 
a distinction".
The earliest case in which the position and power 
of a de facto guardian are acknowledged in Hindu law is 
the well-known Hunoomanpersaud's case on which subsequently 
innumerable decisions are based. Their Lordships of the
1 Mavilswami Chettiar v. Kaliammal (1969) 1 MLJ 177.
2 AIR 1949 FC 218, 222.
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Privy Council observed in that case1*
"It is to be observed that under the Hinoo law, 
the right of a bona fide incumbrancer who has 
taken from a de facto Manager a charge on lands 
created honestly, for the purpose of saving 
the estate, or for the benefit of the estate, 
is not (provided the circumstances would support 
the charge had it emanated from a de facto and 
de jure manager) affected by the want of union 
of the de facto, with the de jure title" •
2Mahajan, J., observed in Snramulu 's case that the
rule laid down in Hunoomanpersaud * s case regarding the
powers of a de facto manager of a minor's estate was
based on Hindu system of jurisprudence, and that the
rule had application to cases of both relations and
friends who assumed management of the minor's property
and who had some connection with the family, and did
not apply to utter strangers and intruders. The acts of
necessity performed by such relations and friends to
safeguard the minor's estate were binding on the minor's
3estate. It was pointed out that if such persons to
4
whom the law including the statute showed preference 
in the matter of appointment of guardianship without 
formally getting themselves appointed by the court, 
assumed out of affection charge of the estate of a minor 
and took upon themselves management of it, paid the 
revenues, realised rents, located tenants, maintained
1 (1856) 6 MIA 393, 412.
2 AIR 1949 FC 218, 251-53.
3 For example, natural father of an adopted son. In 
Krishnamurthi v. Krishnamurthi AIR 1927 PC 139 the 
natural father of an adopted minor son acted as de facto 
guardian and entered into an agreement on the minor's 
behalf•
4 Section 19(b), GWA, 1890.
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the minor and did all other acts of management and the 
courts and other relations stood by and recognised them 
as such, they should not be treated as officious inter­
meddlers with the estate. The learned judge posed the 
question* "Can they not be aptly and appositely described 
as de facto guardians of minor*s person and de facto 
managers of his estate?", and then observed that it was 
the position of such managers that was recognised in 
Hunoomanpersaud*s case, and their acts in the management 
of the estate, provided they were for the protection of 
the estate or for the benefit of the minor's estate, 
were recognised as valid, the test being necessity 
and not the authority that they possessed1. Mukherjea, J.,
very tersely put the law of de facto guardianship in a
. 2single sentence when he said *
"The de facto guardianship is essentially a 
creature of necessity and he could claim no 
legal recognition beyond what necessity actually 
warrants"•
3
Derrett also says *
"The want of an appointment was not considered, 
in the celebrated leading case of Hunoomanpersaud. 
to have any bearing on the binding character 
of his or her acts, if the circumstances justified 
them"•
1.2. Sastric basis of de facto guardianship
Although the specific phrase 'de facto guardian* 
is not known to any text of Hindu law, there are certain
1 Emphasis is mine.
2 Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshavva AIR 1949 FC 218, 233.
3 Critique, 174 para 224; see also the same Appendix II, 
425-432.
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sastric texts which empower a person other than a father,
mother or husband, in other words persons other than
legal guardians, to alienate a family property in which
minors may have interests. As we have said earlier,
verses 27 to 29 of the Mitakshara contain the law relating
to the alienation of joint family property by the father,
and these verses excluding verse 27 but including verse
30 were referred to during arguments in Hunoomanpersaud * s
case* and they have been considered ever since the decision
in that Privy Council case to be the basis of the law of
2alienation by minors' guardians . Verse 27 states that 
the father of a joint family consisting of his minor sons 
has an independent power of disposal of family effects 
other than immovable property for indispensable acts of 
duty and for purposes prescribed by the text of Hindu 
law, such as gift of affection, support of the family, 
relief from distress and so forth; but he has no such 
independent power to dispose of the immovable estate of 
the family, whether acquired by himself or inherited 
from his father or other predecessor, he can dispose of 
such property by gift or sale only with the consent of 
all the sons. Verse 28 contains the text of Brihaspati 
which provides an exception to the above inhibition 
against the disposal of immovable joint family property;
1 Authorities cited before their Lordships are listed at 
page 407 of the judgment. In Benares Bank's case AIR 19 32 PC 
182 Sir Dinsha Mulla stated that verses 27 to 29 were 
relied on in Hunoomanpersaud's case, and in Sriramulu's 
case Hahajan, J., said that those verses plus verse 30
were referred to in the argument before the Privy Council; 
but the report of the judgment shows that only verses 
28 to 30 were referred to. See page 407 of the judgment.
2 Benares Bank's case AIR 1932 PC 182, 185; Sriramulu's 
case AIR 1949 FC 218, 236 per Mukherjea, J.
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and verse 29 gives the meaning of that exception. According 
to that meaning when the sons and grandsons, or unseparated 
brothers are minor and incapable of giving their consent 
to alienation of immovable joint family property, even 
one person who is capable, i.e., either the father or a 
capable brother, may conclude a gift, mortgage or sale 
of that property if a calamity affecting the whole family 
requires it, or the support of the family renders it 
necessary, or indispensable duties, such as the obsequies 
of the father or the like, makes it unavoidable. Verse 30 
provides that among unseparated kinsmen, the consent of 
all is indispensably requisite to make a gift, sale or 
mortgage, but it is not required when there is a single 
owner or the kinsmen are separated where a valid transaction 
can be effected without any consent.
All the verses contain the law relating to the 
disposition of joint property of a family wherein some 
of the members or coparceners may be minors and consequently 
incapable of giving consent to an alienation of the 
family property, but the managing member of the family 
who can effectively dispose of the family property if 
any of the emergent situations arises, is not a stranger 
or a person having no interest in the family property.
It is difficult to agree with Mahajan, J., in Sriramulu*s 
case when he observes^*
’’These quotations (i.e., verses from 27 to 30) 
from Mitakshara are authority for the proposition
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 249.
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that under the Hindu system even persons having 
no lawful authority can effect sale and mortgages 
and gifts of property belonging to others in 
certain emergent situations. This kind of power 
is wholly unknown in other systems of jurisprudence".
The proposition that under the Hindu system persons 
having no lawful authority can effect sale, mortgage and 
gift of property belonging to others in emergent situations 
can hardly be corroborated by the contents of those verses.
The property dealt with in those verses being joint none 
of the coparceners has any individual property in it until 
it is partitioned by metes and bounds1, and the father or 
where the members are brothers, a brother alienates the 
interests of the minor sons, grandsons or brothers, as the 
case may be, in that property as the managing member of 
the family. In such cases consent of incapable members 
is presumed and law imputes authority in the alienating 
coparcener. They a^e not cases of alienations without 
authority. Moreover, as Strange points out , the power 
of alienation and the order of preference in the alienation 
of movable and immovable property as contained in the 
verses are "precisely the insinuation of the Roman law, 
in the case of an inofficious testament". Even verse 30 
does not indicate that a separated or unseparated kinsman 
disposes of the interest of other members including the 
minor coparceners of the family, it implies that the 
alienor transfers or alienates his own share or interest 
in the property.
1 Derrett. Introduction, 322 para 623 ? Phoolchand“v.
Gonal Lai AIR 1967 SC 1470 per Wanchoo, J.; Puttranaamma v.
Ranganna AIR 1968 SC 1018.
2 Hindu law Vol. 1 (1830 ed.), 19.
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However, the following sastric texts provide that 
in extreme cases of emergency a person, either a member 
or a dependant anyway connected with the family, may 
incur a debt for family necessity and the family head 
would be bound by the contract for that debt*
“When a debt has been incurred, for the benefit 
of the household, by an uncle, brother, son, 
wife, slave, pupil, or dependant, it must be 
paid by the head of the family” •
(Bri. XI. 50; SBE Vol. 33, 329)
“Should even a dependant effect a transaction
for the benefit of the family --  in the absence
of his master, for the maintenance of the
family --  whether in his own country or abroad,
the superior --- viz., the master of the dependant
  should not question it”.
(Manu VIII. 167; Derrett, Bharuci Vol. 2, 146)
“Such debts of a son as have been contracted 
by him by his father's order, or for the maintenance 
of the family, or in a precarious situation, 
must be paid by the father”.
(Nar. I. 11; SBE Vol. 33, 45)
“What has been spent for the household by a 
pupil, apprentice, slave, woman, menial, or 
agent, must be paid by the head of the household”. 
(Nar. I. 12; SBE Vol. 33, 45)
“(A debt of which payment has been previously) 
promised must be paid by the householder; 
(Vis. VI. 38; SBE Vol. 7, 45)
"And (so must he pay that debt) which was contracted 
by any person for the behoof of the family”.
(Vis. VI. 39; SBE Vol. 7, 45-46)
"A debt incurred for the (purposes of the) family 
by the slaves, the wife, the mother, the pupil 
or the son (of the head of the family) even 
without his consent when he is gone abroad should 
be paid (by the head of the family).
This is (the view of) Bhrgu.
(Katya* 545; Kane, Katyayansmrti, 226)
The above texts clearly show that a debt could be 
contracted besides the managing member of a family by an
unauthorised person in circumstances of distress and 
calamity or for emergencies or for maintenance of family 
or for meeting the expenses of a marriage, but the un­
authorised persons are in no way wholly strangers. They 
are connected with the family and interested in its welfare. 
The extent of authority of a guardian either de jure or 
de facto over the property of a minor had not been a 
specific subject of discussion by any of the Hindu smrti 
writers. It is, however, clear from the above texts that 
the sastric Hindu law did recognise the rights of a de facto 
manager of the family and even of an individual member who 
was not in the position of a manager to alienate family 
property or to contract debts in times of distress or to 
meet family necessities. The idea apparently is that the 
necessity itself creates authority in the person who 
otherwise would have no authority to alienate a property 
belonging to the family or to contract debts on its behalf.
A sort of implied agency is recognised throughout the above 
texts. The rule of section 68 of the Contract Act (Act 9) 
of 1872 is in conformity with these texts, but probably 
the texts have a wider scope than the principle enacted 
in the section. Under the texts a principal becomes liable 
for the debts contracted by a number of unauthorised 
persons during his absence or when he was disabled, imprisoned 
or afflicted with disease; even a father is liable to pay 
the debts of his son contracted for the support of his 
family or in time of distress.
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As said earlier the sastric Hindu law maintained
a difference between ancestral debts and personal debts,
i.e., debts incurred for the minor's personal and family
necessity and for the benefit of his estate, in other
words, debts covered by the principle of section 68 of
the Contract Act. A minor, so too his guardian, was
not expected to pay the former, but he or his guardian
had to pay the latter. When a man died involved in debts
and was survived by two minor sons and there was no
adult representative of the deceased, the creditors
could not bring an action against the minor sons for
the realisation of their ancestral debts before one of
them attained majority. It was only at the expiration of
the term of minority the son or sons of a deceased were
bound to discharge the obligations of their ancestor1;
and in no circumstances were the minors answerable for
such obligation during their minority, since they could
not exercise any power over the patrimony until they 
2came of age . So long as minority of sons continued the 
property left by a deceased could not be sold for the 
liquidation of any debt which the deceased might have
3
contracted . When, however, a mother borrowed money to
meet the necessary expenses of her minor son she could
execute a bond in favour of the creditor for the debt in
4the name of her son , and the bond was binding on the
1 Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 2, 287-288 case 11.
2 Ibid, 277 case 1.
3 Ibid, 288 f.n.; see also the same Hindu law Vol. 1, 110.
4 Ibid, 289 case 13.
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minor. She could also effect a sale of her minor son's
ancestral immovable property for the purpose of maintaining
her son and liquidating the arrears of revenue due to the
government1, or simply for the purpose of procuring the
2necessaries of life •
None of the sastric texts quoted above was referred
3
to before the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud's case .
Their Lordships referred only to Colebrooke's translation
of Jagannatha's Digest Vol. 1, 302 and Gopee Churun Burra1
. 4v. Mussummat Ishwuree Lukhee Dibia in considering the
binding effects of ancestral debts on the minor and his
estate. That page of the Digest Vol. 1 contains two verses
  one by Katyayana and the other by Narada. Their Lordships
indicated that even if the charge in that case was taken
not to have been created by the minor's mother as guardian,
the minor would still be liable according to the principles
contained in those two verses and the ratio of the alleged
case. Their Lordships looked into the liability of the
descendants to pay the debts of their ancestors, but they
did not take into consideration that such liability was 
. . 5a qualified one . Such debts are not required to be paid 
immediately; only debts which are contracted for the support
1 Macnaghten, Hindu law Voll 2^  294 case 2.
2 Ibid, 310 case 19.
3 In Sriramulu*s case Mahajan, J,, observed that reference
was made in the Privy Council decision to Jagannatha's Digest 
Vol. 1 verses 189 to 193 wherein some of these verses are 
annotated. But the verses mentioned by the learned judge are 
contained in pages 293 to 296, while the oply reference made 
to that volume of the Digest in the whole judgment is page 302
[see page 413 of (18561 6 MIA 393J and at page 407 of the
report where the authorities cited before their Lordships are 
listed reference is made to Jagannatha's Digest Vol. 2, pages 
265, 270, 284, 319 wherein none of these verses could be seen.
4 (1821) 3 Sel• Rep SDA 124 (NE).
5 Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 446, 450.
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of the family are expected to be paid without any delay1.
2
Katyayana says i
"A debt incurred by the father, if he is afflicted 
with disease or has gone abroad, shall be paid 
by the sons after the twentieth year, even when 
the father is living”.
3
Narada says i
"The father, uncle, or eldest brother having gone 
abroad, the son, (or nephew, or younger brother) 
is not bound to pay his debt before the lapse of 
twenty years".
4
Vishnu says *
"If he who contracted the debt should die, or 
become a religious ascetic, or remain abroad 
for twenty years, that debt shall be discharged 
by his sons or grandsons".
Again, a minor need not pay his ancestral debts during 
his minority but when the proper time to pay comes, i.e., after
the attainment of majority, he must pay the debt, otherwise
5 6his ancestors may remain m  hell . Katyayana says i
"(A son need) never pay (the debt of his father) 
when the father is dead, if he (the son) has not 
attained years of discretion. But when the proper 
time (to pay the debt) comes, he must pay according 
to the law, otherwise his forefathers may remain 
in hell. (Katya. 552)
"If (a son) has not reached (years of) discretion, 
he, though independent, is not liable for the 
debt (of the father). (Real) independence is 
understood to belong to one who is senior and 
seniority is due to the (attainment of) certain 
qualities and age". (Katya. 553)
Sastric law suspended the liability of a minor for 
his ancestral debts. The minor was under no obligation to
1 See Jagannatha*s comments on verse 181 in Digest Vol. 1, 284-85.
2 Katya. 548; Kane, Katyavansmrti, 227.
3 Nar. I. 4; SBE Vol. 33, 46.
4 Vis. VI. 27; SBE Vol. 7, 44-45.
5 Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 446.
6 Kane, Katvavansmrti, 227-28.
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pay his ancestors' debts till he attained the age of 
majority; and no one was allowed to pay them on the 
minor's behalf out of the minor's property, since a 
minor's estate should be protected until he reached the 
age of maturity1.
In Gopee Churun Burra1 v. Mussummat Ishwuree Lukhee
. 2Dibia it was held that where money was borrowed to 
discharge bona fide arrears of government revenue by 
a person erroneously registered as proprietor of an estate, 
the rightful proprietor on coming into possession was 
liable for the debt. Opinion of the pundits was sought 
in this case, and they were of the opinion that under 
Hindu law the rightful owner of an estate was liable 
for the payment of debts incurred to discharge government 
revenue, though an unauthorised person had contracted 
them to protect the estate from sequestration. Relying 
on this decision their Lordships in Hunoomanpersaud's case 
upheld the view that a person unauthorised but in the 
management of the minor's estate could incur debts and 
the real proprietor would be bound by them if they were 
incurred for the benefit or protection of the estate.
From the sastric texts and the earlier relevant
cases mentioned in Macnaghten's Principles and Precedents 
3of Hindoo law and the one just referred to above it can
1 Manu VIII. 27.
2 (1821) 3 Sel. Rep. SDA 124 (NE).
3 Vol. 2 (1828 ed.).
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be deduced that a person not having full powers of disposition 
and not being fully authorised could in certain circumstances 
transfer property and confer an absolute and indefensible 
title on the purchaser though he himself did not possess 
that title. Wherever money had been taken or an act had 
been done which had benefited the real owner of an estate, 
that loan or act could not be repudiated merely on the 
technical ground of want of authority in the person taking 
the loan or doing the act. The principle was that if the 
estate of a person, whether a minor or absentee or a joint 
proprietor, had been benefited by the act of a person who 
did not hold proper authority but who was in the management 
of the estate, then that act should be respected by the 
true owner and not repudiated merely on the ground of want 
of authority. Indeed, it was the necessity and not the 
authority of the alienor that used to decide the validity 
of an alienation. De facto guardianship is not therefore 
a concept foreign to sastric Hindu law, but the visualisation 
by the Anglo-Hindu law of a de facto guardian's authority 
to pay the ancestral debts of a minor is undoubtedly 
something foreign to it. Mahajan, J., in Sriramulu*s case^ 
observed*
"The decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case is in 
accord with the spirit of Hindu jurisprudence 
qua payment of debts incurred in certain emergent 
situations or in regard to alienations of immovable 
property effected in similar circumstances".
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 250.
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The observation of the learned judge of the Federal 
Court would have been a right step towards the revival of 
sastric Hindu law if by the words *payment of debts incurred 
in certain emergent situations' he meant only the personal 
debts which include debts for the necessity of the minor 
and his family, and debts for the benefit of his estate, 
and not his ancestral debts; and we could consider the 
Privy Council decision overruled to the extent that it 
had included in it the authority to transfer a minor's 
property by a guardian for the minor's ancestral debts.
It is doubtful whether the learned judge meant what the 
language of the above quotation implies, because through­
out his judgment he did not refer to the important difference 
between the liability for the payment of personal debts 
and that of ancestral debts of a minor. If the decision 
in Hunoomanpersaud's case was implied to be in accord with 
the spirit of Hindu,jurisprudence,-then the observation is 
not fully true, since, we have seen above, the Privy Council 
decision accommodated extraneous principles in Hindu 
jurisprudence,
1,3. Derrett on Hunoomanpersaud*s case
Derrett has challenged everyone to find the sources 
of the dual proposition propounded by Knight Bruce, L.J., 
in Hunoomanpersaud's case, viz., that (i) the manager's 
power to charge the minor's estate 'in case of need, or 
for the benefit of the estate', and (ii) a power analogous
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to that of a prudent owner in order to benefit the estate 
are both capable of exercise in relation to a minor, 
needless to say without the court's consent and irrespective 
of the actual cause of the transaction, the last so far as 
the lender is concerned . At his Critique1 he suggests 
that no source for this rule can be found, and though, at 
page 427 f.n. 4, he suggests that Macnaghten's Hindu law 
must have been before the Privy Council, he insists that 
Macnaghten himself did not believe that a minor's property 
could be sold or mortgaged to pay debts, and cites several 
vyavasthas of pundits which certainly appear to negative 
any such powers by a widowed mother.
However, there are certain other authorities not 
cited by Derrett, the significance of which requires to 
be assessed before we can conclude that his ultimate conjec­
ture of the negotiorum qestio is right, attractive as it
might seem at first sight. In Doe dem Bissonaut Putt v.
2Doorqa Persaud Dev, we find that at that very early date 
pundits both of the Supreme Court of Calcutta and of the 
'Mofussil Court of Appeal', that is the Sadar Dewani Adalat, 
agreed that 'a Hindu widow, having infant sons, could sell 
the property of those sons to a stranger to preserve the 
"child" from want', and 'she can, in cases of emergency 
sell without the consent of her husband's relations, viz.,
1 Derrett, Critique, 427-28.
2 (1815) 2 Morley's Digest, 49 case 34j 1 Hyde East, 50.
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for the subsistence of a child, the portion of a daughter, 
and a sraddha; whereas, if she have means of support from 
the family she has no power of sale'. The pundits alleged 
as their sources the Daya-tattva. the Dayabhacra, and the 
Vivada-chintamani.
Further Derrett has not adverted to Macnaghten's 
Hindu law Vol. 2, 293 case 2, where pundits replied that 
a widow might sell her husband's estate to maintain her 
minor son and grandson, and pay arrears of revenue to 
government, conformably to the Dayabhaga and other authori­
ties. Further in Macnaghten's same work page 289 case 13, 
from Zilla Burdwan, dated 4th December 1817, we have the 
opinion that 'any bond which a mother, having contracted 
a debt for the maintenance of her minor son, may have 
executed in the name of such minor son in favour of the 
creditor, is binding according to the text of Brihaspati 
and others cited in the Vivada-ratnakara, the Vivada-chinta- 
mani, the Daya-tattva. and other authorities. Now from 
the translation there given of two texts upon which they 
rely the mystery is solved.
The mystery may well be solved, but the confusion 
takes a moment to dispell. The pundits, faced with the 
fact that government would sell an estate for arrears of 
revenue, and the inconvenience of having a different 
personal law in the case of Hindus from those of other 
communities, chose to view the guestion from the angle,
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not of the power of alienation of the property of a minor, 
an aspect of guardianship, but rather from the angle of 
the powers of de facto managers of a Hindu family, exactly
as Knight Bruce, L.J., says.
The solution was hinted at by Derrett at page 427, 
last two lines. The topic has been masked from students 
of the history of Indian law because of the persistent 
(but he claims wrong) doctrine that there cannot be any 
manager of a joint family amongst Hindus, whether of the 
Mitakshara or the Dayabhaga School, who is not an adult 
undisgualified male. At 68 Bom. L.R., Journal, 3-6 (1966) 
he thoroughly discusses a row of texts, which are in fact 
exactly those to which our pundits applied their minds.
It emerges from them that widows, as well as wives, can 
very well be managers of joint families in case of necessity,
indeed for exactly the purposes set out by the pundits in
1815 in Doe dem Bissonaut Putt's case, purposes which are 
at once recognisable as those authorising a 'single coparcener* 
to alienate without a court's order or the consent of his 
co-owners under the Mitakshara« In cases of necessity, such 
as payment of government revenue, and the maintenance of 
the persons who could not be expected to find their own 
necessaries (minor children and marriageable girls in 
particular), the de facto manager, even a slave, as we have 
already seen, had powers under the sastra and the earliest 
Anglo-Hindu law to bind the estate. This estate would be 
the joint estate, or the undivided ancestral estate of
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several co-minors and the pundits saw no reason whatever 
why this should not apply to a single minor heir. This 
was pundit-legislation.
An echo of this certainly reached the Privy Council. 
Contrary to Derrett's surmise, every authority cited to 
their Lordships is listed at page 407 of the original 
Moore's Indian Appeals report, and in that list neither 
the case of 1815 nor any material from Macnaghten, nor 
Macnaghten himself, figures. On the other hand their 
Lordships' Committee contained the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward 
Ryan, who was Chief Justice of Bengal more than twenty 
years earlier. He will have been familiar with the con­
sonant decisions of the Sadar Diwani Adalat and the Supreme 
Court in this particular. The Advice drafted by Knight 
Bruce, L.J., which, as Derrett says, gives no authorities 
at this point, betrays precisely the informal 'briefing* 
which their Lordships received. The authorities quoted 
at page 407 of the report will be found to support every­
thing said above on the powers of a manager.
What emerges from all this is simple. If the property 
is viewed as an ancestral and potentially family estate 
governed by Mitakshara law the de facto manager has powers 
of alienation to pay debts, and to meet the minor's 
necessities. This is because of a pundit's extension of 
the texts relating to powers of the manager in emergencies. 
But this by no means takes us all the way home. Those texts,
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which are arranged in such a way as to prevent disputes 
arising about alienations entered into in emergencies, do 
not relate to acts voluntarily undertaken for the minors* 
benefit, Anything for the personal benefit of a minor, 
which is not obviously classifiable as ’benefit of the 
family* (Skt. Kutumbartha). is outside powers envisaged 
in that text, and therefore outside the pundits * opinion. 
They have carefully envisaged kutumbartha as 'benefit*,
i.e., pressing necessity, *of the family', as Knight 
Bruce, L.J., more or less says. What they do not admit 
is that acts may be undertaken voluntarily for the benefit 
of the minor of a positive character, and irrespective of 
emergencies. This is a quite special, and not at all 
authoritative, interpretation of the 'manager-emergency' 
texts (set out by Derrett), and it is at this point that 
Hindu law seems to have been enriched by the neqotiorum 
gestio concept, obtained, as Derrett suggests, whether from 
India itself or from the practice of courts in England 
relative to an administrator durante minori aetate.
1.4. Attempts of some courts to limit the application of 
the decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case
In a few cases some learned judges questioned the 
construction of Hunoomanpersaud * s case and observed that 
the rule laid down in that Privy Council case should be 
limited to cases of natural guardians or to persons who 
have some kind of authority whether as joint owners,
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trustees or otherwise over the property itself but it did
not apply to cases of relations or friends who assume
management of a minor's estate in the absence of natural
guardians and who had themselves no interests in the
property. In other words, the decision could be said to
have application to cases where a person having some
interests in the property entered into management of the
whole of the estate and effected alienation, but it could
not be said to have laid down that a person who without
any title entered into management of the minor's estate
could charge it either for necessity or for the benefit
of the estate itself with debts. In Limbaii Ravji v. Rahi
Ravji1 it was held by Macleod, C.J., and Crump, J., that
a Hindu step-mother who was acting as de facto manager of
a minor had no power to effect a mortgage or sale of the
ward's property. This decision was commented upon in Harilal
2Ranchhod v. Gordhan Keshav where the learned judges found 
that the separated uncle who acted in that case as guardian 
had never been a de facto manager of the minor's estate 
and never assumed management of the property in the real 
sense of the term, and therefore Marten, C.J., who gave 
the leading judgment did not feel the necessity for refer­
ring to a Full Bench the decision in Limba ii *s case for
3its correctness . But eventually the said decision was
1 AIR 1925 Bom 499.
2 (1927) 51 Bom 1040.
3 Ibid, 1045.
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referred to a Full Bench in Tulsidas v. Raisingji1 by-
Baker, J. The question referred to the Full Bench was
whether under Hindu law a de facto guardian of a minor
could validly sell the property of the minor to a third
person for legal necessity. Beaumont, C.J., who was one
2of the members of the Full Bench took the view that the
decision in Limbaji's case was correct and that a de facto
guardian of a minor under Hindu law could not validly 
sell the property of the minor to a third person even
for legal necessity. The learned Chief Justice observed
that in the Hindu law texts there was nothing on the
subject which was really relevant; the Privy Council
decision had no authority in so far as it dealt with
3Hindu law. He further observed *
"The High Courts of Calcutta and Madras have 
both come to the conclusion that a de facto 
guardian of a minor has the power claimed, 
and in so doing they considered that they 
were following the decision of the Privy Council. 
This High Court has come to a different conclusion 
... In my opinion, we are not justified in over­
ruling the decision of our own court unless we 
are satisfied that it was wrong in principle, 
or was opposed to authority which was binding 
on this court".
The learned Chief Justice apprehended that if a 
person claimed the right to sell the property of another, 
he must establish his title so to do. It must be remembered 
that Sir John Beaumont was an English Chancery K.C. who 
came out to Bombay to become Chief Justice there. Although
1 AIR 1933 Bom 15 (FB).
2 The Full Bench consisted of Beaumont, C.J., and Patkar and 
Barlee, JJ.
3 AIR 1933 Bom 15, 17 (FB).
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in many cases the right to deal with the property of 
another might arise from the legal relationship between 
the parties , he felt it strange to suggest that such a 
power could be acquired by such relationship as exists 
between a de facto guardian and the ward, which has no 
legal sanction.' For his observation the learned Chief 
Justice relied on the following remarks of Kumaraswami 
Sastri, J., in Ramaswamy v. Kasinatha1«
"Were the matter res integra I would be disposed 
to hold that the observations of Lord Robson 
[in the Privy Council] above guoted, would be 
applicable egually to cases where the parties 
are Hindus as there is nothing peculiar to the 
Hindu system of jurisprudence which confers on 
a person who without authority assumes the office 
of guardianship any special powers".
The observations of Lord Robson to which reference
2is made in the above quotation are the following i
"It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the 
elder brothers were de facto guardians of the 
respondent and as such were entitled to sell 
his property, provided that the sale was in 
order to pay his debts and was therefore necessary 
in his interest. It is difficult to see how the 
situation of an unauthorised guardian is bettered 
by describing him as a 'de facto' guardian. He 
may by his de facto guardianship, assume important 
responsibilities in relation to the minor's 
property, but he cannot thereby clothe himself 
with legal power to sell it".
But of course that Privy Council case had been between 
Muslims I The learned Chief Justice disagreed with the 
reasoning of the appellant's counsel that in "Hindu law 
the touchstone is necessity, and that once it is established 
that it is necessary in the interest of an infant that his
1 AIR 192B Mad 226. ------------  — ---- - ---
2 Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali (1912) 16 CWN 338, 345; 39 IA 49, 55.
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property should be sold, then anybody who is in fact managing 
the property is authorised to sell it*' • He maintained the 
difference between the position of the manager of a joint 
Hindu family and that of the guardian of a minor. He 
observed that where there was no natural guardian avail­
able the court could appoint any person to be guardian of 
a minor, and that if the de facto guardian in that case had 
been appointed to act by the court she would have had no 
power to make the sale in guestion without an order of 
the court under section 29 of the GWA, and that it would 
be illogical that a *power should be annexed to an office 
held without authority which would not be so annexed if 
the office were held under legal sanction.*
In the same case Patkar, J., agreed with the obser­
vations of the Chief Justice to the extent that there was 
no clear Hindu law text to enable the de facto guardian to 
alienate property. He observed'1'»
"The texts which have been referred to in the 
argument before us ... are Mitakshara, Ch. 1, sec.
1, verses 27, 28 and 29, and Colebrooke*s Digest 
of Hindu law, Vol. 1, pp. 203 and 204. The texts 
in the Mitakshara have been construed by Banerjee, 
J., in Mohanund Mondul v. Nafur Mondul [(1899) 26 
Cal 82077 as authorising alienation by a de facto 
manager of the property of the minor. The texts 
in Colebrooke*s Digest were relied on by Nanabhai 
Haridas, j ., in Bai Amrit v. Bai Manik [(1875) 12 
Bom HC Rep 79"], as supporting alienation by the 
de facto manager. There is nothing explicit in 
those texts which invest a de facto guardian of 
a minor with the power to alienate the minor*s 
property"•
The learned judge admitted that he was impressed by 
the view taken by Lord Robson cited above but he did not
1 Tulsidas v. Raisingji AIR 1933 Bom 15, 18 (FB).
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like to apply the principles contained in the decisions
.1 . .2m  Mata Din v. Ahmad All and Imambandi v. Mutsaddi to
a Hindu case since those decisions of the Privy Council
'deal with Mahomedan law and are based on explicit and
clear texts of Mahomedan law'. He followed the decision
3m  Hunoomanpersaud's case and observed *
"I have not to consider what the law on this
point should be, but I am bound to ascertain
the Hindu law as laid down by the decisions of 
the Privy Council. I think that the decision 
of the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud's case 
has been considered consistently ever since that 
decision as supporting an alienation by a de facto 
guardian in case of necessity".
The Full Bench, however, by a majority on the rule 
of stare decisis held that de facto guardian had power to 
alienate a minor's property in case of justifying necessity 
and they overruled the decision in Limba ii's case.
The decision in Hunoomanpersaud1s case was questioned 
to a certain extent in the Madras High Court in Seetharamamma
4
v. Appiah by Odgers, J., when he observed*
"It has been argued at length for the respondents 
that a de facto guardian is unrecognized in the 
Hindu law. It may be at once said that, if there 
is such a recognition I am satisfied that the 
recognition is more or less modern and possibly 
to some extent, the recognition, if it is legally 
recognized at all, has come about by necessity".
Viswanatha Sastri, J., another judge of the Bench in 
the above case held that the right of a de facto guardian 
to deal with the property of a Hindu minor had been
1 (1912) 16 CWN 338 (PC).
2 (1918) 25 CWN 50 (PC).
3 AIR 1933 Bom 15, 20 (FB).
4 AIR 1926 Mad 457.
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recognised by the courts ever since the decision of the 
Privy Council in Hunoomanpersaud *s case, provided the 
alienation was for necessity.
Hallifax, A.J.C., of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's 
Court was also critical about the rule in Hunoomanpersaud's 
case. He observed obiter in Keshho v. Jagannath1 t
"The structure of Hindu society, with its joint 
family system certainly does differ from that 
of any other society in the world but that does 
not give any person the right to take charge of 
the property of any minor he may come across, 
just because he happens to be a Hindu, whether 
they are nearly or distantly related or not 
related at all, and 'thereby clothe himself with 
power to sell it'. ... The fundamental mistake 
made in respect of Hunoomanpersaud Panday's case 
is in assuming that it defines the powers of a 
guardian of a Hindu minor. It deals throughout 
with the powers of a manager, and the word 
'guardian' occures in their Lordships' judgment 
only four times, twice in quotations from the 
judgment of the Sadar Diwani Adalat, once in a 
quotation from the plaint and once in their
Lordships' summing up of their conclusions. In
the last place the word may have been used
because it had been used all through the case 
in the courts in India, or, if I may suggest it 
without disrespect, by a slip".
2In Ram Nath v. Sant Ram Beckett, J., thought himself 
to have been in an awkward situation to apply the rule in 
Hunoomanpersaud's case to a case where a de facto guardian 
had transferred a reversionary interest of a minor and the 
act was a prudent one in the minor's interests. The learned
judge could not put faith in the Privy Council rule and
himself vainly searched in Colebrooke's translation of 
Jagannatha's Digest, and the Mitakshara to find support for
1 AIR 1926 Nag 81, 83 (FB).
2 AIR 1935 Lah 820.
I
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the transaction, and said that though the powers of a de facto 
guardian under Hindu law were wider than under other systems, 
and though he had the same powers as a de jure guardian 
to dispose of a portion of the ancestral estate in order 
to avert a threatened calamity, but he had no power to 
dispose of a reversionary interest of a minor even though
it seemed to have been a prudent step at the time when it
was undertaken. It was observed1*
"I do not think that the powers of a de facto 
guardian should be extended in the absence of
express authority, and I do not think they should
be taken as including the power to dispose of 
a reversionary interest, though this may seem to 
be a prudent step at the time when it is taken".
Unwittingly the learned judge went to limit the power
of a de facto guardian which was already a limited one. He
could have come to the same decision by distinguishing
the facts in this way that the de facto guardian was not
in the management of the reversionary interest of the
. 2minor and therefore he had no power to dispose of it . It 
is the necessity of the act and not the authority of the 
person doing it that is to be scrutinised.
3 , . .In Nnshingha v. Ashutosh a Division Bench of the 
Patna High Court observed that the decision in Hunoomanpersaud's 
case applied where a person in the management of an estate 
had himself an interest in the property alienated and that 
the Privy Council case was no authority for the view that
1 AIR 1935 Lah 820-21.
2 Krisnamurthi v. Krishnamurthi AIR 1927 PC 139.
3 AIR 1938 Pat 487.
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a de facto manager was something more than an intermeddler 
to alienate the property of a minor. Manohar Lall, J., made 
the following observation1 when the appellant's counsel 
relying on the majority decision in Tulsidas's case contended 
that there was something peculiar to the Hindu system of 
jurisprudence which conferred special power on a person 
who without authority assumed the office of guardianship*
"The decision of the Full Bench was a dissenting 
decision where the learned Chief Justice took 
a contrary view. The other learned judges have 
made observations which appear to be in support 
of the contention of the appellant. The learned 
judges were impressed by the observations of the 
Privy Council in the well-known case of 6 MIA 393 
f Hunoomanpersaud' s case"]. ... If that case be 
carefully examined, it will be found that the 
charge was created by a person who was de facto 
in possession with an apparent title either in 
himself or as the manager of another and in that 
capacity had created a charge on the estate.
... I take the decision of the Privy Council to 
mean no more than what it says, namely that the 
alienation validly made by the manager in actual 
possession of the estate is valid".
The learned judge further observed that if the argument 
of the appellant's counsel was accepted, the GWA would be 
considered to be abrogated. He held that an unauthorised 
guardian by reason of his being a de facto guardian could 
assume important responsibilities in relation to the minor's 
property, and could thereby be responsible for any damage 
that might be occasioned by his wilfully meddling with the 
affairs of the minor's property; but by so doing he could 
not clothe himself with any legal power to dispose of the
1 AIR 1938 Pat 487, 495.
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minor's property and could not by arrogating to himself 
the responsibilities of a de facto guardian be allowed 
legally to deal with or transfer the properties of the 
minor. According to the learned judge such a transaction 
was wholly unauthorised and the question of any benefit 
to the minor did not arise at all. He further mentioned 
that an honest money-lender or a person who honestly 
took transfer of a minor's property had to be careful to 
see that the person who was making the transfer in question 
was either a legal or natural guardian or a guardian 
appointed by the court or was a person who was actually 
managing the estate for the minor in which he had also 
an interest.
1.5. De facto guardianship in Anglo-Hindu law* a product of 
Hunoomanpersaud's case
No doubt there may be some substance in the views 
expressed by the learned judges in the above cases, but 
the number of those cases is very few. In a large number 
of cases in all the High Courts of India the decision in 
Hunoomanpersaud's case has been accepted as laying down 
the rule that a de facto guardian of a Hindu minor can 
alienate his estate in cases of necessity or for the benefit 
of his estate. As long back as in 1868 the Calcutta High 
Court began to follow Hunoomanpersaud's case in matters 
of de facto guardianship. In its earliest reported case of 
Gunga Pershad v. Phool Singh1 Macpherson, J., sitting along
1 (1868) 10 WR 106 (CR).
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with Bayley, J., applied the rule of Hunoomanpersaud1s
case to an alienation effected by a brother as de facto
guardian of his minor brothers, and held that such an
alienation by a de facto guardian would be good if made
under pressing necessity. In Mohanund Mondul v. Nafur
Mondul1 where the grandmother sold the property of a
minor Maclean, C.J., and Banerjee, J., held that a de facto
guardian could alienate the minor's property as de facto
manager of the property, and that the minor would be bound
by such alienation, no matter whether it was by sale or
2 .mortgage,In Adhar Chandra v, Kirtibash Bairaqee it was 
held that the powers of a de facto guardian were the same 
as those of a natural guardian , and that a de facto guardian 
could alienate a minor's property. It was observed in that 
case that such a view was conceded by such an eminent counsel 
as Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh, Mookerjee and Newbould, JJ., in
3
Krishna Chandra Choudhury v. Ratan Ram Pal held that a
de facto guardian and manager of the property of a minor
could effect a valid conveyance of his property and create
a valid charge on it if it was one that a prudent owner
would make for the benefit of the estate. The learned
4
judges remarked *
"This view has been adopted and applied by the 
Indian courts ever since the decision of the 
Judicial Committee was pronounced on the 26th 
July 1856. In the decision of a Full Bench of
1 (1899) 26 Cal 820.
2 (1910) 12 CLJ 586. The relevant portion of this case was
also quoted in Seetharamamma v. Appiah AIR 1926 Mad 457, 458.
3 AIR 1916 Cal 840; (1915) 20 CWN 645.
4 Ibid, 20 CWN 647.
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the Sudder court in the case of Gooroopersaud 
Jena v. Muddun Mohun Soor [(1856) SDA 980 (Beng)^ 
where the judgment was pronounced on the 11th 
December 1856, apparently before the decision of 
the Judicial Committee reached this country, the 
same view was independently taken, and it was
held that the benefit of the minor creating
necessity was a test by which the legality of 
the transaction must be triedi the rule is that 
a party filling a fiduciary character like that 
of a guardian, is authorised to perform any act 
which is manifestly for the infant*s benefit”.
The Bombay High Court started to ascertain the power
of a de facto guardian in the light of the sastric texts.
In Bai Amrit v. Bai Manik  ^where the mother, being the only
adult member of the family and in the managment of the
family property, as such alienated certain family property
for the benefit of the estate, Nanabhai Haridas, J.,
relying on Colebrooke's translation of Jagannatha*s Digest
2
Vol. 1 verses 191 to 193 observed i
"She (mother) was, moreover, by Hindu law, the 
guardian of her late minor son and of her minor 
daughter-in-law, .•. and competent in that capacity 
to deal with the family property for the benefit 
of the estate. ... But seeing that she was manager 
de facto of the family, her sales in that character 
of portions of the family property for valuable 
consideration, which, when obtained by her, was 
actually applied to meeting family necessities, 
cannot ... be guestioned. The Hindu law enables 
even a slave, a fortiori, therefore, a person 
... to bind the family by contracts".
This view now stands affirmed by the majority decision
. . .. 3of the Full Bench m  Tulsidas v. Raisingn . Patkar, J., 
with whom Barlee, J., agreed said in his judgment that his 
duty was to ascertain the Hindu law as laid down by the
1 (1875) 12 Bom HC Rep 79.
2 Ibid, 81. Reference was also made by the learned judge 
to~Bai Kesar v. Bai Ganqa (1871) 8 Bom HC Rep 31 (ACJ) where 
he acted as the counsel for the appellant.
3 AIR 1933 Bom 15, 21 (FB).
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ancient texts and in the absence of texts as laid down 
by the decisions of the_Privy Council. The learned judge 
observed that there was nothing explicit in the verses 27 
to 29 of the Mitakshara and Jagannatha's Digest Vol. 1 
which would invest a de facto guardian with the power to 
alienate a minor's property, but ever since the decision 
in Hunoomanpersaud's case had been taken it was considered 
consistently as supporting an alienation by a de facto 
guardian in case of necessity.
The Madras High Court followed the Privy Council
decision. In Arunachela Reddi v. Chidambara Reddi  ^White,
C.J., and Benson, J., held an alienation of a minor's
property by his mother acting as de facto guardian as valid
2on the ground of necessity. In Seetharamamma v. Appiah
Viswanatha Sastri, J., saidi
"I am clearly of opinion that the right of a de 
facto guardian to deal with the property of a 
Hindu minor has been recognised by our courts 
ever since the decision of the Privy Council 
in Hunoomanpersaud Pandey v. Mt. Babooee Munra i 
[ (1856) 6 MIA 393") provided the alienation was 
for necessity".
The Lahore High Court adopted a similar view. In
3 ,Kundan Lai v. Beni Per shad Tek Chand, J., m  delivering
the judgment of a Division Bench relied on the Full Bench
4 . . .decision in Mastu v. Nand Lai where the decision m
Hunoomanpersaud's case was followed, and held that an
1 (1903) 13 MLJ 223.
2 AIR 1926 Mad 457, 461.
3 (1932) 13 Lah 399.
4 (1890) 25 PR 200 (FB) .
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alienation by the de facto guardian of a Hindu minor for 
the benefit of the minor's estate and with regard to the 
minor's interest could not be impeached by the minor on 
attaining majority on the mere ground that the guardian 
was not a legal guardian under Hindu law.
The Allahabad High Court in its earlier cases went 
even to extend the Privy Council rule to Muslim cases and 
hold that a de facto guardian in that system too had power
to make alienations. This view was set aside in Mata Din v.
1 . . .  2Ahmad Ali • In Nokhelal v. Ra leshwan Kuman the Patna
High Court followed the Full Bench decision of the Bombay
High Court in Tulsidas's case, although in Nrisingha v.
3 . . . .Ashutosh Manohar Lall, J., construed this decision differently.
The decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case was followed by the 
Nagpur High Court like the above High Courts. Particular
mention may be made of the Full Bench decision in Kesho v.
4 . . .Jagannath where Hallifax, A.J.C., following the decision
in Hunoomanpersaud's case said that that decision had been 
consistently followed as a correct exposition of Hindu law 
in a series of several High Courts.
5
In Sriramulu v. Pundankakshayya all the learned 
judges of the Federal Court .of India admitted the decision 
in Hunoomanpersaud's case as the source of the power of a
1 (1912) 16 CWN 338 (PC).
2 AIR 1937 Pat 141.
3 AIR 1938 Pat 487.
4 AIR 1926 Nag 81 (FB).
5 AIR 1949 FC 218.
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de facto guardian. Kania, C.J., said'1'*
"The few Hindu law texts which deal with the 
disposal of a minor's property by some one else 
in case of necessity are collected in Colebrooke's 
Digest Vol. 1, page 302. As regards authoritative 
judicial decisions, the first was given in 1856 
Hunoomanpersaud Pandey v. Mt. Babooee Munra i 
Koonweree [118561 6 MIA 393 J".
. 2Fazl All, J., said *
"It may now be taken to be well settled by a long 
course of decisions that a de facto guardian 
has, in case of necessity or benefit to the 
minor, power to charge, mortgage or sell the 
minor's property. The earliest case which supports 
this view is the well known case of Hunooman­
persaud Pandey v. Mt. Babooee £6 MIA 393j, on 
which a large number of subsequent decisions are 
based".
. 3Mukherjea, J., said :
"There is quite a number of cases decided by the 
different High Courts in India, where it has been 
held on the authority of the decision in Hunooman­
persaud Pandey*s case that the powers of aliena­
tion for necessity or benefit of the infant can 
be exercised by a de facto guardian as well? and 
so far as these powers are concerned, there is 
no distinction in Hindu law between a de jure 
and a de facto guardian"•
. 4Mahajan, J., said *
"The decision in the case (i.e., Hunoomanpersaud's 
case) was given in the year 1856 and has since 
then been discussed and commented upon in a very 
large number of cases in the High Courts in India.
It has been construed as laying down the proposition 
that a de facto manager of a Hindu minor's estate 
can by incurring debts charge his estate and can 
also dispose it of partially or wholly, provided 
the necessities of the minor require it, ... it 
can be said without hesitation that in numerous 
cases alienations in the nature of mortgages or 
sales have been upheld on the basis of the above 
rule".
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 219.
2 Ibid. 223.
3 Ibid, 232.
4 Ibid, 243.
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2. Alienations by de facto guardians
Under Hindu law a de facto guardian has the same 
power of alienating the property of a minor as that of a 
natural or de jure guardian1. He may for legal necessity 
or for the benefit of the estate of the minor sell, mortgage 
or lease out his property. Conversely, when a de facto 
guardian or manager is in possession of a minor's estate 
he will be bound to account to the minor for his manage­
ment as it is open to the minor on attaining majority to
. • 2 elect to sue him either for damages or for an account .
There seems virtually no difference between the powers of
alienation of a de facto and a de jure guardian except that
an improper alienation made by either of them may be either
void or voidable. This will be discussed in chapter V.
3In Snramulu v. Pundankakshavva where the basic 
question involved was relating to the right of a de facto 
guardian under Hindu law in respect of alienating the 
properties of a minor and of creating contractual liabili­
ties enforceable against the minor's estate the learned 
judges of the Federal Court, specially Mahajan, J., discussed
in details the powers of a de facto as well as a de jure
guardian with references to all probable sastric texts,
1 Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshavva AIR 1949 FC 218, 232; 
Annapurnamma v. Raman ianeyaratnam AIR 1959 AP 40, 48.
2 Ramanathan Chettiar v. Raia Sir Annamalai Chettiar (1934)
57 Mad 1031, 1051-52 following Dormer v. Fortescue (1744)
3 Atk 124; 26 ER 875; Hicks v. Sallit (1854) 3 De. G.M & G 
780; 43 ER 304; Howard v. Earl of Shrewsbury (1874) 17 Eq.Cas 
378; Sankaralinaam Chettv v. Kuppuswami AIR 1935 Mad 305 
relying on Suriaprakasam v. Murugesam (1925) 47 Mad 774 (FB)
wherein reference was made to Morgan v. Morgan (1737) 1 Atk 
489; 26 ER 310; Pulteney v. Warren (1801) 6 Ves 73; 31 ER 944; 
Doe v. Keen (1797) 7 T.R 386; 101 ER 1034.
3 AIR 1949 FC 218.
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Anglo-Hindu text-books and a large number of cases of the 
Privy Council and different High Courts of India. The facts 
of the case show that the natural father of an adopted son 
executed as de facto guardian a promissory note in renewal 
of some earlier Promissory notes executed by the adoptive 
father and mother, and executed a sale deed in discharge 
of debts due under the above renewed promissory note. It 
is seen earlier that all the learned judges of the Federal 
Court unanimously accepted the rule of Hunoomanpersaud's case 
and admitted that a de facto guardian similar to a de jure 
guardian had power to alienate a minor's property for the 
twin purposes of Hunoomanpersaud's case. In case of necessity 
or for the benefit to the minor's estate a de facto guardian 
has power to sell or mortgage the property of the minor1,
2but he cannot alienate it for purposes which are not lawful .
An alienation by a de facto guardian supported by legal
necessity cannot be impeached on the ground that it was
3made by a person who was merely a de facto guardian . Some­
times even during the existence of a de jure guardian a de 
facto guardian can alienate a minor's property for the 
latter's necessity and benefit, and he would be bound by
such transaction if the whereabouts of the de jure guardian
4are not known . Alienations executed by a de facto guardian 
can be challenged by the minor as not made for his benefit,
1 Sheo Gobind v. Ram Adhin AIR 1933 Oudh 31, 32; Bettegowda 
v. Dvavaraseqowda AIR 1953 Mys 130; Palani Goundan v.
Van jiakkal AIR 1956 Mad 476, 478; Narayan Prasad v. Sukumari
Dei (1964) Cut 298, 303.
2 Tattya Mohyaji v. Rabha Dadaii AIR 1953 Bom 273; Rambhau v. 
Ra jaram AIR 1956 Bom 250.
3 Panchu v. Hrishikesh AIR 1960 Cal 446, 448.
4 Pnlani Goundar v. Sellappan (1965) 1 MLJ 435.
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but third persons have no locus standi to challenge it on 
that ground1.
The alienation must be proportionate to the necessity
of the minor or the benefit of his estate, otherwise the
. 2de facto guardian will have to account for it • In Ramaswamy
3Pillai v. Kasinatha Iver Kumaraswami Sastn, J., sitting 
with Curgenven, J., observed that where a court found 
that an alienation by a de facto guardian was not wholly 
binding on minors, there were three courses open as regards 
granting relief. The first course was to set aside the sale 
altogether and direct the minors to pay the vendee the 
consideration which was binding on them with interest, if 
any; the second course was to direct the purchaser to pay 
the minors the difference between the actual value of the 
land and the consideration which was binding on them with 
interest; and the third course was to divide the lands in 
proportion to the value of the lands and the actual consider-
4
ation found payable. In Bettegowda v. Dyavarasegowda where 
the maternal uncle under whose care the minor came after 
the death of his parents sold the minor's property for the 
benefit of the minor, Mallappa, J., sitting alone found the 
sale as most advantageous and wisely made, and held that 
alienations should be upheld in full where the necessity for 
them was established in respect of a very substantial portion
1 Tapassi Ram v. Raia Ram AIR 1930 Lah 136, 137.
2 Morgan v, Morgan (1737) 1 Atk 489; 26 ER 310. In this case 
Lord Hardwicke, L.C., observed;"Where any person whether 
father or a stranger, enters,upon an infant's estate and 
continues the possession* this court considers him as
a guardian, and will decree an account, and to be carried 
on after the infancy is determined, unless the infant after
being of age waived such account’1.
3 AIR 1928 Mad 226.
4 AIR 1953 Mys 130.
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of the consideration. Since it is hard to lay down any 
general rule as to what course courts would adopt in a 
case, and since each case depends upon the particular 
circumstances of that case, it may not be always judicious 
to uphold an alienation in full on the ground that the 
legal necessity for a substantial portion of the consider­
ation has been proved. It is not the amount of consideration, 
it is the welfare of the minor that should be considered.
Subba Rao, C.J., observed in Suryaprakasam v. Gangara ju1 
that in all transactions affecting a minor a paramount duty 
rested upon a court not to put its seal on transactions 
affecting his interests. Moreover, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, the right of the purchaser of a minor's 
property from a guardian is only a right of the guardian 
to be indemnified against the minor's property which can 
be exercised only when there was necessity for the trans­
action. Where the amount of the property sold is in excess
of the minor's necessity the purchaser may well be treated
2as a trustee. In Soar v. Aswell Lord Esher, M.R., said*
’’Where a person has assumed, either with or without 
consent, to act as a trustee of money or other 
property, i.e., to act in a fiduciary relation 
with regard to it, and has in consequence been 
in possession of or has exercised command or 
control over such money or property, a Court of 
Equity will impose upon him all the liabilities 
of an express trustee, and will class him with 
and will call him an express trustee of an express 
trust”.
If the welfare of a minor demands the return of the 
remainder of necessity, the court must impeach the transaction
1 AIR 1956 AP 33, 45 (FB).
2 (1893) 2 QB 390, 394 (CA). This case was referred to in
Ramendra Nath Roy v. Brojendra Nath Pass (1917) 45 Cal 111,
136, and Ramanathan Chettiar v. Raja Sir Annamalai Chettiar
(1934) 57 Mad 1031, 1051-52.
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to that extent. Where, however, the remainder has been 
invested for the benefit of the minor, the minor cannot 
attack the sale on the ground that it is devoid of necessity^.
De facto guardianship has no application amongst the
Nairs of Travancore-Cochin, who follow not the Mitakshara
but the Marumakkattayam system. A Division Bench of the
Travancore-Cochin High Court observed in Raman Pillai v.
. 2Kesavan Nair that under the Hindu system of jurisprudence 
it was a special rule that a person in actual management 
of the affairs of a minor could charge the minor's property 
for the latter's necessities, and that it could not by 
analogy be extended to the Nairs amongst whom a self-appointed 
guardian or manager had no legal authority to deal with a 
minor's property.
2.1. Contract for debts by a de facto guardian
2.1.1. On simple bonds
It is seen in the previous chapter that the Federal
Court held in Sriramulu's case that a guardian whether de jure
or de facto could not enter into a contract bringing about
a direct contractual relationship between the creditor and
the minor or the minor's estate. The creditor could, however,
under certain circumstances relying on the principle of
subrogation enforce the rights of a guardian against the
3minor's estate. Kama, C.J., observed that when a loan
1 Subbakkal v~. Subba Gounder AIR 1965 Mad 371. 372.
2 AIR 1955 (NUC) 2202 (Trav-Co).
3 AIR 1949 FC 218, 222.
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was taken for the purpose of necessity or benefit of the 
minor's estate by a de facto manager he could not effect 
a transaction so as to exclude his own liability. The 
learned Chief Justice suggested that so far as the creditor 
was concerned this involved no hardship because he could 
proceed against the de facto manager and make the minor's 
estate liable on the principle of surogation; and this 
would not hurt the honest de facto manager because he had 
got the necessary facts and materials to show that the 
transaction was for the necessity of the minor or for the 
benefit of his estate? nor would it adversely affect the 
minor's interests because when a claim was made and the 
facts showed that the transaction was for necessity or 
benefit of his estate, the minor would have no claim against 
the de facto manager for maladministration and his estate 
should meet the obligation. In this way a de facto manager 
could borrow money for the necessity or benefit of the 
estate, and make the minor's estate liable for the loan 
without making out a contract between the minor and the 
creditor. Mukherjea, J., observed'*' that since a minor could 
not become a party to a contract there could be no direct 
contractual liability established against him or his estate. 
But as the de facto guardian was personally liable under 
the contract he could be entitled to reimbursement from 
the minor's estate under the rule of Hindu law if the loan 
was for necessity or benefit of the minor, and the creditor
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 237.
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could in such circumstances invoke the equitable principle
of subrogation in his favour and claim to be placed in
the position of the de facto guardian for enforcement of
the latter*s right of reimbursement against the minor’s
estate. Mahajan, J., said^ that a de jure guardian could
borrow money on simple contracts entered into on behalf
of the minor provided they fell within the limits laid
down in Hunoomanpersaud * s case, and that when a de facto
guardian was the de facto manager of the minor*s estate,
he enjoyed the same powers and the same status as a natural
guardian except in cases where the statute law of the
country intervened and laid down a different rule, and that
similar to the case of a de jure guardian the touchstone
of necessity was the guiding principle here too. The HMGA
has now wholly abolished the powers of the de facto guardian
to deal with the minor’s immovable property, with the result
that the creditor cannot reimburse himself even from the 
2
minor’s estate .
2.1.2. On promissory note
We have seen in the earlier chapter that a natural
guardian cannot execute a promissory note on behalf of a
3minor. In Nagindas v. Bhimrao a Division Bench of the 
Bombay High Court expressed the opinion that a promissory
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 260.
2 Pradhan, Guardianship Acts, 115.
3 AIR 1943 Bom 44.
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note executed by a de facto guardian on behalf of a minor
even for necessary purposes could not bind the estate of
the minor. In Vembu Aiyar v. Subbiah Pillai  ^Kuppuswami
Ayyar, J., sitting alone held that a minor was not bound
by an indorsement of payment made by his de facto guardian
on a promissory note which the de facto guardian purported
to execute in the minor*s name. A Full Bench of the Madras
2High Court m  Pundarlkakshavva v. Sreeramulu considered
the question whether a person who without lawful authority
took upon himself the management of the estate of a Hindu
minor, could in law execute a promissory note in the name
of the minor in respect of money borrowed for a necessary
purpose and thereby bind the minor's estate. Leach, C.J.,
who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench held that a
de facto guardian, as a person who without lawful authority
took charge of a minor's estate was commonly known as such,
of a minor could not in Hindu law execute a promissory note
in the name of the minor in respect of money borrowed for
a necessary purpose and thereby bind the minor's estate.
This decision was relied on by a Division Bench of the
3same High Court in Baoavva v. Pundankakshavva • Both the 
Full Bench and the Division Bench cases went on appeal to 
the Federal Court where both the appeals were heard together 
and disposed of by one judgment by each of the four judges 
of the Federal Court. All the learned judges by a long
1 AIR 1943 Mad 273.
2 AIR 1946 Mad 1 (FB).
3 AIR 1946 Mad 198, 200.
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persuasive discussion of numerous cases of different High 
Courts came to an uniform decision that a de facto guardian 
of a Hindu minor had no power to pass a promissory note 
in the name of the minor^ so as to bind his estate without 
making himself liable and thus furnish consideration for 
a subsequent conveyance of the minor's property executed 
by the de facto guardian. Nor could such a promissory note 
be treated as an acknowledgment of a pre-existing debt in 
law because it was made by a person who was not authorised 
to give an acknowledgment under the Limitation Act (Act 9) 
of 1908.
2.2. Contract for lease
A de facto guardian has no authority to take a premises
2on lease on behalf of a minor • When a lease is taken it
creates an obligation on the part of the minor to pay a
stipulated premium or rent and a guardian cannot subject a
minor to such an obligation. Ordinarily, in gift or other
transfer in favour of a minor there is no reciprocal
obligation cast on the minor, but in a lease reciprocal
3obligation is cast on the lessee to perform several 
obligations mentioned in section 108-B of the Transfer of 
Property Act (Act 4) of 1882. There is, however, nothing
in the Transfer of Property Act according to which it can
. . 4be said that a minor is disqualified to be a transferee ;
1 Derrett, Introduction, 87 para 113.
2 Javkant v. Durqashanker AIR 1970 Guj 106.
3 Pramila Balidas v. Joqeshar AIR 1918 Pat 626.
4 Munni Kunwar v. Madan Gopal (1916) 38 All 62; Raqhava Chariar 
v. Srinivasa (1917) 40 Mad 308 (FB) overruling Navakotti v. 
Loqalinqa TT910) 33 Mad 312.
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1 2 he may be a purchaser or a mortgagee . In English law a
minor is disgualified to be a transferee of a legal estate
in land but not of an eguitable interest in land or other
3
property . A de facto guardian cannot start a new business
. 4on behalf of the minor. In Benares Bank Ltd. v. H a n  Naram 
the Privy Council held that the manager of a joint Hindu 
family had no power to impose upon a minor member of the 
family the risk and liability of a new business started by 
him, and that it made no difference if the manager was the 
father of the minor. A fortiori a de facto or a de jure 
guardian has no power to start a new business on a minor’s 
behalf, and impose thereby liability on him.
5
In Jaykant v. Durgashanker where a minor's de facto 
guardian took a premises on lease and started a new business 
there on behalf of the minor it was held that since a lease 
created an obligation on the part of the minor to pay a 
stipulated rent, and since there were reciprocal obligations 
cast on him under section 108-B of the Transfer of Property 
Act of 1882, the de facto guardian had no authority to 
create obligations to bind the minor's estate by acts which 
were not for necessity. And relying on the Privy Council 
decision in Benares Bank's case it was held that the de facto
1 Ulfat Rai v. Gauri Shanker (1911) 33 All 657; Munni v.
Perumal (1915) 37 Mad 390; Narain Das v. Mst. Dhania (1916)
38 All 154; Subba Reddy v. Gurava Reddy AIR 1930 Mad 425.
2 Madhab Koeri v. Baikuntha (1919) 52 IC 338; Thakar Das v.
Mst. Pulti (1924) 5 Lah 317; Zafar Ahsan v. Zubaida Khatun 
AIR 1929 All 604.
3 Section 19, Law of Property Act (15 & 16 Geo. 5. c. 20) 1925.
4 AIR 1932 PC 182.
5 AIR 1970 Guj 106.
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guardian could not take the premises on lease for the minor 
for a new business to be started. Moreover, section 107 
of the Transfer of Property Act makes it clear that a 
lease to a minor must be void because it must be executed 
both by the lessor and the lessee. In Raqhava Chariar v. 
Srinivasa -^ Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., drew a distinction 
between cases of contractual liability which a minor agreed 
to undertake and obligations attached to the holding of 
property, and said that in cases of pure gifts there was 
an obligation on the part of the donee to pay the govern­
ment revenue and public taxes. In the case of a gift of 
a man's whole property there was the obligation to discharge 
the donor's debts to the extent of the value of the property. 
But these obligations did not prevent the vesting of the 
property in the minor by a transfer inter vivos, rather 
they were attached to the property and they were not really 
considerations for the transfer. But the learned judge 
singled out the obligations of a lease in the following 
words^ *
"A transfer to a minor by way of a lease, he agree­
ing to pay rent or to perform any particular
covenants which form an essential part of the
transaction, may prevent the transfer from taking 
effect. In a sale, gift or mortgage ordinarily 
there are no such essential consensual obligations".
Therefore, both judicial decisions and statutory 
law are against a minor's becoming a lessee. R.S. Pandey
1 (1917) 40 Mad 308 (FB).
2 Ibid, 335.
3 R.S. Pandey. 'Minor’s agreements in India and the U.K. 
a comparative study’ in (1972) JILI 205-252, 237.
308
asked why the de facto guardian of a minor could not execute 
leases for the minor which were not onerous and were for 
his benefit, and suggested the insertion of an exception 
clause to section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act by 
relaxing the general reguirement of registration of ins­
truments creating a lease. From the very nature of a lease 
it can never be totally free from being onerous, it would 
put the lessee in an obligation this way or that. No 
doubt Mr. Pandey*s suggestion sounds nice, but why should 
a guardian take a lease on a minor's behalf however benefi­
cial that might be? The fundamental duty of a guardian 
de jure as well as de facto is to maintain the property
in status guo and not to augment it. Whether a transaction 
is within the ambit of a guardian's power should be considered 
first, and then it would be considered whether it is for 
the minor's benefit and not vice versa.
2.3. Contract for insurance by a de facto guardian
A de facto guardian can enter into an insurance 
contract on a minor's behalf for the protection of the 
latter's properties. In Great American Insurance Co Ltd. 
v. Madanlal1 a policy of fire insurance was taken by the 
de facto guardian of a minor for certain cotton bales.
The goods were burnt and the minor sued through his guardian 
as next friend. Beaumont, C.J., sitting with Rangnekar, J.,
1 (1935) 59 Bom 656.
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said that since section 27 of the GWA enabled the guardian 
of a minor to deal with the minor's property as a man of 
ordinary prudence and empowered him for this purpose to 
do all reasonable and proper acts for the realisation, 
protection or benefit of the minor's property, the de facto 
guardian had authority to insure the minor's property against 
fire, and that since the minor was the person for whose 
benefit the contract was made, and out of whose estate 
the premium was paid, he would be entitled to sue on the 
contract. A similar view was taken in Vi iaykumar v. New 
Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd.1 where the adoptive mother, then 
on her death, the natural mother of an adopted minor son 
was looking after the business of the minor as the latter's 
guardian. This was also a suit to recover a loss on a contract 
of fire insurance for certain cotton bales destroyed by 
fire. The contract was entered into by the minor's de facto 
guardian, his natural mother, through her agents. When the
counsel of the defendants relying on the Privy Council
2decision m  Mohon Bibee's case argued that the contract
was a contract by the minor and that under section 11 of
the Contract Act (Act 9) of 1872 such a contract was void,
3Desai, J., who was sitting alone observed *
"The proposition laid down by their Lordships of 
the Privy Council being in general terms would 
have led to startling results if very strictly 
applied. For in that case, instead of guarding
1 AIR 1954 Bom 347.
2 (1903) 30 IA 114 (PC).
3 AIR 1954 Bom 347, 351.
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the interest of minors over whom the law throws 
its aegis of protection, it would have done 
incalculable harm to their rights and caused much 
hardship. Pushed to a logical conclusion the 
Privy Council decision would have made it impossible 
for a minor to get benefit under or enforce any 
contract entered into by him even when the con­
sideration had been wholly received by the other 
contracting party. But no such difficult position 
has arisen, since courts in India have, as a rule, 
in effect, confined the application of the Privy 
Council ruling only to cases where a minor is 
charged with obligations and the other contracting 
party seeks to enforce those obligations against 
the minor".
The learned judge followed Great American Insurance 
Co.'s case and held that a minor for whose benefit a contract 
of insurance was made by his guardian was entitled to sue 
on the contract.
2.4. Alienation under ante-adoption contract
When a boy is validly given in adoption to some other 
family, it has the effect of transferring the adopted boy 
from his natural family to the adoptive family as effectively 
as if he were born in such family. The adoption makes the 
adopted boy to all intents and purposes the son of his 
adoptive father as completely as if he had begotten him 
in lawful wedlock; and the adopted boy acquires the status 
of a natural born son with its rights, privileges and 
obligations in the adoptive family. But whilst he so 
acquires, he loses his status in the natural family and 
the rights of a son in the family of his birth. After 
adoption his adoptive father and after him the adoptive 
mother will be the natural guardian of the adopted son1,
1 Derret, Introduction, 121 para 181; Mayne, Hindu law (10th ed.) 
302 sec. 231;Sreenarain v. Kishen (1873) 11 BLR 171, 191 (PC); 
Lakshmibai v. Shridhar (18791 3 Bom 1; see also Nirvanava 
v. Nirvanava (18851 9 Bom 365; Monomohini Dasi v. Hari 
Prasad (1925) 4 Pat 109.
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and if his natural parents act as guardian, they would be
regarded as de facto guardians1. The adopted son may,
however, give up or modify his rights to property and inheri-
2 3tance in the adoptive family either before or after the
adoption. Where the adopted son is a minor his natural
father or mother may enter into an agreement before the
adoption with the adoptive father or mother so as to limit
4the minor*s rights in the property of his adoptive father .
In such cases the question arises* Is the minor bound by
such ante-adoption agreement?
5 6Sometimes the Bench and the Bar put the question
whether, if an act cannot be done by a person as natural
father, can it be done by him as de facto guardian. Such
a situation arises in the somewhat peculiar case of an
ante-adoption alienation. It may happen that at the time
of adoption the natural father of a minor adopted son 
enters into separate agreement with the adoptive parents or 
agrees by the same instrument of adoption (we understand 
as a condition of his son’s being taken in adoption into 
a wealthier family) that the adopted son should not challenge
7
the previous alienations , or that the adoptive mother should
1 Sriramulu v. Pundarkakshavva AIR 1949 FC 218;
2 Kashibai v. Tatva (1916) 40 Bom 668; Pandurang v. Narmadabai 
(1932) 56 Bom 395.
3 S.V. Gupte, Hindu law in British India (Bombay* 2nd ed. 1947), 
1001.
4 Mitar Sain v. Data Ram AIR 1926 All 7; Mittar Sain v. Data 
Ram AIR 1926 All 194; Vithal Laxman v. Yamutai (1934) 58 Bom 
234; Krishnavva Rao v. Maharaja of Pithapur (1935) 69 MLJ 388(PC)
5 Krishnamurthi v. Krishnamurthi AIR 1927 PC 139, 145.
6 Seethiah v. Mutyalu AIR 1931 Mad 106, 109. (The counsel for 
the defendants-appellants raised the question).
7 Ramaswami Aiyan v. Vencatataramaivan (1879) 6 IA 196 (PC).
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be in possession of the whole property during her lifetime1,
or that half of the property would be taken by the widow 
2absolutely , or that a portion of the property would be
3enjoyed by the daughters of the adoptive father , or that 
the adoptive mother should be allowed to give some property
4
to her own brother , or that a fixed sum of money would be
5given in charity annually , or that the adoptive father
should be allowed to dispose of all the property in any
0
way he pleased , or that the adopted son would have no
right of any kind to the adoptive father's property during
7the lifetime of the adoptive parents , and the like.
2.4.1. Conservative view
The conservative view of law on this point is that 
the natural father loses all power over the son from the 
moment when he is adopted, and that the adopted son has in 
his new family precisely the same rights as a natural son, 
save when there arises a competition between the adopted
1 Chitko Raghunath v. Janaki (1874) 11 Bom HC Rep 199; Ravii 
Vinavakrav v. Lakshmibai (1887) 11 Bom 381; Bhaiya Rabidat 
Singh v. Maharani Indar Kunwar (1888) 16 IA 53 (PC); Lakshmi 
v. Subramanya (1889) 12 Mad 490; Naravanasami v. Ramasami 
(1891) 14 Mad 172.
2 Vinavak Naravan v. Govindrav Chintaman (1869) 6 Bom HC Rep 
244; Radhabai v. Ganesh Tatya (1878) 3 Bom 7; Jagannadha v. 
Papamma (1892) 16 Mad 400; Visalakhi Ammal v. Sivaramien 
(1904) 27 Mad 577 (FB).
3 Basava v. Lingangauda (1895) 19 Bom 428; Vyascharyar v. 
Venkubai (1913) 37 Bom 251.
4 Venkappa v. Fakirgowda (1906) 8 Bom LR 346.
5 Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal (1897) 21 Mad 10; Balakrishna 
Motiram v. Shri Uttar Narayan I~1919) 43 Bom 542.
6 Parvatibai v. Vishvanath (1925) 27 Bom LR 1509.
7 Pemra j v. Ra jibai (1937) 39 Bom LR 1069.
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son and a subsequently born legitimate son. Thus the agree­
ment by the natural father cannot prejudice the right of 
the adopted son in his adoptive parents* properties. However 
much a father may judge ex hypothesi that it would be more 
expedient for his son to be adopted1, even though his rights 
are limited, than not to be adopted at all, his acts cannot 
bind a right that begins as his authority ends.
2.4.2. Farran's rule and half-loaf
As far back as in 1887 in Ravji Vinavakrav v. Lakshmibai2 
where a son was adopted by a widow under an agreement with 
the natural father that she should have full enjoyment of 
the property for her life, Farran, J., observed3!
"If the stipulations are unreasonable, such as giving 
to the widow an absolute power of disposition over 
the property, they should be rejected as ultra vires 
of the father; if reasonable, such as only to define 
and limit the son's enjoyment of the property, they 
should be upheld".
The learned judge formulated his rule on the basis of
4
Mayne's observation on minor's liability for his guardian's 
act, and supported it by custom. Lord Macnaghten , however, 
expressed his doubt and said that it was difficult "to under­
stand how an agreement by a natural father could prejudice
1 Derrett, Critique, 136 para 175. Mostly parents give their 
children in adoption for their better and secured financial 
future.
2 (1887) 11 Bom 381.
3 Ibid, 403.
4 Hindu law (Madras* 1st ed., 1878), 172 sec 193. The following 
sentence was quoted in the judgment* "He (minor) will also
be bound by the act of his guardian, when bona fide and 
for his interest, and when it is such as the infant might 
reasonably and prudently have done himself, if he had been 
of full age".
5 Bhaiva Rabidat Singh v. Maharani Indar Kunwar (1888) 16 IA 
53, 59 (PCr.
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or affect the rights of his son, which could only arise
when his parental control and authority determined and
that if conditions were attached to the adoption, the
analogy, such as it is, presented by the doctrines of
Courts of Equity in this country relating to the execution
of powers of appointment would rather suggest that, even
in that case, the adoption would have been valid and the
conditions void”. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court1
put a gloss upon Farran's rule and held that an ante-
adoption agreement when it formed part of the negotiations
preceeding the adoption, and was embodied in the deed of
adoption, came within the powers of the father acting as
guardian of his son in giving him in adoption, and would
bind the son if "the agreement in regard to the property
was in itself a fair and reasonable one, and one which,
taken as part of the contract for the adoption, was for
the minor's benefit, as being a condition on which alone
the adoption would be made". Their Lordships of the Privy
2Council m  Krishnamurthi v. Krishnamurthi observed that 
3the quotation on which Farran, J., formulated his rule 
was from the third edition of Mayne's Hindu law, and that 
the quotation itself being unsound was corrected by Mr. Mayne 
in all the subsequent editions by inserting between the words 
'guardian' and 'when bona fide' the words 'in the management 
of the estate*. Threfore, their Lordships felt it impossible
1 Visalakshi Ammal v. Sivaramien (1904) 27 Mad 577 (FB).
2 AIR 1927 PC 139.
3 Bee supra. 313 f.n. 4.
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to ascribe any value to the guardianship power of the natural 
father to bind the son as to property, in which he could 
not have an interest until the time when guardianship had 
ceased. In Krishnamurthi *s case before the adoption of his 
son the natural father entered into an agreement with the 
adoptive father under which the latter could dispose of 
some portions of his property, and accordingly before his 
death he gave some property to his wife for her life and 
some to persons who were not within degrees entitled to 
maintenance, i.e., strangers. Their Lordships observed1*
’'When a disposition is made inter vivos by one 
who has full power over property under which a 
portion of that property is carried away, it 
is clear that no rights of a son who is subse­
quently adopted can affect that portion which 
is disposed of. The same is true when the dis­
position is by will and the adoption is subsequently 
made by a widow who has been given power to adopt. 
For the will speaks as at the death of the testator, 
and the property is carried away before the adoption 
takes place. It is also obvious that the consent 
or non-consent of the natural father cannot in 
such cases affect the question. But it is quite 
different when the adoption is antecedent to the 
date at which the disposition is meant to take 
effect. The rights which flow from adoption are 
immediate and the disposition, if given effect to, 
is inconsistent with these rights and cannot of 
itself vi propria affect them. There are two propo­
sitions so well settled that no authority need be 
cited. They are, first, that the natural father 
loses all power over the son from the moment when 
he is adopted, and, second that the adopted son 
has in his new family precisely the same rights 
as a natural son, save only when the question is 
one that raises a competition between the natural 
and the adopted son”.
Their Lordships eventually held that the only ground 
on which an ante-adoption agreement with the natural father
1 AIR 1927 PC 139, 144-45.
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could be sanctioned was custom, that an agreement 
giving a life interest in the whole property to the widow 
would be valid if the adopted son could take it on her death, 
and that "as soon, however, as the arrangements go beyond 
that, i.e., either give the widow property absolutely or 
give the property to strangers, they think no custom as to 
this has been proved to exist and that such arrangements are 
against the radical view of the Hindu law". Their Lordships 
also sounded a note of warning against the 'half-loaf' 
notion in the following words1*
"Their Lordships are, therefore, against the idea 
of a general proposition that all arrangements 
consented to by a natural father and of benefit 
in the sense that half a loaf being better than 
no bread, he is better with an adoption with 
truncated rights than with no adoption at all, 
are valid".
The validity of an ante-adoption agreements came
before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Ra iu v.
2Nagammal where an agreement was made with the consent of 
the natural father of the minor adopted son before the 
adoption, and it was arranged that a portion of the adoptive 
father's property would be absolutely given to the adoptive 
mother. The learned judges held the agreement as binding on 
the adopted son, because they thought the arrangement was 
fair, reasonable and beneficial to the adopted son. Although 
the decision seemed to have followed Farran's rule with its 
fair and reasonable gloss, it overlooked the warning of their
1 AIR 1927 PC 139, 146.
2 (1929) 52 Mad 128.
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Lordships in Krishnamurthi * s case, Ramesam, J., explained 
the Privy Council decision to mean that if an absolute 
interest was given to the widow in some items of the property 
which did not amount to practically the whole of the property, 
or as the learned judge said, if a substantial part of the 
property was still left for the adopted son, the arrangement 
could be regarded still as fair and beneficial and therefore 
would be valid1. Venkatasubba Rao, J., observed that for 
determining the validity of ante-adoption arrangements the
2tests laid down m  Visalakshi Ammal*s case should be applied .
Following the decision in Krishnamurthi *s case a Division
.3Bench of the Bombay High Court in Pemrai v, Ra jibai held 
invalid an agreement entered into between the natural father 
and adoptive father, which provided that during the lifetime 
of the adoptive father and mother or either of them the 
adopted son would have no right of any kind to the adopted 
father’s property, and also that an adoptive aunt who had 
no legal claim against the property would be maintained. An 
ante-adoption agreement which provides that the widow should 
manage and enjoy the whole of her husband’s property during 
her lifetime and that the adopted son would take possession 
of and manage it after her death is not unfair, but if the 
widow after such an arrangement alienates practically the 
whole of the property, it cannot be justified on grounds 
of custom^.
1 (1929) 52 Mad 128, 133.
2 Ibid, 140.
3 (1937) 39 Bom LR 1069, 1071.
4 Shankardas v. Channappa (1938) 40 Bom LR 443.
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2.4.3. Modern position
Very recently the question of ante-adoption arrange­
ments came before the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra Ganpati 
v. Ra iaram1. The facts of the case show that by an agreement 
arrived at between the natural father of the adopted son, 
the adoptive mother and the purchaser, all of whom were 
closely related to each other, a small portion of her husband's 
property was given absolutely to the adoptive mother, and 
she sold it to the purchaser for valuable consideration in 
pursuance of that arrangement. Explaining Krishnamurthi *s 
case Shah, A.C.J., who was sitting alone agreed with the 
decision of the Madras High Court in Ra iu * s case wherein, 
as we have seen above, some portion of the property was
absolutely given to the adoptive mother, and held that 
the sale deed executed by the adoptive mother in favour of
the purchaser was binding on the adopted son, and that it
could not be challenged.
After the passing of the Hindu Adoptions.and Maintenance 
Act (Act 78) of 1956 an adoption does no more deprive the 
adoptive father or mother of the power to dispose of his 
or her property. Section 13 of the Act provides*
"Subject to any agreement to the contrary, an 
adoption does not deprive the adoptive father or 
mother of the power to dispose of his or her 
property by transfer inter vivos or by will".
Neither the HAMA of 1956 has affected the recent 
decisions, nor the Hindu Succession Act (Act 30) of 1956 
has necessarily turned the adoptive mother's property into 
an absolute estate in every case. Where the widow taking
1 (1974) 77 Bom LR 62.
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the boy in adoption induces the natural father to agree 
on the minor's behalf to her alienating a substantial but 
not unreasonable portion of the inherited estate to her 
own nominee, this will still be binding on the son when 
he comes of age under the Privy Council ruling. This will 
be envisaged only where, under the terms of the widow's 
deceased husband's will she takes a share of his estate 
subject to the limited estate or subject to the limitation 
that on her death or remarriage it shall revert to the 
testator's next heir. When she inherits for an absolute 
estate no question of divesting can arise1 and therefore 
there is no need whatever for any such bargain in the widow's 
favour.
3. De facto guardianship and the HMGA
3.1. Section 11 of the HMGA
Section 11 of the HMGA has brought about a radical 
change in the law relating to de facto guardians in India. 
The section runs as follows!
•'After the commencement of this Act, no person 
shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, 
the property of a Hindu minor merely on the 
ground of his or her being the de facto guardian 
of the minor".
There is a controversy whether this section has 
abolished the de facto guardianship. S.V. Gupte rightly 
says "This section does not prevent a person from acting
1 Sections 12 and 14, HSA 1956.
2 Hindu law of Adoption. Maintenance. Minority and Guardian­
ship (Bombay: 1970), 416.
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as de facto guardian of the property or person of a minor".
M.W. Pradhan 1 says that this sectiom abolishes de facto
guardians as it is no longer felt necessary to grant
recognition to them. But even a plain reading of the section
would show that it has not abolished de facto guardianship.
As seen earlier, section 4(b) of the HMGA defines a guardian
as a person having the care of the person of a minor or of
his property, and includes a natural, testamentary, certificated
guardian and a guardian appointed by any court of wards.
When any person having the care of the person or property
of a minor or of both his person and property may be included
in the; definition of a guardian, there is no difference
between section 4(b) of the HMGA and section 4(2) of the
2GWA which includes all the four types of guardians enumerated 
in section 4(b) of the HMGA along with de facto guardians^.
The HMGA has not laid down anywhere that the person having 
the care of the person or property must have it by the 
authority of law. Thus there is every reason to believe that 
the HMGA has not abolished de facto guardianship as a whole;
it has limited or restricted those powers merely. Derrett
4said prior to the enactment of the Bill i
"Of course one can hardly abolish de facto guardians 
by statute but one can certainly prevent by this 
means the speedy and effectual act of an adult, on 
behalf of a minor whose natural guardians (i.e. 
parents) have died in some calamity, which would 
secure to the minor financial security and compara­
tive independence. The law has in the past given 
the de facto guardian his status because it was 
necessary to protect an honest man who was willing
1 Guardianship Acts, 229. A similar view was expressed obiter
by Chagla, C.J., in Naravan v. Ramchandra AIR 1957 Bom 146 (FB).
2 Pradhan, Guardianship Acts. 14.
3 Ibid, 15. So Gupte, Hindu law of Adoption, 416.
4 'The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Bill, 1953' in (1953)
55 Bom LR (Jour) 89-94, 90.
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to buy property belonging to a minor and give 
value to it, though the person actually making 
the transfer were merely an adult who had, out 
of charity, taken on some responsibilities with 
regard to the person and property of the minor, 
and was not a certificated guardian. Similarly 
if an orphan were taken in by his maternal uncle 
and housed and educated at his expense there is 
no doubt but that ... that uncle would have 
rights of indemnity against the estate of his 
de facto ward, notwithstanding the lack of 
appointment, and similarly a lender to the uncle 
for the minor's purposes would have a right of 
subrogation against the estate of the minor. We 
cannot abolish the de facto guardian altogether 
since the effects would be monstrously inequitable".
B.B. Mitra says that section 11 has merely prevented 
a _d_e facto guardian from disposing of or dealing with the
1 9property of a minor . So also Kulla says i
"The present section now does away with the authority 
of any person to deal with or dispose of any 
property of a Hindu minor on the ground of his 
being the de facto guardian of such minor".
The mere repetition of the statute's phraseology is 
hardly illuminating. It is already clear that under the 
pre-1956 Hindu law a de facto guardian, although he lacked 
any statutory recognition, had full judicial recognition 
and enjoyed all the powers of a natural or legal guardian 
with regard to the alienation or acquisition of property 
either on behalf of or for the benefit of the minor. But 
under the HMGA if section 5 which contains the overriding 
effect of the Act, is read along with section 11, it would 
appear that he would have no power to dispose of or deal
1 Guardians'and Wards Act, 391.
2 Hindu law (14th ed.), 974.
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with a minor's property, and thus even the rule in Hunooman- 
persaud's case and the interpretations made thereon stand 
overridden. Gupte not-unnaturally asks if-the de facto 
guardian retains powers mentioned in section 8(1) but 
none of those mentioned in section 8(2) of the Act.
Section 5 of the HMGA in fact provides as followsi
"Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,--
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu 
law or any custom or usage as part of that 
law in force immediately before the commence­
ment of this Act shall cease to have effect 
with respect to any matter for which provi­
sion is made in this Act;
(b) any other law in force immediately before 
the commencement of this Act shall cease 
to have effect in so far as it is incon­
sistent with any of the provisions contained 
in this Act".
Derrett has offered two interpretations of section 11. 
He says1*
"According to the first the de facto guardian of 
a minor is reduced to the position of a de facto 
guardian of a lunatic adult. All his dispositions 
on the minor's behalf are void, and even his 
receipts for the minor's debts are unable to 
discharge the minor's debtors, even if they are 
evidence against the guardian that he has received 
money to the use of the minor. The de facto 
guardian is therefore abolished. Since a minor 
cannot under the modern law of India appoint a 
guardian if he cannot appoint a de facto guardian, 
and since a very young child cannot purport to 
appoint anybody under any provision of law, 
this is highly inconvenient. It is very doubtful 
whether the common law rule enabling the minor to 
appoint a guardian can be taken away by the words 
of section 11, and if the de facto guardian is 
saved in such instances there is every likelihood 
that he is saved in the other instances also.
1 Introduction, 85 para 111.
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If the section had said that the acts of the 
de facto guardian should be null and void, thus 
preserving the liability of the guardian for 
receipts, whilst destroying his capacity to 
alienate, no room for doubt would remain. But 
the second line of interpretation takes advantage 
of the words, 'entitled to dispose* and interprets 
them strictly. No guardian by virtue of his 
guardianship has any title in the property of his 
ward, but his office, established by law, entitles 
him to make alienations which will bind the 
minor's estate. The previous state of the law, 
by which, in certain circumstances, a de facto 
guardian was entitled to bind the minor's estate, 
is not, it is submitted, altered by section 11. 
What the statute aims to prevent, it would seem, 
is an alienee claiming against a minor on the 
ground that the alienor (the guardian) was 
entitled to alienate to him 'merely on the 
ground of his or her being the de facto guardian'. 
In other words, where the alienee can show that 
the alienation was on the ground of the minor's 
necessities or the evident benefit of the minor's 
estate, and not merely the character which the 
de facto guardian enjoyed for the time being as 
the minor's general representative, the alienee 
was to be protected exactly as under the previous 
system, to which we must necessarily refer as 
the continuing law of India in reference to 
Hindu minors. The marginal note, 'De facto 
guardian not to deal with minor's property', 
does not control the meaning of the plain words 
of the section, and we must interprete the statute 
in such a way that its plain words take effect, 
particularly when their effect is consistent with 
the intention which, on other grounds, we may 
believe Parliament had. An interpretation which, 
relying upon the marginal note alone, attempted 
to destroy the institution of the de facto 
guardian, would create more inconveniences than 
it would solve".
Commenting on these interpretations B.N. Sampath 
observes -^1
"Professor Derrett's interpretation, though it 
flows from a literal rendering of the section, 
is not tenable in the light of the other pro­
visions of the Act. It cannot be disputed that 
a natural guardian, a guardian appointed by the
1 'Authority of the de facto guardian in Hindu lawi an 
appraisal' in (1969) 2 SCJ 70-78, 77.
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court or even a testamentary guardian has a 
better 'locus standi' than a de facto guardian.
We have earlier noticed that the right of a 
natural guardian to alienate the property of 
the minor was extended to the de facto guardian 
only by judicial rationalization. Now when the 
Act has circumscribed in section 8 the authority 
of a natural guardian to deal with the estate 
of the minor and has further taken away from 
him the right to alienate the property without 
the prior permission of the court even in case 
of necessity, it will not be consistent with 
the attitude of the Act to say that the de facto 
guardian can alienate the property in case of 
necessity, which in effect means that a de facto 
guardian is in a better position than a de jure 
guardian. Further this interpretation ignores 
the fact that the section has dealt with two 
different modes of action on the part of the 
guardian, namely, 'to dispose of' and 'to deal 
with'. This interpretation takes care of the 
expression 'to dispose of ... merely on the
ground of his or her being the de facto guardian*
but it does not account for 'to deal with the 
property merely on the ground of his or her 
being the de facto guardian'. The meaning of 
the latter clause is obvious, that a de facto 
guardian shall not meddle with the property 
of the minor".
Raghavachariar says1 that under section 11 any alie­
nation made by the de facto guardian of a minor's property
is on the same footing as.that made by any ad hoc guardian,
and is invalid and not binding on the minor even if it is 
beneficial to the interests of the minor. Under the heading 
'Reason for the abolition of de facto guardianship' the 
writer points out that the doctrine of the de facto guardian 
ship enunciated in Hunoomanpersaud's case had had its 
origin in the practical equity of the Hindu jurists who felt 
the necessity of protecting the transactions entered into
1 Hindu law (6th ed.), 1144.
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for the minor’s benefit or necessity by one interested in 
the minor and who took charge of the management of his 
property for the minor's benefit, and then observes1*
"When the character of the people changed and 
the high ideals of generosity and philanthropy 
gave place to selfishness and dishonesty with 
the rapid growth in the ideas of individualism 
and separate property, the institution of de 
facto guardianship underwent a corresponding 
deterioration and became an easy instrument of 
unscrupulous profit of friends and relations 
at the cost of the minor. Wherever there was a 
minor with any sizable estate with no parent 
to care for his interest and welfare, there 
was a race amongst the minor's greedy kinsmen 
to clutch at his property and deal with it to 
their advantage posing as the de facto guardians 
of the minor. Cases were not uncommon of several 
persons claiming to be the de facto guardians 
of the same minor and alienating the minor's 
property for ostensible necessity or benefit 
which had no existence in reality but concocted 
for the purpose or by the ingenuity of dishonesty, 
and one not infrequently finds the minor once 
possessed of a prosperous estate reduced to the 
brink of bankruptcy when he attains the age of 
majority. On account of the growing frequency 
of such cases, it was thought desirable to 
abolish the de facto guardianship altogether 
so that no further encouragement might be given 
to such dishonest relations of the minors out 
to profit at another's cost".
That the dishonest practices by the de facto guardians
with the minors' properties restricted the powers of such
de facto guardians is also expressed by Derrett when he 
2
says that the powers of alienation possessed by a guardian 
as an honest de facto guardian are peculiar and are not yet 
finally determined in spite of numerous dicta in reported 
cases, and that the suspicion of intermeddling by dishonest
1 Raghavavachariar, Hindu law (6th ed.). 1145.
2 Introduction, 85 para 110.
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and incompetent persons under the pretence of saving the 
minor's property where no legal guardian exists led to 
Parliament's obscuring the legal position by providing 
section 11 in the HMGA. Or as he surmised1 the Parliament 
passed the section to protect the property of minors which 
the de facto guardians or strangers, as they often are, 
were making away with under the cover of minor's necessity 
or benefit.
The suspicion or distrust' which today is apprehended 
of a de facto guardian cannot be ignored altogether, but 
at the same time it would not be fair to say like Raghava- 
chariar that all people who assume the duty of a de facto 
guardian have given themselves up to such vices. By 
'abolishing' de facto guardianship has Parliament solved 
all the need and problems that caused the growth of the 
institution? The diverse social set-up and bad communication 
system, the unforeseen urgency for money and poor financial 
condition of the people, and dearth and delay of law courts 
and the fear of financial involvement in litigation, as it 
often turns out on a guardianship application, prompted 
the courts to recognise de facto guardianship in the past, 
and it rendered wonderful services to the society for more 
than a century. These conditions are still there, and 
more acutely. The usefulness of de facto guardianship in 
time of distress, the haste with which a transaction could 
be effected under it and less cost for such guardianship
1 Derrett, Critique, 175 para 224.
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procedure have in no way diminished its utility, rather 
increased it enormously.
Of the two interpretations given by Derrett1, undoubt­
edly the second one has much to commend the de facto 
guardianship. We have seen earlier that sastric texts 
did not entitle any person other than manager as of right 
to alienate the family property.' What they laid down was 
that if any member of a family or any person attached to 
the family made an alienation of the family property or 
incurred any debt under certain circumstances, the house­
keeper or manager was bound to honour it or repay it and 
could not avoid it by pleading want of authority on the 
part of the person who actually alienated the property 
or contracted the debt. When the alienee sought to bind 
the manager or the estate he did not base his claim on 
the authority of the alienor, but on the necessity for the 
alienation or the benefit accruing to the family estate 
from such alienation or debt. So also in the case of 
de facto guardianship the guardian is not entitled to 
alienate, but it is his position and the necessity of the 
minor that justify the alienation. That legal necessity 
for the alienation and not the legal authority of the 
person effecting the alienation was at the root of the 
validity of a de facto guardian's acts was admitted by the 
learned judges of the Federal Court in Sriramulu's case.
1 See supra, 322-23.
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Kania, C. J., observed1*
"On first principles, it appears clear that a 
manager, who manages the estate of the minor 
because he finds it necessary to do so, although 
he has no legal title to handle the estate, 
must have his powers circumscribed by the limits 
of the necessity or benefit to the estate of the 
minor. The law has tried to find a solution out 
of two difficult situations . When a Hindu minor 
has no legal guardian, there will be no one 
who can handle and manage his estate in law, so 
that unless some one is deemed to have authority, 
the minor will not receive any income or return 
from his estates. The second point is that a 
person having no title cannot be permitted to 
intermeddle with the minor*s estate so as to cause 
a loss to the minor. Judicial decisions have 
tried to find a way out of these difficulties”.
All the four learned judges of the Federal Court
held that an alienation by a de facto guardian or manager
would be valid if made for the minor’s necessity or benefit
2of his estate. Derrett also says *
”The great feature of Hindu law ... is the authority 
of the guardian to act for necessity or benefit 
of the estate independently of any court order 
and without fear of personal liability in the 
event that a successful attack might be launched 
against the transaction, on the ground that it 
was not objectively justified, provided he acts 
honestly in the minor's best interests. That 
feature is in great danger of being obscured if 
the HMGA is construed in a manner hostile to 
Hindu tradition”.
3
As seen already Derrett has interpreted section 11 
in this way that if an alienee can show that the alienation 
was on the ground of the minor's necessities or the evident 
benefit of the minor's estate, and not merely of the
1 AIR 1949 FC 218, 222.
2 Critique. 176 para 225.
3 See supra. 322-23.
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character which the de facto guardian enjoyed for the time
being as the minor's representative, the alienee could
be protected exactly as under the previous system, i.e.,
the Anglo-Hindu law, and he would not come within the
mischief of the section since his act in respect of the
minor's property was not done on the basis of his being
entitled to do it. T.L. Venkatarama Iyer (a former Justice
of the Supreme Court) observes^*
"If, as seems probable, the section and also
the marginal note --- which, of course, cannot
be referred to for construing the section --
were both intended to give effect to these 
observations (viz., observations of the learned 
judges in Sriramulu's case that a de facto 
guardian could validly alienate for necessity 
or benefit of the minor), then the opinion 
expressed by the author [Dr. DerrettJ becomes 
unassailable".
Although B.N. Sampath is firm in his conviction 
that the provision of section 11 has abolished de facto 
guardianship, he feels the latter's necessity keenly when 
he says^i
"In the present state of the Hindu society and 
the pattern of judicial administration abolition 
of de facto guardianship creates several practical 
problems. It may be urged that those who would 
have otherwise acted as de facto guardians should 
get themselves appointed as legal guardians and 
to this extent they have to put up with the incon­
venience of the legal process. If they are so 
disinclined to undertake even that much inconveni­
ence, law cannot help because nobody compels an 
unwilling party to take up the responsibility 
of guardianship. Though there is some substance 
in this connection, it must be confessed that 
in the prevailing state of judicial administration 
the appointment of even ad hoc legal guardians 
involves considerable inconvenience and expense
1 (1966) 29 Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, 172-174, 173.
2 (1969) 2 SCJ 70-78, 77-78.
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and may indeed deter any well-intentioned relative 
or acquaintance from seeking the appointment. 
Further, either due to ignorance or with a view 
to avoid the pin pricks of legal process the 
de facto guardians may ignore the provisions of 
the Act. Thus in the absence of follow-up action 
to gear up judicial administration with regard 
to the appointment of ad hoc legal guardians, the 
abolition of de facto guardianship would foster 
litigation with respect to the property of the 
minors which indeed is antithetical to the very 
objective of the Act"•
L.S. Sastri observes1!
"A de facto guardian means ... one who has taken 
up the care and protection of the minor and his 
property in the absence of a de jure guardian 
..• ordinarily a relative of the minor, who is 
left helpless by destiny and whom chance has 
thrown in the hands of the benefactor. The minor's 
property may not be large and may be just sufficient 
for the up-keep of the minor. It may not permit 
the taking of proceedings in court for getting 
the de facto guardian appointed or declared 
guardian under the Guardians and Wards Act • In 
India, how many such cases are there? If the masses 
are considered, they must be numerous. Now, accord­
ing to the Joint Committe, this clause 'abolishes 
de facto guardians'. It is an obvious mistake.
The relationship cannot be abolished, it will 
continue to exist perpetually. The utmost that 
can be said is that such a guardian, however 
disinterested and philanthropic his action may be, 
has no power, in law to alienate or deal with the 
minor's property"•
Following the second interpretation of Derrett, Paras
Diwan considers that section 11 has not abolished de facto
2guardianship. He observes i
"In cases where minor's property is not much,
or in cases where a person is not willing to
take the pain and expenses of getting oneself
appointed a guardian, yet he is willing to act
in the interest of the minor, in our peculiar
social context, de facto guardian fulfills a
social need. Then it should not be forgotten
that if de facto guardian has powers of a
guardian, he also has the liabilities qf a 
guardian. On the other hand, if he is just treated
as an intermeddler or a trespasser, no liability
1 Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. 1956 (Allahabad! 
1958), 56.
2 Hindu law (2nd ed., 1974), 231.
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which arises on account of guardian's fiduciary- 
character can be imposed on him"•
One thing is clear from the observations of different
commentators that the necessity for de facto guardianship
is still there in full force in society. In this state
of affairs when the HMGA has not stated categorically that
the acts of a de facto guardian are void1, the de facto
guardianship should not be treated as abolished. On the
contrary, a de facto guardian should be allowed to enjoy
the same powers and position as he used to do before. If,
however, section 11 is construed to have abolished it,
2it is necessary either, as Derrett has suggested to amend 
section 11 "to enable (i) de facto guardians to have powers 
similar to those of natural guardians provided that they 
conform to the requirements of de facto guardianship 
as under Anglo-Hindu law; (ii) alienees from these and 
all guardians other than the appointed guardian to take 
advantage of the rule in Hunoomanpersaud*s case", or 
quietly adopt his second interpretation of section 11 and 
allow a de facto guardian to enjoy all the powers and 
position as he enjoyed under Anglo-Hindu law. But the 
adoption of this interpretation would be difficult so 
long as the language of section 11 is not changed to show 
that de facto guardians have all their previous powers, 
since between an ambiguous statute and a 'forward-looking'
1 Derrett, Introduction. 85 para 110.
2 Critique, Appendix III, 434.
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precedent the former would tempt even a 'socially-commutted• 
judge.
3,2. Section 11 and the courts
There are certain recent cases in which it has been 
held that in view of section 11 a de facto guardian cannot 
alienate a minor’s property. In RaIalakshmi v. Ramachandran1 
Natesan, J., observedi
’’One vital and important change introduced in 
the Hindu law relating to minors is that relating 
to the power of a de facto guardian. Under the 
Hindu law the powers of a de facto guardian or 
a de facto manager of a Hindu minor’s property 
to bind the minor’s estate by alienations of 
immovable property of the minor in case of necessity 
or for the benefit of the minor's estate have 
been recognised in numerous decisions. Section 11 
of the Act now takes away these powers completely”.
2In Naram Singh v. Sapurna Kuer where a mother acting 
as the guardian of her minor son sold the minor’s property 
when the minor's father was alive, Mahapatra, J., sitting 
alone held that as long as the father was alive the mother 
could not claim to be the competent natural guardian of a 
Hindu minor and she would have no authority whatsoever to 
act as a guardian for the purpose of disposing of the minor's 
property as she would not come under any of the categories 
given in section 4(b) read with section 6 of the HMGA, 
de facto guardianship being abolished under section 11. It 
was further held that where the father refused to act as 
the natural guardian or neglected to discharge his obligations
1 (1966) 2 MLJ 4207 422-23.
2 AIR 1968 Pat 318.
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as a natural guardian in respect of the minor, his affairs 
and properties, the mother could take recourse to legal 
proceedings and obtain powers to act as the guardian of
1 2the minor • In Gurumurty v. Raghu Podhan the Orissa High
Court held that the doctrine of legal necessity as enunciated
in Hunoomanpersaud*s case, under which a de facto guardian
could validly alienate a minor's property, was abrogated
by section 11 of the HMGA, and that a sale by a de facto
guardian was void ab initio under section 11 and the alienee
from him would be a rank trespasser. The facts of the case
show that the natural mother of a minor son acting as de
facto guardian sold some homestead land by a registered
deed, which the minor inherited from his adoptive father.
3In Sohrab Khan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation brothers
acting as the de facto guardians of their minor brother
transferred the latter*s property while their mother was
alive. The mother being the natural guardian Gulati, J.,
held that the provisions of section 11 contained an absolute
prohibition against the transfer of a Hindu minor’s property
by his de facto guardian, and that since under section 8 of
the HMGA only the natural guardian was permitted to deal
with the minor's property with the permission of the court,
the alienation was absolutely void. A Division Bench of the
4Mysore High Court m  Talari Erappa v. Muthyalappa also
1 cp., Mavilswami Chettiar v. Kaliammal (1969) 1 MLJ 177.
2 AIR 1967 Ori 68.
3 (1970) 68 All LJ 288, 290.
4 AIR 1972 Mys 31, 33.
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held that after the coming into force of the HMGA under 
no circumstances could a de facto guardian transfer the 
minor's property on the ground of his being a de facto 
guardian, and that under section 11 a sale made by such 
a guardian would be void and the minor on attaining 
majority could not validate such a sale by ratification.
The negative decisions in cases where a person acted 
as the de facto guardian of a minor while a natural guardian 
was alive and either neglected or refused to act, seem to 
have been considerably shaken by the Supreme Court decision 
in Ji jabai v. Pathankhan .^ The court said that if the father 
refused to act as guardian and the mother was in the manage­
ment of the minor's property for several years then she 
would be able to bind the minor by granting a lease of the 
minor's land in the course of proper management of the 
property. Vaidialingam, J., observed that, although 
normally when the father was alive he was the natural 
guardian and it was only after him the mother could become 
the natural guardian, the mother, in such circumstances 
as in the instant case, could be treated as the natural 
guardian. Although the learned judge treated the mother as 
a natural guardian, actually she was a guardian of necessity 
or what was in Anglo-Hindu law a de facto guardian. Section 
6(a) and (b) of the HMGA does not say that both the father 
and the mother could become natural guardian at the same
1 AIR 1971 SC 315, 319.
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time. The section plainly shows that the natural guardian­
ship of one does not arise when that of the other continues, 
i.e., under sub-section (a) the mother cannot become the 
natural guardian of her son or unmarried daughter while 
the father is alive or until he becomes disentitled to 
act as such under the proviso of the section, so also under 
sub-section (b) the father cannot be the natural guardian 
of his illegitimate son or illegitimate unmarried daughter 
so long as the mother is alive and not disentitled under 
the said proviso. When either of the parents is acting as 
natural guardian, the other cannot have that character. If 
he or she performs the duty of a guardian, he or she should 
be treated as a de facto guardian'*' as he or she used to be 
under Anglo-Hindu law. In what may, popularly, be called a 
’break through' the Supreme Court’s decision in Ji iabai's 
case may be taken to have indirectly recognised the insti­
tution of de facto guardianship or at least recognised the 
necessity for it.
Until the ambiguous section 11 is amended as suggested 
by Derrett or Sampath the courts may follow this decision 
and hold the persons who are in the actual management of 
minors’ properties and who are not complete strangers as 
de facto guardians of the minors, $nd their acts in respect 
of property as binding on the minors if effected for the 
benefit and necessity of the minors. Such a view was expressed
1 Manishankar v. Bai Muli (1888) 12 Bom 686; Arunachala Reddi 
v. Chidambara Reddi (1902) 13 MLJ 223? Kundan Lai v. Beni 
Prasad (1931) 137 IC 115? Mavilswami Chettiar v. Kaliammal 
(1969) 1 MLJ 177.
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by all the learned judges of the Federal Court in Sriramulu’s 
case. The Allahabad High Court in Kumar v. Onkar Nath1 
said that even if the father was alive, the mother was 
competent to give a notice of demand for rents and dues 
and also to file a suit on behalf of the minor. Trivedi,
J., observed that giving of notice of demand and filing 
the suit was not disposing of or dealing with the property 
of a minor as understood by section 11 of the HMGA and 
that since a next friend could under Order 32 Rule of the 
Civil Procedure Code (Act 5) of 1908 file a suit on a 
minor’s behalf, the mother could file a suit and give a 
notice. Whether she may be called a next friend or a de 
facto guardian, the fact that she could work as such with 
respect to a minor’s property sufficiently indicates that 
some person other than a natural guardian may work even 
when the latter is alive and the courts recognise such 
work. It speaks at least of the necessity of de facto 
guardianship.
2Recently in Ranqanatha Gounder v. Kuppuswami Naidu 
Ismail, J., of the Madras High Court treated the mother 
as de facto guardian while the father was still alive, but 
the learned judge denied her the authority which the Supreme 
Court extended to her in Ji iabai *s case. The facts of the 
two cases are identical excepting that in the High Court 
case it is not clear whether the father refused or neglected 
to act as the natural guardian and the mother was in the
1 AIR 1972 All 81.
2 (1976) 2 MLJ 128.
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actual management of the minor's property. The learned 
High Court judge did not refer to the Supreme Court case, 
on the contrary, followed Ra jalakshmi * s case which was a 
case of his own High Court but which was regarding some 
illegitimate Hindu minors on whom the wife of their putative 
father settled some properties by a deed of settlement.
The putative father mortgaged some of these properties 
without being appointed a guardian by the court and when 
the natural mother of the minors was alive. If it was.known 
what part the father played in the management of the minors' 
properties the case could have been distinguished from the 
Supreme Court case.
As long as the minors have properties the necessity 
of de facto guardianship would be there. Social and economic 
condition of the common people, the poor distribution of 
judicial machineries and their scanty number in proportion 
to the ever increasing population of the Subcontinent do 
not allow every child to come to the court and get appointed 
a guardian. The old habits would continue; either a member 
of the family or a near relation or an immediate neighbour 
would act as a guardian. The Indian Parliament may deny to 
recognise them as de facto guardians, but the courts would 
find them. Indeed it is unwise to restrict the powers of 
a de facto guardian before effecting a thorough overhauling 
of the socio-economic condition of the people, a thorough 
improvement of the communication system and a thorough 
resetting and renovation of the judiciary.
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4• Specific performance of a guardian*s contract
We have seen in chapter 2 that according to the 
Privy Council decisions in Waghela Raisanii*s and Indur 
Chunder*s case a.guardian of a minor could not enter 
into a contract on the minor's behalf if it imposed a 
personal liability on the minor, and the minor's estate 
could not be made liable for such contract unless the 
guardian showed by acts and behaviour that he acted on 
behalf of the minor. Despite section 11 of the Contract
Act the Indian courts were holding that a minor's contracts
1 . 2 were voidable , but m  Mohori Bibee's case it was held
that such contracts were absolutely void. The guestion of
specific performance of a guardian's contract did not
come before the Privy Council until 1911 when in Mir
3Sarwarian v, Fakhruddin Mahomed the guestion was raised 
for decision* Can specific performance of a contract 
validly entered into on behalf of a minor be enforced?
Lord Macnaghten who delivered the judgment of the Judicial 
Committee held that it was not within the competence of 
a manager of a minor's estate or within the competence
1 Rennie v. Gunga Narain (1865) 3 WR 10 (CR); Hari Ram 
v, Jiban Ram (1869) 3 BLR 426; Boiddonath v. Ram
Kishore (1870) 13 WR 166 (CR); Doorqa Churan v. Ram 
Narain (1870) 13 WR 172 (CR); Hanmant v, Jayarao 
Narsinha (1888) 13 Bom 50; Mahomed Arif v, Saraswati 
Debya (1891) 18 Cal 259; Krishnasami v, Sundarappayyar 
(1895) 18 Mad 415.
2 (1903) 30 IA 114 (PC).
3 (1911) 39 IA 1 (PC).
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of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minor’s 
estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable pro­
perty, and that as the minor was not bound by the contract, 
there was no mutuality and therefore the minor could 
not obtain specific performance of the contract. This 
decision was not uniformly understood by the judges of 
the Indian courts, and as a result different High Courts 
were holding conflicting views on the question until 
very recently when the Privy Council case was distinguished 
as a Muslim case1 and its decision was thought to be 
confined to Muslim cases only. Before discussing the 
Privy Council case we must see in short how specific 
performance is dependent on ’mutuality'.
4.1. Doctrine of mutuality
The doctrine of mutuality means that the contract 
should be mutually enforceable by each party against 
the other, and not that right for right there must be 
a corresponding clause in the contract which may contain 
a series of clauses. Mutuality does not mean equality 
and exact arithmetical correspondence. It means that 
each party must have the freedom to enforce his rights
1 Derrett, 'The power of guardians of non-Muslim minors* 
a sad misunderstanding', in (1967) 1 MLJ 15-20. See 
also Survaprakasam v. Ganqara iu AIR 1956 AP 33, 38;
Vi jaykumar v. Gokulchand (1964) 68 Bom LR 891, 894.
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l ounder the contract against the other . Fry observes i
"A contract to be specifically enforced by the
court must, as a general rule, be mutual, --
that is to say, such that it might, at the 
time it was entered into, have been enforced 
by either of the parties against the other 
of them. When, therefore, whether from personal 
incapacity to contract, or the nature of the 
contract, or any other cause, the contract 
is incapable of being enforced against one 
party, that party is, generally, incapable 
of enforcing it against the other, though 
its execution in the latter way might in 
itself be free from the difficulty attending 
its execution in the former"•
Before Mir Sarwarian's case the doctrine of mutuality
was not recognised in India; it was only after this Privy
Council case that it began to be applied by the Indian
3courts to their cases • Although it is generally agreed 
that for a contract to be specifically enforced there
4
must be mutuality between the parties , there is a differ­
ence of opinion as to the requirement of mutuality. Accord­
ing to one view the court should not grant specific per­
formance to one party when it cannot do so at the suit
1 Fazaladdin Mandal v. Panchanan Das AIR 1957 Cal 92, 95 
per Bachwat, J.; Dasarath v. Sattyanarayan AIR 1963 Cal 
325, 327; Sree Ram v. Ratanlal AIR 1965 All 83, 86.
2 Sir Edward Fry, A Treatise on the Specific Performance 
of Contracts (London* 6th ed., 1921), 219 sec. 460.
3 Krishnasami v. Sundarappayyar (1895) 18 Mad 415; see also 
Whitley Stokes, Anglo-Indian Codes Vol. 1, 931; Paras 
Diwan, 'Powers of the guardian of the minor's property 
under Hindu law', in (1963) 15/2 Law Review. 142-201, 187.
4 Selton v. Slade (1862) 7 Ves 265; 32 ER 108.
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of the other1. Therefore, a minor cannot enforce a contract
2 . . . by this remedy ; his promise is not specifically enforce­
able against him, and there is want of mutuality. According 
to the other view when a person seeking specific perfor­
mance has completed his part of the contract, he renders
3the remedy mutual • The latter view is more popular nowadays,
but it cannot be of any use to our purpose, since such a
contract cannot be enforced against a minor even though
. 4the minor may enforce it • Where a contract is executed 
in favour of a minor and the minor has fulfilled his part 
of the contract, there is no need to raise the question
of the presence of mutuality. Wallis, C.J., observed in
. . 5Raqhava v. Srinivasa i
"The minor could not bind himself by contract 
to pay the price or advance the mortgage 
money; but when he has done so and the vendor 
or mortgagor has executed a registered convey­
ance in his favour, is there any reason why 
the transfer in his favour should not take 
effect?"
In discussing the scope of the doctrine of mutuality
0
Knight Bruce, V.-C., stated in Salisbury v. Hatcher i
"In cases of specific performance, want of mutuality 
is generally material, but it is settled, that
1 Snell, Principles of Equity (26th ed.), 648; Fry, Specific 
Performance (6th ed.), 219; Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern 
Equity (10th ed.), 50.
2 Flight v. Bolland (1828) 4 Russ 298; 38 ER 817; Lumley v. 
Ravenscroft (1895) 1 QB 683.
3 Wylson v. Dunn (1887) 34 CH D 569; Lanqen and Wind Ltd. 
v. Bell (1972) Ch 685.
4 Raqhava v. Srinivasa AIR 1917 Mad 630 (FB).
5 AIR 1917 Mad 630 (FB).
6 (1843) 12 L.J. Ch 68, 70 (NS).
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perfect mutuality is not universally requisite, 
in order to call the powers of a court of equity 
into action. There are numerous cases in which 
decrees have been made in favour of parties, 
who, at the time of the filing of the bill, 
were not in a state to make an absolute convey­
ance. Where in such cases there is no invali­
dity at law, there is a large discretion to be 
exercised by the court".
It is obvious from the above observations of the 
Vice-Chancellor that specific performance being an equitable 
remedy courts may waive the requirement of complete mutuality 
for the specific performance of a contract, and also under 
certain circumstances in the exercise of their discretion 
they can override the doctrine of mutuality1. However, 
mutuality is generally expected to be present for the 
specific performance of an agreement.
After the Privy Council decision in Mohori Bibee*s 
case, where a minor's agreement was declared void, no agree­
ment may be specifically enforced by or against the minor2. 
This does not affect the specific enforcement of a contract 
entered into by a guardian on a minor's behalf.' Both in 
Flight v. Bolland and Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose4. 
where a contract was refused, the contracts were entered
1 For exceptions and limitations to the doctrine of specific 
performance see Fry, Specific Performance (6th ed.), 223-25 
secs. 464-470; Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern Eauitv
(10th ed.), 55-58. -------- M L
2 Pollock and Mulla, Indian Contract and Specific Relief 
Acts (9th ed., 1972), 114.
3 (1828) 4 Russ 298; 38 ER 817,
4 (1903) 30 IA 114 (PC).
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into with the minors themselves who were seeking to enforce 
them. Pollock and Mulla say1 where a contract is entered 
into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or by a manager 
of his estate that contract can be specifically enforced 
by or against the minor, if the contract is one which it 
is within the competence of the guardian to enter into 
on his behalf so as to bind him by it, and further if it is 
for the benefit of the minor. The competency of a 
guardian referred to here is to be determined by the 
personal law of the minor. In this respect there would, 
it is submitted, be no justification for treating the 
specific performance of contracts of guardians of minors 
of different communities on different principles or to
lay down different principles applicable to them unless
. . . . . 2the personal law of a minor justified such a distinction .
We must now study a case which was the cause of further 
confusion.
4.2. Mir Sarwarian*s case (1911) and the doctrine of 
mutuality
The facts of Mir Sarwarian*s case show that one 
Mr. Garth was the manager of the minor plaintiff's estate 
and an agent of Mr. Garth had entered into an agreement 
with Mir Sarwarjan, the defendant, to purchase certain 
property without any express authority from Mr. Garth.
1 Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts (9th ed., 1972), 115.
2 In Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya AIR 1949 FC 218, 222 
Kania, C.J., made a similar observation on a guardian's 
power to sell a minor's property.
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The agreement was subsequently accepted and ratified by
the minor, as if the agent had been the minor’s agent,
which (of course) he was not. On these facts a Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court referred the case to a
Full Bench1 with the following two questions* (l) Can
specific performance of a contract validly entered into
on behalf of a minor be enforced? and (2) Has the case
2of Fatima Bibi v. Debnauth Shah been rightly decided? 
Maclean, C.J., with whom four other judges of the Full 
Bench concurred, answered the questions by saying that 
"if a contract was validly entered into on behalf of a 
minor and there was mutuality in such contract, it might 
be specifically enforced'*, and that Fatima Bibi's case 
was rightly decided. Applying the principle as suggested
by the learned Chief Justice the Division Bench reviewed 
Fatima Bibi's case and both Rampini and Woodroffe, JJ., 
found in their independent concurring judgments that 
Fatima Bibi's case was decided on a misapprehension of 
facts, since, as the learned judges observed, Norris, J., 
who decided Fatima Bibi's case, appeared to them to have 
been under the impression that the contract in Fatima 
Bibi *s case had been entered into by the minor herself 
and was consequently void. Maclean, C.J., did not minutely 
consider the facts of Fatima Bibi's case and therefore 
missed the subtle and important difference between a minor's
1 Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakharuddin Mahomed Chowdhury (1907)
34 Cal 163, 166 (FB).
2 (1893) 20 Cal 508.
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contract and a contract entered into on her behalf by her 
guardian. The learned judges of the Division Bench found 
that the contract in Fatima Bibi's case was entered into 
by the minor's father, Hafiz Abdool Kadir, as guardian 
of the minor, and that the decision was wrong because, the 
father being a competent guardian in Muslim law, mutuality 
was not wanting in that case. On the basis of this finding 
the learned judges of the Division Bench held that the 
contract in Mir Sarwarian's Case (1907) was specifically 
enforceable as they thought rightly that mutuality was there, 
and further that there was no difference between the position 
and powers of a guardian and those of a manager. The case 
was then taken up on appeal before the Privy Council where 
their Lordships proceeded on the assumptions of the Calcutta 
High Court that the contract was intended to bind the minor 
or the minor's estate and that the purchase was advantageous 
to the minor1.
But in considering the opinion of the learned judges 
of the High Court relating to the difference between the 
position and powers of a guardian and those of a manager 
of the minor's property Lord Macnaghten made the following 
observation^i
"Without some authority their Lordships are unable 
to accept the view of the learned judges of the 
Division Bench that there is no difference between 
the position and powers of a manager and those 
of a guardian"•
1 Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed (1911) 39 IA 1, 5 (PC).
2 Ibid, 6 .
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And their Lordships held1*
"It is not within the competence of a manager 
of a minor's estate or within the competence of 
a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the 
minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of 
immovable property, and ... as the minor in the 
present case was not bound by the contract, there 
was no mutuality, and that the minor who has now 
reached his majority cannot obtain specific 
performance of the contract".
What led their Lordships to differ with the Division
Bench's views? Every case must be decided according to the
facts and circumstances of that particular case. It is
most interesting that both the Full Bench and the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Mir Sarwarjan's case
(1907) overlooked the simple fact that the guardian in
Fatima Bibi's case and the manager in Mir Sarwarjan's case
(1907) do not stand on the same footing. The guardian
in the former was recognised in the personal law of the
minor in that case, while the manager in the latter was
2not recognised either m  Muslim law or Hindu Law . Had
the latter been appointed under the Court of Wards that
would have transpired in the course of argument and that
would not have warranted the review of Fatima Bibi's case.
Even if he be considered a de facto guardian, the case
fails to stand the test of neqotiorum gestio which is the
. 3
root of de facto guardianship , because the transaction 
was actually effected by Mr. Garth's agent, Basanta Kumar
1 (1911) 39 IA 1, 6 (PC).
2 In Hindu law to be a manager one must be a coparcener.
See Commissioner of I.T. v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills 
AIR 1966 SC 24.
3 Derrett, Critique, 431.
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Guha, who had no intention to act as a neqotiorum gestor1.
On a simple reasoning it appears that the contract in 
Mir Sarwarjan's case (1911) suffers from a defect. The 
contract being actually entered into by an agent of the 
manager was void; there the contracting party on behalf 
of the minor had no competency to enter into such a contract. 
Therefore there was no mutuality in Mir Sarwarjan's case. 
Woodroffe, J., very correctly stated the law that "specific 
performance may be granted, if the contract be one which, 
being within the guardian's powers, binds the minor" , 
but subsequently the learned judge forgot his own statement 
that the contract must be within the guardian's power when 
he said^i
"Every case must be considered with reference 
to its own facts, and there is nothing in the 
agreement in this suit which in my opinion 
rendered it not binding on the minors. It is 
clearly for their benefit, though the appellant 
objects to the agreement being enforced against 
him" •
So also Rampini, J., considered only the benefit of 
4
the contract and overlooked the capacity of the manager
5while he stated m  his referring order to the Full Bench 
that Basanta Kumar Guha admitted that he had no special 
authority to execute the agreement for Mr. Garth. Both 
the learned judges of the Division Bench rightly pointed 
out that the guardian in Fatima Bibi's case had power to
1 Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to Roman law, 304-305; 
H.W. Tambiah, Principles of Ceylon Law (Colombo I 1972), 
388-89.
2 Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakharuddin Mahomed Chowdhurv (1907)
34 Cal 163, 170 (FB).
3 Ibid, 171.
4 Ibid, 169.
5 Ibid. 164.
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enter into a contract on the minor's behalf, but they 
overlooked that the manager in Mir Sarwarjan's case (1907) 
had not that power.
Although it is inarticulate throughout the judgment 
Lord Macnaghten seemingly had this difference in mind and 
it convinced him to disagree with the opinion of the 
Division Bench that there was no difference between the 
position and powers of a guardian and those of a manager. 
There are two portions in the decision in Mir Sarwarjan's 
case (1911), viz., (i) the manager or guardian was not 
competent to bind the minor or minor's estate by a contract 
for the purchase of immovable property; and (ii) the minor 
was not bound by the contract and therefore there was no 
mutuality. The first portion is the reproduction of two 
earlier Privy Council decisions1, and in the second portion
a new principle is established in the light of another
2 . .Privy Council decision . As a member of the Judicial
3 . 4Committee in Indur Chunder's and Mohori Bibee * s case
Lord Macnaghten himself was well aware of a guardian's 
powers and limitations, and a minor's incapacity to contract. 
A guardian supplements the defective capacity of a minor, 
but if the guardian himself suffers from a want of competency 
under the personal law of the minor, the contract entered 
into by him would be void and would be lacking in mutuality.
1 Waqhela Raisanii v. Shekh Masludin (1887) 14 IA 89 (PC); 
Indur Chunder Singh v. Radha Kishore Ghose (1892) 19 IA 
90 (PC).
2 Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose (1903) 30 IA 114 (PC).
3 (1892) 19 IA 90 (PC).
4 (1903) 30 IA 114 (PC).
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Such a contract cannot be specifically enforced in any 
law1. Again, a manager in Muslim law has no locus standi, 
but under the Bengal Regulation 10 of 1793 and Bengal 
Minors Act 40 of 1858 he could be appointed by courts for 
minors who were paying revenue direct to the government.
None was so appointed in Mir Sarwarjan's case. Therefore 
the contract entered into by the agent of Mr. Garth was 
also lacking in mutuality. The mutuality envisaged in 
Flight v. Bo11and which Norris, J., followed in Fatima 
Bibi's case is different from that sought in Mir Sarwarjan's 
case. Mutuality conceived in the latter is the product of 
contractual capacity of the guardian in relation to the 
minor, while in the former it is the product of contractual 
incapacity of the minor himself.
Not altogether surprisingly, the decision in Mir
Sarwarian's case was not properly applied by the courts
in India. The doctrine of mutuality as implied by the
Privy Council in this case was not understood in its
3proper perspective. The learned judges , as will be seen 
later, could not grasp that where a contract is entered 
into by a competent guardian mutuality is not wanting.
1 Abdul Hag v. Yehia Khan AIR 1924 Pat 81.
2 (1828) 4 Russ 298? 38 ER 817.
3 Sundaram Chetty, J., in Venkatachalam Pillai v. Sethuram 
AIR 1933 Mad 322 (FB); Shearer, J., in Rambilas v. Lokenath 
Chaudhuri AIR 1949 Pat 405; Viswanatha Sastri, J., in 
Ramalinqam v. Babanambal Ammal AIR 1951 Mad 431; Shrivastava, 
J., in Abdulsattar v. Ismail AIR 1958 MP 373; Dhavan, J.,
in Bholanath v. Balbhadra Prasad AIR 1964 All 527.
350
There is a difference between a contract entered into by 
the minor himself or by an incompetent guardian on his 
behalf and a contract entered into by a competent guardian.
In the former mutuality does not exist because the contract 
itself is void, while in the latter mutuality is of full 
force if the contract was for the necessity or benefit 
of the minor. Mir Sarwarjan's case is a case of the former 
type, but Lord Macnaghten spoke of the mutuality as it 
exists in the latter.
4.3. Guardian's purchase under Muslim law and Mir Sarwarjan's 
case (1911)
The word 'purchase' used in the judgment of Mir Sarvar- 
ian ^s case has created a confusion in the minds of some judges1 
who believed that the Privy Council decision had totally 
forbidden the specific performance of a guardian's contract 
for purchase of immovable property. Such an individualisation 
again was not intended by their Lordships of the Privy 
Council. Purchase should be understood as representative 
of all transactions by a guardian relating to property.
The Privy Council decision does not prohibit a competent 
guardian's alienation or acquisition if it is made for 
the benefit of the minor. What it states is that an incom­
petent guardian or manager of a minor's estate is unable
1 Spencer, J., in Naravana Rao v. Venkatasubba Rao AIR 1920 
Mad 423; Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., in Singara Mudali v. 
Ibrahim Baig (1946) 2 MLJ 103; Grille, C.J., and Sen, J., 
in Ramrao v. Suganchandra AIR 1946 Nag 139; Newaskar and 
Srivastava, JJ., in Abdulsattar v. Ismail AIR 1958 MP 373.
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to effect not only a purchase but all sorts of transactions
which a competent guardian or manager can validly contract
on a minor's behalf* Lord Macnaghten used that particular
word in the judgment only because the transaction involved
in that case was of a purchase* A Muslim guardian's power 
, , 1 2
is not confined to sale and mortgage only, it extends 
to purchase also* That a Muslim guardian can purchase 
property for minors is plain to us from the Fatwa-i-Alamqiri 
rendered by N.B.E. Baillie in 1950^, and it must have been 
before the Privy Council. Earlier Anglo-Mahomedan text­
books and British Regulations and Acts also provide that 
for the benefit of the minor a guardian or a manager or 
curator as appointed by courts could purchase property*
In his Principles and Precedents of Moohummudan Law^ 
Macnaghten observesi
"The former description of guardians (i.e., near 
guardians, viz., father, grandfather, and their 
respective executors) answers to the term of 
curator in the Civil law, and of manager in the 
Bengal Code of Regulations ••• having power over 
the property of a minor for purposes beneficial 
to them ...".
At the footnote of page 63 in which the above passage 
occurs.ithe writer has referred to Act XIX of 1841. Section 7 
of that Act providesi
"... All surplus monies realised by the curator 
shall be paid into court, and invested in public 
securities for the benefit of the persons entitled
II
• • • •
1 Macnaghten, Moohummudan law. 64 prin. 14.
2 Hurbai v* Hira ii (1896) 20 Bom 116} Imambandi v. Mutsaddi 
(1917) 23 CWN 50 (PC).
3 Baillie, Moohummudan Law of Sale (Londoni 1850), 245.
4 Ch. VIII prin. 6, p.63.
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Again, section 18 of the Bengal Regulation 10 of 
1793 providesi
"If the Collector should think it unnecessary 
or unadvisable to appropriate such surplus 
receipts to the improvement of the lands already 
under the manager's charge, he shall cause the 
same to be applied by the manager to the purchase 
of other landed property, or to interest loans 
on mortgages, or to the purchase of government 
paper securities, as circumstances may render 
preferable"^ [empasis is mine”]
It appears that both the curator and the manager 
had power to purchase government securities or landed 
properties with the surplus money of the minor' property 
if it was advantageous or beneficial to the said owner. 
Being equivalent to a curator or manager a Muslim guardian 
has this power of purchase. Wilson says that such a 
purchase is approved by Muslim tradition1.
2In the Hedava it is stated i
"The acts ftesarrif 1 of an infant are unlawful,, 
because of the defect in his understanding} but 
the licence or authority of his guardian is a 
mark of his capacity^whence it is that in virtue 
thereof an infant is accounted the same as an 
adult"•
The word'acts' is the English rendering of the Arabic
word 'tesarrif' which means all transactions of any kind
3such as sale, purchase and so forth . The above quotation 
shows that the contractual incapacity of a Muslim minor 
could be removed by the authority of his guardian. If a 
contract is approved or entered into by the guardian on
1 Anglo -^Muhammadan Law (2nd ed., 1903), 215 sec. 125.
2 (Grady's ed.), 524.
3 Hedaya,524 f.n.
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behalf of the minor, the minor would be bound by that 
contract. Therefore, it is within the competence of the 
guardian of a Muslim minor to bind the minor by a contract 
of purchase.
1 . . 2Referring to Radd-ul-Muhtar and Zaidu-nil Ambani
3
Abdur Rahman writes in his Institutes of Mussalman Law *
"Where a father consents to the sale, loan or 
lease of his child's movable and immovable 
property, or to any purchase made for the child's 
benefit, and the child thereby incurs a slight 
loss, the transaction is valid and cannot be 
rescinded by the child upon attaining its majority".
4
In the Fatwa-i-Alamqin it is stated *
"If the lawful guardian of a minor purchases some 
property on behalf of the minor, and happens to 
be the pre-emptor of the same property also, 
then his right of pre-emption becomes void, but 
according to few jurists he can exercise the right 
with the permission of the court".
5Syed Ameer All observes *
"The executor is liable for any serious inadequacy 
in the consideration of any property sold or 
purchased on behalf of the infant".
From the above authorities it is evident that a 
competent guardian under Muslim law has the authority to 
purchase property if it is for the benefit of the minor. 
Besides these textual authorities a Full Bench of the
0
Hyderabad High Court in Amir Ahmmad v. Meer Nizam Ali
1 Vol. 5, 493-495.
2 Vol. 2, 119.
3 (Calcutta* 1907), 236 Art. 423 [My emphasis']
4 Mahomed Ullah ibn S. Jung, The Muslim law of Pre-emption 
(Tr. of the Fatwa-i-Alamqiri and Fatwa-i-Kazi Khan) 
(Allahabad* 1931), 6, 255.
5 The law relating to Gifts. Trusts, and Testamentary Dispo­
sitions among the Mahommedans (TLL, 1884) (Calcutta* 1885), 
571.
6 AIR 1952 Hyd 120 (FB). The case evinces an exhaustive 
survey of case law.
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(V.R. Deshpande, J., dissenting) found that the guardian 
of a Muslim minor could bind the minor by a 'covenant 
even when the covenant is for the purchase of immovable 
property'1. The question involved in that case was whether 
a minor who had agreed to purchase property through his 
guardian could bring a suit for specific performance of 
the contract. M.S. Ali Khan, J., who delivered the majority
judgment after referring to a large number of cases and
2 . . .a few Muslim texts , held that a suit for specific performance
could be instituted by a minor where the guardian was 
competent to bind the minor by his contract and the contract 
was for the obvious benefit of the minor. Therefore, Muslim 
law is not against allowing a guardian to purchse property 
for a minor, on the contrary, it recognises such a purchase 
if it is for the benefit of the minor and within the competence 
of the guardian.
What Lord Macnaghten said in Mir Sarwarian's case 
is, if put in the affirmative, that a contract of purchase 
when validly entered into by a competent guardian can be 
specifically enforced • Negatively, the application of the 
Privy Council decision can be seen only in cases where the 
person concerned is not a guardian or manager by any 
standard of the personal law of the minor. It is not that 
the particular transaction is forbidden to the guardian 
as it is one of purchase, it is because the person acting
1 AIR 1952 Hyd 120, 128 (FB). '
2 Hamilton, Hedava Bk. 35 p.534} Fatwa-i-Alamqiri Vol. 1 
(1834 ed.), 82; Iban Hajar A1 Miski, Allfatawi-i-Kubra 
Vol. 3, 38. For quotations from these authorities see 
p. 128 of the judgment.
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as guardian is not competent to transact on behalf of the
minor. It is not true that guardians of Muslim minors can
never purchase immovable property1. Of course, specific
performance being a discretion of courts, in every case
a guardian may not be allowed to buy immovable property
with the minor's money. If in Hindu law powers of a guardian
2
could be extended to proper cases of purchases , there 
will be no difference between the Hindu and Muslim law 
in so far as a competent guardian's power of purchasing 
properties for a minor is concerned.
The 'bald, unqualified' words of the judgment of 
Mir Sarwarian's case tempted the judges of the Indian 
High Courts to refer to it whenever the question of specific 
performance of a guardian's contract came before them,
and they applied it --  they are doing so in Muslim cases
specially even today --  without bothering to enquire into
their own unjust appreciation of the Privy Council decision.
o
This blind following of the decision in Mir Sarwarlan's
1 Derrett, 'The powers of guardians of non-Muslim minorsj
a sad misunderstanding' in (1967) 1 MLJ (Jour) 15-20, 19.
The reference to Baillie (unspecified) is an error. Baillie, 
Digest, X, viii (ed. 1865, p.678; ed. 1869, p.689),quoted 
at Imambandi's case (Fyzee, Cases, 266-7) plainly says 
that an executor cannot lawfully buy anything for the minor 
but food and clothing; but this is misleading. This 
reference in the said article to the acceptance of this 
pseudo-rule by all textbook-writers reveals an extraordinary 
state of affairs in legal scholarship in India in the last 
half-century.
2 Derrett, (1967) 1 MLJ (Jour) 15-20, 19.
3 Derrett, Critique, 186 para 237.
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case created hardship to many an innocent minor. So far as
the application of the doctrine of mutuality is concerned
there is no difference between Hindu and Muslim law. In a
guardian's contract mutuality depends on the guardian's
competency^, and this competency is to be determined by
the personal law of the minor. On this point there is a
difference between the two personal laws in that they are
2not uniform m  their order and selection of guardians .
Whenever the courts would apply this Privy Council decision,
they should first look into the personal law of the minor
and then determine the competency of his guardian.
A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Abdul Hag v.
3Yehia Khan rightly followed the decision and refused to
grant specific performance of a contract entered into by
the mother of a minor on the ground that a mother in
Muslim law is not a competent guardian to make a contract
on her minor son's behalf. But it was not properly applied
. 4by the Madhya Pradesh High Court m  Abdulsattar v. Ismail 
where Newaskar and Shrivastava, JJ., did not consider the 
competency of the father who was acting as guardian of his 
minor children.
The inconsiderate application of the Privy Council 
decision to cases of Hindu minors evolved the following
1 Derrett. (1967) 1 MLJ (Jour), 15-20, 18. A similar view 
is expressed when the writer made the following remarks 
on Mir Sarwarian's case* ’’The minor was not bound because 
the act was void under his personal law. As the act did
not bind him the agreement lacked mutuality and specific
performance could not be decreed against either party” .
2 For example, in Muslim law the mother is not considered 
a guardian of the minor's property, while in Hindu law 
she is and she comes after the father.
3 AIR 1924 Pat 81.
4 AIR 1958 MP 373.
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rules* First, where the property of a guardian's contract
was the minor's separate property and the contract was to
sell such property, the contract could not be specifically
enforced against the minor when he attained majority^. So
also a guardian's contract for the purchase of property
2could not be enforced by the minor • Secondly, where the
property involved belonged to a joint Hindu family of which
the minor was a member and a contract was entered into by
the manager on behalf of the joint family, the contract
could be specifically enforced even as regards the minor's
share, if it was for the purpose of necessity or benefit 
3of the family . Thirdly, where the property was m  common 
tenancy with another, a contract by the guardian could be 
specifically enforced if one of the co-owners was a major 
and both the minor and his co-owners were intended to be 
bound by the contract. But where such a contract was divi­
sible and could be converted into independent contracts, 
specific performance could not be enforced as against the
4
minor's part of the contract .
1 Naqeswara Rao v. Mandawa AIR 1928 Mad 830; Ramakrishna 
Reddier v. Chidambara Swamiqal AIR 1928 Mad 407; Raghu- 
nathan v. Revuthakanni (l928) 2 MLJ 277; Krishna Chandra 
v. Seth Rishabha AIR 1939 Nag 265; Swarath Ram v. Ram 
Ballabh AIR 1925 All 295; Srinath v. Jatindra AIR 1926 Cal 445; 
Rambilas Singh v. Lokenath AIR 1949 Pat 405; Hari Mohan v.
Sew Narayan AIR 1949 Assam 57; Gopalkrishna v. Tukaram 
AIR 1956 Bom 566; Bholanath v. Balbhadra Prasad AIR 1964 
All 527.
2 Naravana Rao v. Venkatasubba Rao AIR 1920 Mad 423; Venkata- 
chalam Pillai v. Sethuram AIR 1933 Mad 322 (FB); Sinqara 
Mudali v. Ibrahim Baiq (1946) 2 MLJ 103; Ram Rao v. Sugan- 
chandra AIR 1946 Nag 139; Ramchandra v. Manikchand AIR 1968 
MP 150.
3 Haricharan Kuar v. Kaula Rai AIR 1917 Pat 478 (FB); Rama io- 
gaya v. Jagannadham AIR 1919 Mad 641 (FB); Thakur Hargovind 
v * Mehtab Singh AIR 1922 Nag 193; Mt. Dhapo v. Ramchandra 
AIR 1934 All 1019; Brahamdeo v. Haro Singh AIR 1935 Pat 237; 
Sudarsana Rao v Dalayya AIR 1943 Mad 487•
4 Nripendra Chandra v. Ekheralj AIR 1930 Cal 457.
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It is argued that the decision in Mir Sarwarian's
case has been greatly 'shaken'1 or 'overruled'2 by a
subsequent Privy Council decision in Subrahmanyam v. Subba 
3Rao . Is it actually so? We have seen in the previous 
4
chapter that in this case their Lordships of the Privy 
Council found the minor as the 'transferor' in the sense 
in which the word is used in section 53A of the Transfer 
of Property Act of 1882, and thus they enforced the contract 
against him, although it was entered into on the minor's 
behalf by his mother. The two Privy Council cases are 
different from one another. Mir Sarwarian's case was 
dealing with an equitable relief, while Subrahmanyam's 
case was dealing with a statutory remedy. In the latter 
their Lordships applied the hypothetical question! "If 
the mother and guardian had taken no part at all in the 
transaction, the respondent could not have entered into 
a valid contract to sell the land in suit to the appellants, 
but ..• that such a contract could and did come into 
existence in the present case, and the question for
decision is --- was the person who contracted, within the
meaning of section 53A, the respondent or his mother?"
1 Ramalinqam v. Bavanambal Ammal AIR 1951 Mad 431; Abdulsattar 
v. Ismail AIR 1958 MP 373 per Srivastava, J.
2 Survaprakasam v. Ganqara ju AIR 1956 AP 33 per Subba Rao,
C.J.; Vi iavkumar v. Gokulchand (1964) 68 Bom LR 891;
Popat Namdeo v. Jagu Pandu (1968) 70 Bom LR 456.
3 AIR 1948 PC 95.
4 See supra. 230-33.
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And they found the minor as 'transfror'. In fact specific
performance in the sense of a guardian's contract was not
decreed in that case; and for this reason the earlier
Privy Council decision in Mir Sarwarian's case was not
referred to in this case. Hindu law consideration in
Subrahmanyam * s case was only obiter s their Lordships
merely restated earlier Privy Council decisions1 in that
respect. Patanjali Sastri, J., who delivered the judgment
2
of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in that 
case rejected the appellant's claim under section 53A of 
the Transfer of Property Act, and also it is mentioned 
in the order of leave of appeal that for proper interpretation 
of the said section appeal was allowed to be made to the 
Privy Council. So to rely on Subrahmanyam's case means 
to seek the aid of statutory law and not the relief of 
equity. As we have seen earlier section 53A of the Transfer 
of Property Act can be availed of only as a defence and 
the transferee must be in possession of the property under 
the contract. The decision in Mir Sarwarian's case is 
neither shaken nor overruled by the decision in Subrahmanyam's 
casei on the contrary, both are stating the same thing 
from different standpoints. In Mir Sarwarian's case it is 
established that a guardian cannot enter into a valid 
contract relating to the acquisition for or alienation of
1 Hunoomanpersaud's case (1856) 6 MIA 393; Mohori Bibee's 
case (1903) 30 IA 114 (PC).
2 Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao AIR 1944 Mad 337.
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a minor's property unless he is competent under the personal 
law of the minor to do so? while in Subrahmanyam's case 
it is held that a minor cannot be described as a 'transferor' 
under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, and 
would not be bound by a guardian's contract, unless the 
contract is one which is within the competence of the 
guardian according to the minor's personal law and is also 
for the benefit of the minor. The decision in Mir Sarwarian's 
case is not inconsistent with the decision in Hunoomanper- 
saud*s case. In the latter the guardian's powers were 
determined in relation to the minor's economic and moral 
need and benefit, while in the former the guardian's 
competency or capacity was judged in relation to his social 
and legal standing towards the minor.
Derrett rightly points out1 that the decision in
Mir Sarwarian's case is not overruled? but it is not
necessary to call it a 'Muslim case' because once the
principle of competency is accepted, the competency of
guardians of Hindu minors would be decided according to
the decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case and those of Muslim
2 .minors according to Muslim law. In recent cases involving 
the specific performance of a guardian's contract, where
1 Derrett, (1967) 1 MLJ 15-20, 20.
2 Ramalinqam v. Babanambal Amma1 AIR 1951 Mad 431? Suryapra- 
kasam v. Ganqara iu AIR 1956 AP 33 (FB)? Sitarama Rao v. 
Venkatarama Reddiar (1956) 1 MLJ 5? Vi iavkumar v. Gokul- 
chand (1966) 68 Bom LR 891? Popat Namdeo v.. Jaqu Pandu
(1968) 70 Bom LR 456? Hiralal Davaram v. Bhikari Sampat 
(1970) 73 Bom LR 481? Lingo Reddy v. Ramchandrappa (1971) 
Mys LJ 159? Radheshyam v Kiran Bala AIR 1971 Cal 341? 
Muhammad Mursaleen v. Noor Muhammad PLD 1968 Kar 163.
See also Derrett, 'Contracts by guardians of Hindu minors' 
in (1971) 73 Bom LR (Jour) 79-80.
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decisions are taken properly considering the competency of 
guardians according to the personal laws of the minors 
concerned, those decisions are not against the decision in 
Mir Sarwarian's case. But wherever it is followed in the 
sense as it used to be previously without considering the 
competency of the guardian, it is, in fact, disagreeing 
with the Privy Council decision. In Ramchandra v. Manikchand1 
where a mother acting as guardian of her minor children 
entered into an agreement for purchasing a house, and on 
the refusal by the vendor to execute the sale deed instituted 
a suit for the specific performance of the contract,
Bhave, J., sitting with Tare, J., held, following Mir 
Sarwarian's case, that it was not within the competence 
of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minor's 
estate by a contract for the sale or purchase of immovable 
property. The decision cannot be said to have been right, 
since the mother of a Hindu minor is competent to enter 
into a contract on her minor child's behalf and the contract 
could be specifically enforced if it was for the benefit 
of the minor. In reaching to this decision the learned 
judges also said that after the passing of the HMGA of 
1956 the authority of a natural guardian to transfer the 
minor's property had been taken away, and the guardian 
could not effect a transfer without the prior permission 
of the court. Therefore, a contract entered into either 
for sale or for purchase of immovable property could not
1 AIR 1968 MP 150, 155.
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be binding on the minor and consequently neither the minor 
nor the other party to the contract could specifically 
enforce it. It is to be remembered that the word 'purchase* 
is not mentioned in the prohibitive section 8(2) of the 
HMGA, while section 8(l) allows a guardian to do all acts 
which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the 
benefit of the minor. In Than Singh v. Barelal1 a Division 
Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that a guardian 
was not required to obtain permission of court for entering 
into a contract for purchase on the minor's behalf under 
section 8 of the HMGA.
If the decision in Mir Sarwarian's case is understood
in its proper perspective, there is no need to look for
2
its justification in the HMGA or to push it out of the
3 . . 4same Act • Salil Kumar, J., in Radheshyam v. Kiran Bala
took an opportunity to assess the doctrine of mutuality 
in the light of the Specific Relief Act (Act 47) of 1963. 
Section 20(4) of the Specific Relief Act provides that 
merely on the ground of absence of mutuality specific 
performance of a contract should not be refused, and on 
the basis of this section the learned judge granted 
specific performance of an agreement for sale. Oza, J.,
1 AIR 1974 MP 24.
2 Ramchanrda v. Manikchand AIR 1968 MP 150, 155. Bhave, J., 
observed that after the passing of the HMGA the dictum 
laid down by Lord Macnaghten in Mir Sarwarian's case would 
be applicable with all force to all the contracts of the 
natural guardians, whether for sale or for purchase of 
property, if no permission of the court had been obtained.
3 Lingo Reddy v. Ramchandrappa (1971) 1 Mys LJ 159.
4 AIR 1971 Cal 341.
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sitting with Murab, J.,in Than Singh*s case pointed out
that the Indian Law Commission in its report on the
Specific Relief Act had thrown out the doctrine of
mutuality as established by the decision in Mir Sarwarian’s
case, and that section 20(4) incorporated that recommendation.
J.L. Kapur who edited Pollock and Mulla’s Indian Contract
and Specific Relief Acts1 said that the doctrine of
mutuality had been ’already discarded* in section 12 of
the Specific Relief Act. Has the doctrine of mutuality
really been thrown out or only the untoward gloss put
upon it by judicial decisions? Possibly it is the latter.
By advocating the dropping of mutuality surely the Law
Commissioners are not allowing a minor without a guardian
to enter into a valid contract or a stranger to bind a
minor with his contractJ There must be a valid contract,
as that is the pre-requisite of the specific enforcement
2
of it. In Than Singh’s case Oza, J., observed i
”If there are other circumstances which could be 
considered for refusal of specific performance 
along with them this doctrine also could be 
considered. In our view ... merely on the ground 
of want of mutuality a suit for specific perfor­
mance cannot be thrown out”•
5. Testamentary guardianship under Hindu law
5.1. Testamentary guardians
Testamentary disposition was unknown to the Hindus 
3in ancient time j therefore the sastnc Hindu law contains
1 (9th ed., 1972), 878.
2 AIR 1974 MP 24, 26.
3 Strange, Hindu law Vol. 1 (1830 ed. ), 254;
Diqest Vol. 2 (1801 ed.) 516 f.n.r Maine, Ancient^law
[London: 10th ed. (cheap ed.), 1905], 171) West a 
Buhler, Hindu Law (London* 4th ed., 1919),
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no provision for the appointment of a testamentary 
guardian. However, the inherent power of the father to 
control and guide the conduct and disposition of his sons 
led to the recognition of his testamentary power to 
appoint guardians for his sons from the earliest time 
after the reception of English law through the equitable
principles of justice, equity and good conscience1 and
2 3with the support of legislature and the courts . Under
4 5Anglo-Hmdu law an adult father can, by word or writing,
nominate a guardian of the person of his children, and
of their separate property in their hands, such nomination
to take effect after his death and not before . He is
unrestricted in his choice of such guardian, and may even
7
exclude the mother from the guardianship • He can appoint 
a testamentary guardian both as regards the person and
1 Derrett, Introduction. 443 para 700.
2 Bengal Regulation 5 of 1799, section2; Bengal Reg. 1 of 
1800 (repealed by Act 40 of 1858); Madras Reg. 3 of 1802, 
section 16; Madras Reg. 5 of 1829, sections 3 and 4;
Bengal Minors Act 40 of 1858, section 7; Bombay Minors 
Act 20 of 1864, section 8; Hindu Widows* Remarriage Act 
(Act 15) of 1856, section 3.
3 Strange, Hindu law (1830 ed.) Vol. 1, 255; the same Vol. 2,
419; West and Buhler, Hindu law (4th ed., 1919), 618;
Doe dem Munoololl v. Gopee Putt (1786) Morton Rep. 290;
1 ID 174 (OS); Sreenarain v. Bhva Jha (1812) 2 SDA (Beng)
29, 37 (NE); Nana Nurain Rao v. Huree Punth Bhao (1862)
9 MIA 96, 98; Baboo Beer Pertab v. Mahara iah Ra iender Pertab 
(1867) 12 MIA 1, 38; Rai Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder 
Chowdhry (1869) 13 MIA 209, 222-23; Bhaovan Dullabh v.
Kala Shankar (1877) 1 Bom 641; Haribhat v. Damodarbhat 
(1878) 3 Bom 171.
4 Trevelyan, Minors. 62, f.n. 1.
5 Before 1927 the Hindus could make oral wills except certain 
cases; however, from January 1, 1927 all wills made by 
them require to be in writing. See Indian Succession Act
of 1925 sections 57, 63; also see Derrett, Introduction, 
445-446 para 704.
6 Budhilal v. Morarii (1907) 31 Bom 413; Deb Nand v. Anandmani 
(1920) 43 All 213; Konthalathammal v . Thanqasamy (1923)
46 Mad 873.
7 Soobh Dooraa Lai Jha v. Raiah Neelanund Singh (1867) 7 WR 
74 (CR); Trevelvan. Minors. 62.
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and property of his minor daughter. On the marriage of
the daughter during minority, the husband becomes in
law the guardian of her person but, unless there is an
express provision in the will, the guardian appointed by
the father continues to be the guardian so far as the
property is concerned1. The right of the father to appoint
by will a guardian for his child is not lost by his
2becoming a Christian • A Hindu mother although she is 
a natural guardian had no authority to appoint a guardian 
for her son by will. But the court might take her wishes 
into consideration in appointing a guardian after her 
death^.
There was a conflict of opinion whether a Hindu
father could appoint by will a guardian of the ancestral
property in which his minor son had a right by birth.
The earlier view was that the father could make such an
appointment on the ground of convenience. But in later
cases it has been held that the father has no such power.
4In Chidambara Pillai v. Ranqasami Naicker a Full Bench 
of the Madras High Court held that the only adult copar­
cener of a joint family consisting of himself and his 
minor coparceners was not competent to appoint a testamen­
tary guardian to the coparcenary property of the minor
1 Raiaraieswari v. Sankaranaravana (1948) Mad 351.
2 Dr. Albrecht v. Bathee Jellamma (1922) 22 MLJ 247.
3 Venkavva Garu v. Venkata Narasimhulu (1898) 21 Mad 401.
4 (1918) 41 Mad 561 (FB).
coparceners. Sitting in a Division Bench1 of the same
High Court Devadoss, J., observed that the decision in
Chidambara Pillai * s case could govern only cases where
a testamentary guardian was sought to be imposed upon
the coparceners of a joint Hindu family and it could
not be extended to take away the right of a father to
appoint a guardian for the person of his minor son.
A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bri jbhukandas 
2v. Ghashiram followed Chidambara Pillai's case and held
that it was not competent for the only adult coparcener
of a joint Hindu family to appoint by will or otherwise a
trustee, guardian or manager of the coparcenary property
of a minor coparcener during his minority. The reasoning
behind the latter view is that the father who is not
capable of making a disposition of the ancestral property
in his hands, cannot be in a position to control that
property after his death. Where, however, the father left
a will by which he authorised his widow to adopt a certain
boy named therein, and directed that after the adoption
the minor's natural guardian should be his guardian till
he came of age, it was held that the appointment was valid
as it extended to property over which the testator had
3complete power of disposition at the time of death . But
4more recently in Ra ialakshmi v. Ramachandran relying on
1 Konthalathammal v. Thanqasamy (1923) 46 Mad 873, 893.
2 (1935) 59 Bom 316 (FB).
3 Jagannath Rao v. Ramavamma (1921) 44 Mad 189; Ramanathan 
v. Palaniappa (1939) Mad 776, 784.
4 (1966) 2 MLJ 420, 424.
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Konthalathammal* s case it was observed that a father had 
not the right to appoint a guardian by will for his minor 
son by virtue of the power of disposition of his separate 
or self-acquired property, for it was a well-known 
principle of law that a testator could not appoint a 
guardian for a minor legatee only by reason of the dis­
position in his favour, but a testator could appoint 
trustees to hold property for a legatee and that would 
not depend upon the legatee being a minor* On this analogy 
it was held that the mere fact that a person gifted 
property to a minor would not entitle that person because 
of that gift only to appoint a guardian for the minor in 
respect of that property, though it would be open to 
the donor to provide for the management of the gifted 
property by resorting to a trust. Moreover, while a lawful 
guardian was alive the stranger donor could not by an 
instrument appoint another person as the guardian of 
the property for the reason only that the property was 
gifted by him, because the powers of a natural or legal 
guardian either of the person or property of a minor 
could not be taken away by a third party without an order 
of the court, even if the guardian was willing.
Section 6 of the GWA saved the power conferred by 
the personal law of a minor to appoint a testamentary 
guardian. The section runs as followsi
"In the case of a minor, nothing in this Act 
shall be construed to take away or derogate 
from any power to appoint a guardian of his 
person or property, or both, which is valid 
by the law to which the minor is subject"•
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The appointment of a person as a testamentary 
guardian is a matter of personal preference and trust, 
and his rights do not survive to his legal represenative1. 
Whenever a dispute arises as to a testamentary appointment 
in which the validity of the will itself is challenged, 
the court must accept the determination of any competent court 
on the question. Should the question not have been deter­
mined, then the court may itself determine it in guardian­
ship proceedings, but its decision will not operate as
res judicata in a subsequent petition by the guardian
2
for the probate of the will •
5.2. Alienation by testamentary guardians
Section 28 of the GWA deals with powers of a testa­
mentary guardian to alienate the immovable property of 
his minor ward. In the first instance the powers are 
subject to restrictions which may be imposed by the 
instrument appointing him a guardian. In the absence 
of any restrictions in the deed of appointment it would
seem that the powers of a testamentary guardian are similar
3to those of a natural guardian • When a testamentary 
guardian assumes the position of a certificated guardian 
by being declared a guardian by the court under section 7 
of the GWA, his powers of disposal become subject to 
the orders that the court may make in that behalf.
1 Ganqabai v. Khashabai (1899) 23 Bom 719.
2 Chinnasami v. Hariharabadra (1893) 16 Mad 380.
3 Jaqannath Rao v. Ramavamma (1921) 44 Mad 189? Ramanathan 
v. Palaniappa AIR 1939 Mad 531.
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Section 28 provides as follows*
"Where a guardian has been appointed by will or 
other instrument, his power to mortgage or charge, 
or transfer by sale, gift exchange or otherwise, 
immovable property belonging to his ward is 
subject to any restriction which may be imposed 
by the instrument, unless he has under this 
Act been declared guardian and the court which 
made the declaration permits him by an order 
in writing, notwithstanding the restriction, 
to dispose of any immovable property specified 
in the order in a manner permitted by the order".
Where the guardian of a minor appointed under the
will of the minor's father continues the business
started by the father properly as per directions in the
will and incurs debt on behalf of the minor in the course
of carrying on such business, the creditor is entitled
to have recourse against the assets of the business in
addition to proceedings against the guardian personally
according to the principle of subrogation. This right of
indemnity of the guardian is, however, dependent upon the
fact that on taking accounts there is nothing due from him 
to the estate in respect of his transactions1. If a
person was appointed by a Hindu testator as executor of
his will for the purpose of managing his estate and carrying
on his business, the position of the executor would be
that of a validly appointed testamentary guardian of
a son who was adopted after the death of the testator,
and his powers of management would be derived not only
from the will but also from the principles of Hindu law
1 Perumal v. Ramasubramania AIR 1938 Mad 265.
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recognised in Hunoomanpersaud*s case. Such a guardian
could under Hindu law bind the minor's estate by a
contract for simple debt*- if the guardian would make
2himself personally liable under the contract , The 
creditor could not have a direct recourse against the 
minor's property'*.
5,3. Testamentary guardianship under the HMGA
As seen above the right to appoint a testamentary 
guardian according to the personal law of minors was 
left unimpared by section 6 of the GWA, and as a result 
the testamentary guardians, so far as their appointment 
and powers were concerned, were governed by the personal 
law of the minors. The HMGA has intended to amend and
codify the Hindu law in this respect, and in section 9
. . . 4it has introduced elaborate provisions for this purpose .
Section 9 runs as follows*
**(l) A Hindu father entitled to act as the natural 
guardian of his minor legitimate children 
may, by will, appoint a guardian for any of 
them in respect of the minor's property 
(other than the undivided interest referred 
to in section 12) or in respect of both.
(2) An appointment made under sub-section (l)
shall have no effect if the father predeceases 
the mother, but shall revive if the mother 
dies without appointing, by will, any person 
as guardian.
1 Ramanathan v. Palaniappa AIR 1939 Mad 531.
2 Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshavva AIR 1949 FC 218.
3 Suryaprakasam v. Ganqaraiu AIR 1956 AP 33, 45 (FB).
4 Though S.V. Gupte [see supra, 3^  f.n.2.1 wrote in 1970 
he had singularly little to say about section 9 of the 
HMGA# except to point out the conflict with section
of the GWA. See Gupte, pp. cit, 414.
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(3) A Hindu widow entitled to act as the natural 
guardian of her minor legitimate children, 
and a Hindu mother entitled to as the 
natural guardian of her minor legitimate 
children by reason of the fact that the 
father has become disentitled to act as 
such, may, by will, appoint a guardian for 
any of them in respect of the minor's person 
or in respect of the minor's property 
(other than the undivided interest referred 
to in section 12) or in respect of both.
(4) A Hindu mother entitled to act as the natural 
guardian of her minor illegitimate children 
may, by will, appoint a guardian for any of 
them in respect of the minor's person or
in respect of the minor's property or in 
respect of both.
(5) The guardian so appointed by will has the 
right to act as the minor's guardian after 
the death of the minor's father or mother, 
as the case may be, and to exercise all 
the rights of a natural guardian under this 
Act to such extent and subject to such 
restrictions, if any, as are specified in 
this Act and in the will.
(6 ) The right of the guardian so appointed 
by will shall, where the minor is a girl, 
cease on her marriage*'.
The HMGA has removed the mother's incapacity to 
appoint a testamentary guardian of her minor children 
in the absence of their father or his becoming disentitled 
to act as such. It provides that in order to be able to 
exercise the right of appointing a testamentary guardian 
for his legitimate children, the father must be entitled 
to act as their natural guardian; and that if he has 
lost his right to act as a natural guardian either by 
ceasing to be a Hindu or by becoming a hermit or an ascetic, 
he can have no power in this behalf. A testamentary guardian
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may be appointed in respect of the minor's person or his 
separate property or of both, but not in respect of an 
undivided interest of the minor in joint family property 
which is under the management of an adult member of the 
family. Where the father predeceases the mother, the 
appointment made by him will lapse, but it should revive 
if the mother dies without making any appointment.
Although a preferential right of appointing a testamentary 
guardian is given to the father, he cannot exclude the 
mother from acting as a natural guardian after him.
Again, the mother who survives the father has the right 
to make a testamentary appointment in supersession of 
the testamentary guardian appointed by the father. Even 
during the lifetime of the father, the mother can appoint 
a guardian by will, if the father has rendered himself 
incapable of acting as the natural guardian of his minor 
legitimate children because he can no more exercise his 
right. Like the father's, her right to appoint a testamen­
tary guardian is also subject to two conditions, viz., 
that she is entitled to act as the natural guardian of 
her minor legitimage children, and that the appointment 
does not extend to the undivided interest of the minors 
in the joint family property. As the mother has the 
preferential right of guardianship in the case of her 
illegitimate children, she is given the right to appoint 
a guardian for them by will. It may be observed that the 
father has not been given any right in the matter of
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appointment to take effect after the death of the mother
although under section 6 (b) of the HMGA he is entitled
to act as the natural guardian of his illegitimate 
children after her. The appointment of a testamentary
guardian comes into effect after the death of the testator
except where it is made by the father who is survived by 
the mother. The testamentary guardian has all the rights 
of a natural guardian under the HMGA and he is subject 
to all the restrictions to which a natural guardian is 
subject. He cannot have powers in excess of those given 
or which are in conflict with those conferred by the 
HMGA. Likewise a testator cannot remove the restrictions 
imposed on his powers by the HMGAj on the contrary, the 
testator can put additional restrictions on his powers.
As seen earlier, under the GWA a testamentary guardian's 
powers are conferred by the will, and in the absence of 
of such powers his powers are similar to those of a 
natural guardian. Section 28 of the GWA provides that 
the powers of a testamentary guardian to mortgage, sell, 
gift, exchange or otherwise transfer immovable property 
of the minor are subject to those restrictions only which 
are imposed by the will, and in exercising these powers- 
he is not required to obtain the previous permission of 
the court. Under the HMGA the testamentary guardian can 
exercise all the powers of a natural guardian to such 
extent and subject to such restrictions as are specified 
in section 8 of the Act and the will. But under section 8
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a natural guardian cannot alienate the minor’s property 
without the permission of the court. Therefore the 
testamentary guardian cannot transfer without such 
permission. Thus to that extent there is conflict1 
between the GWA and the HMGA. However, in view of section 
5 of the HMGA, the HMGA will prevail, and the testamentary 
guardian to whom the HMGA applies cannot alienate minor's 
immovable property without the prior permission of the 
court even if there is no restriction in the will or 
the will permits him to do so. In this consideration 
the testamentary guardians of Hindu minors of Pakistan 
and Bangladesh enjoy more liberty than their recent 
counterparts in India.
The right of a testamentary guardian to control 
the person or property or both of a minor girl terminates 
on her marriage? and it then devolves on her husband. The 
right of the father or mother to appoint a testamentary 
guardian for his or her child under a marriage declared a 
nullity under section 11 or avoided by a decree of nullity 
under section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act (Act 25) of 1955 
is the same as the power of the father or mother to appoint 
a testamentary guardian in respect of his or her legitimate 
chiId.
1 Gupte, op cit, 414.
-\°rrv -vou.t.
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C H A P T E R  IV
ALIENATION BY GUARDIANS UNDER MUSLIM LAW
1. Alienation by natural guardians
1*1. Who are natural guardians under Muslim lav?
As said in chapter 1, the legal incapacity of minors 
to act was recognised since long and both Hindu and Muslim 
law-givers provided for the care and protection of their 
person and property by adult persons capable of looking 
after their welfare and interests in property. These adult 
persons are entitled by the respective personal lavs of the 
minors to act as guardians without any previous judicial 
sanction so long as they are not deprived of their right 
to act as such by an order of a court of competent juris­
diction1, These adult persons are known as 'natural 
guardians'. The natural guardians are like any other 
guardians, prima facie entitled to the custody of their 
minor wards. But in Muslim law this right is postponed 
for the time being in favour of other persons. As seen 
in chapter 1 the natural guardians under Muslim law being 
all males, they are not entitled to the minors' custody
until the minors attain a particular age. Muslim law recog-
2nises a different class of persons, viz., the females , as 
having a preferential right in that behalf• But that does
1 Trevelyan. Minors. 151.
2 For the order of preference among the females see supra, 
41.
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not deprive the natural guardians of their right of 
guardianship.
Under Muslim law the following persons are entitled 
in the order mentioned below to be the guardians of a 
minor's property1!
(1) the father;
(2) the executor appointed by the father's will;
(3) the father's father;
(4) the executor appointed by the will of the father's
father.
In default of these persons the duty of appointing
a guardian of the minor's property devolves on the kazi
2or judge, as the representative of the ruler ,
All the above four persons are called legal guardians.
It appears therefore that the only relations who could be 
the natural guardians of a minor's property are (l) the 
father, and (2 ) the father's father; and they are the only 
persons who are entitled to appoint a guardian of the 
property of a minor by will. No other relation is entitled 
to the guardianship of a minor's property as of right, 
or no other relation has any power to appoint by will a 
guardian of the property of the minor, not even the mother.
1 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 689; Macnaghten, Moohummudan law,
62 prin. 5; Imambandi v. Mutsaddi (1918) 45 IA 73; 23 CWN 
50; Ara Begum v. Deputy Commissioner of Gonda AIR 1941 Oudh 
529; Kharag Narain v. Hamida Khatoon (l955) 34 Pat 709;
Mohd. Zafir v. Amiruddin AIR 1963 Pat 108; Abdullah Khan
v. Nisar Mohd. Khan PLD 1965 SC 690; Gulam Ghouse v. Kamisul 
AIR 1971 SC 2184.
2 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 689; Macnaghten, Moohummudan law, 
304.
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Unlike Hindu law, the widowed mother of a Muslim minor is 
not the legal guardian of the property of her minor child­
ren, and cannot do any act relating to their property so 
as to bind them, and a sale or mortgage by her cannot as 
such bind the minor children. Though she may be a co-heir 
with her minor children in respect of the property dealt 
with by her, Muslim law does not constitute the senior 
co-heir, like Hindu law, the managing coparcener entitled 
to administer and manage the estate until partition •
Benson and Bhashyam Ayyangar, JJ., in Pathummabi v, Vittil 
Ummachabi1 held that alienations by such a widow could not
be upheld. A similar view was taken by the Bombay High
2Court in Bhika li Ramchandra v. Aiqarally Sarafallv . In 
that case the court observed that where a Muslim widow 
after obtaining the leave of the executing court under Order 
32 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act 5) of 1908, 
executed a sale deed in favour of the mortgagee who had 
obtained a decree for the sale of the land which was mortgaged 
by her deceased husband, on behalf of herself and as guardian 
ad litem of her minor daughter, the sale deed was void in 
so far as it affected the share of the minor daughter in 
the land, and the purchaser acquired no title to it. The 
leave granted by the executing court was not sufficient to 
clothe the widow with power to sell the lands in the absence
1 (1902) 26 Mad 734. Similar views are also expressed in 
Maimunnissa Bibi v. Abdul Jabbar AIR 1966 Mad 468; Jaina 
Beevi v. Govindaswami AIR 1967 Mad 369.
2 AIR 1946 Bom 57. This case was followed recently by the 
Gujrat High Court in Parshotandas v. Bai Dhabu AIR 1973 Guj 
88, 90.
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of her appointment as the legal or certificated guardian 
of her minor daughter. Their Lordships of the Privy Council 
held in Imamabandi v. Mutsaddi  ^that a Muslim mother had 
no power to deal with her minor child’s immovable property.
Under Muslim law the de facto possession over the 
minor heirs' shares cannot make a major heir the guardian 
of their property. That entitlement is to be settled with 
reference to the principles of Muslim law relating to
2guardianship of property. In Parshotamdas v. Bai Dhabu 
a lady lawyer for the appellants wanted the Gujrat High 
Court to accept her arguments aimed at justifying the sale 
by a mother of the whole property left by her deceased 
husband including the shares therein of her two minor child­
ren, she being in possession of the whole property. She 
solicited a decision to the effect that since the sale 
was effected for the purpose of paying off the dues under a 
decree obtained against all the heirs, including the minors, 
it should be binding on the two minor children as well.
The court applied the principles of Muslim law and laid 
down that one of the Muslim co-heirs who was not a guardian 
of the other minor co-heirs' property could not lawfully 
alienate the latter's shares for any purpose whatsoever.
1.2. Alienation of minors' property by natural guardians
In respect of the powers of alienation of a natural 
guardian Muslim law draws a distinction between movable
1 (1918) 23 CWN 50 (PC).
2 AIR 1973 Guj 88, 90.
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and immovable property. If the property is movable he may 
sell or purchase it on account of the minor either for an 
equivalent or at such a price as to occasion an 'inconsi­
derable* loss. Even under unavoidable circumstances the 
consideration of loss would not deter him from effecting 
a transaction, since that would shut the door to the 
'business of purchase and sale'1. But where the inadequacy 
of consideration is due to any fraud or culpable negligence 
on the part of the guardian, the minor may avoid any trans­
action entered into by the guardian on his behalf and make 
him liable for its consequences. But if the transaction has 
been entered into bona fide with due care and attention, the 
guardian would not be held responsible for any untoward 
consequences which may have resulted from it contrary to 
his expectation. Indeed the natural guardian may enter into 
any transaction with regard to the minor's personal pro­
perty on behalf of and for the benefit of the minor and
such transaction will be valid and binding on the minor
2provided there is no unfair dealing or fraud . If the pro­
perty is immovable and if the deceased has left neither
debts nor legacies his dealings with it would be subjected 
. . 3to strict conditions . As reason for such restrictions it
1 Hedaya, 702.
2 Macnaghten, Moohummudan law, 64 prin. 15j Trevelyan, Minors. 
165; Mussamut Syedun v. Syud Velayet Ali Khan (1872) 17
WR 239 (CR).
3 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 687.
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is stated in the Hedaya^i
"The ground of this (difference in the power of 
dealing with the two kinds of property) is, that 
the sale of movable property is a species of 
conservation, as articles of that description 
are liable to decay, and the price is much more 
easily preserved than the article itself. With 
respect, on the contrary, to immovable property, 
it is in a state of conservation in its own
nature, whence it is unlawful to sell it, --
unless, however, it be evident that it will 
otherwise perish or be lost, in which case the 
sale of it is allowed".
1.2.1. Alienation of movable property
Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed in
2Imambandi v. Mutsaddi that the legal guardian of a minor
had the power to sell or pledge the goods and chattels of
a minor for the latter's imperative necessities, such as
food, clothing and nursing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan
3held in Central Exchange Bank Ltd. v. Zaitoon Begum that 
a father could pledge his minor children’s goods for his 
own debts. According to the Hedaya the father may pledge 
the movable property of his minor child to himself for a 
debt due from the child to himself, or he may pledge it to 
another on account of a debt of his own remaining, however,
4
always liable for the value of the goods to the child •
5Syed Ameer Ali has stated that ’other jurists seem to
1 702. This passage has been approvingly quoted by their 
Lordships of the Privy Council in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi 
(1918) 23 CWN 50, 58.
2 (1918) 23 CWN 50.
3 PLD 1968 SC 83, 93.
4 Hedaya, 639.
5 Mahommedan law Vol. 2 (Calcutta* 4th ed., 1917), 615.
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disagree with the author of the Hedaya in this latter 
view*, and he further says that according to them the 
father stands in the same position as any other guardian, 
that is, it is not lawful either for him or for a tutor 
to pay off his own personal debts with the goods of the 
minor, or to pledge them on account of his debts1.
S.A. Rahman, J., in Central Exchange Bank’s case has 
guestioned this view of Syed Ameer Ali, and quoting the
relevant passage from the original text of the Durr-ul-
2 3Mukhtar he translated it as follows *
’’And it is lawful for the father to pledge his 
minor son’s slave for his own debt, for he has 
the power of giving on amanat (deposit in trust). 
If the goods are destroyed, in the case of a 
deposit in trust, there is no liability on the 
person in possession whereas in the case of a 
pledge there will be liability and so this 
(pledge) is preferable. The case of the executor 
is similar. Abu Yousaf has said that they (the 
father and the executor) do not own the property 
(and so they have no right). And Tumurtashi says, 
the executor will be liable for the full price, 
for the father is entitled to benefit from the 
goods of the minor but not the executor. But in 
the Zakhira and other books, they are placed on 
the same footing”.
. . 4It is stated in the Fatwa-i-Alamair^ t
”If the father has pledged his minor child’s pro-v 
perty for such debt as he has incurred either 
for himself or for his minor child, then it is 
lawful”.
1 The writer has referred to Purr-u1-Mukhtar, 846, and 
Jam * a-ush-Shittat as the authorities in the foot note of 
his book Mahommedan law Vol. 2,(4th ed.), 615.
2 Vol. 2, 270 (as quoted in the judgment).
3 PLD 1968 SC 83, 94.
4 As quoted in the judgment p. 93.
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The learned judge of the Pakistan Supreme Court after
l ?referring to a wide range of authorities observed t
"A survey of the authorities, therefore, revels 
preponderance of opinion in favour of the father's 
power to pledge his minor son's goods for his 
own debt. ... It follows that, in respect of the 
fixed deposit receipts, standing in the name of 
the minor daughters, they cannot assimilate them­
selves to the position of sureties. The father 
himself had pledged these receipts and he could 
do so in his own right. The remedy of these minors 
would seem to lie in reimbursing themselves out 
of the estate left by their father, if necessary".
1.2.2. Alienation of immovable property
Under Muslim law the natural guardian of the property
of a minor has no absolute power to alienate the minor's
3immovable property except m  the following cases , viz.,-
(1) where he can obtain double its value?
(2) Where the minor has no other property and the
sale is necessary for his maintenance;
(3) where there are debts of the deceased, but no
means of paying them except by the sale;
1 Fafcwa-i-Alamgiri I Tr. by Maulana Amir Ali (1932 ed.), 222"); 
Durr-ul-Mukhtar [Annotated by Syed Muhammad Abdul Ahad 
(Delhi* 1916)]; Rudd-u1-Muhtar [A commentary on the Durr- 
ul-Mukhtar by Allama Ibn-i-Abidin (Delhi* 1238 Hijra']! 
Bada-i-As-Sanai-Fi-Tartib-ish-Sharai by Imam Alauddin Abi 
Bakr bin Masud Alkasani (Egypt * 578 Hijra); Ain-ul-Hedaya 
by Maulana Amir Ali (Lucknow* 1896); Hamilton, Hedaya 
(Grady's ed., 1870), 638; Wilson, Digest of Anglo-Muham­
madan law (1895 ed.), 123; S.C. Sircar, Tagore Law Lectures—  
1873, 482 Art. 560; Syed Ameer ali, Mahommedan law Vol. 2 
(1965 ed.), 503; Tyabji, Muslim law (3rd ed.), 300; Macna­
ghten, Moohummudan law (1897 ed.), 63; Abdur Rahim, Muham­
madan Jurisprudence (1958 ed.), 345; Mulla, Muslim law (13th 
ed. ) para 366; Saxena , Muhammadan law (1955 ed.), 328.
2 PLD 1968 SC 83, 95-96.
3 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 687-688; Macnaghten, Moohummudan 
law, 64 prin. 14; Mulla, Muslim law (17 th ed., 1972),340 
para 362; Eishu Chugani v. Randal Agarwala AIR 1973 Cal 64; 
Janab Haii Abdul Hamid v. Samsunnissa Begum (1967) 2 MLJ 
195.
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(4) where there are lagacies to be paid, and no 
other means of paying them;
(5) where the expenses exceed the income of the 
property;
(6 ) where the property is falling into decay;
(7) where the property has been usurped, and the
guardian has reason to fear that there is no 
chance of fair restitution.
In Ahmadellah v. Mafizuddin Ahmad  ^Sharma, J., observes 
that the word ’maintenance' as used in the clause 'where
the minor has no other property and the sale is necessary
for his maintenance' does not exclude other necessary expenses 
for mental and physical well-being of a minor in accordance 
with the status of the minor's family in the society. Thus 
the expenses of ordinary and reasonable education upto the 
Higher Secondary stage of a child were held part of his 
maintenance, and a sale of the minor's property by the legal 
guardian to meet the expenses was considered within the 
purview of law. The decision is said to have been 'in accord
with the ideas about education expressed by the law-giver
2 3of Islam' . In Eishu Chuqani v. Ranglal Acrarwala , where
the father of two minors sold their property, and the minors
had also some other properties besides the property sold,
Ghose, J., held that if a minor had other properties and if
1 AIR 1973 Gau 56.
2 (1973) 9 Annual Survey of Indian Law, 221.
3 AIR 1973 Cal 64.
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there was no evidence on the record to show that the pro­
perty was in a bad state of decay, it could not be said 
that the guardian was within his power to sell the property 
and that the sale was valid. In Nasirul Hogue v. Johora 
Khatun S.K. Datta, J., held that the clause that 'minor 
has no other property' should not be literally construed, 
and that its reasonable and proper interpretation should 
be that if a minor was seized of properties and if the pro­
perties did not yield income sufficient for his maintenance 
then it would not only be proper but necessary that all or 
some of the properties of the minor should be sold for the 
purpose of her maintenance. This was a case in which a minor 
daughter represented by her husband challenged the sale of 
her property effected by her father on the ground that the 
sale was not for her benefit.
Mere difficulty in managing the property on account
of its being situated at a distance from the guardian's
place of residence, and absence of profits from it are not
grounds which entitle a guardian to sell the minor's pro- 
2perty . A sale of a minor's property with fraudulent inten-
3tion would be invalid .
The same rules apply to a mortgage^. If a minor has
no other means of paying his debts, ancestral or personal,
• • 5his legal guardian can mortgage his property . A guardian
1 AIR 1974 Cal 248. '
2 Bharat v. Hamjan (1941) 45 CWN 489, 492.
3 S.C. Sircar, Tagore Law Lectures ---1873, 485 Art. 565.
4 Bhutnath Dey v. Ahmed Hosain (1885) 11 Cal 417; Yea iuddin 
Pramanick v. Rup Man jari AIR 1936 Cal 326.
5 Abbas Husein v. Kiran Shashi Devi AIR 1942 Nag 12.
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may borrow money for the support and education of the minor, 
and may pledge the minor's property for the purpose. All 
debts contracted validly and bona fide for the above purpose 
would form a charge on the minor's estate and could be 
paid out of the same1. Broadly speaking, the power extends 
to cases where there is an absolute necessity or where the 
alienation is for the benefit of the minor. Thus the father
or other lawful guardian may grant a lease, if it is for
2 . . .  the benefit of the minor . The prohibition against alienation
applies to immovable property to which the minor has an
undisputed title, and does not apply where the minor's title
to the property is disputed. Thus where the father of a
minor sold part of the immovable property inherited by the
minor from his mother, the title to which was in dispute,
and the sale was made pursuant to a compromise which put an
end to a pending litigation and which rendered practicable
to effect the settlement of a large part of the land in the
minor's favour and to obtain a fair price, the sale was
held to be binding on the minor as being one for the benefit 
3
of the minor . A settlement by a natural guardian for the 
management of a minor's property would not be binding on the 
minor unless there is urgent necessity or clear benefit to
4
the minor for such settlement .
1 Syed Ameer Ali, Mahommedan law Vol. 2 (4th ed., 1917), 614.
2 Zeebunnissa Begum v. Mrs. Danaqher AIR 1936 Mad 564.
3 Kali Putt Jha v. Abdul Ali (1888) 16 Cal 627 (PC); Rahim- 
uddin v. Abdul Malik Bhuvia PLD 1968 Dac 801.
4 Alivumma v. Kunhammed (1910) 34 Mad 527.
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1.2*3. Contract by natural guardians
Under Muslim law a legal guardian can make a contract 
on behalf of a minor and the minor's estate would be bound 
by such contract if it is for the minor's necessity or 
benefit. Macnaghten said1*
"In the case of a contract where there is a possibi­
lity of loss, it has been held that a near guardian 
(by which is meant a father or grandfather or 
guardians duly appointed by them) is at liberty 
to enter into it, but that a remote guardian, such 
as an uncle or a brother, is not at liberty to 
enter into such contract on behalf of the minor. 
Where, however, nothing but loss can accrue to 
the minor, such as in case of making a donation or 
granting a loan, it is not legal for any guardian, 
near or remote, or for any executor or other person 
under whose care he is, to act on his behalf'.
Ever since the decision in Mir Sarwar jan v. Fakhruddin 
2
Mahomed it has been held by the courts of India, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh that a guardian has no power to enter into 
a contract for the purchase of property on behalf of a minor. 
But we have seen in chapter 3 that the said Privy Council 
decision was not properly understood by the courts as well 
as by the text-book writers. In fact what the Privy Council 
decision means is that if the guardian has the legal capa­
city to act on behalf of the minor, he may enter into a 
contract provided the transaction is for the necessity of 
the minor or advantageous to him. In Amir Ahmmad v. Meer 
Nizam Ali^ a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court held 
that a de jure Muslim guardian could bind by personal cove­
nant a Muslim minor even when the covenant was for the
1 Moohummudan law, 305-06 case 2; Sircar, TLL, 483-84 Art. 563.
2 (1911) 39 IA 1 (PC).
3 AIR 1952 Hyd 120 (FB).
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purchase of immovable property if the contract was for the 
necessity and benefit of the minor. Similarly in Muhammad 
Mursaleen v. Noor Muhammad1 Qadeeruddin, J., of Karachi 
High Court held that the father of a Muslim minor was enti­
tled to enter into a contract to purchase property on behalf 
of his minor son and such a contract was enforceable against 
the minor.
1.2.4. Trade by natural guardians
Syed Ameer Ali says that a guardian may carry on a 
trade on behalf of the minor, but in doing so he must be 
careful not to go beyond the bounds of ordinary prudence 
or to engage in hazardous or speculative transactions. The 
courts generally hold that a guardian should not carry 
on a business on behalf of a minor, especially if it is 
one which may involve the minor's estate in speculation or 
loss? and any debt incurred for such trade or business will 
not be binding on the minor's estate. If after the death 
of a Muslim his adult sons carry on their father's business 
for the benefit of the other heirs of the deceased including 
his minor sons, the minors are not liable for any losses 
incurred therein . The minors can claim shares in the profits 
made by the adult members in the business by the use of 
their assets because the adult members are bound in a fiduci­
ary character to account to the minors for profits arising 
from the shares of the minors under section 88 illustration (f)
1PLD 1968 Kar 163.
2 Khorasany v. Acha AIR 1928 Rang 160? Ahmad Ibrahim v.
Muvvappa AIR 1940 Mad 285.
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of the Trusts Act of 18821; and further the adult members
being placed in the dominant position they had in relation
to the whole business under section 90 of the said Act,
they must hold for the benefit of the minors any advantage
gained by the use of their position including the profits
2accruing from such business . Section 90 of the Trusts Act 
runs as follows*
"Where a tenant for life, co-owner, mortgagee or 
other qualified owner of any property, by avail­
ing himself of his position as such, gains an 
advantage in derogation of the rights of the 
other persons interested in the property, or 
where any such owner, as representing all persons 
interested in such property, gains any advantage, 
he must hold, for the benefit of all persons so 
interested, the advantage so gained, but subject 
to repayment by such persons of their due share 
of the expenses properly incurred, and to an 
indemnity by the same persons against liabilities 
properly contracted in gaining such advantage".
. 3In Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Hakim , where a Muslim business 
man died leaving an adult son, a widow and some minor child­
ren, and the adult son continued the family business for 
the benefit of the family and made profits thereby, Wallace 
and Pandalai, JJ.» held that the adult son by his conduct 
after the father's death put himself in a fiduciary relation­
ship to the widow and the minors, and that the assets and 
profits of the business were held by him not as co-owner 
but as trustee under section 88 of the Trusts Act, The adult 
son was therefore liable to account under section 23(f) of
1 The illustration provides* "A and B are partners. A dies. 
B, instead of winding up the affairs of the partnership, 
retains all the assets in the business. B must account to 
A's legal representative for the profits arising from A's 
share of the capital".
2 Shukrullah v. Zohra Bibi (1932) 54 All 916.
3 AIR 1931 Mad 553.
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that Act. Section 23(f) provides as follows*
"Where the breach consists in the employment of 
trust-property or the proceeds thereof in trade 
or business, he is liable to account, at the 
option of the fiduciary, either for compound 
interest (with half-yearly rests) at the same 
rate, or for the nett profits made by such 
employment”.
1*3. Alienations by natural guardians under the GWA
As seen in chapter 2, the GWA does not interfere with
the personal laws of the Hindus and the Muslims. Section 19
of the GWA prohibits the court from appointing the guardian
of a minor whose father or husband, as the case may be, is
alive and is not unfit to be the guardian^". The powers of
a natural guardian are not affected by the restrictions
which the GWA places upon the powers of guardians appointed
by the court. The powers of a natural guardian are however
larger than those of a guardian appointed under the GWA.
He may alienate the property of a minor without the sanction
2
of the court , and the validity of his acts are determined 
by the limitations prescribed by the provisions of section 
27 of the GWA. Once a person is denoted as natural,guardian 
under the personal law of the minor, the GWA does not make 
any difference between the Hindus and the Muslims. The 
general provisions of its section 27 are applicable to all 
alike.
1 Siddiq-un-Nissa v. Nizam-Uddin (1931) 54 All 128. 132.
2 Jalaluddin Shaikh v. Kshirode Chandra Tikadar PLD 1960 Dac
948, 951.
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2 . De facto guardians and alienation
2.1. Who are de facto guardians under Muslim law?
A person who is neither a legal guardian nor a guardian 
appointed by the court but who voluntarily places himself 
in charge of the person and property of a minor is called 
a de facto guardian. The expression 'de facto guardian' is 
used in contradistinction to 'de jure guardian'. Legal 
guardians and guardians appointed by the court are known as 
de jure guardians. As seen earlier, under Muslim law the 
father, father's father and executors appointed by them are 
legal guardians of the property of a minor. Therefore the 
mother, brother, uncle and all relations other than the 
father and father's father are de facto guardians, unless 
they are appointed executors by the will of the father or 
father's father, or are appointed guardians by the court.
2.2. Alienation by de facto guardians
Under Muslim law a de facto guardian is merely a 
custodian of the person and property of the minor. Unlike 
a de facto guardian under Hindu law, he has no power to 
transfer any right or interest in the immovable property 
of the minor. A sale, mortgage or any other transfer by 
him of the, minor's immovable property is void1, and it does
1 Sita Ram v. Amir Begum (1886) 8 All 324; Baba v. Shivappa 
(1895) 20 Bom 199; Moyna Bibi v. Banku Behari (1902) 29 Cal 
473; Imambandi v. Mutsaddi (1918) 23 CWN 50 (PC); Mohd. Shafi 
v. Kulsum Bi (19231 4 Lah 467; Fateh Din v. Gurmukh Singh 
AIR 1929 Lah 810, 811; Mohd. Sultan v. Abdul Rahman AIR 1937 
Rang 175, 178; Gulam Husain v. Mir Jakirali AIR 1939 Nag 
27; Sambhu v. Piyari AIR 1941 Pat 351; Ramchandrayya v.
Abdul Kadir AIR 1948 Mad 37, 38; Venkama v. S.V. Chisty 
AIR 1951 Mad 399; Mohd. Sarder v. Gyanu AIR 1952 Nag 17;
Zafir v. Amiruddin AIR 1963 Pat 108; Maimunnissa Bibi v.
Abdul Jabbar AIR 1966 Mad 468; Parshotamdas v. Bai Dhabu 
AIR 1973 Guj 88.
391
not confer any title on the transferee1. Before the Privy
Council decision in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi it was held in
3a number of cases that if the alienation was for legal 
necessity or for the benefit of the minor, it was valid 
and the minor was bound by such alienation. If a de facto 
guardian made a sale or mortgage in order to satisfy a 
mortgage or other debt of the minor’s father or other person 
from whom the minor inherited or acquired property, such
4
sale or mortgage would not be binding on the minor • Where 
a mother executes a mortgage of her minor children’s pro­
perty inherited from their father, to pay off a prior 
mortgage effected by the minors' father, and also for the 
maintenance of the children, the mortgage was held to be 
void and a decree conditional upon the payment of the amount
by which the minors were benefited was granted to the child-
5ren . In setting aside a mortgage by a mother on behalf of 
her minor son, the Madras High Court also held that the 
court had the discretionary power under section 41 of the 
Specific Relief Act (Act 1) of 1877 to make it a condition 
that the minor should refund the amount by which his estate 
was benefited^. So also where a mother executed as de facto
1 Mastu v. Nand Lai (1890) PR 200 (FB); Nizamuddin v. Anandi 
Prasad (1896) 18 All 373; Sarder Shah v. Haii fl909) PR 75, 
76; Uttam Singh v. Gurmukh Singh (1913) PR 54, 55; Choqhatta 
v. Asa Mai (1913) PR 108, 109.
2 (1918) 23 CWN 50.
3 Hasan Ali v. Mehdi Husain (1877) 1 All 533; Ma iidun v. Ram
Narain (1903) 26 All 22; Mofazzal v. Basid Sheikh (1906)
Cal 36; Ram Charan v. Anukul Chandra (1906) 34 Cal 65; Ummi
Begum v. Kesho Das (1908) 30 All 462; Fakiruddin v. Abdul
Hussain (1910) 35 Bom 217; Abid Ali v. Imam Ali (1916) 58 All 
92; Kapura v. Shankar Das (1918) PR 350.
4 Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali (1912) 16 CWN 338 (PC).
5 Rang Ilahi v. Mahbub Ilahi AIR 1926 Lah 170.
6 Kadir Meeral v. Mohd. Kova AIR 1956 Mad 368.
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guardian a mortgage on behalf of her minor son for the 
maintenance of the son, the son could not recover the 
property without restoring the benefit received, even 
though the transaction was void*.
A de facto guardian cannot lawfully enter into a
\
lease on behalf of the minor; but once the lease is granted
by him, the minor can sue the lessee under section 70 of
the Contract Act of 1872 for compensation for use and
2occupation of the land . He cannot give consent on behalf
of the minor to validate a bequest to the minor's co-heirs ,
nor can he enter into a family settlement in respect of
a minor's property, even though the settlement may be for
. 4the minor's benefit . He can, however, make a settlement 
of the minor's agricultural land with tenants for agricul-
5
tural purposes . He has no power to refer to arbitration 
disputes as to the distribution of the minor's father's
properties, and the minor is not bound by an award on such
6a reference ; nor does subsequent appointment of the de facto 
guardian as guardian of the minor under the GWA make the
award binding upon the minor in the absence of the court's
7 . . .approval of the reference . A deed of partition to which
1 Ahmad Khan v. Mirai Din AIR 1940 Lah 80, 81; Abbas v. Kiran 
AIR 1942 Nag 12, 14.
2 Azizul Rahman v. Choithram Chellaram AIR 1940 Sind 129, 131.
3 Bibi Kulsoom v. Mt. Mariam AIR 1933 Oudh 97, 98.
4 Mohd. Amin v. Vakil Ahmad AIR 1952 SC 358.
5 Tahad Ali v. Sheikh Israrullah (1929) All 89, 94.
6 Ameer Hasan v. Mohd. Ejaz Husain AIR 1929 Oudh 134, 139; 
Mohd. Ejaz v. Mohd. Iftikhar AIR 1932 PC 76, 79.
7 Johara Bibi v. Mohd. Sadak AIR 1951 Mad 997, 1001; Abdul 
Karim v. Mt. Maniran AIR 1954 Pat 6, 7.
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a minor is a party represented by his mother as de facto 
guardian is void and not binding on him1.
An alienation effected by the de facto guardian of a
minor's property cannot be ratified by the minor on attain- 
2ing majority . The de facto guardian has no power to make
3a compromise on the minor's behalf , or enter into any
contract whereby he could saddle the minor with any pecuniary 
. . 4liability , and such contract cannot be specifically enforced
5against the minor or his property . He cannot impose any 
personal obligation on the minor by executing a promissory 
note in respect of the liability for the minor's father's 
debts or by renewing an existing one . A borrowing on the 
personal credit of the minor to clear off a decree on a 
mortgage executed by the de facto guardian on behalf of 
the minor cannot be deemed to be an act arising from the 
wants of the minor and such a borrowing cannot bind the
7
minor's estate .
A de facto guardian cannot carry on business on behalf
o
of the minor . He is not competent to enter into a partner­
ship agreement binding on the minor. A mother being a de facto
1 Assiz v. Chittamma AIR 1954 Trav-Co 370.
2 Anto v. Reoti Kuar AIR 1936 All 837, 838 (FB); Karim v. 
Jaikaran AIR 1937 Nag 390; Ziarat Gul v. Mian Khan PLD 1950 
Pesh 69.
3 Zafir v. Amiruddin AIR 1963 Pat 108.
4 Ghulam Ali v. Inavet Ali AIR 1933 Lah 95, 96.
5 Jaina Beevi v. Govindaswami AIR 1967 Mad 369.
6 Naziruddin Ashraf v. Kharagnarain AIR 1939 Pat 29.
7 Kunhibi v. Kaliani Amina AIR 1939 Mad 881.
8 Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Hakim AIR 1931 Mad 553, 556; Ahmad 
Ibrahim v. Meyyappa AIR 1940 Mad 285, 287.
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guardian is not competent to enter into a contract pledging 
her minor children's shares in the assets of their deceased 
father's firm1.
2.3. Doctrine of necessity for alienation under Muslim lav
As seen earlier under Muslim law a legal guardian can 
alienate the minor’s immovable property for the necessity 
or benefit of the minor. Some may apprehend that the 
doctrine of necessity or benefit of the minor is an import­
ation of Hindu law principle into Muslim law; but such an 
apprehension is not correct. This doctrine is inherent in 
Muslim law in relation to transactions with minors' property^. 
In its application in Indian cases the doctrine used to be 
referred to by the Indian Benches and the Bars in fit cases;
and even alienations by de facto guardians were justified
. 4 5under it . But m  1918 in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi their Lord­
ships of the Privy Council in deciding the question "how far 
or under what circumstances according to Mahommedan law, 
a mother's dealings with her minor child's property are 
binding on the infant" unfortunately observed;
"Under the Mahommedan law a person who has charge 
of the person or property of a minor without 
being his legal guardian, and who may, therefore, 
be conveniently called a 'de facto guardian', has 
no power to convey to another any right or interest 
in immovable property which the transferee can
1 Federation of Pakistan v. Pioneer Bank, Ltd. PLD 1958 Dac 535.
2 Justice Abdur Rahim in Hyderman Kutti v. Syed Ali (1912)
23 MLJ 244, 247; and in Abdul Maieeth v. Krishnamachariar 
(1917) 40 Mad 243 (FB).
3 Hedaya. 702; Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 687.
4 Hyderman Kutti v. Syed Ali (1912) 23 MLJ 244,
5 (1918) 23 CWN 50, 63.
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enforce against the infant; nor can such transferee, 
if let into possession of the property under such 
unauthorised transfer, resist an action in eject­
ment on behalf of the infant as a trespasser”.
The questions arise; Was the law prior to this decision 
the same? Did their Lordships consider cases of extreme 
necessity and benefit of the minor? Is there any direct 
prohibition in Muslim law against assigning capacity to 
de facto guardians? Are the authoritative texts on Muslim 
law uncompromising on the dealings of a de facto guardian 
with the minor's property?
So far as the first question is concerned their Lord­
ships in Imambandi1s case observed that the decisions of 
different High Courts of India as to a de facto guardian's 
capacity to deal effectively with his minor ward's property 
in Muslim law are not uniform. So they felt the desirability 
of laying down a definite rule on the subject; and they did
it by examining virtually the decision of a single High
1 . . . .  2 Court case and referring to a single Privy Council decision •
Let us see, in brief, what exactly was the situation before
this historic judgment.
2.3.1. Earlier decisions of different High Courts of India
The cases of the Indian High Courts show that in 
Muslim law the alienations of a minor's property could be
1 Hyderman Kutti v. Syed Ali (1912) 23 MLJ 244.
2 Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali (1912) 16 CWN 338 (PC).
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made by persons other than legal guardians either as de facto 
guardians or as co-heirs representing the estate of the 
deceased for the payment of the deceased's debts. We are 
not concerned with the latter type of persons and their 
alleged alienations.
Prior to the decision in Imambandi 's case the Calcutta 
High Court followed more or less the principle of extreme 
necessity and benefit of the minor to determine the validity 
of transfers of minors' property by de facto guardians. The 
first relevant case in which the test was applied is probably 
Mussamut Bukshun v, Mussamut Doolhine1. It was a case in which 
the adult elder brother of two minor sisters sold as guardian 
the shares of his minor sisters in the estate to pay off 
certain family debts, Norman, J,, relying on the authority 
of Macnaghten and particularly on 'fuzuli sale' [sale of 
the property of another without his consent] held that in 
case of urgent necessity or very clear advantage to the minor 
such a sale would be permitted. This principle was also
upheld in the case of a de facto guardian's disposition of
3 ■ .a minor's movable property , Although in Movna Bibi v. Banku
Behari^ Rampini and Pratt, JJ., set aside a sale by a de facto
mother-guardian on the ground of her absence of authority
to deal with a minor's estate, they doubted whether, if the
5 .sale was for the manifest advantage of the minor , it could
1 (1869) 12 WR 337 (CR).
2 Moohummudan law, 305 ch. VII case 2.
3 Mussumat Syedun v, Syed Velayet Ali Khan (1872) 17 WR 339; 
Mofazzal Hosain v. Basid Sheikh (1906) 34 Cal 36.
4 (1902) 29 Cal 473.
5 Ibid, 478.
397
not be upheld under Muslim law. This doubt was materialised
after four years, and in Mofazzal Hosain v. Basid Sheikh -^
Rampini and Woodroffe, JJ., decided that a sale for urgent
necessity in order to pay the debts due by the deceased
and for the maintenance of the minor was valid in Muslim
law. The learned judges distinguished the decision in Moyna
Bibi *s case by observing that it had not been shown there
that the alienation of the minor's property was for the
benefit of the minor. In Ramcharan Sanya1 v. Anukul Chandra 
2Achariee Maclean, C.J., and Casperz, J., followed Mofazzal 
Hosain's case, and held that a sale by the mother as de facto 
guardian of her minor son was good and valid if it was 
found to have been made bona fide and for the benefit of 
the minor.
The Allahabad High Court adopted the same principle.
. 3Spankie and Oldfield, JJ., in Hasan All v. Mehdi Husain , 
where the paternal aunt of the minor acting as a guardian 
sold the minor's property to pay off the latter's ancestral 
debts and meet the necessity of the minor, held that the 
sale was binding on the minor. The obiter observation of
4
Mahmood, J., in Sita Ram v. Amir Begum that the mother 
could not exercise any power of disposition with reference 
to her minor children's property, cannot be accepted, as the 
mother in that case did not profess to act on behalf of her
1 (1906) 34 Cal 36. —
2 (1906) 34 Cal 65.
3 (1877) 1 All 533.
4 (1886) 8 All 324.
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minor daughters, and the transferee from the mother was
not a bona fide one for value because he had the knowledge
of the existence of other heirs besides the widow and the
son. In Girrai Bakhsh v. Kazi Hamid Ali1 Edge, C.J., did
not apply his mind to test the validity of the alienation?
he was much concerned with the application of the equity
principle. Following an earlier decision of the same court
2Blair and Banerji, JJ., found in Haiidun v. Ram Narain
that where the de facto guardian of a minor girl sold the
minor's property to pay partly the debts of the deceased
father and partly government revenue, the sale was binding
3on the minor. In Ummi Begum v. Kesho Das the minor daughter
could not impeach the sale of her lunatic father's property
effected by her mother for her (the minor's) benefit. In
deciding inter alia whether the de facto mother-guardian
could mortgage her minor son's property Banerji and Walsh,
. 4JJ., held m  Abid All v. Imam All that m  case of necessity 
and for the benefit of the minor the mother was competent 
to make a valid mortgage of her minor son's property.
The Bombay High Court did not disapprove of the trend 
followed by the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts. In
5
Hurbai v. Hiraji Byramii the mother and one adult brother 
of a minor on their own behalf and as guardians of the minor 
mortgaged the property inherited from the deceased father? 
Starling, J., treated the guardians as having the power
1 (1886) 9 All 340.
2 (1903) 26 All 22.
3 (1908) 30 All 462.
4 (1915) 38 All 92.
5 (1895) 20 Bom 116.
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to mortgage or sell the minor's property if there was 
absolute necessity for the transaction, or if it was for 
the benefit of the minor. In this case, however, the 
mortgage was not upheld, since the purposes for which the 
money was raised by the guardians were not for the benefit 
of the minor. The question of a de facto guardian's power
to deal with the minor's property was also raised in Baba v.
1 . 2  Shivappa and Fakiruddm v. Abdul Hussain ; and m  both
cases the de facto guardian's alienation was upheld.
3
The Madras High Court in its earlier decisions did 
not express any definite opinions on the de facto guardian's 
alienating authority and the validity of such alienation, 
if made for necessity and benefit of the minor. Wallis and 
Krishnaswami Ayyar, JJ., following the Calcutta and Bombay
4
High Court decisions held m  Aliyamma v. Kunhammad that
a guardian's powers in respect of the minor's immovable
property were very restricted in Muslim law and_that
urgent necessity or clear benefit to the minor must be
shown before an alienation by the de facto guardian could
. 5be upheld. In Hyderman Kutti v. Syed Ali Abdur Rahim, J., 
held that the de facto guardian of a minor could alienate 
the minor's property in 'cases of urgent and imperative 
necessity and in cases which are necessarily beneficial 
to the minor'•
1 (1895) 20 Bom 199.
2 (1910) 35 Bom 217.
3 Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi (1902) 26 Mad 734; Purqoji 
Row v. Fakir Sahib (1906) 30 Mad 197; Abdul Kadir v. Chida 
mbaram (1908) 32 Mad 276.
4 (1910) 34 Mad 527.
5 (1912) 23 MLJ 244.
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A similar view was adopted in the Patna High Court.
In Sheikh Ra iab Ali v. Sheikh Wazir Ali  ^it was held that 
the mother of a minor child could validly alienate the 
minor's property if it was for the benefit or advantage
of the minor. The Chief Court of Punjab also followed a
. . . . . 2 similar view. In Anant Ram v. Nazir Hussain Barkley and
Burney, JJ., held that under Muslim law the mother was not
the legal guardian of her minor children but if she alienated
any property of her minor child for the latter's benefit
3
the minor would be bound. In Dad v. Gala Ram the question
of alienation for the minor's benefit was not raised; but
4m  Fazl Ilahi v. Yakub Mirza , where the mother mortgaged 
the minor's estate for the alleged purpose of celebrating 
the minor's marriage it was held that the mother was not 
authorised to effect the mortgage. The question of necessity 
and benefit was pleaded, but the learned judges of the 
Division Bench were not convinced that the mortgage money
5
was spent for the minor's benefit. In Kapura v. Shankar Das 
the decision in Hyderman Kutti's case was followed.
However, the High Court of North-West Provinces had
0
held in Sahu Ram v. Mohammed Abdul Rahman that a mother 
could not lawfully sell her minor son's property, even 
though the sale was made by the mother in good faith and
1916) Pat LJ 188.
1883) PR 433.
1889) PR 154.
1889) PR 680.
1918) PR 350.
1884) N.-W.P HC Rep. 268.
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for the discharge of a debt adjudged to be due by the father. 
But the necessity and benefit was little considered as the 
minor was not a direct party to the suit. Pearson and 
Spankie, JJ. , in Mirza Pana Ali v. Sadik Hossain1 held the 
sale by the mother of a minor son's share in a property as 
invalid without deciding whether the transaction was for 
the benefit of the minor.
The Chief Court of Oudh also followed a contrary view.
2In Matadm v. All Mirza where the mother sold the property
of her minor children to satisfy a mortgage decree, the court
did not consider the sale as valid. Again in Amba Shankar v.
3Ganqa Singh Chamier and Wells, A.J.Cs., held that a mother 
had no power whatsoever to deal with the property of her 
minor children, even if such dealing was 'assumed to be for 
the benefit of the minors'. Greeven and Chamier, J.Cs.,
,4 ■
in Mata Din Sah v. Shaikh Ahmad All reviewed the earlier 
decisions of some of the High Courts, discussed the avail­
able translated authorities on Muslim law and held that the 
mortgage of a minor's property by a person who was not the 
minor's natural guardian or a judicially appointed guardian 
was absolutely void, even though it might have been executed 
to pay off debts legally payable by the minor.
2.3.2. Earlier Privy Council decisions
Besides these High Courts' and Chief Courts' decisions
1 (1875) N.-W.P HC Rep 201.
2 (1902) 5 OC 197.
3 (1906) 9 OC 97.
4 (1908) 11 OC 1.
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there were two Privy Council decisions regarding the guard­
i an^ authority to deal with a minor's property. The first 
one was reported in Kali Putt Jha v. Abdul Ali1. In this 
case the minor inherited some property from his mother and 
his father sold it. Their Lordships of the Privy Council 
upheld the sale on the ground that the sale was for the 
benefit of the minor, inasmuch as it terminated a dispute 
which was there in respect of the minor's title to the 
property. This case was not relevant to the de facto 
guardian's powers, it simply approved of the statement of
law regarding the natural guardian's powers contained in
2Macnaghten's book . The second Privy Council case was Mata Din
.3 . .v. Ahmad All . The question involved in this case was whether
the transfer of a minor's property by a person who was not 
his natural guardian could be upheld, when made to discharge 
a debt payable by the minor. The facts of the case show that 
a minor's share in an estate was sold by his elder brother 
along with his own share to pay an ancestral debt. The 
estate was already in mortgage executed by their ancestor, 
and the vendee was in possession of the property. On attain­
ing majority the younger brother ignoring the sale brought 
a suit against the vendee-mortgagee for redemption of his 
share. The lower courts decreed the plaintiff's claim. In 
the Privy Council Lord Robson in delivering the judgment
1 (1888) 16 Cal 627 (PC).
2 Principles and Precedents of Moohummudan law, 64 ch.VIII 
prin. 14.
3 (1912) 16 CWN 338 (PC).
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of the Board observed^*
"It is difficult to see how the situation of an 
unauthorised guardian is bettered by describing 
him as a 'de facto* guardian. He may, by his 
de facto guardianship, assume important respon­
sibilities in relation to the minor's property, 
but he cannot thereby clothe himself with legal 
power to sell".
2
2.3.3. Rule of Imambandi v. Mutsaddi
In this state of rulings of the different courts of 
India, the oft-quoted Imambandi * s case came before the 
Privy Council in 1918. This was a case in which the mother 
sold for herself and as guardian of her two minor children 
their shares in her deceased husband's estate to the plaintiff 
primarily to avoid a litigation brought by the defendants 
who were disowning her and her children's shares in the 
estate. The question that came for decision was how far accord­
ing to Muslim law a mother's dealings with her minor children's
property were binding on the minors. Their Lordships, per
3Ameer All, observed i
"The mother has no larger powers to deal with her 
minor child's property than any outsider or non- 
relative who happens to have charge for the time 
being of the infant".
Now we come to our second questioni did their Lordships 
consider the cases of extreme necessity and benefit of the 
minor? From the facts of the case it appears that the question 
did not arise at all. The contending defendants did not
1 (1912) 16 CWN 338, 345 (PC).
2 (1918) 23 CWN 50.
3 Ibid, 57.
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claim through the minors; on the contrary, they were estab­
lishing their right in the whole estate illegitimatising 
the minors. It appears from the judgment that their Lord­
ships were more concerned in establishing the principles 
of law than in finding whether the alienation was for the 
necessity or benefit of the minors. However, there was 
little scope in that case to consider the minors' necessity 
or welfare, unless one could look beyond the immediate 
facts. In their judgment their Lordships relied on the 
earlier Privy Council decision in Mata Din's case (1912) 
where Lord Robson in delivering the judgment of the Board 
of which Ameer Ali himself was also a member, adopted 
mainly the reasoning of Greeven, J.C., in Mata Din Sah 
v. Sheikh Ahmad Ali1. against whose judgment the appeal
was made to the Privy Council.
In Mata Din Sah's case (1908) the concerned party
failed to prove the necessity and benefit of the minor.
In that case Greeven, J.C., examined the authority of the
2following passage of Ameer All's book ;
"A mother is not a natural guardian. She is entitled 
to the custody of the persons of her minor children 
but she has no right to the guardianship of their 
property. If she deals with their estate without 
being specially authorised by the judge or by the 
father her acts should be treated as the acts of 
fuzulee [one who sells the property of other without
the consent of the owner]. If they are to the
manifest advantage of the children, they should 
be upheld; if not they should be set aside".
1 (1908) 11 OC 1.
2 Mahommedan law Vol. 2 (Calcutta; 2nd ed., 1894), 476.
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The authority of the passage was first doubted in
Moyna Bibi v. Banku Behari1 and next in Amba Shankar v.
2Ganqa Singh • But in none of them was it discussed. Greeven,
J.C., based his argument mainly on the term 'fuzuli *. His
contention was that as a minor could not give a valid consent
so a fuzuli *s contract which needs the consent of the owner,
could not take place in the case of minors. Greeven, J.C.,
failed to realise that this is an exception to the generally
accepted rule. It is to provide 'great advantage* to a
person who himself does not make the contract; it does not
correspond to the law of agency. The following relevant
3portion from the Hedava about a fuzuli contract will bear 
it out*
"If a person sell the property of another without
his order, the contract is complete, but it remains
with the proprietor either to confirm or dissolve 
the sale as he pleases ... there is no injury in 
this (contract) to the proprietor (as he has the 
power of dissolving it), it is attended with a 
great advantage to him".
No time is fixed for the consent to be given in this
kind of contract; but it is accepted that until it is given,
the contract remains suspended or voidable. The Fuzuli
contract is equivalent to neqotiorum qestio in Roman law.
Like the neqotiorum qestor. the fuzuli 'introduces himself
4unmasked into another person's affairs' , and he validly
5transfer the property of his 'friends or acquaintances'
1 (1902) 29 Cal 473.
2 (1906) 9 OC 97.
3 Hedava. 296.
4 Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to Roman law, 313.
5 Derrett, Critique, 431 para 545.
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when it is to their advantage or benefit; and the transfer 
binds their property without their concurrence. The true 
owner can affirm or disapprove the transaction; but once 
it is affirmed it becomes absolutely binding on him.
That the minors could become parties to a fuzuli 
contract was established by their Lordships in the Privy 
Council case of Newab Mulka Jehan v. Mahomed Ushkuree  ^
where the Judicial Committee found the marriage of a minor 
as fuzuli marriage and held that such marriage needed assent 
after the attainment of the minor's maturity. Again, although 
it appears that Lord Robson left open the question whether 
a sale by a de facto guardian, if made of necessity, or 
for the payment of ancestral debt and beneficial to the 
minor, is altogether void or voidable, had that sale been 
proved to have been made of necessity or beneficial to the 
minor, the decision might probably have swung to the latter 
group.
It is submitted that in Mata Din Sah's case Greeven, 
J.C., did not properly understand the passage of Ameer Ali's
book against its academic background• The learned judicial
2 3commissioner followed Sita Ram's and Amba Shankar's case.
In Amba Shankar's case the passage of Ameer Ali's book was
rejected on the ground that 'no authority is cited by the
author'4. But could it be asked what justification prompted
1 (1873) IA Suppl. 192. ~
2 (1886) 8 All 324.
3 (1906) 9 OC 97.
4 Ibid, 99.
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the learned judicial commissioner to follow Sita Ram's case?
As said earlier the reasoning in Sita Ram's case was obiter 
and less persuasive as Mahmood, J., did not cite any authority 
in support of his statement of principle of law. However, 
the author himself has dropped the passage from his book 
in its subsequent edition. The author did not assign any 
reason in the preface of the 5th edition in which it is dropped 
for this quiet dropping of the passage; on the contrary, he 
naively has given the whole judgment of Imambandi's case 
at the appendix of his book. Even in the 4th edition of the 
book the relevant passage was there. Wilberforce, J.C., 
in Kapura v. Shankar Das1 cited the passage from 4th edition 
Vol. 2, page 611.
2.4. Muslim lagal texts and the doctrine of necessity
We shall now consider the third and the fourth questions 
together. The Muslim legal authorities do not in fact provide 
any guiding light to the problems, unless they are pieced 
together and read supplementing one authority by another.
The dearth of authorities is mainly due to the fact that 
in Muslim law it is ordinarily assumed that a minor should 
be in the care and custody of the executor of his father.
Thus the law relating to the powers and duties of an executor 
may be taken to apply to the guardian of a minor's property.
1 (1918) PR 350.
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The author of the Hedava in laying down the general
rules with respect to an infant's property observes1*
"If a person bestow anything in gift or alms upon 
an orphan under the protection of a particular 
person, it is lawful for that person to take 
possession of such gift or alms on his behalf.
It is here proper to remark, that acts in regard 
to infant orphans are of three descriptions * -
I. Acts of guardianship, such as contracting 
an infant in marriage, or selling or buying goods 
for him; a power which belongs solely to the 
walee [walij, or natural guardian, whom the law 
has constituted the infant's substitute in those 
points.
II. Acts arising from the wants of the infant, 
such as buying or selling for him on occasions of 
need, or hiring a nurse for him, or the like; which 
power belongs to the maintainer of the infant, 
whether he be the brother, uncle or (in case of
a foundling) the Mooltakit, or taker-up, or the 
mother, provided she be maintainer of the infant; 
and as these are empowered with respect to such acts, 
the walee. or natural guardian, is also empowered 
with respect to them in a still superior degree;
  nor is it requisite, with respect to the guardian,
that the infant be in his immediate protection.
III. Acts which are purely advantageous to the 
infant, such as accepting presents or gifts, and 
keeping them for him; a power which may be exer­
cised either by a Mooltakit, a brother or an uncle, 
and also by the infant himself, provided he be 
possessed of discretion, the intention being only
to open a door to the infant's receiving benefactions 
of an advantageous nature".
Of the three classes of acts, class I need not be 
considered, for it refers to the acts of a de jure guardian; 
so also class III, for it does not refer to sale or mortgage 
but to the acceptance of gifts. Although in class III mother 
is not mentioned as capable of performing those acts, in 
the interest or advantage of the estate of the minor, she can
o
do them . Class II refers to acts which may be performed
1 Hedaya, 608.
2 Ibid, 699.
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by a de facto guardian, although a de jure guardian possesses 
the same power in a superior degree. They are acts necessary 
for supplying the wants of the minor, and may be performed 
by the brother, uncle, mother or the Mooltakit in their 
individual capacity as guardian. For these acts their powers 
to transact the minor's property are inherent powers, and 
for them they need not be empowered by a judicial officer, 
such is the implication of the parenthetic clause 'and as 
these are empowered in respect of such acts'1. These powers 
are their natural powers like those of the wali. In the 
absence of natural guardians and for the manifest advantage 
and extreme necessity of the minor the de facto guardian 
may exercise them.
This passage of the Hedava was quoted by their Lord­
ships of the Privy Council in Imambandi *s case and a Full
Bench of the Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court in Narain-
, 2
das v. Mt. Obhai • But the passage was not properly appre­
ciated. First, they failed to realise that the second class 
of acts is an exception to the first class of acts? these 
are acts of extreme necessity and purely advantageous to the 
minor. The full formalities of law are relaxed in their case, 
because of the very nature of their urgency. Their Lordships 
of the Privy Council and the learned judges of the Full Bench 
did not consider this urgent nature of the acts. They did 
not like to allow the de facto guardians to transact a minor's
1 Hyderman Kutti v. Syed Ali (1912) 23 MLJ 244, 250.
2 (1913) 19 IC 911 (FB).
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property under this class of acts, unless they were empowered 
by a judicial officer. The derivative authority of which 
they spoke is not implied from the actual meaning of the 
words used in the original Arabic and translated Persian 
version of the Hedaya1. Their contention was that when an 
almost absolute restriction was imposed on the powers of 
legal guardians on the ground of conservation of minor's 
property, how could a de facto guardian claim such powers?
But it may be said that restriction on the ground of conser­
vation does not imply that the property cannot be transferred 
even in cases of extreme necessity. It simply implies that 
an immovable property, as it is, should not be changed into 
a movable one. Alienation of a property in the case of nece­
ssity or for the benefit of the minor is guite different 
from the alteration of character of the property for conser­
vation. Secondly, their Lordships tried to restrict the 
powers of de facto guardians by referring to the classifi­
cation of goods into movable and immovable. They assumed that 
the power of alienation could be exercised only in the case
of movable goods. The words used in the original Arabic text
2are 'eiznu kabiat al-habbat al-sadagat * which imply all sorts
of property obtained by gift or alms and do not admit of any
such division. Moreover, in the case of transfer Muslim law
hardly recognises any distinction between movable and immovable
3property. Baillie observes i
1 On Professor Derrett's reference Dr. T.O. Gandjei, Professor 
of Persian in the University of London helped me in,explain­
ing the exact meaning of the words used m  the Persian version
of the Hedava.
2 See Ali ibn Abi Bakr, Al-Hidayah fi al-furu (5th ed.,), 460.
3 Moohummudan Law of Sale. 42 of the introduction.
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"Things are commonly divided into movable and 
immovable, the latter comprehending land and 
things permanently attached to it. But the distinc­
tion is not of much importance in the Moohummudan 
law, as the transfer of land is in nowise distingu­
ished from that of other kinds of property".
Reviewing the opinions of the different schools of Muslim 
law in this regard J.N.D. Anderson observes that there is 
little which is of fundamental interest in the differences 
between real and personal property, or more correctly immo­
vable and movable property1.
Thirdly, their Lordships reasoned that if the de facto 
guardians were considered as fuzulis, even then the transfer 
could not be justified, as they thought that the parties 
to a fuzuli contract must be sui juris persons. But we have 
already seen that such a view is unsupportable; the minors 
could be parties of a fuzuli contract. Their attempt to 
find analogical identification of the fuzuli contract with 
the law of agency led them astray. Fuzuli contract is a Muslim 
counterpart of Roman negotiorum gestio, and is distinct from 
agency law.
Lastly, the second class of acts admits the utility 
of de facto guardianship; these acts are allowed to be per­
formed by de facto guardians in extreme cases of necessity 
and they would be binding on the minor's property. The 
decision of their Lordships in Imambandi * s case has denied 
this utility of de facto guardianship and caused hardship 
to the parties of a de facto guardian's contract. In the 
present state of society the Privy Council decision has
1 J.N.D. Anderson, 'Islamic law', in (1975) 4/2 IECL, 103-106, 
104.
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created problems. What would happen in a case where there 
is no legal or court appointed guardian of a minor, and 
the minor has no other property except lands and a situation 
has arisen which demands immediately an amount of money 
which can be obtained only by the sale of the lands? In such 
a case the author of the Digest has shown in the following 
passage1 that eguity allows a de facto guardian to deal 
with the minor's property?
"When no executor has been appointed by the deceased, 
who has left both adult and minor children, the 
judge should appoint an executor? and if there be 
no judge, and the elder children maintain the 
younger out of their shares of the property, though 
they are legally responsible, they are justifiable, 
as between themselves and their consciences, for 
so meddling with the shares of the younger children".
Muslim legal texts do not therefore disregard cases 
of extreme necessity; and in proper and fit cases they 
uphold alienations by de facto guardians. The Privy Council 
decision has only put a road-block on the need of the society. 
In the modern nuclear family a Muslim mother should be given 
the position and power which her counterparts in Hindu and 
Christian society are enjoying.
Generally, the females are not considered in Muslim 
law to be endowed with any managing or administrative quali­
ties. Thus they are deprived with the guardianship of the 
property of their minor children. In discussing the law 
relating to the powers of a Mooltakit with respect to the
1 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 464.
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disposition of a minor's property the author of the Hedava 
says^ i
"It is not lawful for the Mooltakit to perform 
any acts respecting the property of his foundling? 
analogous to the restriction upon a mother;- that 
is, a mother has a right to the charge of her 
infant child, but yet is not at liberty to perform 
any acts respecting his property? and the Mooltakit 
stands in the same predicament. The principle 
upon which this proceeds is that authority to act 
with respect to the property of an infant is estab­
lished with a view to the increase of that property? 
and this is assured by two circumstances, perfect 
discretion, and complete affection? now in each 
of these two persons in question, only one of 
these qualities exists? for a mother, although 
she entertain a complete affection for her child, 
is deficient in point of discretion? and a Mooltakit, 
although he be possessed of perfect discretion, 
is deficient in affection".
It appears from the above passage that the only reason 
for which a mother in.Muslim law fails to be considered to 
be able to deal with her minor child's property is her defi­
ciency in exercising discretion. If, however, she effects a 
sale of her child's property, it would not be altogether
void, but voidable only. To show the effect of such a sale
2Baillie has provided the following illustration i
"A woman after the death of her husband sells pro­
perty belonged to him, supposing herself to be 
his executrix, and her husband having left minor 
children; she after some time declares that she 
was not the executrix, her assertion, however, is 
not to be credited as against the purchaser, but 
the sale remains in suspense till her children 
arrive at puberty. If they should admit that she 
was the executrix the sale by her is lawful; but 
if they deny the fact the sale is void? and though 
the purchaser should have manured the purchased 
land, he has no recourse for reimbursement against 
the woman. What has been said is on the supposi­
tion that the woman sues for a cancellation of
1 Hedava, 208.
2 Baillie, Moohummudan Law of Sale, 249.
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the sale, on the ground that she was not the 
executrix? but if the minor sue on that ground 
his claim is to be heared".
Muslim law makes a sharp distinction between paternal 
and maternal properties of a minor and does not allow the 
mother or her executor to deal with the paternal property1.
This is due to the general notion of women's deficient
2 ^ mental faculty , the assumed idea of their physical debility
to exercise the power to manage the property, the Arab tribal
tendency to perpetuate the property within the family, and
the 'facility of divorce on the one hand and remarriage of
4widows on the other' .
If we consider the law as it was in the Arab tribal
society as inadequate to meet the needs of modern nuclear 
. . 5families and accept the principles stated in Muslim legal 
texts as supplementing each other without conditioning or 
restricting one another the following principles may be 
evolved*
(1) In case of necessity and for the benefit of the 
minor a natural guardian including the mother can 
deal with the minor's property, both movable and 
immovable j
(2) in default of any natural guardian, the de facto 
guardians (persons belonging to immediate family)
1 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 689? see also Bhutnath Dev v. Ahmed 
Hosain (1885) 11 Cal 417, 421.
2 Hedava. 208.
3 Ibid. 699.
4 Sita Ram v. Amir Begum (1886) 8 All 324.
5 J.N.D. Anderson, 'Recent reforms in the Islamic law of 
inheritance' in (1965) 14 LQR. 349? S.A. Raza, 'Modern 
reforms in Muslim family laws', in (1975) 14 Islamic 
Studies, 238? N.J. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim 
family (Cambridge: 1971), 135.
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may, in extreme cases of emergency and for clear 
advantage of the minor, deal with such property;
(3) the transaction will be voidable at the instance 
of the minor on his attaining majority, but the 
avoidance must be by returning the benefit obtained 
therefrom.
If these principles are followed "the most important 
safeguards provided by the Mahommedan law for the protection 
of the interests of infants'*1 would not be wiped out; on the 
contrary Muslim law of guardianship will present similarity 
with Anglo-Hindu law of guardianship; and the basic prin­
ciples of guardianship would be restored, since a law which
2enquires who made the alienation and not why it was made 
cannot meet the emergencies and protect the interests of 
the minors adequately under modern conditions. The courts 
have no doubt a duty to protect the interest of minors, but 
that does not imply creation of new problems. Kensington,
3
C.J., observed i
"As a general rule far less harm is done by leaving 
people to manage the affairs of their children 
in their own way than by attempting to do it for 
them through the agency of a District Court".
Their Lordships' consideration of Muslim law and the 
interpretation of Muslim legal texts demand rethinking.
1 Imambandi's case (1918) 23 CWN 50, 61 (PC).
2 H.S. Gour, Hindu Code (Nagpuri 4th ed., 1938), 301.
3 Havat Khatoon v, Sharam Khatun (1914) PR 345, 347.
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In the modern socio-economic enviornment it proves inadequate^. 
The property guardianship of a Muslim minor should be con­
sidered in the light of the proposed principles, and the 
relations other than strangers should be considered as de 
facto guardians with powers to alienate the minor's property 
in the case of necessity and benefit of the minor.
2.5. Ghost of Imambandi's rule
Since Imambandi's case a sale, mortgage or any other
transfer of a minor's immovable property by his mother^,
3 4brother , uncle or other relations as de facto guardian 
is considered void. Whenever there is a case of alienation 
of a Muslim minor's property by a de facto guardian, the 
courts follow the above Privy Council decision without 
taking the least trouble to distinguish them excepting a 
few which will be seen presently.
1 Derrett, Introduction. 87 para 112. The writer has rightly 
pointed out that it is not always advisable, financially 
at least, for a de facto guardian to be appointed by the 
court. He observes that where a minor's assets are worth, 
say, Rs 50, and the elder brother offers them for sale to 
provide the minor with food, the purchaser would be a fool 
to enquire why the brother did not apply for appointment.
2 Mohsiuddin Ahmed v. K. Ahmed (1920) 47 Cal 713; Laloo Karikar 
v. Jagat Chandra (1920) 25 CWN 258; Husena Bano v. Brojendra 
Kishore AIR 1929 Cal 82; Kannusami Chetti v. Rahimat Amina 1 
(1933) 65 MLJ 548; Maideen v. Kunhalikutti AIR 1935 Mad 1059; 
Sambhu Gosain v. Piyari AIR 1941 Pat 351; Abdul Karim v.
Mt. Maniran AIR 1954 Pat 6; Venkama Naidu v. Sayed Vilijan 
AIR 1951 Mad 399; Maimunnissa Bibi v. Abdul Jabbar AIR 1966 
Mad 468; Jaina Beevi v. Govindswami AIR 1967 Mad 369.
3 Ram Autar v. Ghulam Dastaqir AIR 1929 All 250; Fateh Din v. 
Gurmukh Singh AIR 1929 Lah 810; Anto v. Reoti Kuar (1937)
All 195 (FB); Ardhanari Mudaliar v. Abdul Rahiman (1956)
1 MLJ 243; Rahimuddin v. Abdul"Malik Bhuvia PLP 1968 Dac 801; 
Gulam Ghouse v. Kamisul AIR 1971 SC 184.
4 Ramchandrayya v. Abdul Kadir Chisthi (1948) Mad 270; Abdullah 
Khan v. Nisar Mohd. Khan PLD 1965 SC 690; Rashid Ahmed v.
Amina Begum PLP 1968 Lah 1045.
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2.5.1. Another Privy Council and the Supreme Courts* decisions
The mother's power to deal with her minor children's 
property was called in question in Mohd. Ejaz Hussain v.
Mohd. Iftikhar Hussain ,^ but whether the alienation was 
beneficial to the minors was not raised. In this case the 
mother as de facto guardian made a reference to an arbitra­
tion council of certain disputes relating to the family 
properties which the minors inherited from their deceased 
father. Under an award of the council some of these properties 
were transferred. On attaining majority the minors contended 
that they were not bound by the award. Their Lordships follow­
ing Imambandi's case held that the mother as a de facto 
guardian had no power to refer to arbitration disputes in 
relation to the minors' immovable properties, and that the 
minors were not bound by such award.
2 . .In Mohd. Amin v. Vakil Ahmed the validity of a family 
settlement was challenged by a minor younger brother on 
attaining majority. The facts of the case were that an elder 
brother acting on his own behalf and as guardian of his minor 
brother executed a family settlement for the distribution 
of properties belonging to their deceased father. The question 
how far the settlement was binding on the minor brother was 
raised before the Indian Supreme Court, but Bhagwati, J., 
without any discussion of the merits of the case, negatived
1 (1931) 59 IA 92 (PC).
2 AIR 1952 SC 358.
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the benefit test by simply referring to Imambandi's case.
The de facto guardianship of the elder brother was not 
recognised. In Abdullah Khan v. Nisar Mohd. Khan1 the 
Pakistan Supreme Court following Imambandi *s case did not 
consider the application of a paternal uncle to be appointed 
as the property guardian of a minor; nor did the Indian 
Supreme Court m  Gulam Ghouse v. Kamisul following the 
same Privy Council decision admit the guardianship of a 
minor's brother.
2.5.2. High Courts' decisions
Similar to the Privy Council and the Supreme Courts 
the High Courts of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh did little 
to assess the question of a minor's necessity and benefit,
and thereby admit the utility of de facto guardianship. The
3 4 5 6High Courts of Calcutta , Madras , Bombay , Allahabad ,
7 8Nagpur and the others followed the-Privy Council decision
in Imambandi *s case. In some cases, however, some judges
1 PLD 1965 SC 690.
2 AIR 1971 SC 2184.
3 Mohsiuddin Ahmed v. K . Ahmed (1920) 47 Cal 713; Husena Bano 
v. Brojendra Kishore AIR 1929 Cal 82.
4 Abdul Maiid v. Ramiza Bibi AIR 1931 Mad 468; Venkama v. Sayed 
Vili jan AIR 1951 Mad 399; Jaina Beevi v. Govindaswami AIR 
1967 Mad 369.
5 Bhikaii Ramchandra v. Ajgarally Sarafally AIR 1946 Bom 57; 
Shidlingava v. Raiava (1930) 33 Bom LR 603.
6 Anto v. Reoti Kuar (1937) All 195 (FB).
7 Gulam Jafar v. Ramdhan AIR 1927 Nag 290; Gulam v. Mir Jakirali 
(1940) Nag 553; Mohd. Sarder v. Babu Gyanu AIR 1952 Nag 17.
8 Zafir v. Amiruddin AIR 1963 Pat 108; Ali Mohammad v. Ramniwas 
AIR 1967 Raj 258; Lakshmi Amma v. Kunhi Bava (1967) KLT 203; 
Rashid Ahmed v. Amina Begum PLD 1968 Lah 1045; Reluma1 v.
Huzur Baksh AIR 1947 Sind 179; Saidu v. Amina (1970) KLT 430.
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tried to distinguish the facts of their cases vis-a-vis 
the fact of Imambandi * s case and treat the alienations of 
de facto guardians as voidable.
In Shidlinqava v. Raiava1 Mudgavkar, J., tried to 
give a different interpretation to the ruling of Imambandi * s 
case. The learned judge admitted that the mother of a minor 
had no power as de facto guardian to alienate the minor's 
property? but he reasoned that this absence of power did 
not necessarily imply that alienations made by her would 
be void. On the contrary, he observed, they would be void­
able in cases of extreme necessity. The case was, however, 
decided against the minor on the ground of adverse possession
for more than twelve years. A similar view was adopted in
2
Zainuddin Hossain v. Muhd. Abdur Rahim where a mother
executed an ekrarnama on behalf of her minor son without
being authorised by the court to do so. In that case Mukerji
3and Baitley, JJ., referred to Imambandi's case and observed *
"It is true that under the Mahomedan law a mother 
has no power as a de facto guardian of her infant 
children to alienate or charge their immovable 
property. But it cannot be disputed that if the 
minor on coming of age ratifies the arrangement 
or accepts a benefit under it, he would be estopped 
from questioning its validity".
4In Venkatarayudu v. Ayina Khasim Saheb Owen Beasley, 
C.J., speaking of the restrictions on the powers of a de facto 
guardian found that the mother was capable of executing a 
promissory note on behalf of her minor children in renewal 
of an existing one. A Division Bench of the Peshawar Judicial
1 (1930) 33 Bom LR 603.
2 AIR 1933 Cal 102.
3 Ibid, 106.
4 (1935) MWN 943.
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Commissioner's Court^ in considering the powers of a de facto
2
guardian was unable to find in Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali and
.3Imambandi v. Mutsaddi any authority for the following
4sentences used in Mulla's book on Muslim law i
"A de facto guardian has no power to transfer any 
right or interest in the immovable property of 
the minor. Such a transfer is not merely voidable 
but void".
In support of their reason the learned judges quoted
5the following excerpt from the judgment of Imambandi's case s
"Her own subsequent denial of authority does not 
affect the purchaser's position; but if the trans­
action is impugned by the rightful owner, viz., 
the infant, the onus is on the vendee to establish 
the foundation of his title, that is, that his 
vendor possessed in fact the authority under which 
she purported to act".
And they pointed out that these words appeared to them 
to indicate that it was the minor who could avoid the trans­
action and not that the transaction was void as against the 
whole world.
0
In Tahad Ali v. Israrullah Bennet and Verma, JJ.» 
admitted the guardianship of a mother and the legal validity 
of her transaction of the property of her two minor sons 
but on a different ground. The necessity or benefit of the 
minors was not considered. The fact of the case was that
1 Jawahir Singh v. Kohat Municipality AIR 1937 Pesh 74, 75.
2 (1912) 16 CWN 338 (PC).
3 (1918) 23 CWN 50 (PC).
4 Muslim law (17th ed., 1972), 342 sec. 364. See also the 
argument of Mr. Fida Hussain, the counsel for the appellants, 
in Gulam v. Mir Jakirali (1940) Nag 553, 555.
5 (1918) 23 CWN 50, 63 (PC).
6 (1939) All 89.
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one Q died leaving two sons, A and B, who inherited their 
father's zamindari property in equal shares. A then died 
leaving a widow R, two minors V and I, and three daughters, 
one of whom was N, who assumed the role of next friend of 
the infant plaintiff, I, in the action. The three daughters 
relinquished their rights of inheritance in favour of the 
mother and brothers. In the other branch, B died leaving 
a son S and a daughter Z and some other daughters who did 
not claim inheritance. The suit property consisted of two 
plots of agricultural land. R in her own right and purport­
ing to act as the guardian of her minor sons V, I and S
executed a deed of perpetual lease in favour of T, the
defendant. Subsequently S and Z executed another deed of 
lease in respect of the same plots of land in favour of the 
appellant. I who was minor brought the suit with N as next 
friend for possession of the plots on the ground that R 
had no right to transfer any portion of the property belong­
ing to the plaintiff. The learned judges referring to two 
Privy Council cases* observed*
"The settlement of agricultural land within the 
zamindari belonging to a Muhammadan infant by his 
de facto guardian with tenants for agricultural
purposes does not, in our opinion, come within
the rule of Muhammadan law laid down by their 
Lordships of the Privy Council in the cases 
mentioned above".
2 . .In Abdul Hakim v. Jan Mohammad Bind Basini Prasad, J., 
attempted to distinguish Imambandi's case in a convincing 
way. In this case the minor was the purchaser of half of the
1 Imambandi's case (1918) 23 CWN 50 (PC)* Mohd. Ejaz Hussain 
v. Mohd. Iftikhar Hussain (1931) 59 IA 92 (PC).
2 AIR 1951 All 247.
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property and the plaintiff was one of the holders of the 
other half. The minor exchanged his purchased property 
with the other holders, and the deed of exchange was executed 
on the minor's behalf by his grand-uncle. Hence the question 
was raised by the plaintiff whether the minor's exchange, 
being executed by a de facto guardian, was void according 
to the Privy Council decision reported in Imambandi's case. 
The plaintiff was interested in exercising his right to 
pre-empt. The learned judge observed that the above Privy 
Council decision must be interpreted in the light of the 
case. He pointed out that the real reason for imposing 
restrictions on the guardian's power of alienation of a 
minor's immovable property was to conserve it. The learned 
judge made the distiction on three counts. First, the dis­
puted property in that case was acquired by the de facto 
guardian for the minor, in the Privy Council case it was 
inherited from the father. Secondly, the principle of con­
servation of the property which was the basis of the Privy 
Council decision was not violated. Thirdly, the minor's 
interest was not prejudiced by the transaction of exchange.
On these considerations the exchange transaction executed 
by the de facto guardian was upheld in that case.
This decision was followed with approval by a Division 
Bench of the Saurashtra High Court in Haii Abdulla v. Daud 
Mahomed'1'. Baxi, J., in delivering the unanimous judgment 
of the Bench held that a mortgage by a de facto guardian
1 AIR 1953 Saur 84.
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resulting in the enlargement of a minor's estate was binding 
on the minor. In this case the minor and his de facto 
guardian equally owned a half share in a property. The 
other half held by their cousins was also purchased by them# 
and in so purchasing some of the properties held by the 
minor and his guardian was mortgaged to raise money, the 
minor being represented by his de facto guardian. By this 
purchase the minor's share in the whole property along with 
his guardian was enlarged. The mortgagee brought the suit.
The trial and the first appallate courts rejected the plain­
tiff's claim to a decree against the minor's interest on 
the ground that under Muslim law a de facto guardian has no 
power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable 
property of the minor. In the light of the Supreme Court 
decision in Mohd. Amin's case this decision may seem to be 
erroneous, but it is not injudicious, and more so, it is 
fully in accordance with the basic principle of guardianship, 
i.e., the benefit of the minor.
In a recent case1 of the Kerala High Court Madhavan 
Nair, J., in considering the validity of a de facto guardian's 
dealing with his minor wards' immovable property held that 
such dealing was only voidable at the instance of the minors 
and was ratifiable by them after they become major. A year 
after this decision was confirmed in Lakshml Amma v. Kunhi 
Bava . In this case one A mortgaged his property to M who 
assigned his interests to K, whose widow U acting for herself
1 Abdul Sukkoor v. Muhd. Dirar (1966) KLT 605.
2 (1967) KLT 203.
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and as guardian of her two minor children, released the 
property to A which she was alleged to have been incompetent 
in Muslim law to do. Relying on Zainuddin Hossain v. Muhd. 
Abdur Rahim1 Madhavan Nair, J., remarked that the learned 
judge of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Amin's case did not 
go further to say that alienation by a de facto guardian 
could not be ratified by the minor if he was pleased to do 
so. He distinguished Imambandi's case as one in which no 
ratification by minors on their attainment of majority was 
ever alleged and in which the minors did not appear to have 
attained or entered appearance in the suit. On this ground 
he did not consider Imambandi's case as an authority for 
the statement that 'a sale by a de facto guardian of the 
minor's property cannot be ratified by the minor on attain­
ing majority*.
The above two decisions were overruled by a Division
2Bench of the same High Court in Saidu v. Amina where Raman 
Nayar, C.J., in delivering the judgment observedi
"There could be no ratification of the sale of 
immovable property of a Mahomedan minor by a so- 
called de facto guardian. A de facto guardian is 
not recognised by the Mahomedan law. He is a rank 
outsider".
The facts of the case are not given in the judgment, 
but the main question which was involved was whether the 
sale of the immovable property of a minor by his de facto 
guardian, in this case the elder brother, could be validated 
by the minor by ratification on attaining majority. The
1 AIR 1933 Cal 102.
2 (1970) KLT 430, 435.
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learned Chief Justice followed the decisions in Imambandi 's 
and Mohd. Amin's case. But his views about fuzuli sale that 
the owner or proprietor by whom the fuzuli sale would be 
ratified must be sui juris, i.e., person with contractual 
capacity, cannot be accepted. Muslim law fuzuli sale is a 
class by itself• Moreover the learned Chief Justice was 
more intrigued with the idea of a uniform Civil Code for 
India than with the welfare of the minor.
2*6. Modern Muslim society and the need for de facto 
guardianship
The legally depressed position of women1 in early 
Muslim society did not allow mothers to act as de facto 
guardians of their minor children. The fundamental cause
of a man's superiority over woman is the man's spending money
2 . . on woman ; but that condition has changed now in the present
society. Women are almost equal earners with men. Today
they are no more in the purdah. They can now aspire to hold
any position in the society if they have the.necessary
qualifications for it. They are participating in programmes
of national development and holding responsible key posts
like professors, doctors, bureaucrats, ambassadors and even
3 . 4judges . Kemal Faruki observes I
1 John L. Esposito, 'Women's rights in Islam', in (1975)
14/2 Islamic Studies. 99-114.
2 The Koran. IV. 34. "Men are in charge of women, because 
Allah has made them to excel the other, and because they 
spend of their property (for the support of women)".
3 S.A. Raza, 'Modern reforms in Muslim family laws', in 
(1974) 13/4 Islamic Studies. 235-252, 243.
4 'Orphaned grandchildren in Islamic succession law , in 
(1965) 4/3 Islamic Studies, 253-274, 254.
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"The socio-economic structures of Muslim groups 
have been undergoing great, indeed unavoidable, 
changes* The change from a pastoral or agricul­
tural to an increasingly industrial economy, 
the growing concentrations of people within 
large impersonal cities and the movement of 
people from place to place, as their occupations
demand, far from their ancestral homes --  all
these factors have tended to make the larger 
family of the past less meaningful as a social 
unit. Indeed the process has gone to the extent 
of making even the close, immediate family a 
much looser bond in some parts of the world".
In this changed conditions of society and its families 
should the old law and the rules unduly deduced therefrom 
decide the capacity of mothers and others when they are 
acting as de facto guardians purely for the welfare and 
benefit of the minors? Or should they be reformed? Nothing 
can stand on the way to reforms, for the immutability of 
the sacred Divine law, as the Muslim law is, is now used to 
reforms1. The law of guardianship should be considered in 
the light of the new social set-up, and it should be changed 
for a situation in which the benefit and welfare of a minor 
would be well protected. As far back as in 1938 Stone, C.J., 
and Clarke, J., visualised in Gulam v. Mir Jakirali a situ­
ation where a minor's land might be needed to be sold for 
its sustenance, but glibly as they indicated the way to 
empower a de facto guardian to effect such sale, it is not
1 J.N^D. Anderson and N.J. Coulson, 'Islamic law in contem­
porary cultural change', in (1967) 18 Saeculum, 13-92;
N.J. Coulson, 'Islamic family law, progress in Pakistan', in 
J.N.D.Anderson, ed.. Changing law in Developing Countries, 
240-57; M.I. Zagday, 'Modern trends in Islamic law m  the 
Near, Middle and Far East', in (1948) 1 Current Legal Prob­
lems, 206-221; J.N.D. Anderson, 'Muslim personal law in 
India', in Narmada Khodp, ed., Readings m  uniform Civil 
Code, 41-61.
2 (1940) Nag 553.
427
easy to obtain it. They said1!
"We desire to add however that it is manifest that 
cases could arise when for the mere sustenance of 
a Mahomedan minor it would be necessary to sell 
his land and we apprehend that this practical 
difficulty is overcome by the fact that a de facto 
guardian has power in such circumstances to sell 
the land with the authority of the court. It is 
only necessary to go to the court and get authority 
and then the matter falls within paragraph 264 of 
Mulla"•
The learned judges did not consider that the geo­
physical factors of India are quite different from those
2 . . .of Europe . The judicial systems of the countries in the
3 4Subcontinent are complex and longdrawn . The consideration
of an application for the appointment of a guardian may
outlive its utility and exigency, and sometimes may even
5outweigh m  finance the value of the property to be alienated •
As seen earlier Muslim law is not opposed to the con-
6 7sideration of necessity . Ameer Ali observes »
"When a person died intestate without appointing 
an executor and no reference is made to the kazi,
1 (1940) Nag 553, 557.
2 Derrett, Critique. 186 para 235. The writer saysi "In Europe, 
after all, one does not have to derive for a week through 
swamps or sail along or wade across streams or rivers or 
struggle across mountains in order to obtain a District 
Judge's order ...".
3 In an interview with George Evans, Mrs. Gandhi, Prime Minister 
of India, saysi "Our legal system is complex". The Sunday 
Telegraph, October 12, 1975, page 7.
4 See Pakistan Law Reform Commission 1958-59 Report, ch. X, 
page 59. It is stated in the Report* "Cases have been known, 
where parties to a litigation, have died during the pendency 
of the case after years of travail without having seen the 
end of their labours".
5 Derrett, Introduction. 87 para 112.
6 Hedaya, 608.
7 Mahommedan law Vol. 1 (4th ed., 1912), 689.
428
one of the neighbours (ahl-al-mahalla) may law­
fully administer 'according to necessity'. And 
Fatwa is on this".
Although the specific fatwa is not referred to by the 
writer, it is admitted that according to necessity even an 
outsider can lawfully administer a minor's estate. Again, 
the guardianship of the mother and her capacity to appoint 
others as guardian of her minor children is not wholly denied 
by the Shafi school1. The de facto guardians should be allowed 
to deal with the minors' immovable properties where such 
dealings are essential for the necessity and benefit of the 
minors. The executor of the father or mother of a minor may 
sell the minor's landed property or akar for the (a) necessity, 
(b) benefit, or (c) payment of revenue or ancestral debts 
of the minor. So also for the necessity, benefit or welfare 
of the minor his de facto guardian should be allowed to deal 
with the minor's immovable property, and no 'positive oblig­
ation' should be cast upon him to seek appointment by the
court. Among the de facto guardians the mother's position 
is admittedly superior to other relations , and she should 
be given the status of a legal guardian as in Hindu law.
2.7. Initiative for the change of Imambandi's rule
The change of the Privy Council rule in Imambandi's 
case has become due in all the three countries of the Sub­
continent, viz., India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The rule
1 See Yahya ibn Sharaf, Minhai et Talibin pTr. by E.C. Howard"], 
169. At this page the sentence "A mother can never be the 
guardian in her own right but the father may appoint her
by will" carries a mark which indicates that there are 
contrary authorities of repute.
2 See Hedaya. 609. An uncle cannot lawfully hire his minor 
nephew out in service, but the mother can do so.
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being that of a Privy Council, its change may be effected
either by the highest court of the concerned country or
by its parliament. The respective Supreme Courts of the
three countries should take the lead. They cannot avoid
it by merely saying that they are not to legislate or by
referring to the principle of stare decisis. They can do
it1; and a Privy Council rule which has outlived its utility
in the society and creates only hardship to the parties,
2cannot claim to be respected and followed • The process of 
overruling an old rule may require time, because the courts 
can do it as and when a fit case comes before them. Parlia­
ment may also effect this change, but there must be a public
3
demand for the change. Derrett observes t
"There is a more difficult task of adopting a legal 
rule for the solution of a technical problem, parti­
cularly a problem which recurs none too frequently, 
in which no public demand manifests itself, and 
there is no stable and ancient local precedent to 
serve as a guide ... the legal draftsman rightly 
prefers not to depart lightly from what his country­
men have lived with and by for many years without 
notable discomfort. Naturally it seldom happens 
that the rules are introduced rashly and inconsider­
ately; without a demand for a change the old rule, 
however antique, deserves to remain undisturbed".
The general people are less concerned and they under­
stand little the technical application of the rules of law?
1 See Sir A. Denning, The changing law (London* 1953), 45.
The writer says* "Lawyers are taught, from their youth up, 
that judges do not make or alter the law, but only expound 
it. The judges themselves have fostered this belief. If they 
are invited to amend or extend existing rules, they often 
say 'we are not here to legislate' as if that were itself
an answer to the invitation. The truth is that they do every 
day make law, though it is almost heresy to say so".
2 Derrett, Critique, 401 para 514. See also Asma Jilani v. Govt. 
of the Pun jab PLD 1972 SC 139, 169 per Hamoodur Rahman, C.J. 
The learned Chief Justice observes* "Law cannot stand still 
nor can the courts and judges be mere slaves of precedents".
3 'Commorientes', in (1962) 20/1 University of Ceylon Review, 
55-83, 55.
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on their behalf the vigilant Bars should raise demand and 
persuade the parliaments to^introduce bills replacing the 
old rule.
In Pakistan and Bangladesh where the majority of the 
population is Muslim and where there is no immediate pros­
pect for a uniform Civil Code, or even if there be any that 
will be Islam based, the Bars should put demand for the 
change on the parliaments. It is not for the first time that 
the parliaments of these countries are introducing reforms 
in Muslim law. In 1961; by direct legislation they reformed 
Muslim law1. In the meantime the Supreme Courts of these 
countries should, if proper cases come before them, recognise 
the powers of de facto guardians in accordance with the 
principle of necessity and benefit of the minors. According 
to the doctrine of Qiyas the courts can come to their own 
conclusions by the process of Istihad by departing from a 
principle which is not directly based on the Koran. They 
should not be unnecessarily conservative as the Madras High 
Court appears to have been from its following remarks2*
"We have ... to administer without in any way cir­
cumventing or deviating from the original texts, 
the law, as promulgated by the Islamic law—givers 
to suit the present-day conditions; and in doing 
so, it has to be remembered that courts are not 
at liberty to refuse to administer any portion of 
those tenets even though in certain respects they 
may not sound quite modern".
The Lahore High Court has shown a just and bold attitude 
in this respect by rebutting the age old hizanut rule3. In
1 The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (Ordinance 8), 1961.
2 Veerankuttv v. Kutti Umma (1956) Mad 1004, 1009.
3 Munawar Jan v. Mohd. Afser Khan PLD 1962 Lah 142; Zohra 
Begum v. Latif Ahmad Munnawar PLD 1965 Lah 695, 702.
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Zohra Begum v. Latif Ahmad Munnawar1 Yaqub, J., emphatically 
observed*
MI am fortified in this view by the instances in 
which a Qazi finding hardship in the application 
of a rule of law to which the parties belonged 
sent the case to the Qazi of another school of 
which took a liberal view of the matter”.
Indeed the Koran itself has ordained the Muslims to 
deal equitably towards the minors and solely for their 
welfare^.
The same may also be said about India^; and there is 
an added advantage to effect this change. Codification is 
in progress in India; Article 44 of the Indian Constitution 
provides for a uniform Civil Code. Therefore the framers of 
the Code can easily accommodate provisions for empowering 
the de facto guardians to alienate the property of the minors. 
There is, however, one fundamental problem in India, the 
Muslims being the minority there, any change or reform initi­
ated by the majority may not be always welcome4. It is a 
general psychological factor that whenever a community based 
on a particular religion is in minority, it becomes too much 
touchy specially in matters of its religion. Any effort to 
effect a change in their religion-based law by the ruling 
majority is, no matter however much beneficial it might be 
to them, looked with suspicion and often leads to violence 
unless the ground is properly prepared by making the minority
1 PLD 1965 Lah 695, 702.
2 The Koran, IV, 127.
3 See Derrett, Religion, 513-554.
4 Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqui, *Indian Muslims and the ideology of 
the secular state', in D.E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics 
and Religion, 138-149; Derrett, Religion, 534-38; Mohammad 
Ghouse, Secularism. Society and Law in India, (Delhi* 1973), 
227-233.
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feel its need not by force, but by constant persuasion.
The judiciary, and not the parliament where the people's 
representatives are more politically motivated to fan fire 
from a dying spark to their own advantage than to the good 
of the general people, may bring changes in Muslim law by 
'juristic tricks' to be ultimately legislated by the parlia­
ment. Changes initiated in this way by the judiciary in a 
country which consists of people of different religions may 
avoid double defects of a legislation direct by the parlia­
ment, viz., political manoeuvring of religion by the privi­
leged few, and the harshness of untrialled imposition of a 
sudden piece of legislation1.
1 Derrett, 'A Hindu judge's animadversions on Muslim poligamy', 
in (1970) 73 Bom LR (Jour), 61-63, See also Derrett, 'The 
Indian Civil Code or Code of family lawi practical propo­
sitions', in Narmada Khodie, ed., Readings in uniform Civil 
Code, 21ff.
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C H A P T E R  V
LIMITATION
1• Issues involved
We have seen in chapters 2 and 3 that a guardian may 
alienate a Hindu minor's property for the latter*s necessity 
or benefit of his estate, and we have also seen that if 
such alienation is not for either of the two alleged purposes, 
the minor may repudiate the transaction either through the 
court or merely by conduct, such as ignoring the alienation 
by making a subsequent alienation. This repudiation raises 
two opposing issues, namely, first, from the minor's point 
of view, why should the minor be bound by an alienation of 
his property which has been made for no benefit of his, and 
why should he not recover his own property; and secondly, 
why should an innocent purchaser part with his honestly 
purchased property, and why should he suffer for no fault 
of his own? Much as a minor's property needs to be protected, 
an honest purchaser needs also to be protected. No doubt, 
the law of guardianship has developed on the principle of 
'welfare of the minor*, but justice does not demand that 
this welfare should be gained at the expense of honest men.
The issues are so delicately interwoven that, it seems, one 
cannot be solved without expense to the other. Indeed it is 
very difficult to reconcile the two objects. For a harmonious 
solution of them, legislatures, the Benches and the Bars of
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the under-developed Common-law countries have always been 
making an effort. In Civi1-law countries there is hardly 
any scope for such conflict, since there is little feeling 
in Civil law for a bona fide purchaser from a person 
standing in a fiduciary relation to the minor. In brief, 
an incompetent transfer is void and one deals with a 
'trustee' at one's peril. In Civil law there is no such 
distinction between legal and equitable estate or owner­
ship as in English law. Unlike trust in English law, fidei- 
1commissum in Civil law does not conceive of double estate
. 2 . . . .  or double ownership ; under it the ownership of the fidei-
commissary begins where the ownership of the fiduciary
3
ends. Lee observes t
"It will be observed that in Justinian's law 
there was no tender regard for a bona fide 
purchaser from a fiduciary, though at an earlier 
period in Roman law he was preferred to the 
fideicommissary• The modern law seems to have 
reached the same result in the case of a purchaser 
who without notice of the fideicommissum has 
obtained registered transfer of land or delivery 
of movables"•
Legislators by limiting the period of time within 
which one must seek the help of the court to establish 
one's right or regain possession, if the property is encro­
ached upon or adversely possessed by another or others, 
have long since been (amongst their more obvious aims)
1 Fideicommissum may be described as testamentary trust.
See R.W. Lee, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (Oxford* 
5th ed., 1953), 374.
2 Lee, op cit. 374.
3 Ibid. 382.
435
reconciling these issues* Statutes of limitations contain 
provisions for such reconcilation. In this chapter we will 
endeavour to show how far the law of limitation has been 
successful in bridging the two issues, and, if necessary, 
we would suggest what alterations and improvements the 
present statutory law needs. But before going into the 
details we like to point out some of the dichotomies that 
are being maintained in the working of the Limitation Acts, 
specifically Act 9 of 1908 and Act 36 of 1963 which are 
followed at present in the Indian Subcontinent, the former 
in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and the latter in India. Both 
the Acts provide that where immovable property is in the 
possession of the transferor, and the relief sought is to 
set aside the alienation, the limitation period is six years 
(in Pakistan and Bangladesh) under Art. 120 of the Act of 
1908, but three years in India under Art. 113 of the Act of 
1963. Where the alienee is in possession and the plaintiff 
sues to set aside the alienation the period is twelve years 
under Arts. 126 and 144 of the Act of 1908 and Arts. 109 
and 65 of the Act of 1963. The position of a minor is 
peculiar. If the alienation is effected by a de jure 
guardian Art. 44 of the Act of 1908 provides that a period 
of three years runs from when the ward attains majority, 
when the suit is by a ward to set aside a transfer of pro­
perty by his guardian. The same is basically the rule under 
Art. 60 of the Act of 1963 (on which see infra, 482, f.n. 2).
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On the other hand if a de facto guardian is judicially- 
construed not to be 'guardian' within the meaning of 
Art. 44/60, the suit cannot be governed by that Article, 
but must fall under the residual Articles referred to 
above, so that the ward, to recover immovable property, 
must bring his suit within twelve years. Art. 144 readsi
"144. For possession of Twelve When the
immovable property or years possession of
any interest therein the defendant
not hereby otherwise becomes adverse
specially provided for. to the plaintiff".
To the extent that we are concerned with Art. 65 of the 
Act of 1963 it readsi
"65. For possession of Twelve When the
immovable property or years possession of
any interest therein the defendant
based on title. ... becomes adverse
to the plaintiff".
It would not be out of place to point out that all
the issues revolve around one big questioni is an improper
alienation by a guardian void or voidable? Void and voidable
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alienations present another question* must a suit be filed 
for setting aside either of them? In the course of our 
discussion we will deal with these different dichotomies 
and show especially the practical effects of both the 'void* 
and the 'voidable' solution,
2. Concept of limitation
The law of limitation limits the time after which a 
suit or other proceedings cannot be maintained in a court 
of justice with respect to a right of ownership* or from 
a defendant's point of view, it limits or prescribes a 
time at the end of which persons liable to suit for wrong­
ful possession of other's property would become exempt 
from answering therein1. Understood in this sense, of 
course, limitation will not imply acquisition of ownership 
by such possessor or possessors, although the owner's 
right to sue is barred. Ownership can be acquired by what 
is known as prescription. The law of prescription prescribes 
the period at the expiry of which a substantive or primary 
right is acquired or extinguished under certain circumstan­
ces. Indeed limitation visualised as creating ownership 
over other's property is a product of prescription protected 
by the denial of the owner's right for his indolence. Markby 
observes2 *
"In nearly every system of law it is recognised 
that, if a person has been in possession of a
1 U.N. Mitra. Law of Limitation and Prescription Vol. 1 
(Madras, 6th ed., 1932), 1.
2 W. Markby, Elements of Law (Oxford, 3rd ed., 1885), 264, 
para 545.
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thing, or in the enjoyment of a jus in re aliena 
for a considerable time, defects in his title or 
in his manner of acquiring ownership are cured”.
In Roman law at a very early date the acquisition
of ownership over other*s property was recognised under
the rule of usucapio; and along with usucapio there grew
up another rule called praescriptio. Under this latter rule,
if a person sought the protection of the law, he was required
to seek it within a certain prescribed period after the
cause of complaint had arisen. This praescriptio actually
meant limitation. Justinian abolished the distinction between
acquisition of ownership by usucapio and praescriptio1, and
writers on Roman law subsequent to the Code dropped the use
of the word *usucapio *» and began to imply both limitation
2and possession by the term * praescriptio * • Prescription
3
in this latter sense was adopted by almost all systems of 
modern world**.
In English law Coke defined prescription as the acqui-
. . . . . 5sition of title by length of time and enjoyment . Most
English lawyers used the term in a still more limited sense, 
viz., as denoting that branch of prescription which deals
1 Markby, Elements. 266 para 551. _
2 Ibid. 267 para 554. For prescription-in dharmasastra see
R. Lingat, The Classical Law of India (Londoni 1973), 160-65.
3 Chinese law had no rules of prescription till 1930. See 
Tien-Hsi Cheng, *The development and reform of Chinese 
law*, in (1948) 1 Current Legal Problems, 170-187, 178.
4 Maine, Ancient law (10th ed., 1885), 288.
5 Coke upon Littleton. 114b.
6 For various divisions of prescription see Salmond, Juris­
prudence (London* 12th ed., 1966), 435ff; Paton, Jurispru­
dence (Oxford* 4th ed., 1972), 501 ff.
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with acquisition of easements and other incorporeal herit- 
1
able rights • It was laid down by them as a general rule
that acquisition of ownership in land by prescription was
2unknown to English law • Markby disagreed with this view 
and pointed out that though the form of English legislation 
had been a bar to an action of prescription and though the 
principle of acquisition of ownership in land by possession 
had nowhere been directly affirmed, such acquisition appeared 
always to have been there. He observed that the practice 
of renewing from time to time the periods of limitation 
for the recovery of land which was the bar to the acquisi­
tion by prescription, was afterwards discontinued and a 
general period of twenty years was fixed by 32 Hen. VIII, 
c. 2, and 21 Jac. I, c. 16. These Statutes themselves assisted 
in acquiring ownership by adverse possession, if the poss­
essor could keep the property in his possession for the 
prescribed period; but they did not expressly extinguish 
the owner's right. This law was amended by 3 and 4 Will. IV, 
c. 27 which avowedly extinguished the right as to real 
property after twenty years' adverse possession which was 
further reduced to twelve years by 37 and 38 Viet., c. 57 .
4 . . .U.N. Mitra observed that m  British India attempts
were made by Sir James Colvile in 1859 and Sir James Fitz-
james Stephen in 1871 to introduce an express law for
1 Wilkinson v. Proud (18431 11 M & W 35, 37; 152 ER 703, 706•
2 Markby, Elements, 267 para 554.
3 Ibid, 268 para 556.
4 Limitation and Prescription, 16.
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acquisition by prescription of ownership in corporeal pro­
perty, but Act 14 of 1859 and Act 9 of 1871 were passed 
only after the clauses relating to such acquisition had 
been expunged from the Bills as introduced.
3. Short history of the limitation statutes in India
Prior to 1859 when only a uniform law of limitation 
for all the courts in British India was passed, there were 
different systems of limitation law in different Presidencies 
and even in different courts in the same Presidency. Section 
14 of Regulation 3 of 1793 prohibited the zillah and city 
courts, to which the jurisdiction of the courts of Dewany 
Adawlut was extended for the trial of civil suits in the 
first instance, from hearing, trying or determining the 
merits of any suit whatever against any person or persons, 
if the cause of action accrued previous to the 12th August, 
1765, the date of the East India Company's accession to the 
Dewany of the provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, or any 
suit whatever against any person or persons if the cause 
of action arose twelve years before the commencement of 
any suit on account of it; unless the complainant can show, 
by clear and positive proof, that he had demanded the money 
or matter in question, and that the defendant had admitted 
the truth of the demand, or promised.to pay the money; or 
that he directly preferred his claim within that period, 
for the matters in dispute, to a court of competent juris­
diction to try the demand, and shall assign satisfactory
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reasons to the court why he did not proceed in the suit; 
or shall prove that, either from minority or other good 
and sufficient cause, he had been precluded from obtaining 
redress.
Subsequently the provisions of this section were 
extended to other provinces as well'*'. Then Regulation 2 
of 1805 was passed 'to explain the existing limitation 
of time for the cognisance of suits in the civil courts 
of justice; to provide further limitations with respect 
to certain suits, regular and summary; and to make other 
provisions, relative to the admission and trial of original 
suits, and appeals'. In its preamble this Regulation after 
referring to earlier Regulations declared that "the period 
of twelve years, adopted in all these provisions, appears 
to have been established when the administration of civil 
justice was first committed to the servants of the Company, 
on the institution of courts of dewannv adawlut in the 
year 1772". In the plan for the administration of justice 
then proposed by the committee of circuit, which was adopted 
by Government on the 21st August 1772, it was remarked that 
"by Mahomedan law, all claims which have lain dormant for 
twelve years, whether for land or money, are invalid! this 
also is the law of the Hindoos, and the legal practice of 
the country". We will see in a moment that this observation 
was not correct with respect to the pre-British Hindu and
1 This Regulation was extended to the Province of Benares 
by section 8 of Regulation 7 of 1795, and to the Ceded 
Provinces by section 18 of Regulation 2 of 1803 with the 
substitution of the dates of the Company's acquisition 
of the particular province or provinces for the date of 
Regulation 3 of 1793.
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Muslim law. Whether previously established or not, the rule 
having been in force for over thirty years the framers of 
the preamble thought it improper to abrogate it. Then the 
reason to increase this period to sixty years for suits 
and claims for the recovery of public rights and dues was 
given. It was stated that this period, too, was recognised 
by the provisions of Hindu law in regard to individuals 
and that it was not incompatible with those of Muslim law.
The above Regulations were meant for specified areas. 
The Madras Regulation 2 of 1802 was passed for 'establishing 
and defining the jurisdiction of the courts of adawlut, 
or courts of judicature, for the trial of civil suits in 
the first instance, in the British territories immediately 
subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George'. Section 18 
of this Regulation gave a law of limitation similar to 
that contained in section 14 of the Regulation 3 of 1793.
The Bombay Regulation 5 of 1827 was passed for 'defining 
the limitations as to time within which civil actions may 
be prosecuted, and containing rules of judication respecting 
written acknowledgments of debts executed without receipt 
of a full consideration, also regarding interest, the tender­
ing payment of debts and the disposal of property mortgaged 
or pledged'•
These Regulations did not apply to the Non-Regulated 
provinces. So the Punjab Code modified section 14 of Regula­
tion 3 of 1793 and reduced the limitation of actions of
442
debts or contract, excepting partnership accounts, from 
twelve to six years. In Oudh certain circular of the 
Judicial Commissioner were in force before 1859. Again, 
the limitation law of the Mofussil courts in each Presidency 
differed from the limitation law applied by the Supreme 
Courts which were governed by the English law of limitation. 
For example, the principle on which the English law had 
been framed, namely, that when the period of limitation 
commenced to run it did not cease to run, was unknown to 
the Regulations^. If the person entitled to seek redress, 
or the person under whom he claimed, was precluded by any 
disability from obtaining redress during any part of the 
period of limitation, whether at its commencement or other­
wise, the operation of the rule under the Regulations was
suspended and the time during which such disability lasted
. . . 2was excluded m  computing the period of limitation • Even 
where the person entitled to seek redress had ceased to be 
a minor at the time of her death, her son, if a minor, was 
entitled to a deduction of the periods of his own as well 
as his mother's minority. Limitation operated when the mother 
attained her majority, but was again suspended during the 
son's minority3.
1 See Sir James Colvile's speech, Proceedings of the Legis­
lative Council of India (1855) Vol. 1, 543-554.
2 Troup v. East India Company (1857) 7 MIA 104 (PC).
3 Amritolall v. Rajonee Kant (1874-75) 2 IA 113, 123 (PC).
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The Supreme Courts in the three Presidency-towns 
adopted the English law of limitation as contained in 
21 Jac. I, c. 16, and 4 Anne, c. 16. It was sometimes held 
that under 21 Geo. Ill, c. 70, sec. 17, the Hindu law of 
limitation was applicable in cases of contract between the 
Hindus and not the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 161. But subse­
quently it was determined by the Calcutta Supreme Court 
that the English law of limitation as a part of the lex fori
was applicable to the Hindus and Muslims as well as the
. . . .  2Europeans m  civil actions in the Supreme Court •
The anomalous situation of having different codes 
for different courts in the three Presidencies led to the 
passing of the Act 14 of 1859. The Act was passed 'to amend 
and consolidate the laws relating to the limitation of suits', 
and it was laid down in the Act that 'no suit shall be main­
tained in any court of judicature within any part of the 
British territories in India in which this Act slall be in 
force, unless the same is instituted within the period of 
limitation hereinafter made applicable to a suit of that 
nature, any law or Regulation to the contrary notwithstand- 
ing' • The operation of this Act was postponed by two sub­
sequent Acts, viz., Act 11 of 1861 and Act 14 of 1862.
This Act was hardly in force for ten years when Act 9 of 
1871 was passed with the object of introducing amendments
1 Kistno Chunder Sircar v. Ramdhone Nundy (1834) Morton's 
Rep. 345} 1 ID 1102 (OS).
2 Beerchund Podar v. Ramanath Tagore (1849) 1 Taylor & Bell 
313 i 2 ID 344 (OS)i Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy Mottichund 
(1851-52) 5 MIA 234 (PC).
3 Sec. 1, Act 14 of 1859.
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mainly suggested by the decisions of the courts upon Act 14 
of 1859, and of facilitating the application of the law 
by a tabular statement of the different sorts of suits 
and of certain applications, of their respective periods 
of limitation, and of the exact points of time from which 
such periods were to run. The Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council remarked that Act 14 of 1859 was an 'artifi­
cially' drawn statute1, and Act 9 of 1871 was a 'more care-
2
fully drawn statute' • Act 9 of 1871 was shortly replaced 
by Act 15 of 1877 which could be said to be an elaborate 
and improved edition of the former. Act 15 of 1877 was 
repealed by Act 9 of 1908. The Select Committee observed 
that the objects of Act 9 of 1908 were 'to consolidate the 
law, which at present is scattered throughout a series of 
enactments, to clear up some points of doubt on which 
conflicts exist between various High Courts, to make some 
amendments which are ancillary to the Code of Civil Proce­
dure Bill lately passed by Council, and to remove the hard­
ship caused by a recent decision of the Privy Council in
regard to the period of limitation for certain suits on 
3mortgages* • The Privy Council decision referred to is
4that in Vasudeva v. Srinivasa where their Lordships held 
that Article 147 of Act 15 of 1877, providing a period of 
sixty years, was applicable only to suits on English mortgages
1 Delhi and London Bank Ltd. v. Orchard (1877) 4 IA 127 (PC).
2 Maharana Futtehsangji v. Dessai Kullianji (1873) 1 IA 34 (PC).
3 For the Report of the Select Committee see the Gazette of 
India, 1908, part V, 223} see also R. Pal, The Law of Limi­
tation in British India (Calcutta* n.d), 13.
4 (1907) 34 IA 186 (PC).
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and that suits for sale on other mortgages should be governed 
by Article 132 which provides a period of twelve years. This 
Act was subsequently amended by a host of Acts1. In Bangla­
desh and Pakistan this Act is still in force, but in India 
it was repealed and replaced by Act 36 of 1963. In India 
the new Act was passed *to consolidate and amend the law 
for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for 
purposes connected therewith*.
3.1. Law of limitation under sastric Hindu law
Sastric law is of interest because it gives some slight 
indication of the pre-1772 (or in Bombay State pre-1819) 
practice of the Hindu public. It recognised that long stand­
ing adverse possession of one*s property by another would
create title in that property in favour of the latter. Thus
2Brihaspati observed that in immovable property obtained
by partition or purchase, or inherited from the father, or
received from the king, a title was gained by long possession
and lost by silent neglect. Even in property simply obtained
with or without a fair title, which a man had accepted and
quietly possessed unmolested by another, he acquired a title,
and in like manner he forfeited one by silent neglect. Bri-
3haspati further observed that a possession by strangers 
who are related to one another in the degree of a sapinda
1 Act 17 of 1914; Act 18 of I919j Act 26 of 1920; Act 10 of 
1922; Act 11 of 1923; Act 12 of 1923; Act 30 of 1925;
Act 1 of 1927; Act 9 of 1927; Act 10 of 1927; Act 1 of 
1929; Act 21 of 1929 etc.
2 Bri. IX. 5 and 6; SBE Vol. 33, 310.
3 Bri IX. 10-12; SBE Vol. 33, 310-11; Digest Vol. 3, 443 
Tv7 396).
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for three generations would give them an absolute title,
but a very long and quiet possession by friends, relatives
and kinsmen or by sons-in-law, learned Brahmins, the
king or his ministers would acquire no title. Adverse
possession could not, however, be exercised over, or it
would not give the possessor a title in 'an object given
as a pledge, boundaries (sima), the property of a child,
a deposit, a loan (upanidhi), women, the property of the
king or srotriyas' ^.
. 2  . .Katyayana said that 'in cases falling within the
memory of man, it is desirable that possession must be 
accompanied with title in order to be proof of ownership 
as to land; but in cases beyond the memory of man possession 
extending over three generations in succession is indepen­
dent and valid proof of ownership, since there is no certainty
that there is no title'. Yajnavalkya limited the period
. 3for adverse possession to twenty years. So he said that 
he who saw his land possessed by a stranger for twenty years# 
without asserting his own right, lost his property in them, 
except in pledges, boundaries, sealed deposits, the wealth
of idiots and minors, things amicably lent out for use, and
the 'property belonging to sovereigns, women, or learned
4
Brahmanas'. Vyasa said that 'occupancy during twenty years,
1 Nar. I. 81; Bri. IX. 13; Manu VIII, 149; Derrett, Bharuci
Vol. 2, 139; Lingat, Classical law, 160.
2 Katya. 321; Kane, Katvayansmrti, 178.
3 Yain. II. 24-25; Digest Vol. 1, 185 (v. 113).
4 Digest Vol. 3, 443 (v. 395).
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unmolested by the owner, is considered as possession of
land during one generation; twice as much during two; thrice
as much during three; and in this instance proof of a fair
title is not required'• Manu1 made a distinction between
movable and immovable property and said that in the case
of the former if the adverse possessor could enjoy and retain
it for ten years, and if the owner was neither an idiot or
a minor, the owner would not be able to recover it by law;
on the contrary, the adverse possessor would acquire title
. 2m  it. Narada said that if a man though capable of proving 
his claims to a property omitted to prove it for twenty or 
ten years after the plaint had been lodged by him, his decla­
ration became futile in consequence.
3Strange remarked as follows on this subject i
"Vijnanesvara, after a long argument, rules, that 
it is the perishable produce only of land that 
cannot be recovered after the expiration of twenty, 
and of other property after ten years, such land, 
or other property, having been enjoyed to the 
exclusion of the owners, by his default, or in 
his view* With regard to land, he holds that, if 
legal acquisition can be disproved, even after 
the expiration of a hundred years, considered 
as the measure of the life of man, ownership is 
not established by possession; and he accordingly 
declares, that 'even beyond the period of memory, 
if there exist a current tradition of the illega­
lity of the acquisition, the enjoyment is not 
valid'* And it is observable, that, to render it 
so in any case, it must have been in view of the 
owner* In fact, according to the original and 
correct doctrine of the Hindu law, enjoyment or 
possession can never be cause of ownership, it is
1 Manu VIII. 147-48. See also Derrett, Bharuci Vol. 2, 139; 
Gau. XII. 37; Vas. XVI. 16-18; SBE Vol. 14, 18.
2 Nar. (Quotations) II. 21; SBE Vol. 33, 239.
3 Strange, Hindu law Vol. 2, 26.
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a presumption of it only; but, if the want of 
original title can be shewn, the possessory 
holder may, at any time be divested of the pro­
perty. This applies not merely to land but to 
property of every description".
(The underlined words are in italics in the 
original)
U.N. Mitra1 believes the above remarks to be more 
accurate exposition of sastric law on acquisition of owner­
ship over property, movable and immovable. Lingat has given
,2  . 3a valuable discussion of all this following Derrett •
3.2. Law of limitation under pre-British Muslim law
Unlike Hindu law in Muslim law there was no rule of
4 . 5limitation to bar a claim of right . Macnaghten said that
in the Buhroorayiq an opinion was cited from Mubsoot to 
the effect that if a person causelessly neglect to advance 
his claim for a period of thirty-three years, it should 
not be cognizable in a court of justice, but it was observed 
that this opinion was adverse to the recognised legal doctrine. 
According to Abu Hanifa and one tradition of Abu Yusuf, even 
as to the right of pre-emption there is no limitation as to 
time. This rule is equally maintained in the Hedaya and
7
the Fatwa-i-Alamqiri , and it seems to be the most authentic
1 Limitation and Prescription, 23. Kane has adverted to the 
divergent opinions of the sages and nibandhakars as to the 
length of possession that would constitute ownership, but 
has made no comment of his own. See Katyayansmrti, 177 
f.n. of verse 318.
2 Classical law, 161-165.
3 Religion, 138-146.
4 Macnaghten. Moohummudan law, 76 prin. 1. See also Govind 
Dayal v. Inayetullah (1885) 7 All 775, 811 (FB).
5 Moohummudan law, 76 f.n.
6 Hedaya, 551.
7 Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 492.
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and generally prevalent doctrine1. The British Indian courts
began to apply the limitation law as contained in the Regu-
2 ^ lations to the Muslims • But in Khanam Jan v. Jan Beebee
the court did not refer to limitation law and simply held
that a claim to inheritance could be preferred at any
time subsequent to the death of an ancestor without limi-
4tation. However, in Mahomed Danish v. Choora Gazee the 
court specifically stated that the limitation for the 
institution of suits, prescribed by the Regulations could 
not be curtailed or extended by any special limitation 
or exemption from limitation which could have been declared 
by the Muslim or Hindu law in particular cases.
3.3. General object of limitation statutes
5
In Trustees of Dundee Harbour v. Dougall the House
of Lords observed that all statutes of limitation had for
their object the prevention of the rearing up of claims
at great distances of time when evidences were lost} and
that in all well-regulated countries the quieting of posse-
0
ssion was held an important point of policy. Story said i
"The object of a statute of limitation is to fix
certain periods within which all suits shall be
1 W.M.Bourke, Law of Limitation in India (Calcutta, 2nd ed., 
1868), 9.
2 Zureenah Beebee v. Khajah Ali (1820) 3 SDA (Sel. Rep) 43 (NE); 
Shumsoon-nissa v. Tunnoo Beebee (1836) 6 SDA (Sel. Rep) 68 
(NE).
3 (1827) 4 SDA (Sel. Rep) 43 (NE).
4 (1851) SDA 292 (Beng).
5 (1852) 1 Macq. HL 317, 321. See also A*Court v. Cross
(1825) 3 Bing 329, 332-333} 130 ER 540, 541 per Best, C.J.}
R.B. Policies at Lloyd*s v. Butler (1950) 1 KB 76, 81-82.
6 J. Story, Conflicts of Laws (Boston* 8th ed., 1883), 793- 
794, sec. 576.
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brought in the courts. A statute of limitation 
is a statute of 'repose to quiet titles, to 
suppress frauds, and to supply the deficiency 
of proofs arising from the ambiguity and obscurity, 
or antiquity of transactions'. It discourages 
litigation, by burying in one common receptacle
all the accumulationas of past times which are
unexplained and have now from lapse of time become 
inexplicable".
Indeed unlimited and perpetual litigation disturbs 
the peace of society and leads to disorder and confusion.
A constant dread of judicial process and a feeling of in­
security retard the growth or prosperity of a nation, and 
labour is paralysed when the enjoyment of its fruits is 
uncertain. It is in the interest of the community ut sit
finis litium, that the possibilities of litigation should
be limited and restricted1. And the law of limitation does 
this.
4. Limitation Acts and their provisions relating to com­
putation of period of limitation in the case of minors
Until avoided, a minor would be bound by the completed
acts of his guardian. Thus on attaining majority he must
decide whether he would ratify or avoid the alienations
of his property effected by his guardian. He cannot sleep
over an alienation for an indefinite period of time after
his attainment of majority and then institute a suit to
set it aside for its being improper or unauthorised, even
2if the law sympathises with his minority • Modern statutes
1 Pal, Limitation. 64; Mitra, Limitation and Prescription 
Vol. 1, 26.
2 Bacon observed*
"The rights of infants are much favoured in law, and 
regularly their laches shall not be prejudicial to 
them, upon a presumption that they understand not 
their right, and that they are not capable of taking
(contd)
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of limitation therefore contain provisions providing the 
period of time within which a minor must bring a suit to 
set aside an unauthorised alienation. The minors being 
legally disabled persons, in all limitation Acts the pro­
visions relating to computation of period of limitation 
are provided under the sub-title 'legal disability'. Thus 
in computing the period of limitation in the case of persons 
who were legally disabled at the time when the cause of 
action first accrued Act 14 of 1859 provided in its section 
11 as follows*
"If, at the time when the right to bring an action 
first accrues, the person to whom the right accrues 
is under a legal disability, the action may be 
brought by such person or his representative within 
the same time after the disability shall have 
ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from 
the time when the cause of action accrued, unless 
such time shall exceed the period of three years, 
in which case the suit shall be commenced within 
three years from the time when the disability 
ceased; but if, at the time when the cause of 
action accrues to any person, he is not under a 
legal disability, no time shall be allowed on 
account of any subsequent disability of such person 
or of the legal disability of any person claiming 
through him".
This Act adopted for the first time the principle of 
English law that 'legal disability' to be effectual as an 
exception must exist at the time when the cause of action
(contd) notice of the rules of law, so as to be able to
apply them to their advantage. Hence, by the common 
law, infants were not bound for want of claim and 
entry within a year and a day, nor are they bound 
by a fine and five years' non-claim, nor by statutes 
of limitation, provided they prosecute their right 
within the time allowed by the statute after the 
impediment removed". [M. Bacon, A New Abridgement 
of the Law (London* 6th ed., 1807) Vol. 3"J 587; and 
in 7th ed., 1832 Vol. 4, 348. See also King v. Dilli- 
ston (1688) 3 Mod 221, 223; 87 ER 142, 144; Ramana 
v. Babu (1914) 37 Mad 186, 190.
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accrued1. The Act deemed 'married women in cases to be
decided by English law, minors, idiots, and lunatics' as
2persons under legal disability 5 but it did not define the 
term 'minor'.
Act 9 of 1871 became more specific in providing law 
regarding the computation of limitation period in the case 
of disabled persons. It provided the law in two sections, 
viz., sections 7 and 8 with illustrations appended for the 
first time to section 7. Section 7 runs as follows1
"If a person entitled to sue be, at the time the 
right to sue accrued, a minor, or insane, or an 
idiot, he may institute the suit within the same 
period after the disability has ceased, or (when 
he is at the time of the accrual affected by two 
disabilities) after both disabilities have ceased, 
as would otherwise have been allowed from the 
time prescribed therefor in the third column of 
the second schedule hereto annexed. When his dis­
ability continues up to his death, his represen­
tative in interest may institute the suit within 
the same period after the death as would other­
wise have been allowed from the time prescribed 
therefor in the third column of the same schedule.
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to 
extend, for more than three years from the cessa­
tion of the disabilities or the death of the person 
affected thereby, the period within which the suit 
must be brought"•
Section 8 runs as follows*
"When one of several joint creditors or claimants 
is under any such disability, and when a discharge 
can be given without the concurrence of such 
person, time will run against them allt but where 
no such discharge can be given, time will not 
run as against any of them until they all are 
free from disability".
1 Guz Beharv Singh v. Hussamut Beebee Washun (1864) WR 302 (CR),
2 Sec. 12.
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This Act defined a minor to mean a person who had 
not completed his age of eighteen years1; it excluded the 
English law applicable to married women from the enumeration 
of persons under legal disability. Section 8 provided for 
the first time that when a person was capable of giving 
discharge on behalf of and without the concurrence of a 
minor as joint creditor or claimant, time would run against 
the minor if discharge was given by that person. But if 
such person was not capable of giving such discharge, time 
would not run against the minor until he was free from dis­
ability or where there were more than one minors all were 
free from disability.
Act 15 of 1877 made section 7 of Act 9 of 1871 more 
exhaustive and provided in it the law applicable in the 
case where a person would suffer from double and success­
ive disabilities, and also provided the law applicable in 
the case of the disability of a minor's legal representa­
tive. It stated for the first time that this section would 
not be applicable to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption. 
Section 8 of this Act brought about a meaningful change in 
the last portion of section 8 of Act 9 of 1871. Section 7 
of Act 15 of 1877 states*
"If a person entitled to institute a suit or make 
an application be, at the time from which the 
period of limitation is to be reckoned, a minor, 
or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit 
or make the application within the same period,
1 Sec. 3.
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after the disability has ceased, as would 
otherwise have been allowed from the time 
prescribed therefor in the third column of 
the second schedule hereto annexed.
When he is, at the time from which the period 
of limitation is to be reckoned, affected by 
two such disabilities, or when, before his 
disability.has ceased, he is affected by 
another disability, he may institute the suit 
or make the application within the same period 
after both disabilities have ceased as would 
otherwise have been allowed from the time so 
prescribed.
When his disability continues up to his death, 
his legal representative may institute the 
suit or make the application within the same 
period after the death as would otherwise 
have been allowed from the time so prescribed.
When such representative is at the date of 
the death affected by any such disability, the 
rules contained in the first two paragraphs of 
this section shall apply.
Nothing in this section applies to suits to 
enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be 
deemed to extend, for more than three years 
from the cessation of the disability or the 
death of the person affected thereby the 
period within which any suit must be instituted 
or application made".
Section 8 of Act 15 of 1877 states*
"When one of several joint creditors or claimants 
is under any such disability, and when a dis­
charge can be given without the concurrence of 
such person, time will run against them all; 
but where no such discharge can be given, time 
will not run against any of them until one of 
them becomes capable of giving such discharge 
without the concurrence of the others".
Besides the above additions and alterations in sections 
7 and 8, this Act introduced for the first time a new Article 
in its second schedule, viz., Article 44 under which a minor 
who wanted to set aside an improperly effected 'sale' by his
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guardian, was required to institute the suit within three 
years from the date when he attained majority. But the Act 
omitted the definition of the word 'minor' as provided by 
Act 9 of 1871 and followed the definition as supplied by 
the Indian Majority Act (Act 9) of 1875.
Act 9 of 1908 brought no change in the provisions of
the sections but it rearranged the sections and divided
section 7 of Act 15 of 1877 into two sections and numbered
them as sections 6 and 8. Section 8 of Act 15 of 1877 was
numbered as section 7 in the present Act with some changes
in the first portion of the old section to avoid the conflict
between different High Courts^. Whitley Stokes suggested^
that the word 'sale' in Article 44 of Act 15 of 1877 should
not be understood to imply sale alone; the Article should
be extended to mortgages and leases as well. To give effect
to this suggestion this Act substituted the words 'transfer
of property' for the word 'sale' in Article 44. Under Act 15
of 1877 a suit to set aside a mortgage or lease executed by
a guardian used to be governed by Article 91 read with 
3section 7 . At times the conveyance of a minor's interest 
as mortgagee or lessee was considered as a sale^.
Section 6 of Act 9 of 1908 runs as follows!
"(l) Where a person entitled to institute a suit 
or make an application for the execution of a 
decree is, at the time from which the period 
of limitation is to be reckoned, a minor, or
1 See the Gazette of India. January 4, 1908, part v, State­
ment of Objects and Reasons, 22-29, especially Notes on 
clauses, 23-26.
2 Whitley Stokes, Anglo-Indian Codes Vol. 2, 950,
3 Ramanusar Pandey v. Raghubar Jati (1883) 5 All 490.
4 Madugula Latchiah v. Pally Mukkalinga (1907) 30 Mad 393.
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insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit 
or make the application within the same period 
after the disability has ceased, as would other­
wise have been allowed from the time prescribed 
therefor in the third column of the first schedule#
(2) Where such a person is, at the time from which 
the period of limitation is to be reckoned, affected 
by two such disabilities, or where, before his 
disability has ceased, he is affected by another 
disability, he may institute the suit or make
the application within the same period after both 
disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have 
been allowed from the time so prescribed.
(3) Where the disability continues up to the death 
of such person, his legal representative may insti­
tute the suit or make the application within the 
same period after the death as would otherwise 
have been allowed from the time so prescribed.
(4) Where such representative is at the date of 
the death affected by any such disability, the 
rules contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall 
apply".
Section 7 runs as follows*
"Where one of several persons jointly entitled 
to institute a suit or make an application for 
the execution of a decree is under any such 
disability, and a discharge can be given without 
the concurrence of such person, time will run 
against them all; but, where no such discharge 
can be given, time will not run as against any 
of them until one of them becomes capable of 
giving such discharge without the concurrence of 
the others or until the disability has ceased".
Section 8 runs as follows*
"Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to 
suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall 
be deemed to extend, for more than three years 
from the cessation of the disability or the death 
of the person affected thereby, the period within 
which any suit must be instituted or application 
made"•
The new Act (Act 36) of 1963 of India has kept the 
three relative sections as they were in Act 9 of 1908, but
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it has made some additions to each of those sections, and 
has left out all the illustrations of the old sections.
Thus in section 6 the new Act has added a new sub-section, 
viz., sub-section (5) wherein it makes provision for com­
puting the limitation period in the case of the legal repre­
sentative of a person who died after the cessation of dis­
ability but within the period of three years allowed under 
this section. An important *explanation' has been appended 
to this section in which a 'child in the womb* is included 
within 'minor'. Two 'explanations* are added to section 7 
wherein no change is made. In section 8 some constructional 
changes have been made; otherwise the section is kept as 
it was under Act 9 of 1908. The illustrations are, however, 
deleted since the Law Commission thought them unnecessary 
and sometimes misleading^.
Section 6 of Act 36 of 1963 states as follows*
"(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit 
or make an application for the execution of a 
decree is, at the time from which the prescribed 
period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or 
an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the 
application within the same period after the dis­
ability has ceased, as would otherwise have been 
allowed from the time specified therefor in the 
third column of the Schedule.
(2) Where such person is, at the time from which 
the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected 
by two such disabilities, or where, before his 
disability has ceased, he is affected by another 
disability, he may institute the suit or make the 
application within the same period after both 
disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have 
been allowed from the time so specified.
1 R. Mitra, The Limitation Act (Act 36 of 1963) (Allahabad* 
2nd ed., 1967), 247.
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(3) Where the disability continues up to the death 
of that person, his legal representative may insti­
tute the suit or make the application within the 
same period after the death, as would otherwise 
have been allowed from the time so specified.
(4) Where the legal representative referred to 
in sub-section (3) is, at the date of the death 
of the person whom he represents, affected by 
any such disability, the rules contained in sub­
sections (1) and (2) shall apply.
(5) Where a person under disability dies after the 
disability ceases but within the period allowed
to him under this section, his legal representative 
may institute the suit or make the application 
within the same period after the death, as would 
otherwise have been available to that person had 
he not died.
Explanation --- For the purposes of this section,
'minor* includes a child in the womb.
Section 7 states as follows*
"Where one of several persons jointly entitled to 
institute a suit or make an application for the 
execution of a decree is under any such disability 
and a discharge can be given without the concurrence 
of such person, time will run against them all? but 
where no such discharge can be given, time will not 
run as against any of them until one of them becomes 
capable of giving such discharge without the con­
currence of the others or until the disability has 
ceased.
Explanation 1 --  This section applies to a
discharge from every kind of liability, including 
a liability in respect of any immovable property.
Explanation 2 --  For the purpose of this
section, the manager of a Hindu undivided family 
governed by the Mitakshara law shall be deemed 
to be capable of giving a discharge without the 
concurrence of the other members of the family 
only if he is in management of the joint family 
property"•
Section 8 states as follows*
"Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to 
suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall
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be deemed to extend, for more than three years 
from the cessation of the disability or the death 
of the person affected thereby, the period of 
limitation for any suit or application".
Article 60 of Act 36 of 1963 corresponds to Article 
44 of Act 9 of 1908. The new Act has widened the scope to
cover cases when the minor dies before attaining majority
or within three years after attaining majority. The period 
of limitation, however, remains unchanged. Under the new 
Article in order to set aside a transfer of his property 
effected by his guardian (l) the minor who has attained 
majority must bring the suit within three years from the 
date when he attains majority, or (2) his legal representa­
tive must bring the suit (a) when the minor dies within 
three years from the date of attaining majority, within
three years from the date when the minor attains majority
or (b) when the minor dies before attaining majority, within 
three years from the date when the minor dies.
4.1. Sections 6, 7 and 8 and their relation with Article 44 
of Act 9 of 1908 or Article 60 of Act 36 of 1963
Sections 6 and 7 are not mutually exclusive; on the 
other hand, they are supplementary, the latter section 
supplements the former1. And section 8 is an exception to 
sections 6 and 7; it is restrictive of the concessions
granted in sections 6 and 7, and actually does not confer
2 . any substantive privilege • The right which section 6 gives
1 Rati Ram v. Naidar (19191 41 All 435, 441.
2 Rangaswami v. Thanavelu (1919) 42 Mad 637 per Oldfield,J.
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to a minor, viz., to wait till he attains majority, can be
availed of by him if the circumstances mentioned in the
first portion of section 7 do not exist, that is, if there
is nobody to give a valid discharge on his behalf without
his concurrence. If however a discharge can be given without
his concurrence, he cannot take advantage of his minority
and wait till he becomes a major. In Varamma v. Gopaladasayya1
Seshagiri Aiyar, J., said that the principle of section 7
was that if there were some persons in existence who were
adults and who could have safeguarded the common rights of
themselves and others similarly situated, the failure of
the persons who were sui juris to litigate the right would
start the cause of action not only against themselves but
also against persons in similar circumstances. Bhashyam
Ayyangar, J., deduced the following propositions from the
combined operation of sections 7 and 8 of Act 15 of 1877
2in Ahinsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader in which the right of suit
resided jointly in a plurality of persons*
"(a) Such suit cannot be barred in part in respect
of some, and not barred in part in respect of the
others; (b) if any one of several joint creditors 
or claimants is under a disability and a full dis­
charge could be given without his concurrence by 
all or any of the other joint creditors or claim­
ants, the suit will be governed by the ordinary 
law of limitation and time will run against all;
(c) but where no such discharge can be given, 
time will not run against any of them until all 
have ceased to be under disability; and (d) if all 
were affected by disability, time will not run 
against any of them until all have ceased to be 
under disability, unless one of them, who in the 
meanwhile had ceased to be under disability becomes
1 AIR 1919 Mad 911, 922 (FB).
2 (1902) 25 Mad 26, 38.
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capable of giving a complete discharge without 
the concurrence of the others, in which latter 
case, time will run against all from the time 
when one of them has thus become capable of 
giving such discharge"•
In English law it was similarly held in Decharms v. 
Horwood1 that one coparcener could not sue separately for 
his portion of rent accruing to him and his fellows. Tindal, 
C.J., stated the law on the subject as follows*
"The authorities all agree that whatever be the 
number of parceners, they all constitute one heir. 
They are connected together by unity of interest, 
and unity of title; and one of them cannot distrain 
without joining the others in the avowry ... If 
they cannot distrain separately, how can they 
separately claim a portion of the rent from a 
person who has received it in the character of a 
trustee? It would be a great hardship on him to 
be exposed to three actions instead of one. But 
it might happen that he might have received autho­
rity from the other parceners. Inasmuch, therefore, 
as there has been no division of these rents, nor 
any agreement by the defendant to hold one third 
of them separately for the plaintiff, he has no 
right separately to sue the defendant".
Article 44 was an embodiment of the result of general 
principles of sections 6 and 8 as applied to a suit brought 
by a minor after attaining majority to set aside a transfer 
of his property effected by his guardian. In other words, 
it was an illustration of a specific cause under sections 
6 and 8. In Ramaliah v. Brahmiah Venkatasubba Rao, J., 
effectively illustrated the application of this Article in 
that sense. In showing the scope of the Article the learned 
judge observed*
"The guestion is* when does the cause of action 
arise to set aside the transfer? Does it arise
1 (1834) 10 Bing 526, 529-30; 131 ER 999, 1000.
2 AIR 1930 Mad 821, 823.
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on the date of the alienation or when the ward 
comes of age? Article 44 no doubt fixes the start­
ing point as the attaining by the infant of his 
majority. In my opinion, that Article does no 
more than express the result of applying to the 
particular kind of case it contemplates, the 
general principles embodied in sections 6 and 8, 
Limitation Act. The statute begins to run from 
the date of the alienation but section 6 makes 
minority a cause for suspending the operation of 
the statute. Now, let us suppose that Article 44 
ran thus*
By a ward who has attained ( Three years from
majority, to set aside a if the date of the
transfer of property by his { transfer,
guardian. j[
:_______________ i___________
Let us apply to it the rules contained in 
sections 6 and 8, Section 6 says, where a person 
is at the time from which the period of limitation 
is to be reckoned a minor, he may institute the 
suit within the same period after the disability 
has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed 
from the time prescribed therefor, in column 3, 
Schedule 1, Section 8 enacts that nothing in 
section 6 shall be deemed to extend for more than 
three years from the cessation of the disability, 
the period within which any suit must be instituted. 
The provision as given in its altered shape, read 
in the light of these two sections, yields the 
rule in the exact form embodied in Article 44 as 
it stands. The reason for drafting this.Article 
in this manner is obvious. The other Articles of 
the Limitation Act may apply to minors or to adults, 
but by its very nature the transaction referred 
to in Article 44 concerns minors only. It was there­
fore unnecessary to frame a rule in general terms, 
leaving it to be governed by the principles contained 
in section 6 and section 8. Article 44 seems to 
be the result of an attempt to state the law com­
pendiously in a self contained provision” .
The learned judge is supported in his reasoning by the 
observations of Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Doraisami v. Nondisami1. 
In Doraisami * s case where two brothers brought a suit to set
1(1912) 38 Mad 118.
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aside a sale effected by their mother as guardian during
their minority, the suit being brought within three years
of the younger brother attaining majority but more than
three years after the elder brother came of age, it was
held that Article 44 must be read along with sections 6
and 7. As said earlier, section 7 qualifies section 6 and
provides that time would run against all the plaintiffs,
if they are jointly entitled, even though some of them are
minors, when one of them can give a discharge without the
concurrence of the persons under disability, Abdur Rahim, J,,
whose view was upheld by a Bench of three judges including
the Chief Justice on Letters Patent Appeal in the above
Doraisami *s case pointed out that the applicability of
Article 44 to a case would not preclude the applicability
of the first part of section 7. In Mahabaleshvar v, Ramchandra1
Scott, C.J., followed the view that section 7 would apply
to a case coming under Article 44, The Allahabad High Court,
on the other hand, held a different view in Ganqa Daval v,
2H a m  Ram • It was observed in that case that the elder of 
the two brothers constituting a joint Hindu family was not 
a person capable of giving a discharge without the concurrence 
of the other brother within the meaning of section 8 (corres­
ponding to section 7 of 1908 and 1963 Acts) even though they 
were joint claimants. It is to be noted that in Ganqa Dayal*s 
case it was found that the elder brother never acted as the
3manager. The Privy Council m  Jawahir Singh v, Udai Parkash
1 (1914) 38 Bom 94. >
2 (1908) 31 All 156.
3 AIR 1926 PC 16.
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appear to follow the view of the decision in Ganqa Dayal*s 
case. But it must be pointed out that in the Privy Council 
case the Hindu father who made the alienation was alive at 
the date of the suit and the question was whether the suit 
by the younger son within three years of his attaining 
majority would become barred although the elder son had, 
attained majority more than three years earlier and had 
allowed his claim to set aside the alienation to become 
barred, and it was held that the conduct of the elder son 
in not contesting the alienation would not bar the claim 
of the younger son. Therefore, although the Privy Council 
approved of the decision of the High Court in that case 
in which Ganqa Dayal*s case was followed, it is not clear 
from the facts whether the decision was based upon the 
question of the incompetency of a manager in such circums­
tances to give a valid discharge, or on the question of 
fact whether the elder brother ever acted as a manager at 
all. But it may be observed that in such cases the Privy 
Council seems to recognise the joint nature of the cause 
of action. The Madras High Court took a very clear stand 
in this respect about the Privy Council decision in Jawahir 
Singh*s case. Thus in Narayana v. Venkataswami1 where a 
suit was brought by the younger son within three years of 
his attaining majority to avoid the sale effected by his 
father who was alive when the suit was brought, Devadoss 
and Wallace, JJ., held following Jawahir Singh*s case that
1 AIR 1926 Mad 1190.
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the suit was not barred by limitation, although the elder 
son attained majority more than three years earlier and 
had taken no steps to question the alienation. Again, in 
Surayya v. Subbamma1 where the paternal grandmother alienated 
as guardian of minor brothers their property and the eldest 
brother on attaining majority did not institute any suit 
to set aside the alienation within the time limited by law, 
Devadoss and Jackson, JJ., held when a suit was brought by 
the younger brothers to set aside the sale that the suit 
was barred by limitation. In this case the learned judges 
followed Doraisami *s case, and when the counsel for appellants 
contended that the authority of Doraisami *s case was consi­
derably shaken by the Privy Council decision in Jawahir 
Singh *s case the learned judges disapproved the contention.
4.2. Residuary Article applicable to the alienation of a 
minor's property
The above limitation provisions are applicable only 
where a minor is prima facie bound by an alienation of his 
property made by a person who has legal capacity to do so. 
Where, however, an alienation is effected by a person who 
has no legal capacity to do so on the minor's behalf or 
where it has been done by a legally capable person but in 
assertion of a hostile title, the minor would, it has been
supposed, not be bound by that alienation and he would not
2 . . .be required to set it aside • If the alienee is in possession
1 (1927) 53 MLJ 677.
2 Derrett, Introduction, 82-83 para 105.
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of the property so alienated, the minor must get back the 
possession of his property within a certain specified period 
of time. Otherwise uninterrupted, peaceful adverse possession 
by the alienee would create an absolute right in the property
I
in favour of the possessor. Statutes of limitation provide 
a general residuary Article which requires that for the 
possession of immovable property or any interest therein 
for which no specific provision is made a suit must be insti­
tuted within twelve years from the date when possession of 
the alienee becomes adverse to the minor. Under Act 14 of 
1859 a suit of this description was governed by clause 12 
of its section 1. The period of limitation under that Act 
would begin to run from the date when the cause of action 
arose. Under Act 9 of 1871 the provision for such suit was 
provided under Article 145 of the second schedule wherein 
the period of limitation would begin to run from the date 
when the possession of the defendant, or of some person 
through whom he claims, became adverse to the plaintiff.
Under Act 15 of 1877 the law was provided in Article 144 
of the second schedule wherein the third column ran as 
follows* "When the possession of the defendant becomes 
adverse to the plaintiff" . The words "or of some person 
through whom he claims" of the relevant Article of the 
previous Act were dropped, since in section 3 of this Act 
the words 'plaintiff' and 'defendant' were defined to include 
'also any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives 
his right to sue* or 'a defendant derives his liability to
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be sued'. This Article 144 of this Act was re-enacted as
Article 144 under first schedule of Act 9 of 1908. Act 36
of 1963 has placed this residuary Article along with
others under Article 65 of its schedule. The moment from
which the period of limitation begins to run has been kept
as before. But Article 144 being a residuary Article cannot
be resorted to if a specific Article 44 is applicable to
a suit. The Limitation Acts recognise the distinction between
void and voidable transactions and provide a shorter period
of limitation for remedies in respect of the latter"*". Article
44 cannot be evaded by omitting to sue for setting aside a
transfer by the guardian and by professing to sue for posse-
2ssion or redemption • The law regards a dealing with the 
minor's estate by his legal guardian as, in effect, an act 
of the minor himself through his guardian and prescribes a 
short period of three years after attainment of majority 
for setting aside an improper alienation by that guardian.
In this regard Article 44 is a bit drastic in its operation 
and its application is confined to cases of transfer by the 
minor's 'guardian' only. Article 44 does not differentiate 
between guardians and wards belonging to different communi­
ties. It does not lay down one special rule for a Hindu
1 For example, see Articles 12 and 91 of Act 9 of 1908.
These Articles are applicable even in suit for possession 
of immovable property, if the plaintiff cannot succeed 
without displacing an apparent title under a court sale 
or an instrument by virtue of which the defendant is in 
possession.
2 Madugula Latchiah v. Pally Mukkalinga (1907) 30 Mad 393_; 
Doraisami v. Nondisami (1912) 38 Mad 118; Muthukumara. Che tty 
v. Anthony Udayar AIR 1915 Mad 296; Satyalakshmi v. Jagan- 
nadham AIR 1918 Mad 487; Kandasami v. Irusappa AIRJL918 Mad 
724; Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna AIR 1920 Bom 1 
Arumugam Pillai v. Panayadian Ambalam AIR 1921 Mad
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minor and another for a Muslim minor or a minor of another 
community1. But at the same time it requires the personal 
law of the minors to determine who the guardians of a minor 
are.
4* 3. Disadvantages arising out of treating an improper
alienation as either void or voidable
As said at the beginning of this chapter, the solution 
of the major question whether an improper alienation by a 
guardian is void or voidable would solve other issues in 
its way. But either solution would bring some apparent 
disadvantage for either party, i.e., minor or alienee. For 
example, if an improper alienation is void apparently the 
minor's position would be stronger. He would get a limita­
tion period of twelve years to set aside the alienation 
in contradistinction to three years in the case of a void­
able alienation. Even at times he may not even be required 
to set aside the alienation by instituting a suit, since 
he can repudiate it by mere conduct, such as by reselling 
the property* while under such an alienation the alienee 
would be a mere trepasser in respect of the property he 
purchased, and would be liable for mesne profits if the 
minor could successfully oust him. His financial loss would 
not be recouped from his claim against the guardian; and 
the claim against the guardian would rarely include the 
profits he has lost under the void transfer. Under the void 
transfer the alienee has at least one advantage, namely,
1 Janab Haji Abdul Hamid v. Samsunnissa Begum (l96T) 2 MLJ 
195, 197.
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once the period of limitation is over he becomes an absolute 
owner of the property by adverse possession. If, however, 
the alienation is voidable the minor must set aside the 
alienation within three years to get possession, otherwise 
his right to sue would be ended, though his ownership would 
not be lost and long after the termination of the limitation 
period prescribed for a voidable alienation he can use it 
as a defence. Under this form of alienation the alienee 
stands in a financially better position; he will not be 
liable for mesne profits. Possession under this alienation 
does not create ownership, until it is continuously exercised 
for the whole period of adverse possession.
4.4. Time available to a minor or his legal representative
Article 44 of the Limitation Act 9 of 1908 or its
corresponding Article 60 of the Limitation Act 36 of 1963
requires that if a minor wants to set aside an improper
alienation of his property by his guardian and to recover
possession thereof, he has three years from the date of
his attaining majority within which he must institute a
suit for the same. According to the law of India, Pakistan
and Bangladesh1 a person attains majority on the completion
2of eighteen years , but except m  the case of marriage, 
dower, divorce and adoption a minor for whose person or 
property or both a guardian has been appointed under the 
GWA or a minor of whose property the superintendence has
1 Derrett, 'Minority in the Indian Subcontinent', In 
(1975) 35 L'Enfant, Recueils De La Societe Jean Bodin, 
395-457, 399.
2 Indian Majority Act 9 of 1875, sec. 3.
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been assumed by a Court of Wards reaches majority on the 
completion of twenty-one years. Thus a minor on attaining 
majority gets a limitation period of three years to set 
aside an improper alienation of his property. But an ex-minor 
for-a similar act with respect to his property gets, where
he is out of possession, twelve years1 or, where he is in
2 . .possession, six years to set aside the alienation. Derrett
has rightly pointed out this as an ’unsatisfactory' arrange-
3ment of law which should have been the other way round .
Under section 6 of Act 9 of 1908 or Act 36 of 1963 if a 
minor dies before attaining majority his legal representative 
may institute the suit for such alienation within the same 
period as provided by Article 44 or Article 60 as the case 
may be, i.e., three years after the minor's death. Where, 
however, the legal representative himself suffers from 
any disability, viz., minority, insanity, or idiocy, at the 
date of the death of the minor, the limitation period starts 
under section 6(4) from the date when the disability of the 
representative ceases. But where a minor is member of a 
joint undivided Hindu family consisting of all minor copar­
ceners, under section 6 the elder coparcener on attaining 
majority may challenge an improper alienation of their 
guardian up to the end of the normal period of three years 
calculated not from the accruing of the cause of action
1 Limitation Act 9 of 1908, Article 126; Limitation Act 36 
of 1963, Art. 109; Palania Pillai v. Amiath Ibrahim AIR 
1942 Mad 622 (FB); Konnan Sanku v. Parvathi Amma AIR 1963 
Ker 249; Bhaqirathi v. Gopal Charan AIR 1972 Ori 206.
2 Limitation Act 9 of 1908, Art. 120; Limitation Act 36 of 
1963, Art. 113. .
3 Introduction, 293 para 474.
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but from his attaining majority; the failure of the elder 
coparcener would bar under section 7 the younger coparceners 
to avoid it on the attainment of their majority. The curious 
rule of 'overlapping of lives*1 as is available to an after 
born coparcener to challenge an alienation of joint family 
property is not applicable in the case of alienation by a 
guardian because as soon as the elder brother attains majo­
rity guardianship terminates and the elder brother becomes 
automatically the manager of the family consisting of his 
other minor brothers. He is expected as manager to avail 
himself of the opportunity to set aside the improper alie­
nation and if he does not do it, the younger brothers can­
not do it.
1 Derrett says the following about the overlapping of livesi
"After-born coparceners cannot sue to set aside alienations 
made before their conception or adoption, as the case may 
be. But overlapping of lives may give this very right to 
them. If at the time of his conception there existed an 
unexpired right amongst the coparcenary body to challenge 
the same alienation, the joint-family property in which 
he acquired a birthright includes the 'invisible* asset, 
the property whose alienation could be effectively challenged, 
an asset which, like an equity of redemption, may turn 
out to be of great value. The rule is not open to abuse 
because, although a succession of minors might otherwise 
extend the period of challenge over a long space of time, 
it is settled (fortunately, but not very convincingly) 
that the period of limitation will in no circumstances 
be extended by this 'overlapping"'. [See Derrett, Introdu­
ction. 294 para 475. This paragraph has been approvingly quoted 
by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Kumaraswami 
Mudaliar v. Ra iamanikkam Udavar (1966) KLT 361, 366 (FB).
For overlapping see also Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan 
(1913) 40 IA 213 (PC); Ranodip Singh v. Rameshar Prasad 
AIR 1923 Oudh 52; Dhanra i Rai v. Ram Naresh Rai AIR 1924 
All 912; Jowala Singh v. Sant Singh AIR 1932 Lah 605;
Visweswara Rao v. Surya Rao AIR 1936 Mad 440, 447; Dharu 
Indar Pal v. Firm Badri Das Sohan Lai AIR 1943 Lah 281 (FB); 
Srinivasalu v. Munisami AIR 1943 Mad 378; Devadoss v. Pon- 
nammal (1967)1 MLJ 171; Venucropalaswamy Varu Temple v. 
Visweswara AIR 1969 AP 24.
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4.5. Twenty-one years is too long a period for minority
As seen above, minors of whose person or property 
guardians have been appointed or declared by the courts 
under the GWA or of whose property the superintendence 
has been assumed by the Court of Wards, attain majority 
at the completion of twenty-one years; while those whose 
person or property is not under such guardianship or whose 
property is not under the superintendence of the Court of 
Wards, attain majority at the end of eighteenth year. Such 
duality of law should not be there. At the present society 
twenty-one years age limit is too long; it should be lowered 
to the general majority age of eighteen years.
Before the Indian Majority Act 9 of 1875 came into
1 2force the age of majority of the Hindus and Muslims was
1 In Hindu law regarding the age of majority there were two 
views. According to one view minority terminated at the
end of fifteen years [See Macnaghten, Hindu law Vol. 1, 103; 
Cally Churn v. Bhuggobutty Churn (1873] 10 BLR 231 (FB) ; 
Mothoormohun Roy v. Soorendro Narain (1876) 1 Cal 108, 119 
(FB); Sattira iu v . Venkataswami (1917) 40 Mad 925, 929]; 
but according to the other view, it terminated at the end 
of sixteen years [See Shivji Hasam v. Datu Mavii (1875)
12 Bom HC Rep 281, 290; Shiddeshvar v. Ramchandrarav (1882)
6 Bom 463; Reade v. Krishna (1886j~9 Mad 391, 397J.
2 In Muslim law puberty and majority were considered one and 
the same, fHedaya. 529 f.n.]. On the attainment of puberty 
therefore minority terminated fRe Muthu Ibrahi (1914) 37 
Mad 567; Niamat Ali v. Ali Raza (1915) 37 All 86, 90J. Among 
the Hanafis and Shafis puberty is presumed at the expiration 
of the fifteenth year fHedaya, 529; Baillie, Digest Vol. 1, 
4] and among the Malikis on the completion of the eighteenth 
year fIbrahim v. Ibrahim (1916) 39 Mad 608]. According to 
Abu Hanifa puberty of a boy is established by circumstances 
or upon her attaining eighteen years of age, and that of
a girl, by circumstances or upon her attaining seventeen 
years of age. With this view his two disciples do not agree. 
The lowest age of puberty according to its natural signs 
is twelve years in males and nine years in femalesLBaillie, 
Digest Vol. 1, 4 f.n. 5; Sadig Ali v. Jai Kishori (1928)
30 Bom LR 1346 (PC); Sibt Ahmad v. Amina Khatun (1928)
50 All 733].
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determined by the provisions of their respective personal 
laws and of other communities in India in the absence of 
their own personal laws, by the rules of English law. In 
course of time these provisions were modified in certain 
respects by Regulations and Acts. In Bengal the Bengal 
Regulation 10 of 1793 limited minority to the expiration 
of the fifteenth year with respect to both the Hindus and 
Muslims? but subsequently this limit was raised to the end 
of the eighteenth year by the Bengal Regulation 26 of 1793, 
The Bengal Minors Act 40 of 1858 also regarded every person 
a minor who had not attained the age of eighteen years. In 
Bombay the Bombay Minors Act 20 of 1864 and in Madras the 
Madras Regulation 5 of 1804 provided eighteen years as the 
period of minority. Besides the above Acts, the age of 
majority was also fixed by other Acts for their special 
purposes. Thus the Indian Limitation Act 9 of 1871, as said 
earlier, defined the expression 'minor* as meaning a person 
who had not completed his age of eighteen years, and in the 
Indian Christian Marriage Act 15 of 1872 'minor* was defined 
as a person who had not completed his age of twenty-one 
years. But in the European British Minors Act 13 of 1874 
a person was considered to be a minor who had not completed 
the age of eighteen years. To remove this diversity as to 
the age when a person would complete his minority or attain 
his majority the Indian Majority Act 9 of 1875 was passed.
Twenty-one years* age limit for minority is no doubt 
an incidence of English statutory law on its counterpart
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in India. In neither Hindu nor Muslim law was this age limit 
ever recognised as the age of minority. In summerising the 
•full age' of a person in English law Pollock and Maitland 
observed*!
••There is more than one 'full age*. The young 
burgess is of full age when he can count money 
and measure cloth? the young sokeman when he 
is fifteen, the tenant by knight's service when 
he is twenty-one years old. In past times boys 
and girls had soon attained full age; life was 
rude and there was not much to learn. That pro­
longation of the disabilities and privileges of 
infancy, which must have taken place sooner or 
later, has been hastened by the introduction of 
heavy armour. But here again we have a good 
instance of the manner in which the law for the 
gentry becomes English common law. The military 
tenant is kept in ward until he is twenty-one 
years old? the tenant in socage is out of ward 
six or seven years earlier. Gradually however 
the knightly majority is becoming the majority 
of the common law. ... In later days our law 
drew various lines at various stages in a child's 
life; Coke tells us of the seven ages of a woman; 
but the only line of general importance is drawn
at the age of one and twenty; and infant --  the
one technical word that we have as a contrast for
the person of full age --  stands equally well
for the new-born babe and the youth who is in 
his twenty first year".
It appears from the above paragraph that the knightly
age of majority gradually came to apply to every one. In 1660 
abolishing the military tenure Charles II enacted by the 
Tenures Abolition Act (12 C. II, c. 24) of 1660 that a 
father could in all cases appoint a guardian by deed or 
will until his child became twenty-one years of age. Later 
the courts adopted the practice in cases where the father 
had omitted to appoint a guardian. In English law the age
1 History of English law Vol. 2] 4387
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of twenty-one continued to be the age of majority until
very recently when in 1969 it has been lowered to eighteen
by section 1(1) of the Family Law Reform Act of 1969
which implements the recommendation of the Latey Committee
on the Age of Majority1. In discussing the irrelevance of
historical causes of the age of twenty-one the Committee 
?
aptly remarked »
"Grotesque as it may seem that the weight of armour 
in the 11th century should govern the age at which 
a couple can get a mortgage or marry today, the 
historical background of a subject does not, of 
course, necessarily tell us anything one way or 
the other about its present usefulness. The gradual 
collapse of the primeval forests into coal may 
be interesting, but has no relevance to the question 
of the suitability of coal for today's fireplaces”.
In their general conclusions on the age of majority 
the Committee considered inter alia thati
(i) the historical causes for 21 are not relevant to 
contemporary society;
(ii) most young people today mature earlier than in 
the past;
(iii) by 18 most young people are ready for these 
responsibilities and rights and would greatly 
profit by them as would the teaching authorities, 
the business community, the administration of 
justice, and the community as a whole.
In this perspective it can be said that when the mother- 
law which once determined twenty-one as the age of majority
1 Cmnd. 3342.
2 Ibid. 22-23.
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has been changed and lowered to eighteen, there is no logic 
to stick to it anymore. Moreover the reasons which the 
Latey Committee adduced to bring down the age limit apply 
more forcefully to the youths of the Subcontinent where 
senses of right and responsibility grow more rapidly with 
its climate. Again, when the average longivity of the people 
is within thirties, it is all the more funny to keep a 
person under legal disability till the age of twenty-one.
As in the United Kingdom so in the countries of the Sub­
continent the age of minority should be lowered in all cases 
to eighteen.
Section 4(a) of the HMGA has defined the word ’minor* 
to mean a person who has not completed the age of eighteen 
years. Under this Act a minor who has a natural or testamen­
tary guardian attains majority at the completion of eighteen 
years, and under the Indian Majority Act of 1875 he attains 
majority at the end of twenty-one years. Pradhan^ has pointed 
out that even in the case of minors who have natural or 
testamentary guardians the HMGA has made no change in the 
age of majority, because the HMGA deals only with natural 
and testamentary guardians whose powers come to an end on 
the appointment of a certificated guardian or on the assump­
tion of superintendence of the minor’s property by the Court 
of Wards under section 3 of the GWA. Thus notwithstanding 
the overriding effect of the HMGA if a guardian is appointed 
by the court of the person or property of a minor or if
1 Guardianship, 242-43.
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the superintendence of his property is assumed by the 
Court of Wards, the minor should be deemed to have attained 
majority at the completion of twenty-one years.
5. Meaning of the phrase 'any person claiming under him*
Before going into the actual discussion whether an 
improper alienation of a minor's property is void or voidable, 
we must ascertain the meaning of the phrase 'any person 
claiming under him' as used in section 8(3) of the HMGA. 
Section 8(3) provides as follows*
"Any disposal of immovable property by a natural 
guardian, in contravention of subsection (l) or 
subsection (2), is voidable at the instance of 
the minor or any person claiming under him" .
According to the above section if a natural guardian 
disposes of a minor's immovable property otherwise than for 
the purposes which are necessary or reasonable and proper 
for realisation, protection or benefit of the minor's estate, 
or if he mortgages or charges, or if he transfers by sale, 
gift, exchange or otherwise, the minor's property, or leases 
it out for a longer period, without the previous permission 
of the court, the disposition would be voidable at the ins­
tance of the minor or 'any person claiming under him'.
In Philipose Thomas v. Gopala Pillai1 Madhavan Nair, J., 
said that a person claiming under a minor within the meaning 
of section 8 of the HMGA must be one claiming under a valid 
alienation by the minor or in succession to him. Derrett 
says that the expression 'any person claiming under him'
1 (1968) KLT 388.
2 Introduction, 82 para 104.
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includes not only 'transferees or assignees of the property 
or of rights therein from the minor inter vivos'. but also 
his legatees and intestate heirs.
Prior to the passing of the HMGA it was held in some 
cases1 that the transferee from an ex-minor had no right 
to set aside an alienation effected by the minor's guardian.
It was stated in those cases that where a minor's property 
was sold by the guardian and the purchaser was in possession 
of the property, all the interest which the minor possessed 
in that property was a mere right to sue to have the sale 
set aside and a transfer of such a right was prohibited by
section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act (Act 4) of 1882^.
3
In Thayammal v. Rangaswami Reddy Rajamannar, C.J., said*
"It is well established that the special provision 
of section 6, Limitation Act confers a purely 
personal exemption on a certain class of persons, 
and the exemption as such cannot be taken advantage 
of by the transferee from the person under disability. 
It is sufficient to refer to two leading authori­
ties, the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta 
High Court in —  Rudra Kant Surma Sircar v. Nabo 
Kishore Surma Biswas 1 (1883) 9 Cal 663 Tf b )^ |, and 
the decision of our Court in —  Rangaswami Chetti 
v. Thanqavelu Chetti [AIR 1919 Mad 317J.
It is equally clear from the authorities that 
when a person entitled to the benefit of section 6, 
Limitation Act transfers property to another, though 
the transferee himself may not be entitled to the 
benefit of that section, a suit could be filed by 
the transferor and the transferee and such a suit 
would not be barred, though ultimately the benefit 
of the decision in the suit would go to the trans­
feree" •
1 Jhaverbhai v. Kabhai AIR 1933 Bom 42; Mon Mohan v. Bidhu 
Bhusan AIR 1939 Cal 460.
2 The section runs as follows:
"A mere right to sue ... cannot be transferred".
3 AIR 1956 Mad 15, 17-18.
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The learned Chief Justice further said**
"When ... a minor purports to transfer property 
which had already been alienated by his guardian 
to another, he cannot convey title to the property 
as such. He is really transferring his right to 
recover the properties after setting aside the 
alienation**.
. . . . . 2 Similarly m  Palani Goundan v. Vamiakkal , Ramaswami,
J., held that the right to avoid a guardian's improper ali­
enation was a personal privilege of the minor and it was 
nothing more than a right to sue. Therefore an alienee from 
a minor cannot have any title to the property, and the question 
of setting aside the prior alienation does not arise at all.
But such a view cannot be accepted. There are sound
decisions of courts which hold that the minor's right to
avoid the transfer by his guardian or to set it aside is
3a valuable right attached to the property. Derrett says i
"If the minor dies without avoiding the alienation 
the general law (apart from the HMGA) provides 
that the alienation becomes as good as if it had 
never been subject to a defect, and the right of 
suit does not pass to the minor's legal repre­
sentatives. If however he assigns his rights in 
the property when he reaches majority (for in 
one view the right is transferable), and then 
dies, his assignees may apparently sue to set 
aside the alienation within three years of the 
minor's attaining majority".
4
Kamaraiu v. Gunnayya where a minor's property 
by his mother as guardian and the minor on attaining 
ignored the sale and resold it to the plaintiff 
for possession, Ramesam and Coleridge, JJ., held 
that by selling the property to the plaintiff on the ground
1 AIR 1956 Mad 15, 19.
2 AIR 1956 Mad 476, 480.
3 Introduction, 82 para 104.
4 AIR 1924 Mad 322.
In
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that the prior sale by his mother was not binding on him 
the ex-minor had chosen to avoid the prior sale and that 
the plaintiff could sue for recovery of possession of the 
property without a prayer for setting aside the original 
sale by the mother. The same view was expressed by Viswa- 
natha Sastri, J., in Palaniappa Goundan v. Nallappa Goundan1 
when the learned judge after referring to the earlier cases 
in which the minor's right to avoid his guardian's improper 
alienation was considered to be a mere right to sue, observedI
"I am unable to accept these decisions as embody­
ing a correct statement of the law. There was 
here a sale of property by the ex-minor and not 
an assignment of a mere right to sue. No doubt, 
the vendee from the minor had to sue the previous 
purchaser from the guardian for recovery of poss­
ession of the property, but ..• that did not render 
the sale by the minor a transfer of a mere right 
to sue. ... It is a right annexed to the owner­
ship of property or an interest in property and 
is available to the legal representatives of a 
minor who dies without avoiding the transfer.
Where an ex-minor transfers property unauthorisedly 
sold by his guardian during his minority, he trans­
fers not a mere right to sue but his interest in 
the property, though a suit may be necessary to 
avoid the transfer by the guardian and possession 
of the property from his alienee".
The above two decisions were agreeably cited by Jagan-
mohan Reddy, C.J., and Kumarayya, J., in Nagabhushana Rao
2 . 3v. Gowramma . The learned judges observed i
"On a review of the various cases cited at the Bar, 
we are of the view that as the alienations of a 
de facto manager or guardian are not binding on 
the minor unless they are for legal necessity or 
for benefit to the estate. In case the ex-minor 
transfers his rights in such alienated property 
it must follow that what he has transferred is 
not a mere right to sue but his entire rights in 
the property and his transfer would be binding
1 (1951) 1 M U  265, 272.
2 (1968) 2 An WR 57.
3 Ibid, 64.
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unless and until it is proved that the alienation 
by guardian was for legal necessity or for the 
benefit to the estate or was warranted by the 
exigencies or necessities of the estate. The pro­
hibition in section 6 of the Transfer of Property 
Act therefore, has no application as the transfer 
was not a mere right to sue and therefore the 
plaintiff's suit could not have been dismissed 
on that ground".
In Alamelu Ammal v. Krishna Chettv1 Satyanarayana Rao 
and Balakrishna Aiyar, JJ., had to consider a case where, 
on the death of a minor, the reversionary heirs of the 
minor had brought a suit for setting aside the alienation 
effected by the guardian of the minor. The suit was filed 
by the reversioners within twelve years of the date of the 
alienation but after the expiry of three years from the 
minor's death. The lower courts held that the suit was 
barred by limitation, because under section 6(3) of the 
Limitation Act of 1908 limitation had to be counted from 
the date of the death of the minor. The learned judges 
held that Article 44 would apply to the case and in comput­
ing the limitation section 6(3) should not be invoked. 
According to them the three-year period must be counted 
from the date when the minor would have attained majority 
had he not died. The reasoning of the learned judges was 
that a transferee or a legal representative of the minor 
acquired title to the property subject to the right of the 
minor's option being exercised within three years from the
date of the minor's attaining majority. After referring to
2
certain earlier decisions the learned judges observed i
r~AIR"T954 Mad " 595. 
2 Ibid, 587.
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MIn our opinion, the right which is being exercised 
by the legal representatives is the right of the 
minor to avoid the transfer, and stepping into 
the shoes of the minor he must exercise it within 
the same period which would have been allowed to 
a minor had he been alive till he attained majo­
rity. ... The same disability must therefore apply 
to persons claiming through the minor either as 
transferees or as legal representatives, and they 
must also exercise the option during that period, 
namely, within three years from the date when 
the minor would have attained majority had he 
been alive”.
The learned judges also observed that the right to
set aside an alienation for which Article 44 provided
the period of limitation was not a *personal privilege
conferred upon the minor under section 6* of the Limitation
Act. The views of this case were not accepted as correct
in Palani Goundan v. Vaniiakkal1 where it was thought that
the learned judges of Alamelu Ammal's case had merely assumed
without a detailed examination of the legal position that
a minor's right to set aside the guardian's alienation is
heritable and alienable, and that the learned judges dealt
only with a matter of limitation. Incidentally, the conflict
in judicial decisions regarding the computation of limitation
2
is now resolved by the provisions of Article 60 of the
1 AIR 1956 Mad476, 479.
2 Article 60 runs as followsi
MTo set aside a transfer of property 
made by the guardian of the ward --
(a) by the ward who has attained Three 
majority; years
(b) by the ward's legal 
representative --
(i) When the ward dies within
three years from the date Three 
of attaining majority; years
(ii) when the ward dies before Three 
attaining majority. years
When the ward 
attains majo­
rity.
When the ward 
attains majo­
rity.
When the ward 
dies M.
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Limitation Act 36 of 1963. This Article clearly provides 
for a suit to set aside a transfer of property made by 
the guardian of a ward not only by the ward himself after 
attaining majority, but also by the ward's legal represen­
tative in a case where a ward dies before attaining majo­
rity and also in a case where he dies within three years 
from the date of attaining majority. The right to sue is 
now clearly heritable.
Very recently in Amirtham Kudumban v. Sornam Kudumban1 
the following question was referred to a Full Bench of the 
Madras High Court for decision*
"Whether a transferee from a minor, after he
attained majority, can file a suit to set aside
the alienation made by the minor's guardian or
the said right is one to be exercised only by 
the minor?"
The facts of the case were that a father sold his
minor daughter's property which the latter inherited from
her deceased mother. On attaining majority the daughter
ignored the sale and herself executed a sale deed in favour
of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a suit to set aside
the previous sale and for the recovery of possession. The
learned judges of the Full Bench reviewed the earlier cases
and held that the words "any person claiming under the minor"
occurring in section 8(3) of the HMGA included any person
who derives from the minor the right to avoid the guardian's
alienations; he might have derived the right by inheritance,
under testamentary disposition, by transfer inter vivos 
or by devolution by law; but in all the cases he was a
1 (1977) 1 MLJ 1 (FB).
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person "claiming under the minor". The learned judges 
observed that the right to avoid a guardian's improper 
alienation was not a minor's personal right to sue, and 
therefore it did not come within the mischief of section 
6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. They pointed out 
that according to the plain meaning of section 8(3) of the 
HMGA a transferee from the minor could not be excluded from 
the ambit of this provision, and that when the sub-section 
referred to "any person claiming under the minor", it was 
presumed that the right to avoid the guardian's transfer 
was a derivative right claimed as such by anyone else from 
the minor. It was also pointed out that section 8(3) implied 
transferees as well as the legal representatives of the 
minor, and a transferee from a minor should not be excluded 
from the meaning of the words "any person claiming under 
the minor". Finally the learned judges observed that the 
right to set aside the alienation of a minor's property 
by the guardian was available under section 8(3) not only 
to the minor himself but also to any person claiming under 
him which included a transferee from the minor.
6. Meaning of the words 'void' and 'voidable*
In common parlance the word 'void' means an empty 
space, while in legal parlance, a nullity. In the eye of 
law a void transaction cannot be of any effect; it is non­
existent. Therefore it can be disregarded by the whole 
world. A voidable transaction, on the other hand, is effective
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in lav, but is defective in certain respects, and is 
therefore liable to avoidance by the persons who are 
affected by it. For example, a fraudulent contract which 
is not void, but voidable at the option of the person 
defrauded. In a void transaction neither party is contract­
ually bound, while in a voidable transaction both parties
are so bound, and one of them is empowered to disclaim
his obligation1. In Muralidhar v. International Film Co.
2Ltd. Sir George Rankin observed*
"The option which characterises a voidable contract 
is an option either to say 'it shall not be
enforceable at all' or to leave it as a good
contract enforceable by any party on the usual 
conditions. ... it is enforceable at the option 
of one party in the sense that that party may 
elect to treat it as not binding upon any party”.
In classifying agreements and showing their differences 
3
Salmond says s
"In respect of their legal efficacy agreements 
are of three kinds, being either valid, void 
or voidable. A valid agreement is one which is 
fully operative in accordance with the intent 
of the parties. A void agreement is one which 
entirely fails to receive legal recognition or 
sanction, the declared will of the parties being 
wholly destitute of legal efficacy. A voidable 
agreement stands midway between these two cases.
It is not a nullity, but its operation is condi­
tional and not absolute. By reason of some defect 
in its origin it is liable to be destroyed or 
cancelled at the option of one of the parties 
to it. On the exercise of this power the agreement
1 H.W.R. Wade, 'Unlawful administrative action* void or 
voidable?', in (1967) 83 LQR, 499 ff, and (1968) 84 LQR.
95 ff; S.N. Jain, 'Is an individual bound by an illegal 
executive order?', in (1974) 16/2 JILI, 322 ff.[Dr. Jain 
has evaluated Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujrat (1974)
2 SCC 121 with Professor Wade's materials. His article
is a condensed form of Wade's].
2 AIR 1943 PC 34, 39.
3 Jurisprudence (12th ed., 1966), 341.
<A
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not only ceases to have any efficacy, but is 
deemed to have been void ab initio. The avoidance 
of it relates back to the making of it. The hypo­
thetical or contingent efficacy which has hither­
to been attributed to it wholly disappears, as 
if it had never existed. In other words, a void­
able agreement is one which is void or valid at 
the election of one of the parties to it. ...
Void or voidable agreements may be classed toge­
ther as invalid**.
The relation between the words 'void* and 'voidable' 
is succinctly expressed by Pollock and Mulla in the following 
word1*
"Whenever one party to a contract has the option 
of annulling it, the contract is voidable* and 
when he makes the use of that option that agree­
ment becomes void".
. 2Again they said i
"The party entitled to set aside a voidable contract 
may affirm it if he thinks fit. That is involved 
in the conception of a contract being voidable".
6.1. Is the difference between 'void* and 'voidable* sharp?
If a contract is void, it is a nullity and there is
nothing to be affirmed or validated. The difference between
'void' and 'voidable' is very narrow, and may be wiped out
at the option of the parties entitled to exercise it. Chitty 
3says s
"A void contract is strictly a contradiction in 
terms because if an agreement is truly void it 
is not a contract. ... It produces no legal 
effects".
1 Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts (9th ed., 1972), 
456.
2 Ibid, 171.
3 Contract Vol. 1, 15.
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Stone, J., observed in Visweswara Rao v. Survarao1
that the difference between the terms 'void' and 'voidable'
was so little that the courts often overlooked it. According
to the learned judge even the Privy Council on certain 
2occasions had overlooked the strict import of these words.
Since in strict sense a thing cannot be void and valid 
at the same time, and since 'void* denotes a nullity for 
all, it is totally non-existent. But whenever the expression 
'void as against a person or group of persons' is used, it 
implies void at the instance of that person or group of 
persons. In other words, it is voidable; it has existence 
in the eyes of all; it will be effective unless set aside. 
For example, void as against K means that only K can treat 
it as void; in other words, K can avoid it. Strictly speak­
ing it is voidable at the option of K. Section 8(3) of the 
HMGA provides a clear example of a voidable transaction.
Instances are not rare where violations of mandatory 
provisions of statutes do not render them void; on the 
contrary, courts regard them as voidable. Crompton, J., 
said in Young v. Billiter in his interpretation of the 
provisions of a statutei
"The expression 'void as against the assignees* 
in section 59 of the 1 & 2 Viet. c. 110 [The 
Judgments Act 1838, sec. 59 (repealed; see now 
the Bankruptcy Act 1914, sec. 44)j, seems to 
me clearly to imply that the transaction is to 
be valid as against the insolvent so as to give
1 AIR 1936 Mad 440, 443.
2 Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh AIR 1917 PC 61; Lachman 
Prasad v. Sarnam Singh AIR 1917 PC 41.
3 (1860) 8 HL cas 682, 697; 11 ER 596, 602.
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the creditor a title until it is impeached by the 
subsequently appointed assignee. The transaction 
is to be good except against the title to arise 
in the assignee in the case of susequent insol­
vency" •
In Hughes v. Palmer1 Byles, J., observed!
"There are cases innumerable to shew that 'void' 
may mean 'voidable* or 'void*, at the election 
of the party contracted with, where otherwise 
the wrongful act of the other party would put 
an end to the covenant. ... It is past contro­
versy here, indeed it was admitted that 'void* 
must mean voidable so far as the nonpayment of 
the instalments is concerned. The bankrupt and 
his sureties covenant to pay the instalments, 
with a proviso that, in case of default, the 
deed, that is, the release, shall be void. That 
beyond all doubt must mean voidable at the elec­
tion of the creditors. Some of the acts contem­
plated are acts to which the debtor may or may 
not be a partys but the covenant must be read 
in the same sense in either event. The plain 
intention of the parties was that the creditors 
should not be bound by their releases unless 
the instalments were paid. I think it is impo­
ssible to read the word 'void* any otherwise 
than as voidable at the election of the creditors".
2In Re Brail, Ex parte Vorton Vaughan Williams, J., 
emphatically asserted*
"I have come to the conclusion that the word 'void' 
in section 47 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 [repealed; 
see now Bankruptcy Act 1914, sec. 42], means 
'voidable', and that, consequently, anyone who 
claims, under a settlement affected by this 
section, as a purchaser for valuable considerat­
ion without notice, has a good title as against 
the trustee in bankruptcy. It is quite plain that 
the word 'void* may mean 'voidable', and there 
are several reasons why it should receive that 
construction in this Act. The test, to my mind, 
is whether the object of public policy in view 
in this section requires the strict construction".
The mandatory form of a statutory provision need not 
necessarily indicate that any violation of it would imply a
1 (1865) 19 C B (NS) 393, 407-08; 144 ER 839, 845.
2 (1893) 2 QB 381, 384.
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nullification. Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(Act 5) of 1908 provides*
"No suit shall be instituted against the Govern­
ment or against a public officer in respect of 
any act purporting to be done by such public 
officer in his official capacity, until the 
expiration of two months next after notice in 
writing has been delivered to, or left at the 
office of and, in the case of a public officer, 
delivered to him or left at his office, stating 
the cause of action, the name, description and 
place of residence of the plaintiff and the 
relief which he claims; and the plaint shall 
contain a statement that such notice has been 
so delivered or left".
The language of the section shows that it is imper­
ative in its import and prohibitory in its expression. But 
the Privy Council held in Vellayan Chettiar v. Madras 
Province1*
"There is no inconsistency between the proposi­
tions that the provisions of the section are 
mandatory and must be enforced by the court 
and that they may be waived by the authority 
for whose benefit they are provided. ... There 
appears to their Lordships to be no reason why 
the notice required to be given under section 
80 should not be waived if the authority concerned 
thinks fit to waive it. It is for his protection 
that notice is required; if in the particular 
case he does not require that protection and 
says so, he can lawfully waive his right".
Again Rule 7(l) of Order 32 of the CPC provides!
"No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, 
without the leave of the court, expressly recorded 
in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or 
compromise on behalf of a minor with reference 
to the suit in which he acts as next friend or 
guardian".
1 AIR 1947 PC 197, 199.
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This rule is also imperative and prohibitory in its 
wording, but in Ganaadhar v. Dattatrava1 Gajendragadkar, J., 
with whom Vyas, J., concurred, held*
"An agreement which has been made without comply­
ing with the requirements of sub-rule (l) would 
be binding against all the parties except the 
minor* The minor is not bound by such an agreement 
and he can avoid it. ... It seems to us clear 
that the effect of the provisions of Rule 7 is 
to make the impugned agreement voidable at the 
option of the minor. Such an agreement is not 
void altogether because if it is held to be 
void, it would be a nullity and it would not 
bind any parties to the agreement".
Further section 29 of the GWA providesi
"Where a person ••• has been appointed or declared 
by the court to be guardian of the property of 
a ward, he shall not, without the previous per­
mission of the court, --
(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, 
gift, exchange or otherwise, ant part of 
the immovable property of his ward, or
(b ) ..........
But section 30 of the same Act provides that if a 
guardian alienates the minor's immovable property in con­
travention of the above section, such alienation would be 
voidable at the instance of any person affected thereby.
The interpretation of the above statutory provisions 
shows that the difference' between the words 1 'void' arid 
'voidable' is very narrow. The question whether the contra­
vention of a rule would lead to a total nullification of 
a transaction or only to an invalidation making it voidable 
at the option of the person prejudiced thereby, depends
1 AIR 1953 Bom 424, 425.
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not on the form but on the purpose of the enactment. If the 
provision is designed to promote public interests, its 
contravention would entail a nullification; but if the 
object is to promote private interests of individuals or 
group of individuals, its contravention would make the 
transaction voidable at the option of the person affected 
thereby1. How far can this criterion assist us in our 
guardianship problem? Guardianship, like marriage, partakes 
of both private and public significance. Where a de facto 
guardian alienates the property of a minor, the alienation 
in actual fact involves the interests of the minor alone 
and so the minor may either avoid or affirm it. Therefore 
if it adds to the minor's interests, directly or indirectly, 
and even if any statute calls it void, we may treat a de 
facto guardian's improper alienation as voidable with all 
the incidents of a voidable transaction.
6.2. Article 44 of the Limitation Act of 1908 or Article 60 
of the Limitation Act of 1963 if read in the light of 
the above discussion
From the foregoing discussion it would be seen that 
any attempt to strait-jacket the two terms, ‘void' and 
'voidable', would be impractical and illogical in cases 
where individual interests are involved. Therefore the 
question whether an unauthorised alienation of a minor's 
property by his guardian would be void or voidable, makes
1 W.F. Craies. Statute Law (London! 7th ed., 1971), 269;
P.B. Maxwell, interpretation of Statutes (London! 12th
ed., 1969), 328.
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little difference. When the minor alone is concerned with 
the limitation, it is up to him either to approve or dis­
approve it. The end should not guide the beginning, rather 
the beginning should indicate the end. My contention is 
that the right of approbating or reprobating must lie 
with the minor or be exercised on his behalf and this 
must be our guiding principle through the thick jungle 
of case-law.
7. Alienations by natural guardiansi void or voidable?
7.1. Alienations effected by the guardian specifically 
as guardian
From the basic rule that a guardian may alienate 
his minor ward’s property for the necessity or benefit of 
the latter, the courts have developed the principle that 
an alienation by a guardian, provided he has the capacity
to alienate under the personal law of the minor, is valid,
if it is for the necessity or benefit of the minor, and
if it is not, it is voidable. In Hindu law since Hunooman-
persaud's case an alienation of a minor’s property even 
by his de facto guardian has been recognised as valid, if 
made for the necessity or benefit of the minor; and the 
minor would be bound by such alienation. Such an extension 
is not however recognised in the case of Muslim minors. 
Their de facto guardians are, as seen in chapter 4, irra­
tionally denied this power, though the socio-economic 
condition of the minors of the Subcontinent demands it 
urgently.
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We have seen in chapters 2 and 4 the circumstances 
under which a natural guardian of a Hindu and Muslim minor 
may effect a valid alienation of the minor's property. If 
a natural guardian having authority to alienate the pro­
perty of a minor for proper purposes effects a transfer 
which is in excess of that authority, it is voidable.
When an alienation is voidable, the law of limitation 
requires that a suit must be brought within three years1, 
if the minor wants to set it aside. However much a guardian 
may have exceeded his powers or otherwise acted improperly, 
it would be considered acquiesced in by the minor with 
full knowledge of his rights and all the material facts 
connected with the transfer, unless it is challenged by
the minor, and he would be bound by it. Completed acts of
2
a guardian until avoided must be treated as valid • Follow-
3ing a number of their own cases the Madras High Court
4held in Arumuqam Pillai v. Panayadian Ambalam that a 
transfer by a guardian, however improper it might have 
been, was not a void transaction but only a voidable one.
1 Limitation Act of 1908, Article 44; Limitation Act of 
1963, Article 60; see also Ramphul Singh v. Pegnarain 
Singh (1881) 8 Cal 517; Ramansar Pandey v. Raghubar Jati 
(1883) 5 All 490; Bachchan Singh v. Kamta Prasad (1910)
32 All 392; Laxmava v. Rachappa AIR 1918 Bom 180; Ranga­
swami v. Marappa AIR 1953 Mad 230; Rabi Narayan v. Kanak 
Prova Debi AIR 1965 Cal 444; Hiralal Dayaram Patil v.
Bhikari Sampat Shinde (1971) 73 Bom LR 481.
2 Trevelyan, Minors, 198; Prosonna Nath Roy v. Afzolonnessa 
Begum (1878) 4 Cal 523, 525.
3 Ranga Reddi v. Narayana Reddi (1905) 28 Mad 423; Madugula
Latchiah v. Pally Mukka1inga (1907) 30 Mad 393; Kandaswami 
v. Irusappa (1917) 41 Mad 102; Savavadivelu v. Ponnammal
(1912) 22 MLJ 404; Satyalakshmi Narayana v. Jagannadham 
(1918) 34 MLJ 229.
4 (1920) 40 MLJ 475, 476.
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In Labha Mai v. Malak Ram1 dealing with an alienation by 
a mother which was found to be not supported by any 
necessity, Shadi Lai, C.J., observed as follows*
"Now, it is beyond dispute that the mother is, 
under the Hindu law, a guardian of the property 
of her minor sons; and a conveyance by her is 
not a void transaction but voidable at the 
instance of the minors. It is true that the 
courts below have held that the sale was not 
for necessity, but that finding does not affect 
the nature of the transaction, which should be 
treated as an unauthorised transfer by an autho­
rised guardian. If a sale is effected by a person 
who is not the minor's guardian either according 
to his personal law or by appointment by the 
court, such a sale is a nullity and does not 
affect the minor's property. If on the other 
hand, the sale is made by a natural guardian 
who goes beyond the scope of his authority the 
transaction cannot be regarded as a nullity 
and will bind the minor unless he succeeds in 
impeaching it within the period prescribed by 
law. There is ample authority for the view that 
an unauthorised alienation by a guardian recog­
nised by law is voidable and not void".
This decision was followed by another Division Bench
2of the Lahore High Court m  Khusiah v. Faiz Muhammad Khan 
where the court observed*
"An alienation by a natural guardian of the minor's 
property is a voidable and not a void transaction 
and the fact that it was not for necessity does 
not alter the nature of the transaction. In other 
words, it was an unauthorised transfer by an 
authorised guardian and the limitation to set 
aside such a transfer is prescribed by Article 44".
The Madras High Court has consistently held that an 
alienation by a natural guardian which is in excess of his
1 AIR 1925 Lah 619, 620.
2 AIR 1928 Lah 115, 116.
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1 . . 2 3powers, is only voidable . Similarly the Calcutta , Bombay
4and other High Courts also consider an improper alienation
of a natural guardian as voidable.
5 . . .In Rangaswami v. Marappa an unauthorised alienation
of a natural guardian by way of gift was considered as
voidable. In that case the mother of a minor son gifted
some property belonging to the minor to an unmarried
daughter of her husband's senior widow and the question
arose whether the minor was required to set aside such a
gift within the period mentioned under Article 44 of the
Limitation Act of 1908. The minor challenged the gift made
by his mother as void and not binding on him. Venkatarama
Aiyar, J., followed Palaniammal v. Kothandaraman and held
that though the gift was not binding on the minor, it was
nevertheless one which had to be set aside under Article 44
7
of the Limitation Act. The learned judge remarked i
"Under the law, when a natural guardian having 
authority to alienate the properties of the
1 Ramaswami v. Govindammal (1928) 56 MLJ 332; Satgur Prasad 
v. Hari Narain Das (1932) 62 MLJ 451; Palaniappa Goundan
v. Nallappa Goundan AIR 1951 Mad 817; Rangaswami v. Marappa 
AIR 1953 Mad 230; Adimoola Padayachi v. Pavadari Padayachi 
(1958) 2 MLJ 57; Koya Ankamma v. Kameswaramma (1934) 68 MLJ 
87; Sankaranarayana v. Kundasami (1956) 2 MLJ 411 (FB);
Janab Ha ii Abdul Hamid v. Sumsunnissa Begum (1967) 2 M U  
195; Mohamed Naziruddin v. Govindaraiulu (1971) 1 M U  28.
2 Sham Chandra v. Gadadhar (1911) 13 C U  277; Krishnadhan 
v. Bhagaban Chandra (1916) 34 IC 188; Brojendra Chandra 
Sarma v. Prosanna Kumar Dhar (1920) 24 CWN 1016, 1019;
Rabi Narayan v. Kanak Prova Debi AIR 1965 Cal 444.
3 Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna AIR 1920 Bom 1 (FB); Hiralal 
Dayaram Patil v. Bhikari Sampat Shinde (1971) 73 Bom LR 481.
4 Pran Nath v. Bal Kishan AIR 1959 Punj 313; Keluni Dei v. 
Kanhei AIR 1972 Ori 28; Santha v. Cherukutty AIR 1972 Ker 71.
5 AIR 1953 Mad 230.
6 AIR 1944 Mad 418.
7 AIR 1953 Mad 230, 231.
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ward for proper purposes effects a transfer 
which is in excess of that authority it cannot 
be put in the same position as an alienation by 
an unauthorised person. An unauthorised alie­
nation by a lawful guardian is only voidable 
and must be set aside within the time prescribed 
by Article 44, unlike an alienation by an unau­
thorised person, which is void under the law 
and does not require to be set aside under that 
Article".
The learned judge quoted extracts from the judgments 
of Labha Mai's and Khusiah's case and referring to their 
decisions observed1!
"We are not here concerned with a deed which is 
void under some other provision of law such as 
Transfer of Property Act or Registration Act 
in which case there is in existence no transfer 
of property and therefore, no question of setting 
aside such a transfer. But where the transfer
is operative and the question is whether it is
binding on the ward or not it has to be set aside 
within the time prescribed by Article 44".
In Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Jaga- 
2dish Chandra Sahoo the Calcutta High Court held that a 
transfer by way of gift of immovable property, on the 
basis of a deed of trust, belonging to two minor brothers,
by their mother as natural guardian during their minority
was not void ab initio, but was merely avoidable at the 
option of the minor or minors on attainment of majority.
But a different view was expressed by Ansari, J.,
,3 .
m  Subba Rao v. Ramamurti . Sitting with Subba Rao, C.J., 
the learned judge held that an alienation of a Hindu
1 AIR 1953 Mad 230, 232.
2 AIR 1960 Cal 546.
3 AIR 1958 AP 626.
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minor's property by way of gift was void as being beyond 
the competence of the guardian to make it. In that case 
the adoptive mother of a minor had executed a gift of a 
land in favour of her brother. The minor on attaining 
majority filed a suit for the recovery of possession of 
the property in the hands of his maternal uncle. It was 
urged before the court that the suit was barred by limita­
tion, being voidable and instituted more than three years 
after the minor had attained majority. But the learned 
judges arrived at their decision by observing that there 
was no semblance of authority for the natural guardian 
to confer a vested remainder in favour of a stranger. 
Although it was raised before the court that all unautho­
rised alienations by a lawful guardian were voidable only, 
the learned judges based their decision primarily on the
rulings of Luchmeswar Singh v. Chairman of Darbhanga Muni-
1 . 2 cipality and Rathinasabapathy v. Saraswathi Ammal • These
two cases could be distinguished from other cases,
The Privy Council decision in the first one was given in
the year in which the GWA was passed. The GWA provides in
its section 29 that a guardian appointed or declared by
the court may inter alia with the previous permission of
of the court transfer by gift any part of the immovable
property of his minor ward. The Privy Council decision
has lost its effect after the passing of the GWA, since
1 (1890) 17 IA 90 (PC).
2 AIR 1954 Mad 307.
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under the GWA it has been usually presumed that a natural 
guardian has all the powers which are provided under the 
different sections of the GWA to a guardian of property, 
if they are reasonable and proper for the realisation, 
protection or benefit of the property of the minor. There­
fore a natural guardian can make a reasonable gift for the 
'protection or benefit' of the minor's property; and as 
a gift made by a court-appointed guardian without the 
previous permission of the court is deemed under section
30 of the GWA as voidable, so also the High Courts of
1 2 3 4 5Calcutta , Bombay , Madras , Lahore and Allahabad begin
to look upon an unauthorised alienation by a natural
guardian as voidable. Wallace and Thiruvenkatachariar, JJ.,
0
of the Madras High Court in Ramaswami v. Govindammal and
Bennet and Iqbal Ahmed, JJ., of the Allahabad High Court
7m  Dipchand v. Munni Lai categorically stated that as 
Article 44 of the Limitation Act of 1908 applied to void­
able transfers, its application should not be confined to 
cases of transfers made by certificated guardians alone; 
it should apply to every case in which a minor on attaining 
majority impugned the transfer made by his natural guardian
1 Amar Chandra Chakravarty v. Sarodamoyee Debi AIR 1929 Cal 
787.
2 Kalu v. Barsu (1895) 19 Bom 803; Tatoba Ganu v. Tarabi 
AIR 1957 Bom 280.
3 Kandasami v. Irusappa (1917) 41 Mad 102.
4 Imperial Bank of India v. Maya Devi (1934) 16 Lah 714.
5 Saraswati Kuar v. Mahabir Prosad AIR 1928 All 476; Jagesor 
Pandey v. Deodat Pandey AIR 1920 All 476.
6 AIR 1929 Mad 313.
7 AIR 1929 All 879.
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as well. The old distinction between a transfer by gift 
and a transfer by sale or mortgage is gone, and it is 
bound to go'1'.
In Rathinasabapathv1s case, again, the property 
involved had been the ancestral joint family property and 
not the separate property of a minor. But for the purpose 
of limitation it is not necessary for a minor coparcener 
to set aside an alienation of the family property made by 
the father-manager or manager only within three years. The 
minor coparcener may ignore it, and a suit to recover posse­
ssion of the property is governed by Article 144 and not 
2Article 44 . It is all the same to treat the gift of a
coparcenary property as void or not, since in either case
the minor coparcener*s interest in the property is not
affected until the trespasser peaceably and uninterruptedly
keeps the property under his possession for the statutory
3 . . .period of twelve years . A Division Bench of the Madras 
High Court expressed in Eachan Neelakantan v. Kumarasami
4
Nadar that if the minor’s separate property was sold, the 
transaction would be governed by Article 44, but if it was 
a conveyance of joint family property by the manager and 
the minor was made eo nomine a party, the transaction would 
be governed by Article 144.
1 Derrett, Critique, 187 para 238.
2 Hanumantappa v. Dundappa AIR 1934 Bom 234; Kaka v. Fakir 
Chand AIR 1934 Lah 601; Chhaju Mai v. Multan Singh AIR 1936 
Lah 996; Baidi Singh v. Singrai Murmu AIR 1962 Ori 170.
3 Limitation Act of 1908, Articles 126 and 144; Limitation 
Act of 1963, Articles 65 and 109.
4 AIR 1964 Mad 353.
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The decision in Subba Rao*s case cannot be accepted 
as the correct statement of law. An alienation by a lawful 
guardian of the property of a minor in excess of his 
powers as guardian should be treated differently from an 
improper alienation by a Hindu widow or the manager of a 
joint undivided Hindu family for the purpose of limitation 
law. The transfer by a legal guardian is not void as against 
the minor, but only voidable at the instance of the minor 
and he must set aside the unauthorised transfer within 
the three years limited by Article 44 of the Limitation 
Act of 1908 or Article 60 of the Limitation Act of 1963.
The learned judges in Subba Rao's case failed to make the 
distinction between an unauthorised alienation by a lawful 
guardian and an alienation by an unauthorised person. This 
decision came for consideration before a Division Bench 
of the Kerala High Court in Beeyyathumma v. Moidin Haii1 
where the learned judges did not approve of the decision 
and held that a transaction by a legal guardian, which was 
not beneficial to the minors or for which there was no 
justifiable necessity, was not void but only voidable 
requiring to be set aside under Article 44.
7.2. Post-1956 natural guardians* alienations
As said earlier in chapter 2 the HMGA has put double 
restraint on the powers of a natural guardian, namely,
1 (1958) KLT 602.
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first, he must obtain previous permission of the court 
for any transfer of the minor's property, and secondly, 
his acts must be for the benefit of the minor. If he does 
not obtain the first,his alienation would be voidable under 
section 8(3), and if his act does not comply with the second# 
he would not obtain the first. By the provisions of its 
section 8 the HMGA has increased the number of litigations 
by at least one if not more, once for permission, if it is 
contested, and again for challenging the transfer, if and 
when the parties desire it. Consideration of benefit would 
arise in both cases. Acts which a natural guardian is allowed 
to do under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 8 would be 
voidable under sub-section (3) of the same section, unless 
done with the previous permission of the court. Even if 
the transfer is found for the benefit of the minor, the 
minor may avoid it when it is done without the permission 
of the court. The well meaning intention of a natural 
guardian would not save an improper alienation if the minor 
wants to avoid it. The authority of a natural guardian even 
to transfer the minor's property for legal necessity has
been taken away by the HMGA. The courts have understood the
1 . . 2Act in that way . In Prabhakaran Pillai v. Kumara Pillai
the Kerala High Court held that a minor was entitled to 
avoid a transfer effected by his guardian without the prior 
permission of the court, although the transaction was found
1 Ramchandra v. Manikchand AIR 1968 MP 150, 155; Radhesham 
v. Kiran Bala AIR 1971_Cal 341.
2 (1971) KLT (SN) 32.
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to be beneficial to the minor. Possibly there is little 
scope for Derrett's query'll "Does the rule of Hunooman­
persaud 's case survive the enactment of the HMGA, at least 
so far as alienees from guardians are concerned?" The 
equitable rule of Hunoomanpersaud*s case has been abolished 
by the HMGA as interpreted by the above courts. The right 
of a bona fide incumbrancer or purchaser for value without 
notice would now be affected, for want of court's permission.
He is only entitled to get back the money he paid for the
2 . . .mortgage or sale of the land . This abolition would no
doubt create hardship to the natural guardians and ultimately
the minors. Derrett who knows more than any other the
different social structures, the socio-economic condition
and the mental set-up of the people of the Subcontinent,
and who is much acquainted with its nervous judiciaries
for their unsocial habit of interpreting statutes strictly
3
to the letter, has expressed :
"The rule in Hunoomanpersaud's case is of such 
obvious utility, and has stood the test of time 
so well, that one can hardly imagine why it 
should have been abolished in our present context. 
HMGA ... section 8(3) provides ... that disposals 
in contravention of section 8(1) or (2) are void­
able 'at the instance of the minor or any person 
claiming under him'. Are we to understand from 
this that the defendant-alienee cannot plead in 
his defence that, though there might turn out 
to have been no such justification as comes within 
section 8(1) and (2) (e.g. land was sold without 
the permission of the court), he is protected 
by having made sufficient bona fide enquiry into 
the existence of justification, had acted honestly,
1 Derrett, Critique, 191 para 244.
2 Prabhakaran Pillai v. Kumara Pillai (1971) KLT (SN) 32.
3 Derrett, Critique, 191-92 para 244.
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and consulted the minor’s interests but had 
been deceived (e.g. by being shown a forged 
court order purporting to authorise the sale)?
In a case where the alienee has used every 
care are his rights to be postponed to those 
of the minor in every possible context?”
As the Madras, Calcutta and Kerala High Courts have 
already held that the HMGA has taken away the natural 
guardian's authority to transfer for legal necessity, there 
is hardly anything into which an alienee would make a bona 
fide enquiry. No doubt, this is a 'considerable departure 
from the previous law', but nothing could be done without 
an amendment of the section itself. It would have been nice 
if the Indian judiciary had worked according to the follow­
ing suggestion of Derrett'*'i
"Altogether it seems better to believe that 
Parliament intended that in any event alienations 
of immovable property should be upheld, even if 
the provisions of section 8(2) were broken, 
where the alienee could prove that he had made 
sufficient bona fide enquiry and had been deceived".
Alas, there is every doubt that the judiciary would 
ever do it.'
7.3. Alienations effected not as guardian
Sometimes a natural guardian may alienate the minor's 
property in his own personal capacity, as if he were the 
real owner of the property. In such a case the alienation 
would be void and the minor would not be bound by such
1 Critique, 192 para 244.
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alienation. Mulla says1!
"No act done by a person who is the guardian of 
a minor binds the minor, unless the act was done 
by him in his capacity of guardian. It is a 
question of fact in each case whether a particular 
act done by a person was done in his capacity 
of guardian or on his own behalf and on his own 
account. In the former case, the act binds the 
minor, provided it was otherwise within the 
power of the guardian? in the latter case, it 
does not. The mere fact that the name of the 
minor is not mentioned in a contract, or in a 
deed of sale or mortgage, is not conclusive 
proof that the transaction was not entered into 
on behalf of the minor".
?Derrett observes s
"... if the alienation is a transfer in assertion 
of a hostile title, for example as if the property 
were his or her own, or where property in which 
the minor has an interest is alienated by the 
guardian otherwise than as guardian, or gratui­
tously or with a fictitious consideration, the 
transaction is void, this statute is not called 
into play, and the minor or his heirs may ignore 
it as an absolute nullity until a title to it 
is perfected by adverse possession on the part 
of the possessor, who is, of course, a mere 
trespasser".
Where there is an alienation of a minor's property
by his guardian the minor becomes eo nomine a party to
that contract, but if the guardian alienates the property
under an assertion of a hostile title the minor does not
become a party to that alienation, because the guardian
then acts in his own personal character and not in the
character of a guardian representing the minor. Derrett 
3
has said that "it will never be presumed that the guardian 
assumed proprietorship if his action can possibly be
1 Hindu law (14th ed., 1974), 583 sec, 529.
2 Introduction, 82-83 para 105.
3 Critique, 189 para 241.
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construed more favourably to him". It should be followed 
with caution. The courts should not extend their presump­
tion too far^as the Bombay High Court once did in Murari v. 
Tayana1. In that case the mother of a minor executed a 
sale deed in her own name without mentioning the name of 
the minor in the deed. The court held that though the 
sale deed did not purport to be on behalf of the minor 
it would nevertheless be binding on him as it was the 
intention of the mother to deal with the interest of the 
minor. The court put reliance on decisions in which alie­
nations by managers of joint Hindu families were upheld 
when they were for proper purposes. The correctness of
this decision was doubted by the Madras High Court in 1953
2m  Rangaswami v. Marappa . The Bombay High Court itself
even did not follow this decision in its subsequent cases.
3Thus in Nathu v. Balwantrao where the mother alienated 
a property on the footing that it belonged to her and not 
to the minor, and with the sale proceeds discharged debts 
binding on the minor, when the minor after attaining majo­
rity challenged the alienation the court held that the sale
4 . .was not binding on him. In Balwant Singh v. Clancy a similar 
matter came before the Privy Council. Although Balwant 
Singh*s case related to the powers of a manager of a joint 
Hindu family, the High Courts began mostly to follow this
1 (1896) 20 Bom 286.
2 AIR 1953 Mad 230.
3 (1903) 27 Bom 390.
4 (1912) 39 IA 109 (PC).
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decision in guardianship cases. The facts show that the 
elder of two brothers asserted that their family estate 
was impartible and as such descended to him as absolute 
owner and that his brother was entitled only to an allowance 
for maintenance. In the assumed position of the absolute 
owner of the impartible estate he purported to mortgage 
certain villages belonging to the family to secure sums 
of money borrowed and applied (even) in discharge of the 
debts contracted by his father. The question of these debts 
being binding on the younger brother under joint-family 
law was not pursued. The younger brother also signed the 
mortgage deed but it was found that at the time of the 
transaction he was a minor. It was contended on behalf of 
the mortgagee that in making the mortgage the elder brother 
must be deemed to have acted as the manager of the family 
for the benefit and protection of the estate and that con­
sequently the younger brother*s share in the family pro­
perties would be bound by the mortgage whether or not the 
latter was of full age at the time of the transaction.
Their Lordships rejected this contention on the ground 
that the elder brother could not (on the facts as proved) 
be supposed in the circumstances of the case to have acted 
as the manager of the joint family. This Privy Council 
decision was followed by the Madras High Court in Ammani
Ammal v. Ramaswami Naidu1 and the Allahabad High Court in
2
Nandan Prasad v. Abdul Aziz . Referring to these two cases
1 (1919) 37 MLJ 113.
2 (1923) 45 All 497.
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Patanjali Sastri, J., in Muthiah Chettiar v. Ravalu Avvar1 
remarkedi
"In all these cases it was observed that the 
transferor was really asserting an absolute 
title to the property in himself adversely 
to another person and could not, therefore, 
be considered as having represented that other 
person in making the transfer, for the position 
assumed by the former was quite inconsistent 
with any intention to act on behalf of the 
latter whose interest in the property transferred 
he was repudiating".
2In Rangaswami v. Marappa where a minor's mother 
executed a deed of gift of the property inherited by her 
minor son from his father in favour of the daughter of 
her co-widow out of affection, the court found tha alie­
nation made not as a guardian but in assertion of a hostile 
title. The alienation being void, the court held that there 
was no question of any election to affirm or disaffirm it, 
and that the son would not be precluded from recovering 
the property merely because he attested the deed.
Having dual personality  one, his own personal
identity, and the other, as representative of the minor --
the validity of a guardian's alienation, as seen above,
3
depends upon the capacity in which he works. Derrett has 
rightly said that "in a great many cases the careless alienee 
may not know whether the guardian acted irrespective of 
his powers ... or outside his powers ...". Section 8(3) 
has not changed the position; it has not relieved the 
alienees from the evils of being careless. The section
1 (1943) 2 MLJ 548.
2 AIR 1953 Mad 230.
3 Critique, 188-89 para 241.
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says that an alienation made without the previous permi­
ssion of the court would be voidable when the natural 
guardin is acting in his representative capacity. It 
has not said anything what would happen if he acts in 
his personal capacity. So the pre-HMGA situation remains 
and the alienees should be on their guard.
8. Alienations by de facto guardiansi void or voidable?
8.1. Pre-1956 alienations
Earlier in chapter 3 we have seen that in Hindu law1
the de facto guardian of a minor may alienate the minor's
property in case of necessity or for the benefit of the
latter; and in this respect his powers are the same as
2those of a legal guardian. In Ramaswamy v. Kasinatha a
Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed;
"A de facto guardian is under the Hindu law in 
the same positiorn as the de jure guardian so far
at least as acts done by him for the benefit of
the minors are concerned and as regards such 
acts the same test is to be applied as would be
applied in case of an alienation by a legal
guardian".
Indeed, started with a Privy Council decision and 
reasserted by a Federal Court decision at an interval of 
ninety-four years de facto guardianship has proved its 
necessity to the society, and the assignment of powers 
equal to that of a natural guardian does not seem to have 
been unjustified.
1 Muslim law does not allow a de facto guardian to 'inter- 
meddle' with a minor's property. See Imambandi v. Mutsaddi 
(1918) 23 CWN 50(PC).
2 AIR 1928 Mad 226.
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As seen already, an improper or unauthorised alie­
nation of a natural guardian is voidable and not void.
Would the same follow in the case of a de facto guardian's 
unauthorised alienations? In the 10th edition of his book 
Mulla says1;
"An alienation by a de facto guardian, which is 
neither for necessity nor for the benefit of 
the estate of the minor, is not void, but only 
voidable, and it may therefore be ratified on 
the minor attaining majority".
Derrett in his Introduction to Modern Hindu Law has
. . . . . . 2not specifically said that it is voidable. He has observed ;
"Where the alienation by the de facto guardian 
was unjustified it was called 'void in toto'. 
but was really inchoate. If the property were 
in the minor's possession when he attained 
majority he had only to repudiate the transaction 
by notice, or by conduct inconsistent with the 
alienee's title. If it were out of his possession, 
as is usually the case, he might sue for the 
alienation to be set aside, for a declaration 
that it did not bind him, and for possession".
In this regard the courts are not uniform in their
decisions. It must be emphasised that the de facto guardian
acted in each case as guardian. Much of the confusion
was caused by the reliance of the courts on the Privy
. 3Council decision in Mata Din v. Ahmad All • Both the Bench 
and the Bar of the Bombay High Court invariably cited in 
their judgments or arguments, as the case may have been, 
the said Privy Council decision whenever any case for 
setting aside an alienation of a de facto guardian came
1 Hindu Law, 601.
2 Introduction, 87-88 para 114.
3 (1912) 16 CWN 338 (PC).
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before the court* None of them considered that the Privy 
Council case was a Muslim law case, and that there was 
difference between the powers of a Muslim de facto guardian 
and a Hindu de facto guardian! In respect of a minor's 
property the former is a 'wholly unauthorised person', 
while the latter is, though not an authorised, a recognised 
person* What is void in the case of a Muslim de facto 
guardian, is only voidable in the case of a Hindu de facto 
guardian.' If Article 44 of the Limitation Act does not 
have any application in the case of an alienation by the 
former, it may have its application in the case of an 
application by the latter.* Since Article 44 was not applied 
by the Privy Council in the case of the de facto guardian 
in Mata Din's case, the courts started not to apply it in 
the case of any de facto guardian. And the acts of de facto 
guardians which ought to have been voidable because they 
were done in excess of their recognised authority, began 
to be looked upon as void requiring not to be set aside 
by the minors. Indeed the whole confusion started from the 
use of the words 'unauthorised person* in the case of a
de facto guardian in the Privy Council decisions in Mata
l 2 . . . .Din's and Imambandi's case, and their blind application
by unconcious busy judges in the case of Hindu de facto
guardians. This resulted in the anomalous situation that
in some cases the courts began to assess the validity of
1 (1912) 16 CWN 338, 345.
2 (1918) 23 CWN 50, 59.
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a de facto guardian's act not from the competence of the 
guardian but from the applicability of the limitation 
Article to his act. The unwisdom of this is apparent.
In Balappa Dundappa v. Chanbasappa1 a step-mother 
sold the mortgaged lands of a Hindu minor son. The minor 
on attaining majority challenged the sale on the ground 
that it was not for his benefit. The trial and the first 
appellate courts dismissed the suit as being time-barred 
under Article 44 of the Limitation Act of 1908. On second 
appeal the case came before the Bombay High Court where 
the question for decision was whether Article 44 would 
apply to the circumstances of the case, Scott, C.J., follow­
ing Mata Din's case reversed the decisions of the lower 
courts, and held that Article 44 had no application to the 
case of a de facto guardian wholly unauthorised to effect 
a transfer. The learned Chief Justice did not consider the 
competence of a Hindu de facto guardian.
. 2In Malkariun Annarao v. Sarubai Shivyocri without 
much consideration Divatia, J., unconvincingly came to find 
an unauthorised alienation by a de facto guardian as void.
He observed*
"In the case of a person who is not a manager but 
a 'de facto' guardian it has been held by a full
bench of our High Court in --  Tulsidas v. Raisingji
[AIR 1933 Bom 15 (FB)] that such guardian can 
validly sell the minor's property only for his 
benefit or legal necessity. It would therefore 
be void if no legal necessity was proved. It is 
thus quite clear that if such alienation is made 
either by a manager of a Hindu family or a de facto
1 (1915) 17 Bom LR 1134.
2 AIR 1943 Bom 187.
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guardian of the minor's interest in the property, 
it is not voidable but void in its inception.
If the alienation is made by a natural guardian 
or a guardian appointed by the court, then only 
is it required to be avoided within three years 
attaining majority".
In Tattya v. Rabha1 where the younger brother impugned 
the alienation of his interest in the joint family property 
effected by the elder brother as de facto guardian, a 
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed*
"Apart from authorities, it seems to us that an 
alienation by a 'de facto' guardian of the minor's 
property without justifying necessity must be 
held to be void 'ab initio' ... As stated by 
their Lordships of the Privy Council in the 
decision under Mahomedan law (Mata Din's case) 
the *de facto* guardian is nothing more than 
an intermeddler not deriving any authority for 
the alienation either by natural relationship 
with the minor or legal authority from appoint­
ment by a court. There seems no reason why in 
such a case the minor should be held bound by 
the transaction which is not for his benefit 
and has been entered into by a person who has 
no semblance of authority to deal with the minor's 
property".
A similar view had been taken by a Division Bench
2of the Allahabad High Court m  Dip Chand v. Munni Lai .
In that case the property of a minor was transferred by 
a de facto guardian. The court held that the transaction 
was void ab initio and it was not necessary for the minor 
in order to recover possession of the property to have 
the transfer set aside. In this case it should be noticed 
that none of the cases referred to in the judgment dealt 
with de facto guardianship.
1 AIR 1953 Bom 273, 276.
2 AIR 1929 All 879.
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The Madras High Court meanwhile rightly considered 
an improper alienation by a de facto guardian as voidable. 
In Seetharamamma v. Appiah1 the court rationalistically 
compared the powers of a de facto guardian with that of 
a legal guardian, and held that as the powers of a natural 
and de facto guardian are similar a transaction entered 
into by a de facto guardian not for necessity was only 
voidable at the option of the minor. In Adeyya v. Govindu 
where the case involved two mortgages of the same property 
Curgenven, J., agreeably remarked*
"If a de facto guardian, equally with a de jure 
guardian, can alienate for necessity, it is not 
very easy to perceive why, if not so supported, 
the one should be only voidable and the other 
void. Even to alienate for necessity connotes 
some power to deal with the property and indeed 
not only is such a power recognised in a de facto 
guardian but the view seems to be that in all 
such dealings no distinction can be drawn between 
the powers of the two classes of guardians".
The liberal views as expressed in the above two cases
were unfortunately not maintained in subsequent cases of
this High Court. A restricted meaning was attached to the
3
word *voidable*. Thus m  Purushotama v. Brundavana Ramesam, 
J., classified the suits brought by persons to set aside 
alienations by their guardians during their minority into 
the following three categories*
(1) where guardians are de jure guardians*
(2) where alienations are made by de facto guardians* 
and
1 AIR 1926 Mad 457, 459.
2 AIR 1931 Mad 274, 276.
3 AIR 1931 Mad 597, 598.
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(3) where the alienations are made by persons who 
pretend to be guardians though they are not the 
real guardian and are only intermeddlers just 
for the purpose of the transaction.
The learned judge observed that alienations which 
were made by a de facto guardian during the minority of 
of a minor, were not void but voidable. If they were for 
justifiable necessity, they could be upheld wholly or 
partially. Their voidability was allegedly analogous to 
the voidability of a widow's alienation which could be 
ignored by reversioners, and a suit could be brought within 
twelve years under the general law of limitation1. It was 
further observed that the word 'voidable' in such cases
should not be used in the same sense as it was used in the
2 . 3law of contracts . In Bapayya v. Pundankakshayya Wadsworth,
C.J., and Patanjali Sastri, J., held a similar view. The
4learned judges remarked i
"The test of void or voidable is not always deci­
sive on the question of liability of mesne 
profits. ... While an alienation by a de facto 
guardian for necessity has been held to bind 
the minor, ..• he need not sue to set aside an 
alienation without necessity by such a person 
within three years of attaining majority, but 
can sue for possession treating it as a nullity 
just like a reversioner. ... That is to say, no 
improper alienation by a de facto guardian is 
binding on the minor until it is set aside, 
although it may be voidable in the sense that 
he may elect either to ratify it or avoid it 
by treating it as a nullity".
1 On this point the learned judge referred to his own 
decision in In re Appavu Nalcken AIR 1931 Mad 377.
2 In the matter of Arithalincra Tevan AIR 1928 Mad 986.
3 (1946) Mad 648.
4 Ibid, 656-658.
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The unfortunate 'turn-about' created in Bapayya's 
case is not unconnected with the extremely unsuitable 
analogy with the case of a widow's alienation of the estate 
she herself fully represented in her lifetime, and the 
mischievous words have been underlined by me above. An 
alienation by a de facto guardian was further called 'void' 
in Rangaswami v. Marappa1 in contradistinction to voidable 
alienation by a lawful guardian. The slide into error was 
steep.
2But in Palani Goundan v. Vamiakkal the Madras High 
Court seems to have reverted to its earlier decisions. 
Without distinguishing the previous cases of their High 
Court Govinda Menon and Ramaswami, JJ., happily held that 
when an alienation was made by a de facto guardian osten­
sibly for necessity or for the benefit of the minor, it 
was only voidable at the instance of the minor who could 
repudiate it or more formally challenge it by bringing a 
suit either through a next friend during his minority or 
after attaining majority within the period of limitation 
allowed by law.
3Recently:in Ranganatha Gounder v. Kuppuswami Naidu 
Ismail. J., treated the alienation of a de facto guardian 
as void. But the case could be distinguished; the learned 
judge in that case assumed that a de facto guardian had 
no power of alienation; the HMGA had taken away all his
1 AIR 1953 Mad 230.
2 AIR 1956 Mad 476.
3 (1976) 2 MLJ 128.
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powers. He observed1!
"The further effect of this Act is that it has 
taken away the power of any de facto guardian 
to deal with the property of a Hindu minor, 
which power was available to a de facto guar­
dian under the prior Hindu law in certain 
stated circumstances. ... Consequently, ... 
the alienation ... by the sixth respondent 
acting as the guardian of her minor children, 
is wholly void, and, therefore, is not binding 
on the minor children".
The alienation of a de facto guardian was not recognised 
even if that was for the necessity or. benefit of the minor.
In such a case it is not unlikely that a de facto guardian's 
alienation would be void as it is considered in the case 
of a Muslim de facto guardian. But if the de facto guardian 
is still considered to possess his pre-1956 powers, his 
alienation would be voidable.
The Patna High Court regarded the de facto guardian's
improper alienations as voidable in the restricted sense.
.. 2 . 3Relying on Tulsidas v. Raisingn and Seetharamamma v. Appiah
4Chatterji and Beevor, JJ.,in Kailash Chandra v. Raiani Kanta 
held that if an alienation by a de facto guardian was not 
for the benefit of the minor, it was not binding on the 
latter; but if he chose he could ratify it. Chatterji, J., 
erroneously, it is submitted, observed that it would be 
unjustified to extend the analogy that a de facto guardian 
under Hindu law was in the same position as a de jure 
guardian so far as acts done for the minor's benefit, to
1 (1976) 2 MLJ 128, 131.
2 AIR 1933 Bom 15 (FB).
3 AIR 1926 Mad 457.
4 AIR 1945 Pat 298.
517
cases where the alienation by a de facto guardian was not 
for the benefit of the minor. The learned judge further 
observed1*
"The distinction between the powers of the two 
classes of guardian lies in the fact that while 
the de jure guardian is under the law clothed 
with authority to deal with the minor's property, 
the de facto guardian is not clothed with similar 
authority, though if the latter alienates the 
minor's property for his benefit, the court will 
uphold the transaction. In the case of an alie­
nation by a de jure guardian, not for the benefit 
of the minor, the guardian acts in excess of 
his authority derived under the law, whereas in 
the case of a similar alienation by a de facto 
guardian, his act is wholly unauthorized. In the 
latter case, however, the minor may choose to 
ratify the transaction though it is not binding 
on him".
In the matter of a de facto guardian's improper alie­
nation the Calcutta High Court followed the Patna High Court.
2In Pachu v. Hnshikesh Banerjee, J., observed that a de
facto guardian's unauthorised alienations were voidable
not in the sense that they would be binding on the minor,
but in the sense that he could ratify them. A similar view
3was held by the Lahore High Court also •
The whole subject of alienation of a minor's property 
by his de facto guardian had, however, been exhaustively 
and authoritatively dealt with and the entire case law 
had been reviewed by the learned judges of the Indian
Federal Court in their individual judgments in Sriramulu v.
4Pundarikakshayya . In the opinion of the learned judges
1 AIR 1945 Pat 298, 300.
2 AIR 1960 Cal 446.
3 Tapassi Ram v. Ra ia Ram AIR 1930 Lah 136.
4 AIR 1949 FC 218.
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the dealing of a de facto guardian with the estate of a 
Hindu minor by way of sale or mortgage would be regarded 
not as void altogether but voidable at the instance of 
the minor, and the same tests would be applied to deter­
mine the validity of such sale or mortgage as are applied 
in the case of a de jure guardian's sale or mortgage. Yet 
this admittedly long case has not exercised the influence 
equal to the pernicious influence of Mata Din's case.
From the decisions of different High Courts three 
views emerge, Viz., first, improper alienations of de facto 
guardians are wholly void (.') ; secondly, such alienations 
are voidable and required to be set aside under Article 44; 
and thirdly, they are voidable in a restricted sense, that 
is, if the minor wants, they can be ratified, but they are 
never required to de set aside. The first and third views 
maintain a discrimination between the competency of a de 
facto and a de jure guardian. But such discrimination was 
never envisaged in the decision in Hunoomanpersaud's case.
In tracing the true scope of the decision in Hunoo­
manpersaud 's case Mahajan, J., observed1*
"Relations under Hindu law have the right to be 
appointed as guardians by the court. They are 
not in a position of utter stranger. The position 
therefore is that if such persons to whom the 
law including the statute shows preference in 
the matter of appointment of guardianship 
without formally getting themselves appointed 
by the court, assume, out of affection, charge 
of the estate of a minor and take upon themselves
1 Sriramulu v. Pundarikakshayya AiR 1949 Fc 21b, 202-53.
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management of it, pay revenues, realize rents, 
locate tenants, maintain the minor and do all 
other acts of management and the courts and 
other relations stand by and recognize them 
as such, should they be treated as officious 
intermeddlers with the estate? Can they not 
be aptly and appositely described as de facto 
guardians of minor's person and de facto managers 
of his estate? It was the position of such 
managers that was recognized in Hunoomanpersaud 
Pandev's case [(1856) 6 MIA 393”|, and their 
acts in the management of the estate, provided 
they were for the protection of the estate or 
for the benefit of the minor's estate, were 
recognized as valid, the test being necessity 
and not the authority that they possessed".
The Mitakshara texts of verses 1.1.27 to 1.1.29 
and also other sastric verses of Bri. XI. 50, Manu VIII.
167, Nar. I. 12, Vish. VI. 38-39 and Katya. 542-543 would 
show that under the Hindu system persons having no lawful 
authority or title could effect sales, mortgages and gifts 
of property belonging to others in certain emergent 
situations. This kind of power is wholly unknown in other 
systems of jurisprudence. Probably for this reason de facto 
guardians in other systems are not allowed to handle minors' 
property. The helplessness of Indian judges is therefore 
understandable. In Hindu law a de facto guardian cannot 
be said to be without any legal coverage, but it lacked 
the protection, the aegis, of English law, the Indian 
judiciary's constant prop. In the case of minors it is 
their necessity, and not their relationship that authorises 
a person to alienate their property; it is not the father- 
and-son relationship that determines the validity of a
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father's transfer of his minor son's property, it is the 
necessity of the son that determines it* The same is the 
case when it is done by others. In Hindu law the authority 
of both a de facto and de jure guardian is derived from 
necessity, and for this reason where there is necessity 
the validity of acts of both of them is recognised. It is 
not correct as the courts usually say that one has legal 
sanction and the other has not. If the courts consider 
legal competency as the only point of discrimination 
between the two classes of guardian, and certainly there 
is no other discriminating ground, they should place both 
at par.
The decisions of the two Privy Council Muslim cases,
.1 . .2 viz., Mata Din v. Ahmad All and Imambandi v. Mutsaddi ,
of the early 20th century have greatly influenced the
courts to forget the true character of a de facto guardian
in Hindu law, and indeed the general wording of the judgment
of Mata Din's case is bound to produce such a situation
unless the judge is conscious about the religion of his
case. Unscrupulous pleaders could deceive busy judges by
simply quoting the words of the Advice to His Majesty.
In Hunoomanpersaud*s case the mother of the minor did not
ostensibly act either as natural or legal guardian but she
intruded upon the estate and managed it as if she were a
1 (1912) 16 CWN 338 (PC).
2 (1918) 23 CWN 50 (PC).
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guardian of the minor's property or manager of the same.
The Privy Council practically uses the words 'guardian* 
and 'manager of the property of an infant heir' in the 
same sense. Courts have adopted this principle for a long 
time and have recognised the powers of a de facto guardian. 
Though it may be that the powers of a de facto guardian 
are somewhat limited and qualified, it does not follow 
that transfers effected by him are ever void. In Imambandi's 
case the Privy Council held that under Muslim law a de facto 
guardian of the person or property of a minor had no power 
to convey to another any right or interest in immovable 
property which the transferee could enforce against the 
minor. This decision was according to Muslim law; the parties 
were Muslims; and the authorities cited were Muslim. So 
this decision should not be referred to or followed in the 
case of a Hindu de facto guardian who has an acknowledged 
traditional authority to deal with a minor's property. But 
in numerous law reports it would be seen that this case, 
since it is a Privy Council case, has been considered to 
determine the authority of a Hindu de facto guardian. Again, 
in Mata Din's case the Privy Council held that the provi­
sions of Article 44 of the Limitation Act of 1908 had no 
application to a sale effected not by a guardian, 'but by 
a wholly unauthorised person'. In Hindu law a de facto 
guardian, as seen above, is not an unauthorised person 
like a Muslim de facto guardian. Although statute has not
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recognised him, tradition has long acknowledged him.
We have seen earlier how the Bombay High Court followed 
it. So on the basis of Muslim cases of the Privy Council 
a Hindu de facto guardian should not be called an 
unauthorised person. Thus the observations made in Hindu 
cases in which de facto guardians are looked upon as 
unauthorised persons are open to doubt1. The unholy differ­
entiation that courts have forged between a de facto and 
a de jure guardian in the application of Article 44 should 
go, and unauthorised alienations of both the classes should 
be treated as voidable. The alienations made by a de facto 
guardian are to be treated as on a par with those made by 
a de jure guardian. If they lack justification, they are 
in both cases voidable. And when they are voidable, the 
application of Article 44 is an inescapable corollary. It 
cannot be said that alienations made by de jure guardians
are within the Article 44 and those made by de facto
2 3guardians are not • In Fakirappa Limanna v. Lumanna shah,
J., laid down that all avoidable transactions should be
set aside on the principle laid down before Mata Din*s
4 . . 5case in Malkar iun v. Narhari and Khiaraimal v. Daim .
If that is still to be followed then Article 144 cannot
be applied to suits to set aside voidable alienations?
1 See the comments of Parthasarathi, J., in Kasturi v.
S.V. Rao AIR 1970 AP 440, 445.
2 cf. Kasturi v. S.V. Rao AIR 1970 AP 440; Aswini Kumar 
v. Fulkumari Dassi (1972) 77 CWN 349, 354.
3 AIR 1920 Bom 1 (FB).
4 (1900) 25 Bom 337 (PC).
5 (1904) 32 Cal 296 (PC).
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Article 44 would apply in the same way as it was done in 
the case of legal guardians.
In Palaniappa Goundan v. Nallappa Goundan Viswanatha 
Sastri, J., even held that the word 'guardian' in Article 
44 of the Limitation Act must be interpreted as meaning 
only a lawful guardian and not as including a de facto
guardian of a Hindu minor, and in so arriving the learned
judge distinguished the Federal Court decision in Sriramulu's 
case in which a de facto guardian's improper alienation 
was held as voidable by observing*
"We are, however, concerned in this case with 
the interpretation of Article 44 of the Limita­
tion Act, though the rules of Hindu law may
also have a bearing on the point".
This is, with respect, an altogether perverse approach. 
Such a distinction does not help achieve the general object 
of limitation law as a whole, it denies justice and incre­
ases the incidence of litigation. It is true that Article 
44 does not say anything about de facto guardians, but it 
is also true that it does not contain any specific word by 
which to imply a particular class of guardian. There is no 
definition of the word 'guardian' in the Limitation Act of 
1908 or of 1963, but as defined in section 4(2) of the GWA 
a guardian is only a 'person having the care of the person 
of a minor or of his property, or of both his person and 
property'. This is a very general definition and is wide
1 (1951) 1 MLJ 265, 266.
524
enough to include along with natural, testamentary and 
court-appointed guardians de facto guardians as well1.
This definition, if followed by the limitation law, it 
must be followed with its different shades of interpre­
tation unless it is qualified by any word as in the case 
of section 21 of the Limitation Act of 1908. Since the 
word used in Article 44 is a bald one it appears to have 
been used in the same sense to include all classes of 
guardians as in the GWA.
8.2. Post-1956 alienations
Earlier in chapter 3 it is seen that after the pass­
ing of the HMGA courts in India consider that de facto 
guardianship has been abolished. Section 11 of the Act is 
said to contain an absolute prohibition against the trans­
fer of Hindu minor's property by his de facto guardian.
The Act has given powers of disposal of a minor's property
only to a natural guardian and not to a de facto guardian.
. 2Therefore any alienation by the latter is deemed void ,
and a person claiming under such alienation cannot be
. . . 3considered as one claiming under a minor . In Ranganatha
1 Noshirwan v . Sharoshbanu (1933) 58 Bom 724, 728; Mst. Prem 
Kuar v. Banarsi Das (1934) 15 Lah 630; Great American 
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Madanlal (1935) 59 Bom 656, 662; 
Abaji Ganesh v. Damodar AIR 1938 Nag 399.
2 Danevi Gurumurty v. Raqhu Podhan AIR 1967 Ori 68; Ra iala- 
kshmi v. Ramachandran AIR 1967 Mad 113; (1966) 2 MLJ 420; 
Narain Singh v. Sapurna Kuer AIR 1968 Pat 318; Talari 
Eruppa v. Muthvalappa AIR 1972 Mys 31.
3 Philipose Thomas v. Gopala Pillai (1968) KLT 388.
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Gounder v. Kuppuswami Naidu1 Ismail, J., observed*
"Section 11 of the Act ..• abrogates the power of 
the de facto guardian to deal with any property 
of a minor, whether it is an undivided interest 
in a joint family property or not. Unlike sections 
6 and 9, which, while referring to the 'minor's 
property* expressly state 'excluding his or her 
undivided interest in joint family property* and 
'other than the undivided interest referred to 
in section 12', respectively, section 11 does 
not exclude any such undivided interest of a minor 
in the joint family property from its scope and 
therefore the incompetency of a de facto guardian 
to deal with a minor's property extends to all 
the properties of a minor without any exception".
9. Should a suit be filed to set aside an improper alienation?
2Trevelyan says m  an oft-cited passage *
"A transfer which is voidable at the instance of 
the minor may be repudiated by any act or omission 
of the late minor, by which he intends to communi­
cate the repudiation, or which has the effect of 
repudiating it; for instance, a transfer of land 
by him avoids a transfer of the same land made by 
his guardian before he attained the age of majority. 
It is not necessary that he should bring a suit; 
but a suit to set aside the acts of his guardian 
during his minority amounts of course to an express 
repudiation".
Similar to the author's view was the opinion of Jenkins,
3C.J., in Hem Chandra v. Lalit Mohan . The learned Chief
4
Justice observed *
"It is not necessary for a person in the position 
of the defendant to bring an action to set aside 
the transaction and it is sufficient if he declares 
his will to rescind by way of defence when an 
action is brought to enforce the mortgage against 
him".
1 (1976) 2 MLJ 128, 131.
2 Trevelyan, Minors, 202.
3 (1912) 16 CWN 715.
4 Ibid, 717.
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This, of course, is quite another matter. The author's 
view is applicable in cases where the minor or his transferee 
is in possession of the property, which may happen either 
in the case of a simple mortgage or where possession has 
not been parted with though it ought to have been delivered. 
In defence he may protect his title, but not otherwise.
Where the assistance of the court is necessary for possession 
a suit must be brought within the period prescribed by 
Article 44, otherwise title would be absolute with the 
possessor under section 28 of the Limitation Act of 1908 or 
section 27 of 1963 Act.
It is seen above that all the courts are unanimous
in their finding that an improper alienation by a natural
or lawful guardian is not void as against the minor but
only voidable1. If the minor desires to set aside such a
transfer, he must bring a suit within three years of his
attaining majority under Article 44 and obtain a judicial
2rescission of the transfer ; he cannot disaffirm it by a 
mere notice of his intention to repudiate. His right to 
recover possession of the improperly alienated property 
would be lost and his title thereto would be extinguished 
under section 28 on the expiry of the three years' period, 
if he does not sue to set aside the transfer within that 
period. Speaking for a Full Bench of the Madras High Court,
1 See supra,
2 Pran Nath v. Bal Kishan AIR 1959 Punj 313; Rabi Narayan v. 
Kanak Prova Debi AIR 1965 Cal 444.
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Govinda Menon, J., observed in Sankaranaravana Pillai v. 
Kandasami Pillai i^
"There is no doubt whatever that a transaction 
entered into by a guardian relating to the minor*s 
properties is not void and if the minor does not 
sue to set it aside within three years of his 
attaining majority it becomes valid under Article 
44 of the Limitation Act. In such a case the 
minor is deemed to be a party to the transaction. 
But where the document is executed by a manager 
of the family and it is not binding on the family , 
the minor or any other member can ignore the 
tranaction and recover possession of the property”.
Section 8(3) of the HMGA provides that if a natural 
guardian alienates a minor*s property otherwise than as 
provided in sub-section (l) or (2) of section 8, the aliena­
tion will be voidable at the instance of the minor or any 
person claiming under him. And since it is voidable the 
minor must file a suit within three years of attaining majo­
rity to set the alienation aside under Article 44 of 1908 
Limitation Act or its corresponding Article 60 of 1963 
Limitation Act in India. In the case of a natural guardian's 
improper alienation all the courts were uniform. But recently, 
very abruptly and unfortunately Krishna Iyer, J., of the 
Kerala High Court (he is now in the Indian Supreme Court), 
interpreted the word 'voidable' in the same way as it is 
being done when used in the case of a de facto guardian's 
improper alienation, meaning that a minor need not bring a 
suit to avoid it.
1 AIR 1956 Mad 670 (FB).
2 In passing it is desirable to note that South India 
understands some acts of the manager as 'void', e.g., 
unauthorised gifts.
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Santha v. Cherukutty1 the learned judge held that
the transfer of a minor's property by his natural guardian
without the sanction of the court was voidable at the
instance of the minor and the minor could avoid it by his
conduct and without a suit. The facts of the case show that
the mother'of a minor daughter transferred the minor's
property as her natural guardian. After the minor's marriage
her husband ignored the transfer as the legal guardian of
his minor wife and proceeded to execute a partition decree
against the transferee. The transferee raised the defence
that unless the transfer was set aside the partition decree
could not be enforced. The question that came for decision
was whether the transfer effected by the mother as natural
guardian could be avoided unilaterally or should it be set
aside by a decree if the sale was in contravention of section
8 of the HMGA. The learned judge discussed and distinguished
2
a wide range of cases and observed i
"It is indisputable that no sanction of the court
was taken for the alienation in the present case 
by the mother acting as the guardian of the minor 
and, therefore, there is a plain violation of 
section 8(2) of the Act. Consequently, section 
8(3) is attracted and the disposal of the property, 
even though by a natural guardian becomes voidable 
at the instance of the minor. Should this process 
of avoidance be effected by a suit to set aside 
the alienation, or is it enough if the minor 
repudiates the transaction by his own act? I have 
considered this question in an unreported decision 
in S.A. No. 683 of 1969 (Ker) and the view (1971) 
KLT (SN) 32 expressed by me there, which after all
1 AIR 1972 Ker 71.
2 Ibid, 75.
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the arguments on both sides, I am not inclined to 
change, is that when a minor is entitled to avoid 
a transfer effected by his guardian on the ground 
of absence of permission of the court, it becomes 
a nullity on his unilateral act. He can merely 
avoid it by his conduct and there is no need to 
file a suit for avoiding the transfer".
In the case of improper alienations of de facto 
guardians, as seen earlier, the courts are unjustly divided; 
some hold an improper alienation is void, some hold it is 
voidable in a restricted sense. But in either case the minor 
need not bring a suit to set it aside. In Velayudhan v. 
Sreedharan  ^Varadaraja Iyengar, J., had said*
"Now Article 44 applies to suits to set aside a 
transfer of property by a guardian and instituted 
by a ward who has attained majority. The period 
fixed is three years from when the ward attained 
majority. The question is does this expressin 
'guardian' comprise 'de facto* guardian ... . In
my mind it does not. No doubt such de facto
guardians are recognised by Hindu law as capable 
of transferring the minor's property for valid 
necessity and transfers by such guardians without 
necessity are not void but only voidable. But 
this only means that these defective transfers 
are capable of ratification by the minor on 
attaining majority and not that they are binding 
on the minor until set aside".
The errors in all this have been pointed out above. We 
have said earlier.how the courts have created the artificial 
difference between the validity of an improper alienation 
of a natural guardian and that of an improper alienation of
a de facto guardian. What the law has become as a result of
1 (1959) KLT 468.
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this artificiality may be summarised as followsi
(1) where an alienation is for the benefit of the 
minor, the minor will be as bound by an alienation 
of a de facto guardian as that of a natural or 
legal guardian;
(2) an improper alienation of a legal guardian is 
voidable in the sense that the minor will be bound 
by it unless he sets it aside by a suit, while 
such an alienation of a de facto guardian is void­
able in a restricted sense implying that the minor 
will not be bound by it; he may treat it as void 
by his act or conduct; and
(3) in the case of an improper alienation by a legal 
guardian Article 44 applies for setting it aside, 
while in the case of such an alienation by a de 
facto guardian the setting aside of the transaction 
is not a condition to the recovery of the property 
from the alienee and the minor can sue for possession 
of the property within the period of twelve years 
limited by Article 142 or 144I
If all alienations of both de jure and de facto 
guardians are made voidable with equal incidents thereto 
there will be more uniformity of law and more certainty of 
rights. Where the property is in the possession of the minor 
no suit is necessary1, he may plead his title in defence
1 Narsingh Bahadur v. Surai Din (1919) 52 IC 137; Raza Ahmad 
v. Zahoor Ahmed AIR 1930 All 858, 859.
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against the trespasser. Where, however, the transfer is
null and void there is no necessity for the party to come
to the court promptly^*$ he may sue for recovery of possession
within the period of twelve years allowed by Article 142 or
144. An alienation by a de facto guardian under Muslim law,
whether for necessity or otherwise, is void ab initio; but
even this void alienation may be regarded as voidable. We
have said earlier that the difference between ’void1 and
•voidable* is very slender. Void against a particular person
or group of persons means that it is voidable at the instance
of that particular person or group of persons. Derrett has
ably argued that a void transfer of a minor's property is
2
•indeed a voidable transfer* . So far as the voidable alie­
nation is concerned the minor as well as the transferee 
know their limitations, the minor knows that unless he sets 
aside the alienation within the specified period he will 
lose his property and the transferee knows that unless he 
can prove the necessity or benefit for the sale and his 
bona fide enguiry into such necessity he will lose his title 
in the property. In the case of a void alienation there is 
the possibility of injustice on both sides. There is the 
apparent advantage that the minor need not come before the 
court. He can dispose of the property to a second transferee, 
and thereby disapprove of the first alienation. But he will 
not get a good purchaser willing to offer him a just price
1 Mohammad Nazir v. Zulaikha AIR 1928 All 267.
2 Critique, 189-190, paras 241-242.
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for the property. Few people will come forward to purchase 
a property in impending litigation? those who will come 
will calculate and discount all the costs and expenses of 
the expected litigation and, in addition to that, they will 
pay hardly more than 50% of the market value, since they 
will consider it an investment in speculation. On the other 
hand, the transferee is always under the apprehension that 
he may lose the property even in the eleventh year and he 
may have to pay mesne profits. Again, if the minor has to 
come before the court himself there is hardly any difference 
between a voidable and a void alienation. There is loss in 
consideration of time in the one, but there is more loss in 
consideration of finance in the other.
10. Problem and solution
In all transactions with a minor's property, whether 
by a de jure or de facto guardian, the fundamental consider­
ation is the protection of the minor's interest for which 
law has evolved the principle of benefit as the standard 
of judging the necessity for a transaction. As long as a 
transaction is in accordance with this standard all is well; 
but when it is not the question of suit arises and with it 
that of limitation. We have seen above how improper aliena­
tions are to be treated as void or voidable, and when title 
in improperly alienated property is to be cured. In its cure 
does the law of limitation do justice to either party? So 
far as voidable alienation is concerned the law is more or
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less sound. But in the case of a so-called void alienation
it strangely may put either party to a disadvantage. This
can be done by treating all void alienations voidable, for
which, as we have seen, judicial authority exists and
contrary authority is unsound. In sastric law1 a minor’s
property was not allowed to be lost by adverse possession.
Under the present law relating to void alienation little
2protection is afforded to alienees. Derrett says :
"The man whom the law penalises is the alienee 
and it is only against the law that the alienee can
have any claim ---  an obviously useless one.
Thus in order to protect alienees all improper 
alienations by guardians should be voidable .•., 
for if alienees are in healthier position minors* 
properties have a larger value in the market".
Only under ’voidable* alienations it is possible that
as long as a guardian acts bona fide and the alienee likewise
the time should run out three years after majority, a very
convenient period of time within which title will be settled,
and in the case of de facto guardians the need to file a suit
will also be introduced, which will protect the alienee much
better. Moreover, under voidable alienation there is little
3apprehension of a minor’s being tipped down wells , an 
unhappy eventuality which is evidenced in the cases and 
which is not avoided by section 8(3) of the HMGA where the 
minor can make no alienation during his minority and the 
murderer, or his wife, may be the minor's intestate heir.'
1 Manu VIII. 148; Nar. I. 80; Vas. XVI. 18T
2 Critique, 190 para 242.
3 Palani Goundan v. Van iiakkal AIR 1956 Mad 476.
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C H A P T E R  VI
LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP IN SRI LANKA
1• Different influences on the law of Sri Lanka
If the legal systems of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
present a mixture of double influences, viz., the customary 
laws of the peoples inhabiting those countries, and the English 
Common law and equitable principles as applicable to their 
'society and circumstances', the legal system of Sri Lanka 
presents a mixture of treble influences, viz., the customary 
laws of the local people, the Roman-Dutch law1 and the
1 For Roman-Dutch influence see the Proclamation of 23 Sept­
ember, 1799, in the Legislative Enactments of Ceylon Vol. 1, 
189; A. W. Renton and G. G. Phillimore, Colonial laws 
and Courts (Londoni 1907), 186-88; J.C.W. Pereira, The laws 
of Ceylon (Colombo* 2nd ed., 1913), 18ff; Sir A.W. Renton, 
'The Roman-Dutch law in Ceylon under the British regime', 
in (1932) 49 South African Law Journal, 161 ff; R.W. Lee,
An Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (Oxford* 5th ed., 1953), 
10, 23; the same, 'The Roman law and Common law elements 
in South Africa and Ceylon*, in (1959) Acta Judicia, 114ff; 
J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, 284; T. Nadaraja, The legal 
system of Ceylon in its Historical setting (Leiden* 1972), 
57-59; the same, 'The administration of justice in Ceylon 
under the Dutch government', in (1968) 12 Journal of the 
Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (NS),1 ff; ”
H.W. Tambiah. Principles of Ceylon law (Colombo* 1972), 15; 
J.W. Wessels, History of the Roman-Dutch law (Cape Colony* 
1908), 386ff; L.J.M. Cooray, An Introduction to the legal 
system of Ceylon (Colombo* 1972), 43ff; the same, 'The 
administration of justice in Sri Lanka', (1976) 6 Hong Kong 
Law Journal, 67ff; see also Puthatampv v. Mailvakanam (1897)
3 NLR 42; Mudianese v. Appuhamy (1913) 16 NLR 117; Kuddiar 
v. Sinnar (1914) 17 NLR 243, 244; Nagaratnam v. Muttutamby 
(1915) 18 NLR 257, 259; Iva Mattayer v. Kanapathipi1lai 
(1928) 29 NLR 301, 307; Rabot v. de Siva (1909) AC 376;
Silva v. Balasuriya (1911) 14 NLR 452; Samed v. Segutamby 
(1924) 25 NLR 481.
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principles of English law1. Sometimes the influences of the 
Indian Hindu^, Muslim^ and Buddhist^ law, and that of a
1 For the influence of English law see Cooray, •Common law
in Ceylon’, in (1972) 10/2 Ceylon Law Society Journal, 45ff;
D.R. Wijegoonewardone, The law of Defamation (ColomboI 1956); 
Savitri Goonesekere, *Res ipsa loquitor', in (1969) 1 Colombo 
Law Review, 76ff; Cooray, 'Secret trusts in Ceylon*, in 
(1969) 1 Colombo Law Review, 46, 5Iff; R.W. Lee, 'The Roman- 
Dutch law in South Africa; the influence of English law*, 
in (1969) 1 Colombo Law Review. 1-11; Nadaraja, Legal system, 
229-249; Tambiah, Principles, 132ff; the same, *The law of 
Thesawalamai*, in (1958) 7/4 Tami1 Culture, 13-14; see also 
Seelachchy v. Visuvanathan Chetty (1922) 23 NLR 97, 116-118 
(FB). The English law of undue influence was applied in 
Soysa v. Soysa (1916) 19 NLR 314, and Perera v. Tissera 
(1933) 35 NLR 257; the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher 
(1868) 3 HL 330 was applied in Korossa Rubber Co. v. Silva 
(1917) 20 NLR 65, 81; and the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale 
(1854) 9 Ex 341.was followed in David & Co. v. Seneviratne 
(1946) 47 NLR 73, 75-76. Besides this, English case law 
was widely applied in the law of defamation, malicious 
prosecution, contributory negligence, employees* liability 
and the liability of joint tort-feasors.
2 For Hindu law influence on Kandyan law see Derrett, *The 
origins of the laws of the Kandyans', in (1956) 14/3 & 4 
University of Ceylon Review, 105ff; F.A. Hayley, The laws 
and customs of the Sinhalese or Kandyan law (Colomboi 1923), 
M.L.S. Jayasekera, The sources and development of the cus­
tomary laws of the Sinhalese upto 1835 (unpublished thesis, 
Ph.D, University of London, 1969); the same, 'The sources
of Sinhalese customary law', in (1970) l/l Journal of Ceylon 
law, 8lff; Tambiah, Sinhala Laws and Customs (Colombo! 1968), 
47ff* For Hindu law influence on Thesawalamai law see Tambiah, 
Principles, 112-115; the same, 'The law of Thesawalamai', in 
(1958) 7/4 Tamil Culture, 7-8; Sir I. Jennings and Tambiah,
The Dominion of Ceylon1 the Development of its Laws and Cons­
titution (London1 1952), 262-263; T.S. Ramanathan, Tesawala- 
mai (Colombo; 4th ed., 1972); also see Muruqasu v. Aruliah 
(1913) 17 NLR 91, 92; Kumarasamy Kurrukal v. Karthigesa 
Kurrukal (1923) 26 NLR 33, 38.
3 For Muslim law influence see Tambiah, Principles, 115-116, 169; 
Nadaraja, Legal system, 14-15; J.N.D. Anderson, 'The Anglo- 
Muhammadan law', in South,Asia Seminar, 1966-67, South Asia 
Regional Studies, University of Pennsylvania, 137, 141ff.
In Sultan v« Peiris (1933) 35 NLR 57, 68, Macdonell, C.J., 
admitted that the Muslim law text-books of Ameer Ali and 
Tyabji were regarded as authoritative books by their courts.
4 For Buddhist law influence see Hayley, Laws and Customs, 530ff; 
T.B. Dissanayake and A.B. Colin de Soysa, Kandyan law and 
Buddhist ecclesiastical law (Colombo; 19637# 13-15, 241ff; 
Tambiah, Principles, 111-112; the same, 'Buddhist ecclesias­
tical law', in (1962) 8/1 Journal of the Ceylon Branch of
the Royal Asiatic Society (NS), 7Iff.
536
codified derivative English law, such as the Indian Penal 
Code and Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be ignored? deri­
vative in the sense that they contained English principles 
which are processed and codified in the light of the prac­
tices and behaviour of the people of a country other than 
Sri Lanka where the codifications were adopted verbatim1.
Before the British occupation, Sri Lanka was a Dutch 
colony where the Dutch themselves were governed by the 
'Laws in force in the Fatherland' which means the Roman- 
Dutch law , and 'the natives (i.e., the Asian inhabitants) 
are governed according to the customs of the country if
these are clear and reasonable, otherwise according to
3 . . .our laws' • After their conquest the British continued the
Roman-Dutch law by charter as the rule in civil and criminal
matters and decided the cases of the 'natives' according
to their customs. Sir Richard Ottley, Chief Justice of
4
Sri Lanka, 1828-1833, observed in his answers i
"These laws (laws administered by the British) 
therefore consist partly of the old Roman-Dutch 
law, partly of the customs of the natives, partly 
of the local statutes or regulations enacted in 
the time of the Dutch and also of the British.
The criminal law is founded on the criminal law 
of the Netherlands as it existed antecedently 
to the conquest of the Island by the British, 
but various modifications have been introduced".
1 Tambiah, Principles, 106.
2 Nadaraja, Legal system, 11.
3 From the memoir of A. Pavilioen, Commander of Jaffnapatnam, 
written in 1665, as quoted by Nadaraja, Legal system, 10 
f.n. 153, and also by Derrett, Religion, 284.
4 From the answers given in 1830 to His Majesty's Commissioners 
of Inquiry by the learned Chief Justice, as quoted by 
Moncreiff, A.C.J., in his dissenting judgment in Karonchi- 
hamy v. Angohamy (1904) 8 NLR 1, 9ff.
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And further in his answers he stated*
"The laws applicable to property are very multiplied 
in Ceylon. The British have one Code, the Dutch 
another, the Mohammedans a third, the Malabars or 
Tamil inhabitants a fourth. The Sinhalese generally 
abide by the Dutch law. The Dutch laws of property 
are always applied where no other code is prescribed".
Almost similar to the Hindus and Muslims in British 
India who were the two major communities having their own 
distinct customary laws by which they were allowed to be 
governed, the three major communities in Sri Lanka, viz., 
the Kandyans, the Tamils and the Muslims were allowed by 
the Dutch and subsequently their liberal successors, the 
British, to be governed by their respective 'clear and 
reasonable* customs. In the absence of any such customs 
the Roman-Dutch law was applied to them also. Indeed the 
Dutch influence was little felt in the law of persons of
these communities and this helped in the development of 
the three customary laws in Sri Lanka, namely, the Kandyan 
law applicable to the Kandyans, Tesawalamai to the Tamils 
specially of the Northern province of Sri Lanka, and Muslim 
law to the Muslims. Persons besides them, such as the low- 
country Sinhalese, the Tamils of the Eastern province, the
Burghers and the Europeans, were governed by the Roman-Dutch
1 2 law • In Sultan v. Peiris the Roman-Dutch law was described
as "the general law or the 'common law' of the Island", and
1 Tambiah, Principles, 229.
2 (1933) 35 NLR 59, 68.
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in Pe Costa v. Bank of Ceylon  ^as 'residuary common law*.
Roman-Dutch law as used, after the end of the Dutch regime
in 1796, to imply the common law of Sri Lanka, does not
mean the 'Roman-Dutch law pure and simple'2or the 'Roman-
Dutch law as applied in the United Provinces of the Nether- 
3
lands' or the Roman-Dutch law as applied in Sri Lanka
under the government of the United Provinces of the Nether- 
4
lands ; it is the latter body of laws as 'modified in 
many directions, both expressly and by necessary implica­
tion, by our statute law and also by judicial decisions'5 .
It is misleading to speak of the Roman-Dutch law as the 
common law of modern Sri Lanka. Nadaraja observes5!
"Today ... the Roman-Dutch law can at best be 
regarded as merely a 'subsidiary common law where 
our own law and practice are silent'.In fact, the 
residuary general law of modern Ceylon is a new 
body of law, neither pure Civil law nor pure 
Common law, which our legislators and judges have 
forged on the anvil of contemporary life in 
Ceylon out of materials derived mainly from 
the Roman-Dutch and the English law; and this 
mixed body of law may not inappropriately be 
termed 'an indigenous common law of Ceylon', 
because it has largely been fashioned in this 
country with particular reference to the condi­
tions here"•
However, because of its diverse laws the law of guardian­
ship of Sri Lanka demands a quadrangular treatment, i.e., 
as it is under the three customary laws and lastly as under 
the Roman-Dutch law.
1 (1969) 72 NLR 457, 519.
2 Korossa Rubber Co. v. Silva (1917) 20 NLR 65, 74.
3 Kodeeswaran v. Attorney General of Ceylon (1969) 72 NLR 337, 
342 (PC).
4 Ibid. 342.
5 Korossa Rubber Co.'s case (1917) 20 NLR 65, 74-75.
6 Legal System, 247.
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2• Customary laws of guardianship
2.1. Kandyan law^
Like many other systems under Kandyan law so long 
as the parents are alive the natural right of guardianship
over the person and property of their minor children rests
2 3with them , and on their death it goes to the king as
4under sastric Hindu law . Among the parents the father, 
if his marriage was m  diga form , is by nature and nurture 
the guardian of his minor children. If his marriage was in 
binna form^, he can exercise no right of guardianship over
7
his children. Tambiah says i
'•In a binna-marriage, during the lifetime of the 
mother the father is not the guardian of the 
minor children. The children would live under 
the protection and guardianship of the maternal 
grandparents if they happen to live in the 
mulgedera [ancestral home], but if the maternal 
grandparents are dead the children will be under 
the guardianship of their mother. But if the 
mother dies, the father of the children becomes 
the guardian in preference to a maternal uncle.
If the father leaves the wife's ancestral house 
with the children, the latter do not lose their 
rights to the maternal inheritance".
1 Nirmala Chandrahasan's article 'The vexed problem of defi­
nition in the application of the Kandyan law', in (1972) 3 
Colombo Law Review, 56ff contains a nice account regarding 
the application of Kandyan law with recent cases.
2 A.B. Colin de Soysa, Digest of Kandyan law (Ceylom 1945), 11.
3 Tambiah, Sinhala laws. 152j Derrett, 'The origin of the laws 
of the Kandyans', in (1956) 14/3 & 4 UCR, 124.
4 Kane, Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 574.
5 In diga-marriage the wife is conducted to her husband's house 
and she lives in that house with her husband's family. See 
Tambiah, Sinhala laws. 129; Niti Nighanduwa. 17.
6 In a binna-marriage the husband is brought to the house of 
the wife or her relations and resides on the property belong­
ing to the wife's ancestral home, and he is liable to expul­
sion at any time by his wife or her parents. See Tambiah, 
Sinhala laws, 127-28.
7 Sinhala laws, 153.
540
On the death of the father the diga-married mother 
becomes the natural guardian of the person and property of 
her minor children in preference to the male agnatic rela­
tions of the minors1. Her right of guardianship may be 
forfeited if by her conduct she brings 'shame and disgrace' 
to the relations. In Kandyan society 'nothing is considered
a great calamity to the family than where a woman contracts
2
a marriage with a man of lower caste' • If she contracts 
such a marriage or commits a theft or some such other crime 
the paternal relations may take the children from her care
3
on the ground that they will contract the same evil habits .
Kandyan customary law gives the parents the right 
to nominate guardians for their children? and the parents
4
may exercise it orally or by will. Not only laymen but also
5priests may be appointed as guardians . In the appointment 
of a guardian the diga-married husband has a preferential 
right over his wife. Conversely, a binna-married wife has 
a similar right over her husband. Where a diga-married 
mother appoints a guardian 'such guardian cannot inherit 
the property of the ward which the latter inherited through 
his or her father' •
1 Ampitiva Menik Etena v. Appoo Naide (1819) Hayley, Laws~and 
customs. Appex. 2 note 51.
2 Tambiah, Sinhala laws. 153; Niti. 44-45.
3 Ibid
4 Niti. 44; Tambiah, Sinhala laws. 153.
5 Ibid
6 Tambiah, Sinhala laws. 154.
541
Under Kandyan law the father as guardian of his minor
children can deal with their property for their necessity.
The mother as guardian of her minor children has the right
to sell or mortgage her deceased husband's estate including
his Paraveni1 property during the minority of her children
for the payment of her husband's debts without the permission 
2
of the court • To effect such a sale it is not necessary
3for her to obtain letters of curatorship from the court .
On the death of both parents the testamentary guardian 
appointed by the father or mother becomes the lawful guardian 
of the minor children. Where no such testamentary guardian 
is appointed the children should be given to the 'charge of 
the most affectionate and loving of its relations', and for
their welfare even their nearest relatives may be refused
4 . 5their guardianship . Quoting Sawers, Tambiah observes that
the guardianship of a minor under Kandyan customary law
belongs to the following persons in the order given belowi
(1) maternal grandfather or grandmother;
(2) maternal uncles or aunts;
(3) paternal grandfather or grandmother;
(4) paternal uncles or aunts;
(5) an adult brother or sister.
1 Ancestral or inherited property. See section 10 of the 
Kandyan law Ordinances 39 of 1938 and 25 of 1944.
2 Tambiah, Sinhala laws, 153.
3 Ibid.
4 Niti. 44.
5 Tambiah, Sinhala laws, 154.
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It appears that the Kandyans prefer the maternal to 
the paternal relations. The above persons cannot as a matter 
of right claim guardianship which the court decides at its 
own discretion. Kandyan law presents some similarity with 
Kautilya's views on the guardianship of the property of a 
minor. Kautilya prefers to keep a minor's immovable property 
with his maternal relations or village elders1 instead of 
with his heirs or agnatic kins. Perhaps the Kandyans are 
led to believe that it is advantageous for the minor to keep 
property with strangers, since that will help him in assert­
ing his independent rights and preventing unwarranted 
accidents^.
Under Kandyan customary law the guardians are not
only the custodian of minors' property, they are allowed
to enjoy the usufruct of their property as long as the
3minors have not attained majority • But they cannot there­
fore alienate the minors' property even with the consent 
4
of the minors • As a corollary of the guardian's right to
enjoy the usufruct of his minor ward's property, a Kandyan
guardian is personally liable for the maintenance of the
minor. He cannot in the event of the minor having no property
call upon other relations to contribute towards the minor's
. 5maintenance, unless he gives up his guardianship • Where a
1 Kaut. III. 5; Kangle, Arthasastra Vol. 2, 210; Kane, 
Dharmasastra Vol. 3, 573.
2 Derrett, 'The origins of the laws of the Kandyans', in 
(1956) 14/3 & 4 UCR, 105, 123-24.
3 Hayley, Laws and customs, 216; Tambiah, Sinhala laws. 156 
f.n. 1.
4 Niti. 47; Tambiah, Sinhala laws. 156.
5 Hayley, Laws and customs, Appex. 1 (Sawer's Memoranda and 
Notes), 23.
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guardian spends money on his ward he cannot ask for a refund 
of it even after the minor has attained majority. Probably 
this may indicate the reason why a guardian has a preferen­
tial right over other relations in the matter of succession 
if the minor dies without descendants or close relations1.
It is the guardian's duty to free the minor's ancestral 
property from encumbrances, if any, by paying the debts out 
of the profits of the estate. If necessary, he could even 
use the capital or sell the corpus of the estate for such 
payment.
2.2. Tesawalamai
Unlike Kandyan law Tesawalamai was a codified law
2 . .since the Dutch period ; and the British continued to apply
it to the Tamils. The father is the natural guardian of
his minor children under the Tesawalamai. But peculiarly
enough he loses this right over his 'young' children when
he contracts a second marriage after the death of his first
3 .4wife . Section 11 of the Tesawalamai providest
"If the father wishes to marry a second time, the 
mother-in-law or nearest relation generally takes 
a child or children (if they be still young) in 
order to bring them up, and in such case the father 
is obliged to give at the same time with his child 
or children the whole of the property brought in 
marriage by his deceased wife, and the half of the
property acquired during his first marriage".
1 Derrett, 'The origins of the laws of the Kandyans', in 
(1956) 14/3 & 4 UCR, 105, 124; Hayley, Laws and customs, 
482-85.
2 Jennings and Tambiah, Dominion of Ceylon. 262-63; Tambiah, 
Principles. 200.
3 Tambiah, The laws and customs of the Tamils of Jaffna 
(Ceylon* 1947), 148-152.
4 Regulation 10 of 1806 and Ordinance 5 of 1869.
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On the death of the father guardianship of his minor 
children devolves on their mother. The mother retains the 
whole of the property if she takes the children by her 
deceased husband and keeps them until they marry when she 
is obliged to give them a dowry1. The sons cannot demand 
anything so long as the mother lives. But, as in the case 
of the father, if the mother marries a second time she, 
too, loses her right and has to surrender the guardianship 
to her parents. When both the parents are dead the maternal 
grandparents become the guardians of the minors in prefer­
ence to paternal grandparents. In this respect Tesawalamai 
presents a similarity with the Kandyan law and also sastric 
Hindu law so far as Kautilya's views are concerned. Though 
the maternal grandmother is given the custody of the person 
of minors and the whole of their deceased mother's property 
brought by her marriage plus half of the property acquired
during her first marriage when the father remarries, she
2 .cannot claim it as a matter of right . It is the discretion
of the court to allow her to keep the child as against the
father if he proves to be unfit to be entrusted with the
child. Where the father is deprived of guardianship on the
ground of unfitness he has to provide for the maintenance
of the child while it remains under the custody of the
3grandmother or other relation •
1 Section 9, Tesawalamai.
2 Annaoillai v. Saravanamuttu (1938) 40 NLR 1.
3 Thevanapillai v. Ponniah (1914) 17 NLR 437.
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2.3, Muslim lav
Like Tesawalamai Muslim law in Sri Lanka was codified
by the Dutch1 and the British adopted that code to decide
Muslim law cases. But the code was not an exhaustive one,
2
In v. Miskin Umma Bertram, C.J., called it a 'rough
modification of certain portions of jurisprudence' to be
read in the light of the general principles of Islamic
jurisprudence. In spite of its incompleteness if there
occurs any conflict between the provisions of the code and
the principles of Muslim law, it is the former which the
3courts should follow • In matters of guardianship the code 
contains little information, and the courts follow the
4
general principles of Muslim law preferably of the Shafi 
school^.
3, Roman and Roman-Dutch law of guardianship
As seen in chapter 1, in Roman law as long as the pater 
familias was alive the question of guardianship of minors
1 Tambiah, Principles. 227.
2 (1925) 26 NLR 330, 333.
3 Bandirala v. Mairuma Natchia (1912) 16 NLR 235. The code 
was repealed by the Muslim Intestate Succession and Wakfs 
Ordinance (Ordinance 10) of 1931, the Muslim Marriage and 
Divorce Act (Act 13) of 1951 and the Muslim Mosques and 
Charitable Trusts or Wakfs Act (Act 51) of 1956.
4 Naravanen v. Saree Umma (1920) 21 NLR 439 per De Sampayo, J. 
See also Cooray, Introduction, 127ff.
5 On pure question of law as distinguished from questions of 
usage or practice where the code is silent the courts refer 
to the Anglo-Indian standard text-books on Muslim law, such 
as those of Tyabji, Ameer Ali and Fyzee, See Lebbe v. Thameen 
(1912) 16 NLR 71, 73; Sithi Mafthooha v. Thassin (1963T 65 
CLR 84, 85. Paradoxically, all these text-books contain 
Hanafi law as it grew up in India.
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under his potestas did not arise. It was only when he died 
that their guardianship was taken up by persons appointed 
by his will. If there were none so appointed it would be 
taken up by near relations, and in their failure by guardians 
appointed by the court known as tutors.
The functions of these tutors or guardians lasted
until the minors attained puberty, and from that age until
the age of twenty-five curators were appointed for them by
the ’appropriate authority'. Dutch law, however, made no
such distinction between the two stages in minority. Under
it all children below the age of twenty-five years were
minors, and tutorship and curatorship were merged together
into a single office of guardianship. Again, contrary to
Roman law, Dutch law did not recognise a surviving parent
1 2as the natural guardian of the children . Lee observes «
"In the Dutch law the father generally administered 
the property of the minor children during the sub­
sistence of the marriage. But a surviving parent 
was not as such their guardian, however much paren­
tal power might imply control of the person. After
his wife's death the father had a prior claim to 
be appointed guardian to act concurrently with 
the testamentary guardian or guardians nominated 
by his wife or with one or more guardians appointed 
by the Court or the Orphan Chamber, when it was 
charged with this function. Except in this capacity 
a surviving father had no right to intermeddle 
with the estate".
In recent years this view has undergone changes in
favour of the fatherj and he is now regarded as the natural
1 Manickam Chettiar v. Murugappa Chettiar (1957) 60 NLR 385, 
388.
2 Roman-Dutch law, 36.
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guardian of his legitimate children until they attain 
majority. He has not only the paramount right to the 
custody of his children; he has now the exclusive control 
of their property except where a curator has been nominated 
by the donor of property to the minor, or the court deems 
him unfit. His powers are greater than those of a testamentary 
or court-appointed guardian; he can receive and retain 
moneys due to the minor, can invest them in ’good securities*, 
and can utilise the profits and income of the property for 
the minor’s maintenance, education and similar other purposes1. 
But this does not give him an unlimited power. He cannot 
bind the minor by a contract for the purchase of land for 
which there is no fund, nor can he impose a liability on the 
minor for the payment of a purchase price detrimental to the 
minor*s interest,
A mother's right of control over the person and property 
of her legitimate children does not arise until the father 
is dead. Where the father has appointed a guardian, the 
testamentary guardian obtains the guardianship over the 
person and property of the minor children. This does not, 
however, imply that the mother is ousted from the personal 
control of her minor children; she is allowed some sort of 
joint guardianship as under English law. When a father dies 
without appointing any tutor or guardian, the mother acquires 
the full rights of a natural guardian and gets all the powers
1 Donaldson, Minors in Roman-Dutch law, 6.
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which her husband enjoyed before his death, including the 
right to appoint tutors by will for the minor children1.
As under Roman law so also under Dutch law a guardian 
in general must provide for the maintenance and education 
of his ward according to the ward's situation in life and 
the value of his property. In the management and administra­
tion of the minor's property he must 'display the diligence
2
of a bonus paterfamilias' . He may sell or mortgage the
minor's movable and immovable property, but in the case of
the latter he must obtain the sanction of the court. He must
preserve and secure the property, but unless he is the father
of the minor, he should not keep any excess money of the
minor in his hands. He may invest the surplus in government
securities and pay the debts and liabilities of the minor
as they fall due. He has no right to make a donation of a
minor's property or to release a manifest right of the minor.
He may enter into a contract on behalf of the minor, but
this does not give him a right to bind the minor with an
onerous contract. He is to authorise the minor's acts, i.e.,
interpose his authority in the minor's transactions. During
the continuance or on the termination of guardianship or
as and when the court directs, he must submit accounts of
3the minor's properties •
1 Lee, Roman-Dutch law, 37.
2 Ibid, 106.
3 Ibid, 109.
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4• Roman-Dutch lav in Sri Lanka
Roman-Dutch law which was applied in Sri Lanka during 
the Dutch occupation was a modified form of Dutch law. It 
was mainly the customary laws of the Province of Holland 
as were consistent with customs of the people of Sri Lanka.
In it Roman law was only one of the component elements. The 
whole of the Roman law as it existed in Holland was never
bodily imported into Sri Lanka and it never formed part of
1 . 2 the law of Sri Lanka . Nadaraja says i
"A judge would have enquired first whether any 
local statutes dealt with the matter in hand.
Where local statutes contained no clear provision 
on the point or were silent, and in the absence 
of any local custom having the force of law, he 
would have had recourse to the statutes of Batavia. 
If these two were silent, he would then have turned 
to the law of Holland, excluding such customs and 
legislation as had reference to the special local 
circumstances of the mother-country. In practice 
this meant that he would have relied on the general 
principles expounded in those 'books of authority' 
which were most commonly used”.
It consisted of the Old and some New Statutes of 
. 3Batavia , which were consistent with the customs of the
4
Dutch settlers and their government in Sri Lanka . From
5the memoir of A. Pavilioen it is understood that this law 
was applied:to the Dutch settlers in Sri Lanka and to those 
who had no 'clear and reasonable customs of their own'.
1 Silva v. Balasuriya (1911)14 NLR 452, 458.
2 'The administration of justice in Ceylon under the Dutch 
Government', in (1968) 12 Journal of the Ceylon Branch of 
the Royal Asiatic Society (NS), 1, 13-14.
3 Cooray, Introduction, 5, 43ff, Tambiah, Principles. 119-21.
4 Jennings and Tambiah, Dominion of Ceylon, 181.
5 Derrett, Religion, 284; Nadaraja, Legal system, 10 f.n. 153.
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The British after assuming the sovereignty over Sri Lanka 
continued to administer it. It still exists today as a 
'subsidiary common law' of Sri Lanka.
5• Modern law of guardianship in Sri Lanka
The law of guardianship of minors in Sri Lanka is
the 'Roman-Dutch law subject to the modifications made by
the Civil Procedure Code, 1889, in particular, and other
enactments*1. Thus appropriate cases of guardianship will
be decided by the Code in supersession of all other laws
in Sri Lanka, and wherever there is no express provision
2m  it, the Roman-Dutch law will apply .
5.1. Statutory law
Chapter 40 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1889, contains 
provisions for the appointment and functions of a guardian 
for the person and a curator for the property of a minor. 
Whoever claims the right to have charge of a minor's property 
in trust under a will or deed or by reason of nearness of
kin, he may apply to the District Court for a certificate
. 3  . . . .of curatorship , and the court on its satisfaction will
grant the certificate to him. Where there is no such person 
or if such a person is unwilling to undertake the trust,
1 Cooray, Introduction, 25.
2 Tambiah, Tamils of Jaffna, 43; the same, Sinhala laws, 156.
3 Civil Procedure Code, 1889, section 582.
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and the court finds a near relative of the minor willing
to accept the curatorship, and the court considers him,
on the recommendation of a headman whom the court calls
upon to report on the character and qualification of such
relative, fit to be entrusted with the charge of the minor's
property, such relative may be granted a certificate. The
same person to whom a certificate of curatorship is granted
may also be appointed as the guardian of the minor by the
court, if it deems him fit^. Where the court does not issue
a certificate to a person claiming under a will or deed
and where there is no near relative willing and fit to be
entrusted with the charge of the minor's property, if the
court thinks an appointment necessary for the interest of
the minor it may appoint any person whom it deems fit for
. , 2the purpose and grant him a certificate • In this case
when the court is granting a certificate of curatorship,
it must at the same time appoint a guardian 'to take charge
of the person and maintenance of the minor'? but the person
to whom the certificate of curatorship has been granted
should not be appointed a guardian if he would be a 'legal
3heir of the minor if the minor then died' . The guardian
must provide for the education of the minor in a 'suitable 
4manner' • The curator should file m  the court an account 
of the property belonging to the minor on assuming the
1 CPCr sprtion 585s see also K.D.P. Wickremesinahe, Civil" 
Procedure in Ceylon (Colomboi 1971), 347.
2 CPC, section 586.
3 Ibid, section 587.
4 Ibid, section 594.
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office, and, when it is in his charge, accounts showing
the receipts and expenditure of the property1. If he fails
to give satisfactory accounts, he iray be removed by the 
2court • The appointment of the curator as well as the
guardian is however a matter of discretion of the District
Court within whose jurisdiction the minor resides • But if
the minor does not reside within the jurisdiction of the
District Court, it has no power to appoint a curator over
his estate, even though the minor may have property situated
4within its jurisdiction .
In their setting and language the provisions contained 
in chapter 40 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1889 are similar 
to those of the Bengal Minors Act 40 of 1858 and the Bombay 
Minors Act 20 of 1864, In a way the provisions of the Civil 
Procedure Code of Sri Lanka have stated the law more strongly 
against the union of the guardianship of person and property 
of a minor in the same individual when the person to be 
appointed is the legal guardian of the minor if he died 
then. Kautilya's views are more aptly followed in it, since 
when the willing near relative is considered to be appointed 
a curator of the minor, the court seeks the opinion of a 
headman about the character and qualification of the said 
relative. Although the customary laws are made to go into 
disuse by the statutory and Dutch law, they may still play
1 CPC, section 588(2).
2 Ibid. section 591.
3 Courts Ordinance No. 1 of 1889, section 71, and section 
69(1) as amended by section 7 of Ordinance No. 4 of 1938.
4 Such is the law if sections 582 and 584 are read together. 
See also Muttiah v. Baur (1906) 9 NLR 190, 195; In re Daisy 
Fernando (1896) 2 NLR 249.
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their role in the consideration of the choice when two or 
more applicants are there under section 582 of the Civil 
Procedure Code which provides that a certificate of curator­
ship may be issued to a person who claims 'a right to have 
charge of property in trust for a minor by reason of near­
ness of kin or otherwise*. The Code has made a departure 
from the Dutch law and aligned itself with the Indian 
statutory enactments1. It has put much consideration on 
the minor's welfare by separating the guardianship of person 
from that of property wherever necessary. In Roman-Dutch 
law the term 'guardian' was used to imply one appointed to 
take charge of both the person and property of a minor, and 
the term 'curator' to one appointed to take charge of the 
estate of a lunatic or prodigal? but under the Code the term
'curator' is applied to one entrusted with the property of
2 . . 3a minor , and 'guardian' to one with the person of the minor ,
just as the terms 'manager' and 'guardian* were used under 
Indian Acts. The Code contains little law regarding the 
duties of a curator or guardian excepting those which are 
stated in sections 588 and 594.
5.2. Courts of Sri Lanka and the law of guardianship
5.2.1. Guardianship of person
As under all the customary laws of Sri Lanka (excepting 
in the case of children by binna-marriage in Kandyan law) so
1 Bengal Minors Act 40 of 1858, and Bombay Minors Act 20 of 
1864.
2 CPC, section 582.
3 Ibid, section 587(1).
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also under Roman-Dutch law the father is the natural guardian 
of his legitimate minor children1? and his right to the 
custody of their person remains unaffected even by the fact 
of separation of the spouses. In Ivaldy v, Ivaldy2 Fernando,
J ., referring to the judgment of a South African case3 laid 
down that under the Roman-Dutch law where there was no legal 
dissolution of a marriage the court could not deprive a father 
of his custody of his minor children except^ (l) that in 
authorising the parents to have a separate home the court 
could 'regulate the parental power in accordance with the 
interests of the minor child', and (2) that the court as 
upper guardian of all minors has powers to interfere with 
the father's custody on special grounds, such as 'danger to 
the child's life, health or morals'. The father's right to 
custody cannot be said to be absolute. The Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction in a writ of habeas corpus to take away
the custody of a minor child from the legal custody of the
father and hand over the same to the mother if such a course 
is necessary in the best interests of the child's life,
r /•
health or morals • In Padma Fernando v. T.S. Fernando while 
affirming his own views expressed in Ivaldy's case Fernando,
J., stated that 'so long as the mother is shown to be fit
1 Madulawathie v. Wilpus (1967) 70 NLR 90, 91,
2 (1956) 57 NLR 568.
3 Calitz v. Calitz (1939) SALR 56, 63 (AD).
4 E. Spiro, The Law of Parent and Child (Juta, Cape Town, 1959),
170.
5 Kamalawathie v. De Silva (1961) 64 NLR 252? Gooneratnayake 
v. Clayton (1929) 31 NLR 132.
6 (1956) 58 NLR 262, 264.
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to take care for the child', it is the natural right of
the child that she should enjoy the advantage of her mother's
care and not be deprived of that advantage capriciously,
since such a forcible separation from the mother would be
detrimental to the life, health and morals of the young
child. When in Weragoda v. Weragoda1 the respondent's counsel
relying on Roman-Dutch law principle enunciated in Calitz*s
case urged that the rights of the father were superior to
those of the mother in regard to the custody of minors,
2Sansoni, J. reviewing a wide range of English cases quoted
3the Privy Council dictum of Lord Simonds in McKee v. McKee 
that "the welfare and happiness of the infant is paramount 
consideration ... to this paramount consideration all others 
yield", and observed that the danger to the child's life, 
health and morals was only an example of special grounds 
which would justify the interference of the court, and that 
it was for the court.to decide who would have the custody 
of the child after "taking into account all the factors 
affecting the case and after giving due effect to all pre­
sumptions and counter-presumptions that may apply, but 
bearing in mind the paramount consideration that the child's 
welfare is the matter that the court is there to safeguard". 
In English law the courts fulfil this duty by considering
1 (1961) 59 CLW 49.
2 R v. Greenhill (1836) 4 Ad & El 624; 111 ER 922; In re Fynn 
(1848) 2 De G & Sm 457; 64 ER 205? In re Aqar-Ellis (1883) 
24 Ch D 317 (CA); R. v. Barnado. Jone's case (1891) 1 QB 
194 (CA); R. v. Gynqall (1893) 2 QB 232 (CA).
3 (1951) AC 352.
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the whole of the 'circumstances of the case, the position 
of the parent, the position of the child, the age of the 
child, the religion of the child so far as it can be said 
to have any religion, and the happiness of the child'
The same concept of welfare of a child in determining 
the issue of his custody is implied by the phrase "danger
oto the child's life, health or morals" in Roman-Dutch law •
There is no difference between the English and Roman-Dutch
3law m  this respect . Though m  Weragoda's case Sansoni, J,, 
said that the danger to life, health or morals was only an 
example to the special grounds which would justify the inter­
ference of the court, this does not appear to have made the 
principle of welfare subservient to the father's right when 
he said that "the rights of the father will prevail if they 
are not displaced by considerations relating to the welfare 
of the child, for the petitioner who seeks to displace 
those rights must make out his or her case". However, in
4
Kamalawathie v. De Silva where the mother of a five year 
old child applied for the custody of the child against the 
father who was a reckless man who never gave money for run­
ning the house, Tambiah, J., followed Padma Fernando's 
case and held that as long as the mother was a fit person 
the father could be deprived of his right to custody. But
1 Re McGarth (1893) 1 Ch 143, 148.
2 This phrase was guoted in Ivaldy v. Ivaldy (1956) 57 NLR
568 from the judgment of Calitz v. Calitz (1939) SALR 56 (AD).
3 There is merely some conceptual difference between the English 
and Roman-Dutch law in respect of the court's guardianship.
In the former the court is the guardian of all minors, while 
in the latter the state is regarded as the upper guardian 
of all minors.
4 (1961) 64 NLR 252.
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his reasoning suggests* and indeed,the judgment shows that 
it does so, that the mother can claim custody even without 
leading evidence to indicate that the father was not fit 
to have the custody of the child. It may be submitted with 
due respect to the learned judge that he failed to consider 
the context in which the dictum in Padma Fernando’s case 
was made. The facts of that case show that the father of 
a four and a half years old girl wished to entrust the child 
to his sister who was over fifty years of age to 'compensate 
her, apparently, for her own childlessness' and this per­
suaded the learned judge to form the opinion that "it would 
be detrimental to the life and health and even of the morals 
of such a young child if that child is forcibly separated 
from her mother and compelled to live, not even in her father's 
custody, but under the care of an elderly relative to whom 
she is not bound by any natural ties". The whole judgment 
of the case leads one to believe that the learned judge over­
rode the fundamental right of the father; and his bad argu­
ments prompt one^ to think that his decision obscured the 
validity of Ivaldy's case and shook the basic premise of the 
modern Roman-Dutch law, i.e., the preferential right of the 
father as enunciated in Calitz's case. Padma Fernando's case 
did not deny the father's right, it merely subjected it to
1 Savitri Goonesekere deplores the whole judgment as it has 
eroded the concept of the father's preferential right and 
created in its place a preferential right in the mother; 
and more so, she thinks it has jettisoned the delicate 
balance between parental power and the welfare of a child 
forged by the Roman-Dutch law and has introduced a liberal 
thinking into the law at the cost of 'the social traditions 
of Ceylon'. See 'Custody of minor children', in (1970) l/l 
Journal of Ceylon Law, 147.
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the minor's welfare. Yet the actual situation in which 
Kamalawathie's case arose justifies denying a reckless, 
indifferent, indigent father the custody of the child. The 
welfare of the child demanded the custody to be given to 
the mother. The Roman-Dutch law independently of English 
influences recognises that the court can deprive the father 
of the custody m  the interest of his child .
2Like other progressive systems the modern law of
• 3Sri Lanka, says Weeramantry, J., in Fernando v. Fernando
has 'grown away from rules directed towards penalising the
guilty spouse and towards a recognition of predominance of
the interest of the child'. In South Africa a putative
marriage which is null and void ab initio for defective
procedure or formalities or suppression of vitiating factors
by either party produces none of the legal incidents of
marriage in favour of the spouses. But the status of children
of such marriage does not differ in any way from that of
4other legitimate children s and subject to any order that 
a court may make, the putative father as a natural guardian 
is entitled to the custody of the children. Similar to the
1 In Gooneratnayake v. Clayton (1929) 31 NLR 132, 135 Drieberg, 
J., observed that the custody of a minor could not be given 
to the father if the child capable of exercising discretion 
wished against it. In Bote ju v. Jayewardane (1968) 75 CLW 55 
Weeramantry, J., held that the custody of a child of tender 
age should be awarded to the mother despite the preferen­
tial right of the father if there was no convincing evidence 
of unfitness on the part of the mother.
2 Specially the South African system to which the judges of 
Sri Lanka nowadays look for references.
3 (1968) 70 NLR 534, 537.
4 H.R. Hahlo, The South African Law of Husband and Wife (Juta, 
Cape Towni 3rd ed., 1969), 453•
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laws of South Africa questions of guilt and innocence of
parents are not the sole determining factors in questions
of custody in Sri Lanka. In deciding to whom custody would
be awarded the interests of the minors are given the main
and paramount consideration. Indeed the courts of that
country have, by their increasing reference to the South
African legal text-books, and the cases, shifted in its
observance of principles from a conservative pole to a
liberal. As said already the South African courts do not
hesitate to give the custody of a child to a guilty spouse,
if the interests of the child can be better served by its
being given to the custody of the guilty spouse than to the
innocent; and only when they fail to find out what is best
for the child do they consider the guilt or innocence of
the spouses and tip the scale accordingly1. They do not
take into account the superior right of the father as natural
guardian. If they think that it would be best to keep the
child with the mother they award the custody to her, even
in the absence of any 'misbehaviour or shortcoming on the
2
part of the father' •
In Fernando's case following the South African autho­
rities Weeramantry, J., gave the custody of two minor children
1 Hahlo, South African lawi 454.
2 Ibid. The view appears to be somewhat contradictory to 
the decision in Calitz's case. It is too much generalisa­
tion of the exceptions of that case. However, the courts 
of the two countries are following this recent trend,
and it is more humanistic.
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to their mother who bigamously married the putative father 
suppressing her earlier marriage. The learned judge gave 
emphasis to the paramount interests of the children and 
observed1*
"There is a rule commended alike by law and ordinary 
human experience, which to a large extent will 
determine the matter before me. This is the rule 
that the custody of every young children ought 
ordinarily to be given to the mother, a rule which 
ought not to be lightly departed from".
The father's right to the custody of his children in
Sri Lanka terminates where he surrenders the custody of the
child to a stranger; and he cannot claim it back if the
surrender is a legally complete one1. But the mere handing
over of a child by the natural parents to another does not
indicate renunciation of their parental rights to the child2,
since under the Roman-Dutch law a natural parent has a right
to the custody of his or her child and that custody can only
be terminated under the circumstances which are well recog-
3nised and clearly defined by that law • In Abevawardene v.
4
Jayanarayake Nagalingam, A.C.J., observed*
"The mere delivery of a child by its natural parent 
to a third party does not invest the transaction 
with any legal consequences. If the parent had a
right to hand over the custody of a child then
that parent would also have the undoubted right 
to resume the custody himself as the authority
of the parent must prevail in the latter instance
as much as in the former".
1 Samarasinghe v. Simon (1941) 43 NLR 129. 140.
2 Joachim Fernando v. Dylanthie Fernando (1965) 70 CLW 91.
3 Lee, Roman-Dutch law, 113.
4 (1953) 55 NLR 54.
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This view was fully supported by de Krester, J., in 
Endoris v. Kiripetta1 where a father applied for a writ of 
habeas corpus in respect of the custody of his eight years 
old son against the son's paternal aunt who had brought up 
the son from the time when his mother died and he was about 
a month old.
When the father is dead and no guardian is nominated
by him, the mother takes his place as natural guardian of 
2the children • But where both the parents are dead, a guardian
of the person and a curator of the property of a minor will
be appointed by the District Court as provided under the
provisions of sections 582-587 of the Civi Procedure Code 
3of 1889 • The courts of Sri Lanka have not made any departure
from the Roman-Dutch law principle that the mother is the
. . 4guardian of her illegitimate children . When m  Ran Manika
5v. Paynter a boy of thirteen years old was taken away from
the custody of the mother by the putative father with whom
the mother lived as a mistress and never married, Drieberg,
J., gave the custody of the boy to his mother who is also
recognised under English law to be entitled to the custody
6of an illegitimate child •
1 (1968) 73 NLR 20,,21.
2 Ramalinqam Chettiar v. Mohamed Adjwad (1938) 41 NLR 49, 53;
Arunasalam Chettiar v. Muruqappa Chettiar (1954) 57 NLR 21, 23.
3 See supra, 550-551.
4 Lee, Roman-Dutch law, 37.
5 (1932) 34 NLR 127.
6 Bromley, Family law (4th ed., 1971), 271.
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5.2.2. Guardianship of property
5.2.2.1. Alienation by guardians under Roman-Dutch law
As said earlier under Roman-Dutch law a guardian was 
both the custodian of the person and property of a minor; 
and he could deal with the minor's movable property, but 
not with immovable property unless he was permitted by the 
court to deal with it. If an alienation of immovable property 
was effected by him without the permission of the court 
it became ipso jure null and void; so also if the permission 
was obtained by fraud. The remedies of a minor in respect 
of an unauthorised alienation of his property were two1, 
viz., (l) he had actio tutelae directa against the tutor, 
and (2) he could vindicate the property against the alienee 
together with all fruits, where the defendant's possession 
was mala fide, but where it was bona fide together with 
fruits existing only at the time when the action was brought. 
If, however, the purchase money was received and applied 
to the minor's use or benefit, it should be refunded with 
interest as a condition precedent of the return of the 
property. On attaining full age a minor could ratify an 
alienation void ab initio. Such ratification could be 
either express or implied. In Roman-Dutch law even after 
ratification a transaction could be rescinded by the minor 
on the ground of laesio enormis, i.e., on the ground of 
the contract being onerous, or the price paid being inade­
quate .
1 Lee, Roman-Dutch law, 108-109.
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5*2.2*2* Alienation by guardians under the lav of Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka the powers and responsibilities of a 
court as the traditional upper guardian of minors under 
Roman-Dutch law have received statutory recognition in 
section 69(1) of the Courts Ordinance of 1889 whereby every 
District Court is entrusted with the care and management 
of a minor's estate situated within its jurisdiction1* The 
section providesi
"Every District court shall have the care and custody 
of the persons and estates of all idiots and persons 
of unsound mind and others of insane and non-insane 
mind resident within its district, with full power 
to appoint guardians and curators of all such 
persons and their estates, and to make order for 
the maintenance of such persons and the proper 
management of their estates, and to take proper 
securities for such management from such guardians 
and curators, and to call them to account, and to 
charge them with any balance which may be due to 
any such persons as aforesaid, or to their estates, 
and to enforce the payment thereof, and to take 
order for the secure investment of any such balances; 
and such guardians and curators from time to time 
to remove and replace as occasion may require*
Also in the like manner, and with the same 
powers, the care of the persons of minors and wards 
and the charge of their property within its district 
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the District 
court"•
As seen earlier chapter 40 of the Civil Procedure Code 
of 1889 provides for the appointment of curators to take 
charge of such property under the general supervision of 
the court* But no express provision is made for granting 
authority to a curator to sell or alienate a minor's property; 
it has always been assumed that such authority would be given
1 Fernando v. Fernando (1968) 72 NLR 174.
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subject to well established limitations in appropriate 
cases* In fact, the Civil Procedure Code recognises and
does not limit the powers conferred on guardians by Roman-
1 2 Dutch law • Gratiaen, J., in Cassaly v* Buhary quoting
from the judgment of Cayley , J., in Re Hider, ex parte
3
Corbet observed t
"When an application is made by a curator for 
sanction to sell or encumber property belonging 
to a minor, 'there should be a decree ... the 
minor being represented by a guardian-ad-litem 
for the purpose* The facts should then be especi­
ally adjudicated upon, and a formal order entered*
There must in fact be, as laid down in Voet 27|9*6, 
a causae coqnitio, a probatio. and a deereturn*•
The Court, before sanctioning a sale of property 
which is already vested in the minor, must be 
satisfied on proper material that the proposed 
transaction is 'manifestly to his advantage*".
4
Under the Civil Procedure Code the curators are allowed
to deal with the minors* immovable property, if they do it
5 . . . .  6with the sanction of a court of competent jurisdiction •
Since in Sri Lanka a curator appointed under the Civil
Procedure Code is different from a Roman-Dutch guardian, a
natural, testamentary or court appointed guardian cannot
alienate or encumber the property of a minor unless he has
been appointed a curator by the court. On the death of the
1 Pereira, Laws of Ceylon, 193.
2 (1956) 58 NLR 78, 81.
3 (1876) 3 SCC 46. The relevant portion from the judgment 
of this case was also quoted in Mudiyanse v. Pemawathie 
(1962) 64 NLR 542, 545.
4 Under the Bengal Minors Act 40 of 1858 and the Bombay Minors 
Act 20 of 1864 a person in charge of the management of a 
minor's property was called a manager, and a person in charge 
of the minor's person, a guardian.
5 Mana Perera v. Perera Appuhamy (1895) 1 NLR 140.
6 Mustapha Lebbe v. Martinus (1903) 6 NLR 364} Giriqorishamy 
v. Lebbe Marikar (1928) 30 NLR 209.
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father, the mother also cannot deal with her minor children's 
property, if she does not obtain a certificate of curator­
ship from the court*.
In issuing a certificate of curatorship the court can­
not authorise the sale of a minor's future contingent interest 
in property. If there are unborn potential beneficiaries 
to whom the property or some interest in it could on a 
certain contingency pass in due course, a stricter test 
than usual must be satisfied. Where an unborn person is 
involved the authority to sell his future contingent interest 
cannot validly be granted by the court unless the benefit 
to the immediate and known beneficiaries is overwhelming
as compared with any possible detriment to the unknown ultimate 
2beneficiaries • Indeed only an alienation on the ground of 
extreme necessity would be justified.
When a curator applies to the court for permission 
to sell a minor's property, the court may grant him a certifi­
cate (l) when the sale is necessary for the payment of debts,
(2) when it is for the maintenance of the minor, or (3) when
3it is clearly for the benefit of the minor • Thus where A 
transferred certain immovable property to the children of 
Mr. and Mrs. B by a deed of gift and empowered Mrs. B to 
sell it, if necessary for the benefit of the children, and 
invest the proceeds in the purchase of another property, or
1 Lebbe v. Christie (1915) 18 NLR 353 (FB)•
2 Cassaly v. Buhary (1956) 58 NLR 78, 81-82.
3 Mustapha Lebbe v. Martinus (1903) 6 NLR 364.
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deposit the same in a bank in favour of the children. When 
Mrs. B sold the property and spent the money, the court 
held that the sale was void as it was done without the 
previous sanction of the court whose duty it was to see 
that fair price was paid and that the sale was manifestly 
for the advantage of the minor1. So also where a guardian 
mortgaged the property of two minors for the purpose of 
raising money to meet the expenses of the minors as directed 
by the deed of gift under which the property was donated 
to the minors, the court held that the mortgage was void,
2for it was done without the previous sanction of the court • 
Again, unless made under the sanction of the court, a natural 
or a court appointed guardian cannot grant a lease of a
o , 4
minor’s property . If he does, it would be void .
The natural guardian of a minor of tender years cannot
even compel the minor's debtors to pay the money due to the
5minor, unless he is appointed as curator by the court . In
0
Manickam Chettier v. Muruqappa Chettier , Basnayake, C.J., 
observed that Voet used to say that a father or a mother 
was not ipso jure guardian unless he or she was so assigned 
by the 'last will of the deceased spouse or of some stranger', 
and that unless they were confirmed by a magistrate they
1 Mustapha Lebbe v. Martinus (1903) 6 NLR 364.
2 Giriqorishamy v. Lebbe Marikar (1928) 30 NLR 209,
3 Lebbe v. Christie (1915) 18 NLR 353 (FB).
4 Perera v. Perera (1902) Brown 150.
5 Arunasalam Chettiar v. Muruqappa Chettiar (1954) 57 NLR 21.
6 (1957) 60 NLR 385.
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could not exercise legal guardianship over their children's 
property. It is yet to be seen how much a parent can take 
the cover of neqotiorum qestio which is still in use in 
the courts of Sri Lanka. If the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka 
can find a neqotiorum qestio situation in a case where a 
person pays off the debts of another, why can a parent or 
a guardian who deals with a minor's property demonstrably 
advantageous to the minor, and not in 'bad faith and with 
intention of furthering his own interests', not bind the 
minor? In Atukorale v. Atukorale1 Samerwickrame, J., observes 
that if a person pays off a debt of a third party with the 
knowledge and consent or acquiescence of that party, he acts 
upon a mandate from him and is thereby entitled to recover 
the money paid as upon a contract! but if he does so without 
such knowledge or consent, the debtor acts by way of a 
neqotiorum qestioi and if the third party brings an action 
as neqotiorum gestor. he is normally required to show that 
he acted with the intent of serving the interests of the 
debtor. The learned judge further observes that the scope 
of the action may be extended on equitable grounds to a 
gestor who intervened in bad faith and with intention of 
furthering his own interests, and in such a case his claim 
against the debtor is limited to the extent to which the 
debtor has been enriched.
1 (1971) 71 NLR 369, 374. The case may well be compared 
with the English case G (A) v. G (T) (1970) 3 All ER 546 
(CA) where the parent of minor made some payments on 
behalf of the minor, and Lord Denning, M.R., held that 
a disposition by an agent for a minor was voidable and 
the minor would be bound by it unless avoided within a 
reasonable time after attaining majority.
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If a curator alienates a minor's property without 
the permission of the court, the alienation becomes ipso 
jure void; and the minor may avoid such a transaction either 
by restitutio in integrum or by a vindicatory action. In 
Cassaly v. Buhary1 Gratiaen and Gunasekara, JJ., held that 
under a void transaction the minor was entitled on attaining 
majority to vindicate his title to the property.
2The following principles are set out in Sande and
Voet i^
"If the immovable property of a pupil, minor, or 
madman, or that movable property which can be 
safely kept, is sold without good grounds for 
alienation, and without an order of court, the 
alienation is ipso jure void, nor does the dominum 
pass from the pupil or minor".
(Sande 1.1.79)
"A pupil or minor, whose landed property has been 
alienated in spite of a prohibition, retains an 
actio in rem. that is, a vindication, which he 
can maintain not only against the purchaser, but 
also against any third person who has possession". 
(Sande 1.1.80)
"It seems unquestionable that restitution would 
not be necessary to a minor, but that the ordinary 
vindicatory action could be brought against the 
purchaser as possessor, because no one's property 
can be transferred to another by someone else at 
his pleasure".
(Voet 4.4.16)
The above principles were approved by the South African
4
court in Breytenbach v. Frankel where Solomon, J., after 
quoting them observed*
"And the distinction drawn by Voet and Sande between 
the two actions is a matter of substance, and not
1 (1956) 58 NLR 78, 81.
2 Johan Van Den Sande, Treatise upon Restraints upon Aliena­
tion of Things [Tr. by W.S. Webber (Juta, Cape Town, 1892)"], 
41-42 *
3 Johannes Voet, The Selective Voet being the commentary on 
the Pandects [Tr. by Percival Gane (Durban* 1955) in 8 VolsJ, 
666.
4 (1913) SALR 390, 400 (AD).
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merely of form. For where the vindicatory action 
lies, the minor is entitled to succeed on mere 
proof that his property was alienated by his 
guardian without the sanction of the court? 
whereas ... if the action is one for restitutio 
in integrum, the onus lies on the minor to prove 
damage. We were referred to authorities to the 
effect that it is necessary for a minor to come 
to the court for restitution in cases where his 
guardian has entered into contracts on his behalf. 
But in my opinion, those authorities apply to 
contracts only, and have no reference to the case 
of an alienation of immovable property. Such an 
alienation is dealt with on entirely different 
lines, and, as I have pointed out, there is a 
great mass of authority to the effect that such 
an alienation is of no effect, and that there is 
no necessity, therefore, for the minor to apply 
for restitution”.
The courts of Sri Lanka approved the decision in
Bretenbach's case and followed the authorities of Sande
1 . 2 and Voet m  Cassaly v. Buhary and Mudiyanse v. Pemawathie .
6. Law of prescription in Sri Lanka
Quite different from the law of limitation of India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka has the law of prescrip­
tion. In chapter 5 we have seen the conceptual difference 
and functional unity between the two terms 'limitation' and 
'prescription'. The law of prescription of Sri Lanka is 
contained in Ordinance 22 of 1871 as amended by Ordinance 2
3of 1889? and the Ordinance 22 of 1871 is based on English law .
Section 3 of the said Ordinance provides that lands or
immovable property could be acquired by an uninterrupted
adverse possession of ten years. The section runs as followsi
"Proof of the undisturbed and uninterrupted possess­
ion by a defendant in any action, or by those under
1 (1956) 58 NLR 78, 81.
2 (1962) 64 NLR 542, 547.
3 Emanis v. Sadappu (1896) 2 NLR 261, 268-69 (FB).
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whom he claims, of lands or immovable property, 
by a title adverse to or independent of that of 
the claimant or plaintiff in such action (that 
is to say, a possession unaccompanied by payment 
of rent or produce, or performance of service or 
duty, or by any other act by the possessor, from 
which an acknowledgement of a right existing in 
another person would fairly and naturally be infer­
red) for ten years previous to the bringing of 
such action, shall entitle the defendant to a 
decree in his favour with costs. And in like man­
ner, when any plaintiff shall bring his action, 
or any third party shall intervene in any action 
for the purpose of being quieted in his possession 
of lands or other immovable property, or to prevent 
encroachment or usurpation thereof, or to establish 
his claim in any other manner to such land or other 
property, proof of such undisturbed and uninterrupted 
possession as herein before explained, by such 
plaintiff or intervenient, or by those under whom 
he claims, shall entitle such plaintiff or inter­
venient to a decree in his favour with costsf
Provided that the said period of ten years 
shall only begin to run against parties claiming 
estates in remainder or reversion from the time 
when the parties so claiming acquired a right of 
possession to the property in dispute”.
Section 4 provides that if a person is dispossessed 
of any immovable property he must bring an action for the 
recovery of that property within one year from the date 
of such dispossession. The section states*
”It shall be lawful for any person who shall have 
been dispossessed of any immovable property 
otherwise than by process of law, to institute 
proceedings against the person dispossessing him 
at any time within one year of such dispossession.
And on proof of such dispossession within one 
year before action brought, the plaintiff in such 
action shall be entitled to a decree against the 
defendant for the restoration of such possession 
without proof of title*
Provided that nothing herein contained shall 
be held to affect the other requirements of the 
law as respects possessory cases”.
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But section 13 of the Ordinance provides that time 
would not run against a minor until he attains the age of 
majority. The section runs as follows*
"Provided nevertheless, that if at the time when 
the right of any person to sue for recovery of 
any immovable property shall have first accrued, 
such person shall have been under any of the 
disabilities hereinafter mentioned, that is to 
s a y --
(a) infancy,
(b) idiocy,
(c) unsoundness of mind,
(d) lunacy, or
(e) absence beyond the seas,
then and so long as such disability shall continue 
the possession of such immovable property by any 
other person shall not be taken as giving such 
person any right or title to the said immovable 
property, as against the person subject to such 
disability or those claiming under him, but the 
period of ten years required by section 3 of this 
Ordinance shall commence to be reckoned from the 
death of such last-named person, or from the ter­
mination of such disability, whichever first shall 
happen; but no further time shall be allowed in 
respect of the disabilities of any other person;
Provided also that the adverse and undisturbed 
possession for thirty years of any immovable pro­
perty by any person claiming the same, or by those 
under whom he claims, shall be taken as conclusive 
proof of title in manner provided by section 3 of 
this Ordinance, notwithstanding the disability 
of any adverse claimant"•
It is to be noticed that under the limitation law of 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh if the person entitled to 
institute a suit against the adverse possessor is, at the 
time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, 
affected by a disability^he may institute the suit within 
the same period after the disability has ceased'*'; or if he
1 Section 6(1) of Limitation Act 9 of 1908, and Limitation 
Act 36 of 1963.
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is, at the time from which the period of limitation is 
to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or if 
before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another 
disability, he may institute the suit within the same 
period after both the disabilities have ceased1; or if 
the disability continues up to his death, his legal repre­
sentative may institute the suit within the same period
after the death as would otherwise have been allowed from
2the time so prescribed ; or if the legal representative 
himself is, at the date of the death of the person whom 
he represents, affected by any such disability or disabili­
ties, he, or if he dies in disability, his legal represen­
tative, may, in the repetition of the same process as stated 
above, institute the suit within the same period as would 
have been allowed to him whom he represents or as would
have been allowed to him in the case of the death of the
3person whom he represents • In this way the right to sue 
may continue for an indefinite period of time, and no title 
is created by adverse possession, since that person or his 
legal representative may establish his title in defence 
long after the expiration of the statutory period of adverse 
possession. But the Prescription Ordinance of Sri Lanka has 
specifically provided that after an adverse and undisturbed 
possession for thirty years an absolute title would be
1 Section 6(2) of the Limitation Act 9 of 1908, and Limitation 
Act 36 of 1963.
2 Section 6(3).
3 Section 6(4).
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created in favour of the adverse possessor.
In Sri Lanka a minor is deemed to have attained the 
age of majority when he completes twenty-one years of age^;
2and time does not run against him until he attains majority,. 
Therefore where his property is adversely possessed by 
others or where he is dispossessed of his property by others, 
time will start running against him only when he has completed 
twenty-one years. He must bring an action against the adverse 
possessor within ten years, or against the person who ousts 
him from possession within one year from the date on which 
he completes twenty-one years. It is to be observed that in 
the case of dispossession no proof of title is necessary. 
Therefore where a minor is dispossessed of a property, he 
can bring the action for possession even if he makes no title 
to the said property.
An improper alienation of a minor’s property by his 
curator or property guardian is regarded as void, and not 
voidable as in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. But unlike 
the void alienation of these three countries, the minor in 
Sri Lanka is required to avoid the void transaction, other­
wise it may be treated as ratified. Under the Roman-Dutch 
law a void alienation may be tacitly confirmed by an implied
ratification as it were, if the minor has not raised any
. . . . 3protest within five years after attaining majority . But
1 Age of Majority Ordinance (Ordinance 7) of 1865, sec. 2.
2 Lee, Roman-Dutch law, 143; Tambiah, Principles, 276.
3 Sande 1.1.88; Johan Van Den Sande, Treatise upon Restraints, 
44-45.
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the Prescription Ordinance of Sri Lanka does not contain 
any specific provision which provides for the avoidance 
of a void alienation. However, section 10 of the Ordinance 
is a residuary section; and it may be resorted to for 
the purpose. The section providesi
"No action shall be maintainable in respect of any 
cause of action not herein before expressly 
provided for, or expressly exempted from the 
operation of this Ordinance, unless the same shall 
be commenced within three years from the time 
when such cause of action shall have accrued” .
The minor whose property is improperly alienated by 
the curator is therefore required to bring a vindicatory 
action1 to avoid the alienation within three years from 
the date on which he attains majority. It has a strange 
similarity with the period of time required to avoid a 
voidable alienation in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
1 Cassaly v. Buhary (1956) 58 NLR 78.
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C O N  C L U S I 0 N
Minors* welfare is the hardcore of the law of guardian­
ship; and for the achievement of this welfare developed 
states are very careful about their parental duty to the 
minors in proper cases as and when the state functionaries 
are approached. To cope with the changed social needs and 
circumstances, to protect the minors and their properties 
against economic inflation and decaying moral values new 
legislation is passed from time to time. But when one looks 
at the guardianship law of the Subcontinent one would be 
shocked to find antiguated laws obtaining there. It is not 
that society is not changing there; there is a lack of 
initiative, a disregard to minors* interests and selfish, 
unprogressive attitude on the part of the general public. 
Derrett observes^":
’’The law relating to guardianship is antiguated 
in shape, if not always in spirit. It is essen­
tially conservative and restrictive. It is, like 
the Old India, very conscious of fraud, peculation, 
corruption. ..• The sense of family is acute in 
India and Pakistan, and the love of children 
ubiguitous. But the Old India, with its caste, class, 
religious and other differences, has not got to 
grips with guardianship law, and this remains 
in need of urgent overhaul. As long as one is 
inspecting Hindu law, or Muslim law, this need 
is not so apparent. It is when one takes up the 
group of personal laws ... that one realises how 
antiguated the system is, and how ill adapted 
(as a whole) to the needs of a fast growing and 
developing nation**.
1 Derrett, 'Minority in the Indian Subcontinent', in (1975) 
35 L'Enfant, Recueils de la societe Jean Bodin, 395-457, 
3967 —
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In the Subcontinent the guardianship cases that come 
up are mostly regarding the alienation of properties of 
minors, involving primarily three factors, viz., first, 
the welfare of the minors by the preservation of their 
properties, secondly, the extent of the recognised and 
lawful authority of their guardians to alienate properties, 
and lastly, the protection of the interests of innocent 
purchasers of such properties. The correct balancing of 
these three factors is par excellence the function of the 
judges. The position of the latter is indeed very delicate. 
If they fail in their duties, injustice would be caused 
either to the minor or the alienee, rather than to the
ifguardian, who deals with minors property but seldom bears 
the effects of his dealing. In their endeavour to ascertain 
the balance the judges are guided either by the personal 
law of the minors or the statutory law as the situation 
demands. The law gives the guidelines and not the solution; 
it is the duty of the judges to mould the law justly to 
solve particular problems. But in so doing they must not 
be unjustly favourable to one party at the expense of the 
other. Unconscious bias, arising out of a priori notions 
regarding guardians, for example, must be exposed, or that 
balance may be prejudiced.
The guardianship Acts of the Subcontinent do contain 
provisions for the welfare of the minors but they do not 
contain any provision for safeguarding the interests of
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alienees from guardians; that does not, however, indicate 
that only the interests of the minors should be protected 
and not those of the alienees. In the ultimate analysis, 
in the matter of alienation of minors* properties the 
interests of minors and alienees are so interdependent 
that one cannot thrive at the cost of the other. Therefore, 
in deciding cases involving alienations of minors* pro­
perties the judges should take into consideration the 
interests of both minors and alienees. In fact the consi­
deration of these interests arises when the validity of a 
guardian's alienation is challenged by the minor on attain­
ing majority. In Hindu law the validity of a guardian's 
alienation was determined by the application of the twin 
principles of Hunoomanpersaud's case  ^and this worked very 
well till the passing of the HMGA.
The HMGA requires the natural guardians to take the
previous permission of the court for the alienation of a
2minor's separate immovable property ; and if they do not
take any such permission, the alienation would be voidable
requiring to be set aside at the instance of the minor or
persons claiming under him. Section 11 of the Act is said
to have abolished de facto guardianship, and therefore
. 3  .renders, as the courts are interpreting it , all alienations
1 See supra, 87, 150, 182.
2 See supra, 244-245.
3 See supra, 332-334, 336.
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effected by de facto guardians void. This has, what Derrett 
calls1, ''the unfortunate effect that even in the most 
deserving and proper cases of alienation, and even where 
the minor’s needs are most pressing, no action will bind 
the minor unless the de facto guardian is first appointed 
by the court and the transaction is either specifically 
authorised or falls within the appropriate powers apper­
taining to this form of guardianship”.
It may not be unlikely that Parliament was conscious 
about the dishonest practices of de facto guardians to 
make away with the minors' properties under the cover of 
minors' necessity or benefit, and this led them to insert 
section 11 to protect the property of the minors. But it 
cannot be denied that the needs and problems that once 
caused the growth of the institution of de facto guardianship 
are still there; for the last century and a quarter it has 
proved its utility to society. The present state of Hindu 
society and the pattern of judicial administration obtain­
ing in the Subcontinent do not at all favour the abolition 
of de facto guardianship. The considerable inconvenience 
and expense in the appointment of guardians would not 
encourage well-meaning relatives or friends of a minor to 
seek appointment to deal with the minor's property as 
Parliament apparently expects. Therefore the interests of
1 Critique, 175 para 224.
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minors would suffer most, since the would-be alienees would 
shut their doors to them. On the alleged abolition of de 
facto guardianship the equitable rule of Hunoomanpersaud's 
case, that a bona fide purchaser for value from a de facto 
guardian would not suffer for want of title in the guardian, 
cannot survive. Even in the case of natural guardians this 
principle has failed to survive under the HMGA. Since even 
the natural guardians are required to get the prior permission 
of the court for every major alienation of their minor 
children's property, the right of bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice would no longer remain as such if the 
alienation was effected without such permission. This would 
also affect the interests of the minors.
In this state of affairs it was not wise to read the 
section as abolishing de facto guardianship. It is seen 
from the observation of different commentators of the 
section1 that the usefulness of de facto guardianship is 
felt in everyday life. The de facto guardians should be 
allowed to enjoy the same powers as they used to do under 
Anglo- Hindu law. But as long as section 11 in its present 
form is there,the over-enthusiastic judges would interpret 
it as having abolished de facto guardianship. Therefore 
section 11 of the HMGA needs urgently to be amended to 
enable (i) de facto guardians to have powers similar to
1 See supra, 322-332.
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those of natural guardians as far as they are conformable 
to the requirements of de facto guardianship as under 
Anglo-Hindu law; and (ii) alienees from de facto and 
natural guardians to take advantage of the equitable rule 
in Hunoomanpersaud' s case.
When section 11 of the HMGA has been amended in 
accordance with the suggestions made above, the Anglo-Hindu 
law view about the improper alienation of a de facto 
guardian and the difference that was maintained in this 
respect between the improper alienation of a de jure 
quardian and that of a de facto guardian would be required 
to be removed. It is seen that following the Privy Council 
decisions in Muslim cases, where the idea about, alienating 
authority of a de facto guardian is quite contrary to Hindu 
law, the courts were holding the improper alienations 
of Hindu de facto guardians as void, although the Hindu 
de facto guardians are not 'unauthorised persons' like 
Muslim de facto guardians. The difference between the 
improper alienation of a legal guardian and that of a de 
facto guardian was purely artificial and had no connection 
with the actual state of affairs. Both kinds of improper 
alienations should be treated as voidable, and not the one 
void and the other voidable, and a suit must be filed for 
avoiding each of them.
Completely new as compared with the Limitation Act 
of 1908, Article 60(b) [India] Limitation Act of 1963
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provides that the legal representatives of a minor may 
sue to set aside the transfer made by the guardian within 
three years of the ward's attaining majority where the 
ward dies within those three years, and where the ward 
dies before attaining majority within three years from 
the date of the ward's death. Under the personal law this 
applies only when a guardian's alienation is voidable and 
the suit is to set aside that alienation1. If a de facto 
guardian's improper alienation is considered voidable it 
would fit squarely with the provisions of the above Article 
of the Limitation Act. Moreover the provisions of the Article 
agree fairly with provisions of section 8(3) of the HMGA. 
Indeed when the improper alienations of de facto guardians 
are regarded as voidable there would be a harmony between 
the personal and the limitation law, and a desirable unifor­
mity between the incidents of natural and de facto guardian­
ship in Hindu law. It will also add some security to the 
lives of minors; no more wicked uncles would be benefited 
by tipping the minors down wells, since the persons claim­
ing under them (minors) may include the transferees from 
2them and they may avoid the guardians' improper alienations. 
This needs only a Supreme Court ruling. The Indian Supreme 
Court is expected to give a decision in the light of discus­
sion made in this thesis.
1 Derrett, Critique, 191, para 243.
2 Amirtham Kudumban v. Sornam Kudumban (1977) 1 MLJ 1 (FB).
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Again, section 8(2) of the HMGA requiring a guardian
to obtain the prior permission of the court for the
alienation of a minor's property presents a problem in
the case of a joint family consisting of the minor and
his mother, if the minor's interest in the joint family
property is required to be transferred. The mother cannot
sell the minor's interest as she is not the manager and
she cannot be such as she is not a coparcener; nor can
she sell as the natural guardian because the court, other
than the Original side of some High Courts, having no
jurisdiction over the undivided interests of a minor under
section 6 of the HMGA, cannot give her permission for sale^.
In such a case either the court should be given jurisdiction
over the undivided interest of the minor in joint family
property by amending the section 6, or the mother should
be considered a manager to be able to alienate the minor's
interest in the joint family property. Of the two solutions
the latter is more welcome, since it can be achieved by a
Supreme Court ruling overruling its obiter dictum in
2Commissioner of I.T. v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills . The 
decision of the said Supreme Court should therefore be 
overruled.
In Muslim law the mother is not considered as the 
natural guardian of her minor children; she may be entrusted
1 See supra. 248-249.
2 AIR 1966 SC 24.
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with the person of her minor children but not with their 
property because according to Muslim authorities she being 
a woman cannot exercise 'discretion* properly1. Such a 
notion about women should hardly be a matter of law in 
this day and age. In the modern world given egual opportu­
nities they could prove equal to men. In the present developed 
society with its nuclear families the mother should be con­
sidered as the natural guardian of her minor children with 
power to deal with the minors' movable and immovable pro­
perties. She should be given full powers of a father; and 
her guardianship should be recognised next after the father. 
The authority of a de facto guardian to alienate the property 
of a minor is also not yet recognised in Muslim law even 
in the case of extreme necessity or benefit of the minor.
This situation resulted from the Privy Council ruling in
2Imambandi v. Mutsaddi ; but prior to this ruling a de facto
guardian's authority to deal with a minor's property was
not altogether denied; in cases of extreme necessity and
3for the benefit of the minor it was allowed . Unusually 
identifying Muslim fuzuli contract with law of agency their 
Lordships came to their finding, while fuzuli contract is 
a Muslim counterpart of Roman negotiorum gestio and under 
it a stranger can act for the benefit of another. The Muslim 
authorities which were mainly relied on in that case do 
not say anything directly against de facto guardianship;
1 See supra, 413.
2 (1918) 23 CWN 50 (PC).
3 See supra, 396-400.
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it was the assumption of their Lordships from those authori­
ties merely. The grounds which inspired the growth of de 
facto guardianship among the Hindus are also there in the 
case of the Muslims. In the absence of any direct authority 
in support of the Privy Council decision and there being 
constant cases for the denial of power to de facto guardians, 
the said Privy Council decision should be reconsidered in 
the light of present needs and circumstances. Therefore 
Muslim mothers should be given the status of natural 
guardians with power to deal with their minor children’s 
property and also de facto guardians' authority to deal 
with the minors' properties should be recognised. Supreme 
Courts of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh should give rulings 
in this direction in proper cases.
The courts of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh should 
understand the ruling of Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed1 
in the light of the discussion made in this thesis. They 
should no more hold that it is not within the competence 
of the guardian of a minor to bind the minor's estate by a 
contract for the purchase of immovable property. Through 
the wrong understanding of the decision in the above Privy 
Council case the courts of the Subcontinent have developed 
the precedent that a minor's guardian has no authority to 
bind the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of
1 (1911) 39 IA 1 (PC).
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lands, and that no contract can be specifically enforced 
against the minor’s estate. If a guardian is otherwise 
competent and if it is beneficial to the minor, he can, 
in my submission, enter into a contract for the purchase 
of lands and such contract may be specifically enforced 
against the minor's property. There is hardly any necessity 
to distinguish this case as a Muslim case. What the Privy 
Council said in that case about the existence of mutuality 
in a guardian's contract was not properly understood by 
the courts. The Supreme Courts of India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh should give rulings in the light of the sugges­
tions made here.
In the appointment of guardians the courts of different 
countries should be careful not to appoint the same person 
as the guardian of a minor's person and of his property if 
that person is a prospective heir to the minor's property. 
Here a useful provision of Islamic law can be adopted with 
advantage for all communities. The legislatures may review 
the age of majority to bring it down to eighteen years of 
age in all cases.
In Sri Lanka under the general law a natural guardian 
of a minor cannot deal with the minor's property unless he 
is appointed a curator by the court, anf if he acts without 
appointment his act would be ipso jure void. But if a 
stranger acts as a negotiorum qestor for a.third party, 
his act may be upheld if it is done in good faith and for
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the benefit or advantage of the third party1. The Supreme 
Court of Sri Lanka may consider if the institution of 
negotiorum gestio could be introduced in the case of a 
guardian's dealings with his minor ward's property
It is hoped that the problems which arise in the 
family laws of South Asian countries, which are highlighted 
in this thesis, would attract the attention of the concerned 
countries and they may try to solve them, in the light 
of the suggestions made here, either by legislation or by 
judicial development of the relevant laws as appropriate.
1 Atukorale v, Atukorale (1971) 71 NLR 369, 374.
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